

## **States and Political Cultures in Latin America**

In this text I am trying to point at the opportunity opening before the researchers of the state by the possibility of explaining it further through discussions of political culture or, to be more precise: its various concepts and their links to the notion of the state. Thus it is not the political culture; indeed it is the state as an organisation (and simultaneously, an institution) that is the basic subject of my interest. After all, the condition of the state is not only the subject of my essay, but also of the entire volume. And yet, what is discussed here most extensively is the political culture, as I refer to the pertaining literature as if I treated the collection of the works listed below and the concepts discussed in them as a toolbox with measuring instruments and results of such measurements performed on the state. Therefore I begin with my own definition of the notion of political culture, and later use it while making a concise review of literature on that concept to grasp such aspects of the connection between the state and the political culture as public discourse, policy-making, democratisation, and collective (national) identity in the state. Yet as the road to a theory is still long, I prefer to use "states" and "political cultures" in plural to emphasise the diversity of the processes and phenomena involved. Such discussions – not always brought to a definite conclusion – are to provide some more food for thought about the nation-states in Latin America.

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### **The concept of political culture**

Political culture is the union (not a unity) of culture and politics, but it is a special relationship. Its content must be sought in the cultural and the political.

I use the notion of the cultural, to define the capacities of an individual and a collective to build their identities as an individual and as a community. This process begins at the level of a family and goes on up to the level of the community in which a person defines her/his position owing to the individuation of her/his identity. It was so in the earliest history of social mankind, and it is so now. Quite naturally, the individual always defines himself or herself in social relations, that is in interactions with other individuals. Yet not only individuals. Also with other groups i.e. communities. The existence of these communities, on the other hand, is the result of the organisation of individuals. The propensity to such a self-organisation is what I define as the political, if the composition of the group goes beyond the family, even a multigenerational one. Currently, the highest organisational form of the group – of a community or society – is the state. Yet as the state undergoes transformations as well, one has the liberty to consider that, like the cultural is permanently present in the continuous process of shaping and transformation of individual and collective identity, the political is a permanent feature of human social existence.

The collective identity of a society organised within a state assumes various forms as a civic society and political nation. It is, however, especially connected to the political through norms and ideologies. A certain particular set of such norms builds the institution of the state. A certain particular type of ideology is patriotism and nationalism. These norms and ideologies operate in the consciousness of citizens of the state. This means that the notion of the state is to embrace both the institution and also its elements being the population with its collective identity and the territory of the state. For this reason, the state is only partially available to sensory perception. What is available and created intellectually – and includes norms and ideologies – assumes among other forms that of political culture.

Political culture is a set of forms of social consciousness, that is widespread and respected beliefs, operating with relative stability (also as new elements yet equipped with the features of potential stability) in the process of political self-organisation of a society as defined by the cultural. As the institution of the state is a specific result of this self-organisation, and such self-organisation may also mean reforming an existing state, therefore, **the political culture of a society in a given state and time is the set of widespread and relatively stable and respected beliefs (a) related to the identity of the society as a political nation that is the constitutionally defined sovereign, (b) expressed in public discourse, and (c) referring to the state as the institutional correlate of that identity, and espe-**

cially to the constitutional system of policy-making. This refers *mutatis mutandis* to the community, which had the state externally imposed.

If the ethnical structure of the political nation is complex, its political culture is to a degree a function of that structure. Characteristic for the political nation is also the class and layer structure, and that is why the political culture of such a nation is composed to a certain extent of the cultures of individual social groups. A strong nation state exists when the cultural and the political are already such a state of political culture (a set of widespread and relatively stable forms of social consciousness), where the national identity of the whole population of the given state includes also fundamental acceptance of the existing statehood of the nation. Statehood requires an appropriate collective identity, yet in turn such a fundamental acceptance of statehood reinforces the collective identity of the political nation (society in the state). Potential proposals of state reforms lie within this political culture. The revolutionary project assumes a radical change of the political culture, as in itself it is a manifestation of the inconsistencies that came to being at the level of the connections between the identity of the revolutionary group and the identity of the majority of the society.

Such a concept of political culture will be helpful for me in reading literature referring to the various definitions of notions of political culture. Here I am looking for information referring to the components listed in my definition. Yet I primarily want to note down the variety of concepts present in the literature concerned.

The matter is highly complex and there are plenty of definitions of political culture. Before I embark on the diverse contemporary and most widespread varieties of the notion, I want to point at the origin of the very concept of political culture in European literature, where it appeared first. For it may be worthwhile to make references to earlier discussions that are hardly known today.

The term "political culture" itself we owe most probably to Herder. In this way, we use this nineteenth-century term, even though until the end of 1960s, "any mention of its genesis in subject literature" was lacking (Barnard 1969: 392). Possibly because the term had not become widespread until the twentieth century. Those who visit Galleria d'Arte Moderna in the Milanese Villa Reale may see "Il quarto stato", a painting by Giuseppe Pellizza da Volpedo. It presents "the fourth estate": workers on strike. Twenty-five years later, the title of the painting from 1901 became the title of a periodical: "Il quarto stato. Rivista socialista di cultura politica". It is immaterial for us how much of the

inspiration of the revolutionaries of the earlier period, representing the third state, there is in the stance of Italian socialists and republicans. It is important that socialists referred the notion of political culture to social consciousness. And to democracy, should we note that they wrote about it already after Mussolini's March on Rome (*Marcia su Roma*). Yet they were politicians. The researchers of political culture are inspired by crises. "Research on political culture is practised predominantly in the periods of rapid social change; they may be termed as a phenomenon accompanying social and political crises" (Bevc 2007: 94–95). The source of the interest in the political culture of Latin America may be similar. It is connected to the politically worrying image of a weak state, not only – and not even predominantly – in Latin America. The key is the cultural studies-related explanation of this state of such a State.

That in the twentieth century Max Weber worked on the application of the notion of culture in a research, is a known fact. Yet, if I am not mistaken, the first extensive concept of political culture in twentieth century literature is found not earlier than in the work of Józef Siemieński dating to 1930 (Siemieński 1932), i.e. it was actually written in a crisis period. Even though the text itself is devoted not to Latin America but to the Polish political culture of the sixteenth century, that is of a society with complex and yet relatively harmonised ethnical and political structure of what at the time was one of the largest European states. Professor of the Jagiellonian University, Siemieński was almost certainly familiar with the writings of Herder and Weber. He could be inspired with them in Kraków, but he never quoted the formal definition of the notion he used. We may, however, construct – or, rather, reconstruct – it to the scope that Siemieński's text allows such a practice by (a) skipping the elements pertaining specifically to sixteenth century society, yet (b) using the language of the author:

Political culture is produced by the nation (entire society or its specific stratum) and its most important and most characteristic expression is the form of government (the system of the state). The system may be endured with submission (passivity or yielding to force) or may be developed (activity in building the state; modernisation) through democracy.

Siemieński uses the following indicators of democratisation:

- (1) political consciousness of the constructor of political culture (awareness of one's own power and understanding of public matters.);
- (2) percentage of population sharing power by participating in the establishment and operation of representative bodies (organs of power), and carrying out direct democracy by participation in local general assemblies

(Siemieński referred to the *sejmiki szlacheckie*: dietines, or regional parliaments of the nobility in the sixteenth century);

- (3) equality of citizens before law and equal access to offices (positions);
- (4) political liberalism, that is guaranties of civil freedoms;
- (5) the degree of exercising civil rights, especially the guarantee of freedom;
- (6) education in legal matters; using political literature, production of such literature, publication of statute books;
- (7) discipline that is civil discipline hinging on the ability to achieve political compromise;
- (8) rule of law in relations between the organs of state authority and citizen, and between citizens;
- (9) efficiency of the organs of the state (state apparatus);
- (10) modernisation that is increasing the efficiency of own institutions (as better than the slavish imitation of the foreigners);
- (11) quality of political law (In Siemieński's Poland, the term was considered more appropriate than the German *Staatsrecht* or the French *droit constitutionnel*);
- (12) significance of eminent individuals eager to lead in a politically unorganised society, capable of managing the crowd; great significance of talented demagogues;
- (13) high level of political rhetoric;
- (14) political culture as the foundation of stability of the state, which may yield only to external violence;
- (15) research of political culture.

It is easy to notice that some indicators of political culture may be helpful in grasping the characteristic features of our contemporary culture in Latin America. Yet the historiosophic concept of Siemieński seems a category of rather intuitive and descriptive than explanatory and theoretical nature, despite the relatively high level of coherence that emerged in the process of its reconstruction.

Some indicators used by Siemieński were precursors of later concepts. What deserves emphasising is the fact that, even though in the development of his concept Siemieński accounted for the international comparative perspective, he referred the notion of political culture to a specific state, one state, and, moreover, focused on the nobility (identified with a particular understanding of the nation) in the capacity of the producer or constructor of political culture characteristic for the system of the researched state, that is the social group the political (a term unknown to Siemieński) of which is decisive for the state's system. This is why Siemieński comes to identifying the political culture with

"the culture of political life" and "the culture of the state". What is, however, striking here is Siemieński's belief that the Polish state was lost towards the end of the eighteenth century (partitioned by the neighbouring powers) mostly – or only – as a result of external force, as the system of the Polish state – according to him – favoured its stability.

We know that Ernst Cassirer, contemporary to the Polish researcher, a bit later pondered over the union or joint interface of culture and politics. Not as a historian but as a philosopher, he tied political culture to freedom, preaching the opinion that freedom is "given as a task" and not just given (*aufgegeben, nicht gegeben*). For this reason, culture may develop only in a pluralistic society, and the human being is responsible for building this culture. It is not difficult to notice that a pluralistic society may develop only as a result of democratisation, while the notion of freedom is connected to the notion of the guarantee of freedom. The position taken by Cassirer was close to that of Siemieński's, yet he most probably did not know the work of the Polish researcher.

I want to notice the position taken by the theoreticians of the Frankfurt School (Max Horkheimer, Theodor W. Adorno), being after all a current that originated while Siemieński and Cassirer were active. These theoreticians knew the Germany of the 1930s and the USA of the 1940s from the personal experience, much like Cassirer. They defined the political culture of such a society (both German national socialism and American capitalism) as a system of subjugation that needed abolishing, and preached the idea that a human being may be free, that is live without fear as the "other" (i.e., somebody who is individually defined, living his or her separate life, the alien, someone thinking differently) only in a pluralistic society. Such a society is the expression of the political culture they postulated, while the political culture itself refers to the social and economic system (capitalism) and is not limited to the conditions of the single state. What we deal here with are the requirements for pluralism, i.e. democracy, and with the postulate of freedom, as in the case of the other authors, only that these theoreticians formed their theses on political culture in the context of analysing the capitalist system, which was distinctive for them at the time.

Following Siemieński, Cassirer, and the Frankfurt School, a new attempt to make the theoretical view of political culture by European authors could be expected from the "Dizionario di cultura politica", edited by Antonio Basso connected with the anti-fascist movement, and published by Autori Associati in Milan in 1946; a book with contributions by approximately 50 authors. Yet the

dictionary does not contain the entry "political culture", and individual authors treat this category as a synonymous to the category of "politics".

The Latin American use of the notion of political culture appeared during the second world war in Brazil. Fifty issues of the magazine "Cultura Política – Revista mensal de estudos brasileiros" were edited by Almir de Andrade and published in Rio de Janeiro from March 1941 to May 1945. At that time it was the platform for the Estado Novo financed by the government. In 124 articles by 73 authors of this magazine – cheap and widely available in its days, and easily accessible via Internet today – apologetic analyses of the political ideology of Vargas's government (1937–1945) were included side by side with an array of materials from the realms of historiography, economy, law, art, information on current activity of the government, Brazil-related bibliographies, etc. The term "political culture" is not used even once in the editorial. Its use in the title of the magazine seems to be a gentle – and, in its concept, attractive, i.e. at least not repulsing the reader – all-encompassing definition of the policies of the head of the government. Yet the content of the magazine is a source for studies of political culture, and so is the article by the editor-in-chief in the last issue, where on the occasion of the birthday of the leader, President Vargas is defined as "ao constructor da mais brilhante época de nossa história" ("Cultura Política", No. 5, p. 6). The term political culture itself played an important social function, yet its content remained undefined in the magazine. This, however, might be due to my only perfunctory reading, while systematic research may yet lead to the reconstruction of the content of the title notion...

Since the latter half of the 1940s, works heralding the cultural-studies related approach to politics began to emerge, yet they operated with the categories to the like of "style of action", "operating code", "national character", etc. It was only in 1955 that Gabriel Almond announced his concept of political culture in the USA: "Every political system is embedded in a particular pattern of orientations to political action. I have found it useful to refer to this as the political culture." (Almond 1956: 396). Beer and Ulam soon used "political culture" as the central category in their comparative studies of politics (Beer and Ulam 1958), and Lucian W. Pye quoted its following definition: "Political culture is the set of attitudes, beliefs, and sentiments which give order and meaning to a political process and which provide the underlying assumptions and rules that govern behavior in the political system. It encompasses both the political ideals and the operating norms of polity. Political culture is thus the manifestation in aggregate form of the psychological and subjective dimension of politics" (Pye,

International Encyclopaedia of Social Science, 1961). We shall return to Pye's definition.

Two years later, Almond, together with Sidney Verba, used the concept of "civic culture", defining it as "specifically political orientations – attitudes towards the political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system" (Almond, Verba 1963: 17) and listing its three kinds, or rather ideal varieties, whose mix in different proportions the actual political cultures are composed of:

- parochial culture, with a political orientations are not separated from religious and social, and citizen realise the operation of the central power only to a minor degree, and conduct their lives within an enclosed sphere, independent of the decisions undertaken by the state. Example: Ottoman Empire.
- Subject culture, whether citizens are as a rule oriented on the political system, they are aware of the operation of the central power and clearly subjected to its decisions, with little potential for taking a very own (different) stands/position. Example: German Empire.
- Participant culture, which citizens can influence the central authorities, in a number of ways, which in turn has an impact on them (Almond, Verba 1963: 17–19).

Generally, therefore, this culture is manifested in orientations, and more specifically – in civic attitudes, and the research of those is the research of the "civic culture" mentioned above. This is all about civic culture – studying individual citizens and groups of people forming the family or school (considered by the authors the main institutions transferring culture). We are allowed to treat "civic culture" as political culture, yet do the denotational ranges of these notions fully overlap? After all, the authors knew the notion of political culture, and yet preferred "civic culture". Much later, they would treat these notions as synonyms, which may be considered the answer to the question asked above. They turned their attention to the fact that appropriate set of attitudes of the citizens of a given state favours stable democracy in the state. Even if the subjects are citizens of various states, the frame of reference for a specific citizen is his or her specific state. This tripartite division of "civic culture", refers to a specific state at all cases. Almond and Verba's method was based on confronting the technique of individual questionnaires with the cultural macro scale, which entailed the need to juxtapose the value of the individual human with the operation of the state system (the political system) in a cause and effect relationship, which means that it is easier in this case to point at correlations than at cause and effect relationships.



Writing, somewhat earlier (in 1959) about the functional approach to comparative studies of politics, Almond used the notion of political culture only marginally, and did not use the notion of "civic culture" at all, nonetheless putting forth a claim, which he referred also to Latin America, namely, that political culture (much like the entire political system, political structure) is dualist due to the mutual interpenetration of the modern and the pre-modern (earlier, primitive, non-Western).

He continued the application of Kenneth Jovitt's concept of modernisation in the research of the political culture of "Marxist-Leninist systems", putting forth a thesis that the relation present between the political structure and the political culture is similar to the relation between the formal and informal organisation of a production plant. As the system being the object of research made inducing a change in the political culture of the society its objective, this particular modernisation pertains to the informal organisation of the political structure that is the state. "Political culture refers to set of informal, adaptive postures – behavioral and attitudinal – that emerge in response to and interact with the set of formal definitions – ideological, policy, and institutional – that characterize a given level of society" (Jovitt 1974: 173). Such an approach limits the scope of the notion of "political culture" to the area not regulated by law, or possibly even by the customs related to the implementation of law (for example, the regulatory significance of the procedural precedents in the operation of the parliament). This is akin to the representation of the civil society by a collection of non-governmental organisations, thus being a decisively too narrow a perspective.

Embarking on an analysis of these systems (also in reference to Cuba), Almond wrote about the political culture in a manner that allowed treating his statement as the final version of his concept of political culture (Almond 1983: 127–128). What results from this is the fact that Almond not only no longer limited himself to the postulate of researching attitudes and their classification but he also paid specific attention to the degree of rooting of the forms of political culture, that is to the degree of its stability and resistance to the change as such.

Pye, already quoted above, modified his own definition and wrote in 1993: "Involving both the ideals and the operating norms of political system, political culture includes subjective attitudes and sentiments as well as objective symbols and creeds that together govern political behavior and give structure and order to the political process. Nations generally have both elite and mass political cultures, along with further subcultures that are rooted in regional, occupational, class, ethnic, and other differences" (Pye 1993).

There is no entry for "political culture" in *The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Thought* of 1989, revised in 1991 and frequently republished later, edited by Oxford philosophers of politics: David Miller and Janet Coleman, William Connolly, Alan Ryan (Miller 1994).

It is interesting that the second edition of the "Dictionnaire de la science politique et des institutions politiques" (1996), a very important publication as it does not bring up the definition of political culture even though it provides the characteristics of politics and culture. Nevertheless, French sociology has known the view that the political culture "*est constituée d'un ensemble de connaissances et de croyances permettent aux individus de donner sens à l'expérience routinière de leur rapports au pouvoir qui les gouverne et aux groupes qui leur servent de références identitaires. Elle permet donc à chacun de se situer dans l'espace complexe du politique en mobilisant un minimum de repères, conscients ou non, pour leur guider dans ses comportements: ceux de citoyen par exemple ou ceux d'électeur, de contribuable etc.*" (Braud 1998: 212). At the same time the French manual for students and candidates for civil servants approaches political culture most pragmatically, implying by the way a definition of the state that is hard to accept: "*La culture politique vise le phénomène politique dont le centre aujourd'hui est la relation entre l'Etat ou les gouvernants et les gouvernés*" (Lageot, Pavegeau 2008: 8).

In turn, the new (2006) and popular German manual, whose authors declare their acceptance for the concept of Almond and Verba's, is built on the claim that "*Ziel der vergleichenden politischen Kulturforschung war und ist die Erklärung der Stabilität oder besser des Ueberlebens von Demokratie*" (Pickel, Pickel 2006: 144).

I have found a multifaceted discussion of the notion of the ties between politics and culture in the second edition of Jan-Erik Lane and Svante Ersson's "Culture and Politics: A Comparative Approach" (2005). The authors account for such analytical categories as social structure, ethnicity, historical heritage, religion, civil attitude (including values) and use these categories not only to examine the conscience of a human being, but also – political processes at regional and state levels. Despite such efforts, the authors are not capable of giving the rule governing the link between culture and politics besides stating that culture has a significance, which they however define in reference to individual societies and nation-states. These, however, differ from one another with their cultures, and this is how the circle closes.

In no other language but English so many articles devoted to the concept of political culture have been published. This is mostly thanks to the political

scientists and historians working in the USA. The critical review of positions – as of the year 2000 – is given by Formisano in "The Blackwell Dictionary of Twentieth-Century Thought", where he defines the study of political culture as a "degenerative research program" – unproductive, unclear, and tautological" (Formisano 2001: 404). I have found no polemical statement on this claim.

Turning now in the chronological order only towards the works of Latin-Americanists, I shall now for order's sake note the pioneering article by Daniel H. Levine on "Issues in the Study of Culture and Politics: A View from Latin America" (Levine 1974), yet I would like to turn the attention especially to the Latin American criticism of Almond and Verba's approach. After all, the two authors included in their book – by now a classic – also the analysis of the civic culture of Mexico, "with a thought", as Almond would write 20 years later, "that a developing, non-European country with mixed democratic-authoritarian features might furnish some interesting contrasts with the European and American cases" (Almond, Verba 1980: 22).

"The Civic Culture Revisited", a collection of studies quoted here that Almond and Verba edited includes a work by Ann L. Craig and Wayne A. Cornelius that refers to the political analysis and culture (and not to civic culture) of Mexico mentioned above. Craig and Cornelius carried out a systematic criticism of that analysis (including the opinion survey methodology followed) and formulated a number of guidelines suggesting that the researchers in political culture of Mexico: (1) research the perception of attitudes of individuals and groups by political decision-makers (rather than focus on researching these attitudes), (2) account for subcultures that is the cultures of individual social and cultural groups, with appropriately constructed samples and with special consideration of regional differences, (3) award greater significance to the authoritarian aspect of the political system of Mexico, (4) turn special attention to the conditions and functions of participation in political activity in connection with interests (Craig and Wayne 1980). I believe that the guidelines mentioned above may also apply to studying the remaining countries of Latin America.

Would it yet be Latin America as a whole? The question whether Latin America exists rises again.

The affirmative answer comes in a three-volume synthesis of the history of Latin America from the decline of the colonial period until the contemporary times, published over 25 years ago in Poland. The main author and editor of the work, who I know not to have read Almond and Verba's works, claimed in the closing essay ("Cywilizacja latynoamerykańska" – lit.: "Latin American civilisation") that political culture is "public life organising the community: state

and power; law, and political structures and customs; the governing and the governed, their conflicts: the relations between the organised groups and of the state to the external world: cooperation, coexistence, war and making war" (Łepkowski 1980: 599–600). Moreover, the author notices at that "huge convergences in state structures and political culture of Latin America and the USA: republicanism, well-rooted presidential system, parliaments usually operating under the name of Congress, and the federal system that is often binding, yet in the recent decades [written in the latter half of the 1970s, – R.S.] often in retreat. Nevertheless, in practice, the North American standard does not function, or, rather, functions in a limited scope if not as a sheer formality. State tradition and political culture of Anglo-America and Ibero-America are quite different qualities." [...] The army [...] popularised a particular model of political culture: the standard for behaviours that assume with silent approval that it is primarily the pistol that makes decisions in politics, especially that – following the idea of the colonial tradition – "la ley se acata pero no se cumple" (the law is respected, but it is not followed)." Still, the author distinguishes the state and political culture (Łepkowski 1980: 618–619). He also points at European influence, believing that what belongs to the specifically Latin American political culture are "personalism, militarism, populist phraseology" (Łepkowski 1980: 623). Łepkowski refers to Latin America as a whole, and in his understanding political culture is a correlate of Latin American civilisation. It is a concept of Latin American political culture in the singular.

The positive answer to the question about the existence of Latin America is given also by Howard Wiarda, who treats this region as a whole, as a civilization, as a culture area, as he is writing about the philosophically envisaged "soul" of Latin America, justifying it through political sciences rather than historiography, and writing about revolutions, positivism, nationalism, Marxism, and corporatism, that is indirectly about the potential and actual premises of political culture (Wiarda 2003). Wiarda emphasises that while the founding fathers of the USA were the people running away from European absolutism and feudalism, the Ibero-American colonies functioned thanks to the people who were recreating European systems within them. Americans in the North valued freedom and individualism, and together created a new state, while the Americans in the South were breaking away from the centre of power in Europe, but did not question the European social order – initially not even the monarchy. They preferred group privileges, and built separate states, in which they would resort to extremism and violence in internal struggle. Wiarda turns the attention to such features as militarism, religious orthodoxy, and hier-

archical structure built on social inequalities as well – which may be surprising for readers used to thinking in the categories of Latin American individualism – as a particular collectivism (organised groups, corporation style). The author points to the importance of the heritage of social philosophy. Yet if Spain and Portugal themselves changed so strongly in the twentieth century, cultural heritage requires an insight that is absent in Wiarda, which in turn weakens the statement on Latin America as a whole.

Similarly, Harry E. Vanden and Gary Prevost are convinced – much like Łepkowski and Wiarda – that there is the certain specific variety of political culture that is Latin American, ergo common for the entire Latin America, in which they make reference to the first book by Almond and Verba, stating that "political culture is defined as those attitudes and beliefs that affect the way we think about, engage in, and evaluate politics and political events" (Vanden, Prevost 2006: 175).

Of different opinion is Peter H. Smith, who uses Larry Diamond's definition and says that political culture may be defined as "a people's predominant beliefs, attitudes, values, ideals, sentiments and evaluations about the political system of their country and the role of the self in the system" (Smith 2005: 286). Naturally, democracy and values condition each other mutually, yet the notion of political culture refers here to a specific state and not to the entire Latin America.

The author of probably the best manual for studies of politics in Latin America, Gavin O'Toole, defines political culture by referring culture to individuals, and tying it to the specific qualities of the system of a specific state, differing from the system of another state: "Political culture: a unique combination of beliefs, attitudes and values held by individuals in any given society about how political system and economic life should be conducted that together help to shape a political system's distinctive character" (O'Toole 2007: 518).

An anthropological concept ("model") of political culture is proposed by Larissa Adler Lomnitz and Ana Melnick, who establish it on the "structure of social networks (1), connected to power and (2), being a system of symbols legitimising, feeding, and supporting this power" (Adler, Melnick 2000: 2). These networks may function as either vertical or horizontal, while the system of symbols may be manifested in discourse, political rituals, language, architecture, myths of political cosmology, insignia, way of treating time and space: factors that often provide a part of the nationalist ideology. The authors applied the concept to the examination of political parties – considered the representa-

tion of the middle classes – using source material in the form of historiographical works, press, and interviews and data from participant observation. They identified the type of network and diverse cultures and subcultures of the parties examined, entered into what they call “the grammar of domination, subjugation, and cooperation relations, that is the grammar of power” (Adler, Melnick 2000: 141).

A highly sophisticated and at the same time complex approach can be perceived in the collection of texts devoted to Mexico, Costa Rica, and Chile edited by Roderic Ai Camp (Camp 2001). The authors founded their reasoning on the results of a study of individuals, and the individuals' evaluation of politics and the type of politics that they postulate. At the same time, they construct the common scope of political culture of the people examined and put forward the question how political culture – assured in this way – influences the behaviours of the people examined and the development of specific institutions, and also how democratic operation of these institutions shapes the attitudes of the persons examined within this political culture that they share. The research proves (a) the need of differentiating political cultures viz. nationality of those examined and at the same time (b) the presence of certain aspects of individual attitude at the supranational (supra-state) level. While the first is not surprising, the latter is unusual, as one should be expecting that the attitude to democracy must depend on the position assumed by the given person in the social structure (status is measured by income, education, and the type of work performed, as well as by the age of the person in question). It is interesting where these differences become manifested. In the group of older citizens, the tendency to be satisfied with electoral democracy predominates, while the people of the younger generation conceptualise democracy in a more sophisticated manner (including into it, for example, the protection of minorities) and they simply expect more. In all the age groups, the understanding of politics is positively correlated to education. Nonetheless, also in the case of this very interesting book, discretion requires that we consider the implications of the method applied (opinion survey), as it is known that the media aspect of the public discourse is not always taken into consideration while interpreting the respondents' answers, a racially-biased person is not always eager to disclose his or her attitude to the pollster, an authoritarian personality does not have to be manifested by the public questioning of democracy, the vast majority of people do not use general categories (“the political system”) and think rather about specific government or political party, and so forth. Should we take into consideration a similar list of the countries – Mexico,

Chile, and Uruguay – we may put forward a hypotheses that the political cultures operating today are connected to the phenomenon of a very high growth of employment in the public sector. It would be extraordinary if such a process did not favour acceptance of the state that developed this employment. This is how a variety of norms became mingled, which helps in the understanding why the military juntas of Uruguay and Chile could resort to torture with fair approval of many employees of public administration. They must have clearly accepted the principle of very broad application of brute force in the process of executing power even earlier.

The line of reasoning presented above is easier to understand, should one know that before 1930 the state employed in Latin America less than 1% of population, which means that at that time there were fewer than 500 000 civil servants. During the three following decades, that share grew only to 1.2%, yet with the parallel increase in population the change meant that the number of employed in the state sector grew by the factor of five (a number that does not account for the state-owned economic entities). The largest increase occurred in education, yet of the three countries listed here, it was only in Mexico that education came first in the ranking by the number of employees. The high rate of employment growth in administration was noted in Uruguay: from 1.6% of the country's population (30 000 civil servants) in 1930 to 2.9% (52 200) within two years, and by 1966 – to as much as 22.5%! Chile also proved a major growth of employment in the administration in 1930–1970, as the numbers rose nearly 5 times. The rate for Mexico was 0.93% in 1930, yet in 1986 – with state corporations left aside – it was already 7.5%, and paralleled by the very high rate of demographic growth mentioned above. While in 1930, two in every three state employees worked in the states' and municipal administration of Mexico, in 1980 it was already only one in four (Whitehead 1998, *passim*). It is the central government that employs people today. The reasons behind the growth of employment in the administration of the countries listed above include anti-crisis policies (absorption of the unemployed from the middle class in Chile and Uruguay), and the development of state functions. The deterioration (1930–1970) of the quality of administration in Chile and Uruguay, with its simultaneous improvement in Mexico, brought the levels of administration in these countries close. Wherever reforms were recorded, it was not public administration that generated their programmes, corruption rendered implementation of law difficult, and clientelism was blossoming. As neither military governments nor the current phase of democracy changed the tendency to increase employment in administration, although the growth is now

minor in absolute numbers, political cultures in these social groups most probably favour retaining the bureaucratic *status quo*, with the unavoidable oscillations of the circumstances related to political orientations of the president, ministers, governors.

Let us, however, draw the attention also to the fact that in the concepts of Peter Smith and many other authors, it is significant that political culture is something that is present among "people". They do not focus on specific groups: politicians or civil servants. Smith's notion of political culture refers to the statistically basic, greater part of the society (population). Moreover, he believes that political culture is the result of the impact of politics, and not its source or reason, devoting little attention to the feedback between politics and political culture, which might have been manifested as the result of examining the connection between the increase of employment in public administration and political culture in these social groups.

Authors from the Universidad Nacional de Colombia make reference to various understandings of political culture, beginning with Almond and Verba's classical concept and ending with Spanish political science. The team working under Oscar Mejía Quintana published (in 2006) a volume of studies edited by Gina Paola Rodríguez, relating the connections between culture and politics to the state, nation, and globalisation in the long process of Colombian modernisation. For all considerations of greatest importance is the closing essay by the editor of the volume, entitled *Los estudios sobre la cultura política en América Latina* (Rodríguez 2006: 269–293). She primarily asks the familiar question whether we deal with the political culture that is common for Latin America as a whole, or, rather, with political culture of the individual countries. In her analysis, Rodríguez refers to several Latin American works. These do not include the results of clearly empirical research. The author makes the reservation that it is impossible to build a comprehensive perspective, because – and here she quotes Jose Joaquín Brunner – "*las culturas de América latina en su desarrollo contemporáneo no expresan un orden – ni de nación, ni de clase, ni religioso, ni estatal, ni de carismas, ni tradicional ni de ningún otro tipo – sino que se reflejan en su organización los procesos contradictorios y heterogéneos de conformación de una modernidad tardía, construida en condiciones de acelerada internacionalización de los mercados simbólicos en el ámbito mundial*" (Rodríguez 2006: 291–292). She goes on to add that "*con esto, el campo de la cultura política latinoamericana se nos presenta como plural e indeterminado, pero además móvil y cambiante, de tal suerte que frente a la ausencia de una historia unificadora, emergen un sinnúmero de relatos*



*e identidades fluctuantes que, no obstante su condición, logran dar cuenta de nuestra características en determinados tiempos y espacios. Así, la cultura política latinoamericana puede ser definida como la suma de las matrices culturales que componen el collage de la actividad política de nuestras sociedades en un momento dado. Esto hace que, así como podemos hablar de una cultura política democrática, puede resultar justificado hablar, en otro contexto, de una cultura política autoritaria, cuando predominan ciertos actores, actitudes y formas de acción que bien favorecen la instalación o el mantenimiento de regímenes políticos autocráticos*" (Rodríguez, 292). The cognitive pessimism of the author seems to me exaggerated, however, though doing this she points quite appropriately to the limitations of the "demo-liberal" model as the only or basic measure of political culture in Latin America.

An extremely interesting attempt at applying the notion of political culture, I found in "Political Cultures in the Andes, 1750–1950", a collection of works edited by Nils Jacobsen and Cristóbal Aljovín de Losada (2005). It is extraordinary in the sense that – as far as I would like to use considerations of political culture to reach the lesser-known aspects of the state – the authors of the book apply considerations of the history of the nation-state to portray political culture and the histories of historical polities. As the research of the history of the state in Latin America (in this case: of the Andean states) is more advanced than the research of the political culture of the societies of the Andean region, one is free to believe that the political change known from history will help the authors to point at a change in the scope of political culture that has not been known as yet. In the meantime, such changes are always difficult to be specifically identified. The result is in most cases, a suggestion, if not only an allusion, but not a statement about a change documented in the sources. Moreover, the content of what undergoes change is not always clear either. Yet the authors list here three important features typical in the twentieth century for the political culture of the region of the Andes, and at the same time specific against the background of Latin America.

I perceive these features in the following manner: first and foremost, there are representations of the former local civilisations, representations building the mythological foundation (for state- and nation-forming processes). Second, beginning with the great rebellions of the latter half of the eighteenth century, a phenomenon has been observed in the region, namely, that the local actions are conducted in mutual communication despite the great natural obstacles, while after the fall of such efforts, the local ties – being the ones that oppose the centralist tendency of the state – are reinforced. Third, the state-

mate between the main political forces is more clearly and lastingly visible here than elsewhere in Latin America. The basic factions of the elite have failed to work out consensual cooperation and are incapable of building a lasting coalition, at the same time, they all apply the principle of excluding everyone from outside the elite (discrimination is a means of control), while other social (and ethnical) groups efficiently resist the attempts at suppressing the local cultures by centrally imposed ideologies. Although capable of inter-communal communication, they are, on the other hand, unable to develop their joint political strategy.

It goes without saying that the three features—phenomena are the features or manifestations of political culture, even though in his chapter of the book in question, Alan Knight (Knight 2005: 25–57) expresses plenty of justified doubts on the usefulness of the notion of political culture, the editors of the volume, on the other hand, emphasise that there is no political culture of the Andean region even despite the presence of these three features shared. I shall not be able to refer to each book on political culture of Latin America and/or its specific countries. The catalogue of the Library of Congress alone lists 45 titles. I can say however that most authors accept the known concept of civic culture; others offer no definition of the political culture, as Mansilla in his pioneer study of political culture of the authoritarian rule in Bolivia, applying the term “political culture” as a synonym of the state performance (Mansilla 1987).

## **Political culture and the public discourse**

My concept of political culture requires that the set of widespread and relatively stable and respected beliefs connected to the identity of the society as a political nation, that is the constitutionally defined sovereign, were expressed, among others, in the public discourse.

In the public discourse, citizens and institutions of the civic society – in a democratic state – conduct a debate on the *raison d'état* and the socially important goals of policy-making. This is how the public hierarchy of the shaping policy factors is continuously updated, including the ideologies transforming into political doctrines and programmes of political parties. What we deal here with is the formation of a certain “public *raison d'état*” within a pluralist society. With the lack of democracy, the public discourse looks somewhat different, yet also plays an important function.

Going beyond the face-value understanding of the discourse, as a debate in the mass media and through education and publication, I use this notion to define – under the influence of Foucault – the “public debate of operating subjects – actors (also institutional), working out the generally accepted understanding of the given question, resulting from the shared history and culture of social communication, and manifested in a variety of ways, yet, finally, represented in language” (Stempowski 2007: 325).

Does the criterion of the language not exclude registering forms of consciousness and resultant behaviours if they are not expressed directly in verbalisation? To illustrate the problem let me ask whether the phenomenon of the mass failure to observe the principles of road traffic is a manifestation of political culture. Peter Waldmann described the vehicular traffic over the river in the Bolivian city of Santa Cruz, where one of the bridges has only one lane and requires alternating one-direction traffic. The increased weekend traffic loads (as the route leads to attractive suburban areas) is obstructed by the drivers who – ignoring the queue of the cars that have arrived earlier – attempt to force their way into the head of the column from a side (from outside the only lane), which results in the situation reminding of “shepherding of a flock of rams disturbing one another into a pen” (Waldmann 2006: 204). Neither a pedestrian nor a driver produces any written statements on such an occasion. Even though not every crossing the street by a pedestrian on a red light in a Latin American city will find its description in a work by a learned democrat in the European Rechtsstaat, such behaviours have their correlate not only in the drivers’ mentality but also in the form of police descriptions of the situation that can be considered representative (language) for research in political culture. It is only the public emergence of the description of the attitude (introduction of the results of the research into public domain) that allows using such a secondary source of information: and it is this very information that is a component of the discourse recognizable through language, also – if not predominantly – accounting for the colloquial language, which may “disclose” to the researcher the actual state of consciousness present in large numbers of individuals. Having identified the source of information, we may consider the conceptualisation involving the language in a deeper sense.

Continuing considerations on the language as a manifestation of culture, we notice that the phenomenon of the populist leader communicating with the masses is typical for the Latin American *cultura verbalista*. “Give me a balcony, and I will become the president,” José María Velasco Ibarra, five times the President of Ecuador (winner in the elections of 1933, 1943, 1951, 1959

and 1967), used to say. Similarly known was the *balconazo* practised by the President of Peru, Alan García, during his first presidency: he would leave the place behind his desk, grab the microphone ready for such a circumstance, run out to the balcony and announce his decisions "in dialogue with people". In this, he might have followed Perón, yet the latter began from using the microphone thrust at him by a journalist by name of Evita, and did so in the street (which, after all, made their joint way to the balcony of Casa Rosada easier). The "living" language is not only the carrier of information about the programmes or resolutions, but also a more broadly conceived component of the political, and of organisation of the political power in a Latin American state. Neither television nor the Internet could fully replace the balcony. Is this connected with the cult of the hero so widespread in Latin America? Possibly only of those, who have earned their special status in their lifetime, and usually on an exposed position (Brunk and Fallaw 2006). The attitude towards the hero is hard to be distinguished from the one towards the caudillo, should one disregard the manner such leadership is created. *Balconazo* could, however, be explained in the categories of symbolism and communication in politics (Dittmer 1977), that is, as one of the manifestations of political culture, moreover: one that is very old and enjoys Independence traditions (*cabildo abierto*).

Quoted above, the criterion of the "generally accepted understanding of the given question", significant for the evaluation of the public discourse, does not cover – I believe – the totality of citizens in any country of Latin America. It definitely does not encompass those who do not realise that their homeland lies within a territory that others (aliens) believe to be within something that those aliens refer to as the state. From time to time groups of such original inhabitants of South American jungles are found, especially in Brazil and around its north-western borders. These descendants of the original inhabitants who are aware of being subjected to the state's central power, on the other hand, are not a uniform group. Present here is the dualism of political culture. Besides the norms of traditional organisation – present here are the norms of the imposed state; side by side with the precolonial political culture – there are the norms connected to the new culture of the conquerors, especially among the persons passively or – the more so: actively – accepting the new state. A great portion of the autochthonous population of Latin America does not participate in the construction of the "generally accepted understanding of the given issue" that is to be the result of the "shared history and culture of social communication" in the given state. For this reason, in a country with such an autochthonous population, it is impossible to find such an "understanding of the

issue" that would be produced by all the citizens. Political culture of the autochthonous population mentioned above is related to the political that connects their civic consciousness with precolonial forms of social self-organisation, and with these forms of collective life that originated in the process of these people's adaptation to the colonial and postcolonial order. The twentieth century Indigenism and even Indianism served that adaptation. Only those who had gone through the process of acculturation were capable – to a certain extent – of winning through the dualism, although the question about the content of citizenship in consciousness (political culture) of these people – or, to be more precise, about the scope of acceptance of statehood as a factor co-constituting national identity – still comes up. There is probably the phenomenon of two levels of identity in the local social space, where one can be a member of both the local community and one that is broader, yet in a different manner than the *bien acomodados* politicians from the capital.

Black slaves and their progeny did not participate in the process at all. By paradox, the black was "invisible" (Bryan and Serbin 1996: 40–41), although the Blacks' blood "flows in a majority of Brazilians" (Burns 1970: 356) and in many other inhabitants of Latin America. Yet our knowledge of the political culture of non-European population – also about the political cultures (the plural use intended) originates from the analysis of secondary sources, that is published results of anthropological, archaeological, ethnological, historical, political, and sociological studies.

Social movements, as for example the Zapatista in the Mexican state of Chiapas, favour the development of these forms of political culture that are connected to the political of the local Indian communities and can make use of modern means of communication (Internet). The participation of the leaders of such a movement in public discourse favours the development of our (observers') knowledge about this political culture. They participate in the public discourse also in the forms that attract the attention of the media.

Turning attention to the importance of the criterion of the generally accepted understanding of the given issue, we perceive that the convergence of the condition of the communities listed below with the condition of the communities of the Andean region described in the book edited by Jacobson and Aljovín de Losada referred to above. The inability to produce a national collective identity of the population in such states signals the poorer advancement of the cultural, and – the more so – of the political. Or, in other words, of such widespread and stable forms of social consciousness, where the joint identity of the political nation and acceptance of common statehood exist. I cannot dwell

here upon the historical example of Paraguay from before the Guerra de la Triple Alianza (1864–1870), when most probably the country featured a process of nation-building that was most advanced in the entire Latin America, and a situation to which the statements about identity and statehood made above could possibly not apply.

Reflected in the public discourse, the poor advancement of the cultural and the political is present also in reference to the social inequality in the position of the woman and the man. The extreme demographic imbalance (overwhelming numerical overrepresentation of women) in Paraguay after the mentioned Guerra de la Triple Alianza weakened the state, yet such a problem does not exist in today's Latin America. There is, however, an inequality of a different type. The participation of women in the public discourse is smaller than that of man, yet even the overrepresentation of women over men in the parliament does not naturally have to be a mark of actual democracy (see Rwanda). There are at least three factors that influence the status of the woman measured in her impact in the discourse and especially her impact in elections: (1) the tension between the religious and lay orders connected with the economic conditioning of the status, (2) the level of institutionalisation of the state, (3) mindset or the attitudes within specific party elites – which is at least how I understand the thesis formulated by Fiona Macaulay (Macaulay 2006). There are at least two models of equalising the status, Brazilian and Chilean. The first is based on a huge political party, Partido Trabalhista, being the promoter of women's rights, while the centralised Chilean system developed the Office for Women (Servicio Nacional de la Mujer). Visible clearly in both the countries is the progress in equalising the status of the woman and man. It continues faster in Brazil, possibly due to the starting point being lower, greater differentiation of the country, and flexibility that accompanies it in the realm of social advancement.

The division into urban and non-urban population causes the inequality of participation in the discourse, because the non-urban population is poorly educated and organised, which is especially visible wherever this division as a criterion is superimposed on the criteria of ethnicity and sex. I have been unable to ascertain how much the two sections of the population differ regarding their examination by the social sciences; I suppose only a small share of the population has at all been covered by research. Which is why we have to confine ourselves to making hypotheses through application of deduction and extrapolation of the results contained in secondary sources. Mentioned above, Craig and Cornelius verify the classical work by Almond and Verba and turn the attention to the methodological implication of such a state-of-the-art in the domain.

The urban population participates in the public discourse intensively, yet to the manual labourers of production and services sectors do it mainly through their trade unions, direct actions, union and party manifestations, participation in elections, and organised crime. Information about political culture is to a great extent expressed in the language of trade union activists, politicians and media, police, persecutors and judges, and to a lesser degree in the language of other secondary sources, that is works of social scientists. The research of the connection between identity, work (labour) and forms of protest is now only beginning to discover the political culture of people remaining outside trade unions and other organisations (Peloso 2008) or forming entirely new movements.

A manifestation of civic movement that creates something that is really of an alternative character, were the gatherings that originated in Argentina as a spontaneous answer to the suddenly developed deep atrophy of state power and banking institutions in December 2001. These movements were "not demanding something new, but creating it" (Sitrin 2006: 10). Consensus (and not the method of reaching decisions by majority vote) led these people to organise themselves around the basic functions related to employment and sustenance. It is hard not to notice that this bears a resemblance to some premises for the actions of organisations of autochthonous communities, the Argentinian "piqueteros" (Escudé 2005: 67–100), and even the guerrilla movements, corruption cliques, etc.

Similarly, political culture is influenced by religious organisations that at the same time are to a certain extent a manifestation of that culture; a fact that can be attested by the common presence of such institutions among the Latin American migrants in the USA and Europe: it is a presence with no serious institutional competition, should one disregard the ethnical organisations focused on the commercial services for migrants (as e.g. the media). Transfer of religious institutions from the native country to the target country is a manifestation of the cultural (a function of the identity) of the migrants that took shape before the migration. The research of a similar – yet much earlier phenomenon – among immigrants from Europe in Argentina and Brazil proved that émigré religious institutions promoted maintaining contact with the country of origin, i.e., with the country or the institution of the state, with all its implications for the political culture, yet this was true mainly about Catholicism. In the case of Latin America, the most active religious organisations among immigrants are not Roman-Catholic. Besides this, what is visible here is a religious syncretism, a phenomenon known in Latin America (and the Caribbean) yet rather from the colonial period. Local religions that are now born that are theologically

universal and of transnational character. For that reason, their impact on political culture must differ from the one we know from the history of Atlantic migrations from mid-nineteenth century to 1930s.

The importance of religious organisations in Latin America for the public discourse requires a systematic research. Important are the unorthodox elements of religious activity, among whose number I count the liberation theology and the activity of North American evangelising missions. On the other hand, systematic religious practices in the churches and religious associations recognised by the state apply to a tiny share of population, and for that reason the social teaching of the most popular church – the Roman Catholic Church – including the personal impact of priests, monks, and nuns – seems to me something of secondary importance immersed in the syncretism of local cultures. Such an opinion is in no way denied by the fact that some grass-root guerrilla movements opposing the European intervention in Mexico in mid-nineteenth century used the imported Catholic icon of Mother of God, i.e., the image of Our Lady of Guadalupe.

Worth attention is the function of the system of education in the public discourse. The role of primary and secondary education is obvious, especially in those areas where *educación cívica* was persistently promoted, yet its results are visible after the students have left school. The university is of greater importance.

Unlike in the British colonies in the Caribbean, in the colonial America, later referred to as Latin, the establishment of universities preceded the development of general education of the primary and secondary levels. The university reinforced the culture of colonial metropolises, opening in the period since the Independence to the more-broadly-understood European culture yet retaining its elitist character. Where the European presence made its strongest mark due to mass European immigration in the latter half of the nineteenth and in the first decade of the twentieth centuries, this model of university was questioned. The implications of the Argentinian *Reforma Universitaria* (Cordoba, 1918) went beyond the university, influencing the broader political culture in a manner unequalled also outside Latin America.

The reformers put forward three groups of ideas and demands: (1) they defined the university as a republic of the intellectuals, managed like a democratic state, with the participation of citizens i.e. students, claiming the participation of students in managing bodies. (2) They opposed what they defined as dogmatism, demanding discourse showing opposing points of view, wanted to abolish the system of "catedráticos" i.e. lifelong professorships (with fixed number of tenures): they wanted these posts to be staffed through competitions, and



later regularly verified (here, postulates were confined to generalities); they demanded that the prerogatives of the rector and dean in their brief of defining the curriculum be abolished, imposing and entrusting the same to the lecturer (here the postulates varied); demanded abolishing compulsory attendance at the lectures, and improvement of relations between the teaching and the taught. (3) They wanted to develop a new type of a link between the university and the society: (a) Universities were to embark on the most important problems of the country, but they were to be autonomous, and the state authority was not to influence the operation. (b) Universities were to be accessible also for the youth without the financial support of the family, and were also to run certain branches in the form of people's universities. (c) The Manifesto includes the notion of "scientific liberalism". It may be believed that it led its the authors to postulating the university as "a tool of social impact" so as to transform the "high culture" into "scientific disciplines" given into the service of the society. The reformers rejected the "colonial mentality" and the university perceived as a "monastery", demanding "a university being a laboratory".

Implications of these postulates for the considerations on political culture are obvious. Nevertheless, the movement of university reform did not, however, aim at the creation of the alternative university, even if it helped to establish people's universities. Additionally, it must be remembered that thanks to its instigation of establishment of a national student associations (a political culture factor in and of itself), the reform movement helped democratisation by the reinforcement of parties representing the middle class. After many years, the socially radical tradition of the reform reinforced the factors politicising academic milieux in Latin America. One may even consider whether and to what degree the reform of 1918 could be treated a few decades later as the historic legitimisation of the social role of the reformer and even the reformism-despising revolutionary of the 1960s and 1970s (Stempiński 2008).

The contemporary political discourse encompasses even wider problem ranges that connect the concepts and postulates of justice with those pertaining to the attitude to the natural environment. There are plenty of suggestions that it is the very platform where the people of various ethnicities, nationalities, social classes, sexes, etc may co-operate. The recognition of forms of consciousness in this scope requires a new sensitivity to the questions of the natural environment. Such a recognition runs into elementary difficulties with access to data on the natural environment, especially ones that refer to this environment indirectly, as e.g. the data on the health status. Such data, where they actually exist, are indeed testimony to exposing people to the dangers resulting from

the changes (more precisely: destruction) of the natural environment, that is to environmental hazards.

In some cases, the purpose of seeking the link between the environment and justice – and indirectly, the political culture – will seemingly concern only the autochthonous people, the *indígenas*, *pueblos originarios*. What is most visible is the fact that these people fall victim to the most blatant social inequalities. This, however, pertains also to the descendants of the slaves and – generally – the poor as such. Indeed, some of the poor invade the lands of other poor, albeit belonging to the *indígenas*, in which case the victim is everyone on both sides of the conflict, for which someone else is responsible.

Although passing legislation on natural environment has continued in Latin America for over 20 years, its execution is partial because this is how law operates there and also because the laws are copied from highly industrialised states (the US, EU countries), where these norms operate in a different social context. Let us take a note of what access to water looks like – a case that I treat as an illustration of the problem discussed – and there are few needs as basic for existence as the satisfaction of the human need for drinking and watering the cultivated lands. The more so, as both the notion and the physical substance of water have different significance in some cultures than in the culture of the West. Let us remember that for example the subterranean resources of *Acuífero Guaraní* (covering the hydrographical conditions within a basin around the borders of Brazil, Paraguay, Argentina, and Uruguay) are one of the largest prospected body of fresh water in the world in its type (Schmidt, Vassolo, Assolo 2007).

Even though it is only 5% of the world's potable water that is privately managed, the revenues from this title are nearly twice as large as those produced by the entire global oil industry. Major foreign investors, not to mention Latin American governments, must be interested in local political cultures, not only those that take up huge areas and speak mostly the *Guaraní*. "Sophisticated infrastructure and management regimes for irrigation were developed by communities in the Andes well before the Incas flexed their imperial muscle [...]. In some places in Mexico, communities managed water autonomously and cooperatively. In arid regions, water management was 'heavily dependent on terraces, diversion dams, aqueducts, and canal networks within valley-limited drainages which were knit together by expanding empires' [...]. Mexico City was a marvel of water engineering when Hernán Cortés and his forces arrived to conquer the Aztec empire [...]. Indigenous values and political cultures and the complex systems of rights and responsibilities where they have any status at

all have been reduced [...]. States and market systems of water-resource management 'ignore or deny the existence or importance of common-law normative frameworks regarding local indigenous rights and uses and water resource management' [...] (Wickstrom 2008: 287–289). Local people fight back not only major foreign investors but also the new settler (*colono*). Moreover, the more local the water management, the more efficient it is, which may be at odds with the culture of a major corporate investor.

The presidency of Evo Morales favours the introduction of new property relations in Bolivia concerning water distribution, a change that the people of the poor urban districts began struggling for earlier. Social organisations in Chile also work hard for a new regulation in this scope. In Mexico, operating within NAFTA "[...] elites have attempted to deconstruct the corporatist political culture of the Mexican Revolution, but have yet to replace it with a new political culture" of free trade in water (Wickstrom, 310).

The language of talks about water may be a problem in itself, if a foreign investor considers it among physical resources or means of labour in the enterprise constructed, while the local community treats water as something that has its identity in the system combining all the elements and including the river, the forest, people, air, mountains, etc. with each of the components being treated in a similar way. Political cultures of the investor and the local people belong to different worlds. Even though all the participants of the communication process may speak one language in the philological sense, there is a need for an interpreter being a cultural broker.

The problem of language is also present when speaking in Latin America about one of the most important questions, namely the redistribution of the domestic product, in the language of the societies of highly developed Europe with its social structure different from Latin American. It is rather the "style of former leftist rhetoric" of social democratic and/or liberal origin – not adequate to today's EU or the US – that is to be used in Latin America: the language of David Lloyd George, Franklin Roosevelt, and William Beveridge treating these issues in the categories of "social patriotism" and aimed at the "average citizen" (Jackson 2009), i.e. according to the principles of class solidarity. Here, political culture is immediately connected with the forms of ideological thinking about the nation and major groups in social structure.

I would also like to point to the significance of the Aesopian language and the public discourse. It is present when the words uttered in an explicit literary and historical context acquire a different meaning with the listener, because he or she refers it to his or her contemporary political reality. We know this phe-

nomenon from the practice of autocratic systems not only in Latin America. Any mention of a "Fall" may be associated with the expected fall of the military junta, the "Spring" is the harbinger of changes, and in Chile the "earthquake" (after the actual earthquake in 1985) was associated quite unambiguously: cases of Chilean and not only theatres operating under censorship that sought for the language of political resistance are quite well known. This is how also objects—signs may speak out, for example, I saw a small electric resistor pinned into the lapel that signalled the attitude of opposition against the dominant system. The political joke is close to such behaviours. In the language of Aesop and in the language of signs, political culture finds its manifestation.

Examining the public discourse, we prefer searching for utterances that are the result of existing convictions and beliefs: widespread and typical in the statistical sense, predominant in the given set. The set may be the entire society, or, at another time – a group singled out along with defined criteria. This, however, does not exclude examining the beliefs of individuals, which is discussed below. Methodology-wise, it is more difficult to decide whether a given belief is respected. One might assume that "the given individual respects the given belief, if in a systematic manner (at an appropriate time) the individual undertakes the appropriate activity regularly as if the individual accepted that belief as a subjective and rational premise of that activity" (Kmita 1985: 25). The individual may in fact accept such a belief in this manner, yet the acceptance itself may nevertheless be gradable. On the other hand, not every regular action must be the result of acceptance, as what we deal with may be a reflex and not an action resulting from acceptance (conscious action).

To the considerations about the participation of individuals and social groups and organisations in the discourse, I would like to add a comment on the media. They participate in the shaping of the discourse, yet it is risky to deduce political culture on the grounds of their message. We have in memory the impressive spread of the printed word in Argentina and Uruguay in the first half of the twentieth century, with the long terms of office of very different governments in these countries. Together with education at the secondary and higher level, the printed word increases the level of orientation in education, yet the radio and especially the television must be even more important. Television seems to be the national carrier of political culture mostly in the sense that it emphasises the central executive power and the national symbols. The European viewer in Latin America is stricken by the name of the state being the most frequently repeated word in the president's speech. This has also lost the semblances of novelty to Latin Americans, and they hardly notice it. They have

been accustomed to frequent references to the state by the school with its everyday ritual of singing the national anthem and raising the flag. It is possible that the term "nacionalismo" has lesser importance in Latin America than in Europe. I mean here especially the immigrant countries. Nevertheless, these were the governments of Latin America that in the 1930s rejected the European concept of national minority as Latin American elites found it conflictogenic. It seems, however, that there is still room for such a form of conscience, where a descendant of European immigrants ideologically finds the indigenous population a minority, even though it may constitute the statistical majority there.

The significance of the elite is obvious, and often these are the family ties that play a decisive role in its formation (Lindhal 1962), yet what is the significance of the so-called authorities or individuals of high standing? Individuals as public or moral authorities in Latin America are a rarity, while authorities built on the position held in the halls of the academy are an extreme rarity. Such a position of the authority may be acquired by a writer, but one must first gain recognition abroad – best in Europe. A musician or a singer should acquire fame in the United States. Naturally, a footballer always remains a highly popular and possibly the best recognised celebrity, a fact that politicians know how to use, yet how is this it connected to the construction of civic society? It definitely may play a socially compensating function, as it shows a specific path of social advancement and makes the acceptance of external world easier. (Yet even in the United States it took 61 years from the moment the first black basketball player was selected for a league team to the election of Barack Obama the President.) Of interest is the fact that Latin Americans are primarily highly successful in team games, which rebuffs the stereotype of their excessive individualism. Does it prove that the ability of closely regulated cooperation – in their culture – comes to them with ease? Such a cooperation is also a form of public discourse with media reinforcement. NB: Neither General Powell nor President Obama would be considered Blacks in Latin America.

With full acceptance of the special significance of the mass media and spoken word, and also of the Internet – especially in Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, and Mexico (Riedinger 2008: 185; Gascó Hernandez 2008) – one may not forget the fact that bodies of state authorities and persons involved in public administration participate in the public discourse, speaking mostly through official acts and the normative acts published. Moreover, these bodies express themselves also in a particular manner by implementing laws and carrying out political directives. They conduct a certain discourse with citizens and the (non-governmental) organisations along the rules of the dominant political culture.

Closing, we need to answer the question whether considering the ties between the widespread and stable forms of social consciousness with the public discourse, we examine beliefs as a manifestation of the consciousness of an individual or an organ of public authority, and in this we deem that having examined a certain (large) number of persons, also members of a collective body, we are allowed to make binding statements on social consciousness, which means that we believe that a social phenomenon is determined by individual phenomena... Or maybe it is otherwise, namely that the individual consciousness (ergo also individual beliefs) are determined by the social consciousness? Answering yes to the last question, we would have to assume that social consciousness is something more than just an averaged collection of individual beliefs; it is a manifestation of social practice, an aspect of the social existence that is a set of beliefs that are both commonly respected in the examined society, and defined by the functioning of that society. Such a statement should reinforce our assumption of the connection between the cultural and the political with the language of political culture. Nevertheless, neither this language nor the language of analysing political culture may be adequate provided a resident of the country, a citizen, a social group or the analyst do not believe themselves to be a part of the whole they belong to together with the subject of the analysis: "the language has its inertia and is used also when it has long ceased to adhere to the world that it is to describe", says Leszek Kolakowski (Kolakowski & Mentzel 2009: 126).

## **Policy-making and political culture**

It results from the definition assumed initially that political culture is a set of widespread and relatively stable beliefs referring among other questions to the constitutional system of policy-making. It would therefore seem that the obvious direction of considerations should be connected with the examination of the content of the legislation and its implementation, and the widespread and reinforced forms of consciousness, opinions, attitudes, and behaviours of citizens to identify the forms carried out in social practice – both formal (law) and informal ones – jointly providing a testimony to the beliefs that together build political culture. I, however, embark on my discussion in this chapter from a point that is removed a step further, immediately borrowing a well-known assertion of the lack of democracy and assuming that the generally binding law was implemented throughout the most of the twentieth century to a degree

insufficient (the actual function, not the assumed one) for the emergence of a lasting operation of this set of systemic (constitutional) functions assumed by a democratic republic. This shortage was quite naturally present to a varying degree and in diverse periods in different countries, and also in various institutional circumstances (e.g. democracy existing in a local community but lacking within a group of similar size in a latifundist *hacienda*), but it did not pass any of the countries, even Costa Rica. (Yet a hundred years ago, the turn-up at the polls in Latin America did not diverge significantly from the European average.)

Beginning from recording the phenomena most broadly known and present throughout entire Latin America, it would be impossible to fail to mention the numerous coup d'état. Of not lesser importance is the fact of widespread failure to execute tax law and other forms of financial law. Added to that must be the inefficiency of the policing services in ensuring safety and security for citizens, especially outside metropolises, and even outside some of its districts. Connected to this is the insufficiency of the judiciary and abuse of the principle of the free discretion of the judge. Imposed on all these is also the disregard of the law by the officers of public administration. Contempt for the law and being unpunished. There is also the fact that the diplomatic and civil staff, with the exception of few executive positions, remains in the ministries independent of systemic changes. This is no Civil Service whatsoever. These are rather obedient conformists. When General Onganía made his coup d'état in Argentina in 1966, only one diplomat resigned. When President Díaz Ordaz brutally suppressed the student demonstrations of 1968, only one ambassador of Mexico handed in his resignation. The prevalent political culture evidently did not suffer from these. At the same time there is no shortage of people among the administration who adjust to the new order, whether authoritarian or democratic, and use the language of the new power, yet award individual terms with contents different from ones assumed in programmes. Demoralisation engulfed also the judiciary. In Argentina, for instance, many of the judges initially accepted the dictatorship, and – after its fall – took to sabotaging the proceedings against torturers and their accomplices by delaying them. “Thus, within a single country we can observe both notable experiences of authentic democratisation of public life as well as the worst authoritarian fictions, both supported by the same language and by the same legal and institutional foundations” (Olvera 2008: 115).

Another characteristic phenomenon is that – while corruption of civil servants, judges and politicians in a state ruled by law is a rarity and entails infringement of law – in Latin America it is frequent and is often connected to

the effort to implement (and adjudicate) law, as this law promises to the citizen more than the state as personified by policeman, judge, ministerial or municipal officer is able or actually wants to provide for him. Corruption is an additional transaction cost in the unfriendly environment of public authorities, and frequently a manifestation of solidarity being a reaction to the unbearable public administration. It is a manifestation of political culture, amending the unaccepted law, a form that sanctions parallel redistribution of the GDP. It may be more enduring than the political circumstances that gave birth to it. Moreover, a bureaucrat usually accumulates as a bribe-taker.

Studies of contemporary political corruption in Brazil, Mexico, Paraguay, and Venezuela show a variety of corruptive phenomena in Latin America and the level to which countering them is becoming the central problem in the consolidation of political reform in Latin America (Little and Posada-Carbó 1996: 13, 195–285).

The government frequently runs a policy of privileging some at the expense of others, as in the case of foreign financial operations of natural persons and private businesses, which receive tax breaks and amnesties to the detriment of public funding in education, healthcare, social aid, and law enforcement. Efficient evasion of taxation can most evidently be reconciled with other forms of political culture, related to the beliefs – and expectations – of other citizen viz. the policies of the government that require budget expenditure.

It is a paradox, yet one may say that even though these states are weak, they are at the same time perversely stable and foreseeable. It is so as their weaknesses are visible. At least it was so until the recent years. A criticism more comprehensive and acute than mine; in fact truly devastating for the Latin American state; was given by Waldmann, who defined it as *el estado anómico* (Waldmann 2006). Nevertheless, now Latin America – entering that stage of its development when it enjoys the highest pace of economic growth in the last three decades, the current economic crisis notwithstanding – is slowly becoming increasingly democratic and changing its vast social inequalities (still high throughout the Latin America, yet with the decreasing Gini coefficient) step-by-step, even though at the same time it is becoming more politically torn. With the passage of time, this will influence the system of policy-making and political culture. To a certain extent, these phenomena represent also the foreign influence as democratisation is the requirement of foreign and international institutions, whose cooperation Latin Americans may want or be forced to use. This, in turn, favours the façade character of administrative actions in support of democratisation.



Embarking on a more systematic analysis of the connection between social consciousness and the systemic way of policy-making, I would like to emphasise that the frame of reference (institutional model) here is a democratic state. The notion of policy-making refers here to policy-making in the comprehensive sense of "policy", unless the term "foreign policy" is used. Policy-making encompasses everything that may refer to actors (including agents), without limitation of the notion of the actor to the notion of a subject of international public law. Special attention will be paid to the operation of the federal system, executive power, the notion of *raison d'état*, the presidential decision-making process, efficiency of policy-making, existential security, and potential change in policy-making resulting from the existence of autocratic government. Democratic transformation will be discussed in the following chapter.

1. Majority of Latin American states are unitary, and hardly differ one from another. The only federal Latin American states are Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela, but most people in Latin America live in a federal state. There are some 46 federal states in today's world, yet it is difficult to find two that would be the same. The following concepts of federalism, carried out in different states of Latin America in different proportions, are decisive for discussion of political culture:

- a) All three types of power – legislative, executive, and judiciary – must be present at both institutional levels: institutions of the federal state and institutions of the member of the Federation.
- b) The functional division of power is based on the fact that defined functions (tasks, permanent goals) of the state are conducted independently on either level.
- c) The characteristic features of culture, economy, etc. of the individual regions, whose borders usually coincide with the borders of members of the federation, are maintained.
- d) The principle of subsidiarity, in reference to the institutions of public authorities, and to the voluntary civic associations, is respected in the society of the federal state.

Federal character is always manifested in the consciousness of citizens, depending on the legal awareness, yet it may also be so to the extent to which: (1) The colonial "territorialism" (Carmagnani 1984) of the economic interests of local elites was finally overcome, and they were fully included into the supraregional market, with the simultaneous maintenance of the regional specific character, also cultural, and (2) the above is allowed by the centralist presidential system of policy-making and the system of elections – also in the

scope of its abuse. The situation where the problem of territorialism does not refer solely to the elite is not a typical one (Jan Szemiński told me how, on Sunday, in the market square of Cusco first the Peruvian flag is hoisted to the mast to the accompaniment of the Peruvian anthem, but immediately thereafter the Himno al Cusco is heard and the flag of Tawantinsuyu is hoisted).

The so-called *intervenciones*, i.e. the cases of assuming control over a province by the president of the federal republic in the place of the authorities of the province (a member of the federation) are a common phenomenon. Of specific importance is also the system of electing governors (of states, provinces, departments, territories, autonomous regions) in the non-federal states. In some of them, governors are elected in popular election (Nicaragua, Colombia, Peru, Paraguay, Uruguay) just like in the federal states. Moreover, in Paraguay, Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia – that is in unitary states – the departmental/regional/provincial legislative authorities are elected.

2. Policy-making is the operation of the state's executive power, that is carrying out the competencies on the basis and within the scope of law by the policy-making body. The principle of state policy-making by the executive power pertains to all the states, whatever their system, even though there have been systems where the decision-making body was the "party" group, governing under its "secretary", while the organ of state authority, not only of executive character, just rubber-stamped those decisions. The position of the policy-making body within the structure of executive power depends only on the constitutionally defined system of policy-making. In Latin American states, there is only one such organ, and this is the head of the state – the president, and as a rule she/he is elected in popular election. Rooted in the political culture is the authority of the leader (*jefe de Estado*, *jefe político*, *caudillo*, *líder*) that reinforces the legitimisation of the highest organ of executive power. The president holds the key power. This principle is similar for entire Latin America but variations do exist as to the powers accorded to the president and the kind of parties and party system (Mainwaring and Shugart 1997). There is no place here for the conflict between the president and the Cabinet, that is the team of ministers, and it used to be so even in those states where the traditional leading role of the Minister of Home Affairs was for some time replaced by that of the First Minister. In a democratic state in Latin America, however, there emerges the tension between the President and the Parliament. Both these organs or bodies of state power come from popular election, and this is the mandate that they fall back on in their disputes.

The parliamentary scrutiny covers only ministers, and not the president, with the exception of the impeachment procedure meaning accusation of the president before the parliament, considering him guilty and his removal from the post by the parliament. In some countries, the parliamentary majority may not be tantamount to the presidential party, yet in divided parliaments this ensures the president with a relatively broad freedom to act. At the same time, the parliament participates in the process of ratification of treaties concluded by the executive power, and history knows a long list of treaties that have never been ratified. Tolerating such a *status quo* signals the condition of legal awareness that is present in political culture which sanctions such politics of the president, who may refrain from ratifying a treaty, even should it be one his representative previously signed. Worth emphasising is the fact that in most cases it is the president who is the active subject, while the parliament remains the reactive one, which finds reflection in the construction of the legislative agenda (Cox and Morgenstern 2002: 446–468). One is allowed to believe that the functioning of organs of public authority may not continue clearly and for a long time against the political culture of the president, members of the parliament, and the staff involved. To quote Sondrol “*De jure*, but more importantly, *de facto* political arrangements in Latin America reflect a unique, corporatist and centralist tradition dating back to Spain’s Philip V and before. The coexistence of *de jure* republicanism and *de facto* authoritarianism in the region reflects a clash of values [...]. Dictatorship constitutionally disguised reflects the blending of institutions and attitudes inherited from Iberia of the fifteenth century and the United States of the eighteenth century. Cultural and institutional predispositions have fostered authoritarian leanings in the Latin American presidency. At the same time, the aspirational qualities of Latin American constitutions (no reelection provisions, legislative impeachment procedures, judicial review) reflects an equally powerful predilection for some mode of pluralistic politics.” Sondrol suggests that the Latin American presidential system may be “a different breed, mixing the primordial corporatist centrism of the region with the more modern tenets of pluralistic liberalism to produce a facade polyarchy that masks a civilian authoritarian system dominated, as always, by a strong executive. [...] Historically and presently, the influence of tradition and of prevailing conditions combine to expand Latin American presidential authority. The executive provides a rallying, unifying symbol, enhances respect for the autocratic state, and overpowers regional or factional challengers to the developmental goals of the regime. [...] This developmental model

does not correspond to those usually employed by Northern Europeans and North American modernisationists, who seem to view their own developmental process and socio-cultural values as exportable in a condensed version. Through an examination of the writings by Latin American *pensadores* reacting to their own caudillistic, personalistic and elitist cultural heritage, the present study of the Latin American presidency seeks to convey the idea that the institution represents a culturally congruent alternative to the United States prototype, not an aberration" (Sondrol 1990: 431–433). This argumentation may be reinforced by turning the attention to the importance of the machismo as a factor that is as characteristic for Latin American cultures as reinforcing various shades of authoritarianism, both in their predominantly "male" political elite and, more broadly, in the society. Relevant and widespread, the stable and respected beliefs are part and parcel of political culture.

3. Theoretically speaking, making policy, the president uses categories that analysts may see as part of the concept of *raison d'état*. It seems, however, that in the political vocabulary of Latin America, the notion of the "*raison d'état*" has acquired somewhat perverse connotations and it is rather the notion of "the national interest" that is used, even though it is quite rare. It has become a custom to present the goals of politics in a manner as descriptive as obscure, and aligned with nationalistic and populist rhetoric. This is most clearly required by political culture, independent of the differences between the states (Coniff 1999). Yet in the research of policy-making, a concept of the *raison d'état* or of the national interest is worth using. The content of such a concept may be the rationally justified requirement of policy-making based on a certain hierarchy of goals; in a democratic state – on the primacy of goals that are: a) stably connected with (1) the national identity (expressed in political concepts of the common good, fundamental liberties, existential security, justice, peace, and human rights), (2) basic functions of the state in law-making and law-implementation (including law-adjudication), (3) cooperation of organs of state power, and b) combining change with continuation, c) tested in continuous public discourse, d), non negotiable in relations with foreign subjects. (Stempowski 2007: 207–216). What we discuss here is an ideal criterion. Whoever has analysed the speeches by Latin American presidents knows that reconstruction of the *raison d'état* on such grounds may border on the impossible.

The notion of a political concept of justice, much like of the fundamental liberties and existential security refer solely to the basic institutions of the state, which only partially connects these notions with the stable forms of consciousness, worldviews, ideologies, doctrines, philosophies of morality, religions, etc.

widespread in a pluralistic society; hence – with the political culture of people who are not a part of the broadly perceived composition of the bodies in question. (Yet we distinguish the political culture of individuals, only inasmuch as the political culture of such persons differs from the political culture related to the institutional bodies involved.)

Under military governments and civilian authoritarian presidencies, the rules of functioning of executive power quoted above apply with the following assumptions:

- a) a non-democratic type of presidency implies the concept of the national interest being the reflection of the objectives of the individual involved or group wielding power; present here may be different political cultures, including racist stereotypes and specific beliefs about the relationship between the given nation and other nations, and even nationalistic ideologies accompanying the formation of the concept autonomising "the nation" in the definition of the content of the national interest;
- b) political instability requires a politically exposed citizen to continuously monitor the legal state, including the information related to the implementation of the law being made by the incumbent president (with the limitation or liquidation of the legislative power, and the limitation of the judiciary), especially in the scope of human rights, respect for civil and legal contracts, and the property status; such an updating is performed in relation to the dominant political culture;
- c) the public discourse is controlled directly by the president, a fact also related to political culture;
- d) there is no effective parliamentary scrutiny; present here again is either contradiction or harmony with the political culture;
- e) responsibility of the president is decided along the rules established by the ruling group, which can be characterised in the categories of political culture;
- f) the awareness of the democrats that the values the ruling few are suppressing, are of significance for their opposition is becoming more and more acute; the connection between the policy-making and political culture of these people is obvious.

4. The policy-making: president makes decisions – as a politically rational decision maker – falling back on the identification of resources and frames of reference (even though it were only the position of his group or political party), operating in uncertain circumstances.

The process of policy-making is a set of feedbacks between the objectives of the stated policy with the goals in progress and the goals actually achieved, and

the process of policy-making by the president in a finite (defined) time is the grand total of such feedbacks. Construed in such a way, this process holds the potential of permanent updating of the objective and sequencing of the decision-making acts. Yet the inaccessibility of data on the decision-making process, even worse – the colossal obstacles in accessing the archives, if not the downright lack of documents in the archives – make it difficult to investigate the motivations and consequently the connection between the decisions made with the stable beliefs of decision-makers and other citizens, that is their political culture. Therefore, it will be difficult to use the knowledge of that culture in an examination of the state.

Political rationality is connected primarily to the identity of the president and – to a certain extent – personalities (including emotional profiles) of the president's staff and advisors, and also with their groups of reference, and finally: with the political consensus concerning the national interest. Political rationality allows the president to reinforce his hold on power. The recognised forms of political culture should be obviously useful here, as the president's decisions are to a great extent connected to his tactics. Documentation of the decision-making process conducted rarely bears traces of political rationality, even though such a rationality is obviously present. An insight into such a process could rather be provided in the form of published biographies, diaries or memoirs of its participants, yet such sources are scarce in Latin America.

The internal frame of reference includes the state's unitary or federal character. The president may "intervene" and subjugate the federational subjects (members of the federation), yet a democratically oriented president may strengthen his position towards the federal subjects even without an "intervention", by using instruments related to his unquestioned competences in foreign policy, and command over the Armed Forces. President's social radicalism may lead to the questioning of his position by federal subjects under control of the conservative forces opposing him. See Bolivia under the government of Evo Morales, and compare with what can be said on the federal system and the contemporary society in general (Schulte 1990; Reissert 1995).

The external frame of reference may be less complicated emotionally for the decision maker, yet highly differentiated. It is easier to observe the environment which is composed primarily by: the political situation, the global system, the self-evaluation of the position of the state within the system, international law, and the binding treaties. The assessment of the situation of the state should be performed, among others, with the internationally recognised indices and cri-

teria. Part and parcel of such a practice should be the evaluation of the efficiency of policy-making.

It seems that the political practice is based on the application of a vision of international relations, if not even a few at the same time. For an analyst and other people interested in world politics, the most important element in the frame of reference valid for every state may be the global system construed as the accumulated result of the feedback between subjects and processes, present since the end of the nineteenth century as a universal, procesual, multi-subject, functional, self-regulating system (Stempiński 2007: 99–102). There are also other, varying concepts of the global system: the world system in Frank's model, and world-systems in Wallerstein's model. The explanation of these concepts lies, however, beyond the frameworks of this text. Worth noting is also the fact that even quite recently the notions of the periphery and the Third World were not familiar to everyone in Latin America, and among those who knew them, there were in some countries quite a few, whose political culture required the rejection of these notions when referring to their country, a fact that was especially true of the notion of "the Third World".

5. Policy-making is strongly efficient if maintaining the stability of the constitutional system of policy-making leads to the improvement of the state's position in the global system. It is the optimum one when maintaining the stability, the state reaches a record improvement. Supportive criteria may include: the efficiency of Mercosur and other regional cooperation agreements in Latin America, and in the future – of the Unasur system. A yardstick of this efficiency may be the political culture of those who operate at this level of consciousness, which though a small group is yet unresearched for its political culture.

6. The respect for the (real) property and the principles of justice belongs to the category of existential security (an ingredient of the notion of *raison d'état*), and the postulate of justice in Latin America must refer primarily to the distribution of wealth. One may risk the statement that the postulate of existential security is rooted – though differently formulated – in the political culture of every society, and the better we get to learn this culture, the more precisely we will understand that postulate. Yet, let us ask to what degree the concepts worked out in the prosperous societies apply to Latin American states? Is it the volume of assets that is the criterion, or is it rather its perception? How strong is the impact of relative deprivation? The scope of existential security entails also personal security. How does a residential district of a metropolis compare

here to the favelas? Going further, what is the position taken by Latin American governments viz. such blatant manifestations of the "inequality and the rule of law" that are found in the "police killings" (Brinks 2008), lawless intimidation and killing suspects and witnesses by the police in cities including Salvador, São Paulo, Buenos Aires, and Córdoba?

7. A specific aspect of the relationship between the state and the political culture results from policy-making defined as counterinsurgency, and being in its essence, state terrorism. This is how the state redefines the constitutionally declared institution of the rule of law, putting the citizen not only before the authority which is autocratic but also applies double legal standards. This is based primarily on the fact that the most repressive actions are concealed and publicly presented as apparent abuse of the apparatus of power, while in fact, they result directly from the policy-making of the government; they are conducted on the basis of governmental decisions and decisions of the bodies, services, and offices dependent on the government. Such a policy was present in the operations of the so-called "death squadrons" and even in the Operation Condor initiated during the cold war by the government of Chile and conducted jointly on the power of an agreement between the governments of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay, and in a certain scope also of Ecuador and Peru, by the special services of those states, with the knowledge and approval of the US government, and with the support of the CIA (McSherry 2007). It is hard to expect that the political culture of people from outside the government machinery or groups supporting it could develop the culture of civic identification with the state under such conditions.

## **Democratisation and political culture**

The stability of certain features of colonial, metropolitan political culture in Latin America went hand in hand with the Latin American constitutional republicanism, that is something systematically – ergo also culturally – different from European (ex-)colonial metropolises throughout the nineteenth century and the first decades of the twentieth century. Hence the idealistically formulated Latin American constitutions include the principles of the sovereignty of the people, division of powers, representational bodies, principles of equality of rights, electoral law, etc. with the simultaneous rejection of slavery, inquisition, aristocratic titles, privileges of catholic clergy, limitations of liberties, limitations of private ownership, etc. Nevertheless, this republican constitutional



order was contradictory not only with the (post)colonial order of the metropolis, but also with the practice of Latin American governments – authoritarian and rather akin to the colonial. Obviously, contemporary political cultures of those societies were related rather to the *ancien régime* and may be said to have posed barriers for the new order. The democratic Latin American republicanism drew on European doctrines and US federalism to excel over European monarchism (which is not contradicted by the fact that for a time Mexico and Brazil were monarchies), yet it never managed to transform into the practice of governing in Latin American states. This is why the economic and political development in the United States and Western Europe made the systems of Latin American states of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries measured with the model of the democratic state ruled by law outside Latin America, in the United States and Western Europe of the latter half of the twentieth century. It is mostly on this model that the typical conceptualisation of democratisation of Latin American states is based, with all the limitations of the Eurocentric approach. Hitherto, any new approach is still *in statu nascendi*.

There are features of political culture that favour democratisation, and yet some features of this culture result from the existence of democracy. In the process of democratisation – being a transformation of the systemic kind – there are processes that to a certain extent depend on the system from which one goes to democracy.

In the case of every state under transformation in Latin America: (a) the social grounds for wielding state power (legitimation) changes, which is followed by the legalisation of the previously existing party system, provided there had been one; (b) the implementation of a democratic constitution is restored, institutions of the democratic state are built by the restitution of the system for law-making and establishment of representative bodies of state power (president, parliament) through democratic elections; (c) the functioning of the judiciary is returned; which, however, does not automatically mean the automatic implementation of all the binding legal norms (with the saying *la ley se acata pero no se cumple*, retaining its validity to an extent). The state undergoing systemic transformation is potentially strong, if the success of transformation is assumed, yet the transformation runs from the level of a weak state under the conditions of weakness. (The transformation itself does not make the state, strong.) What is obviously discussed here is the transformation of autocracy into democracy, and not vice versa.

As I mentioned above, the weakness of a Latin American state is stable, which makes it foreseeable. Now, however, I would like to discard this semi-

ironic use of the notion of stability, for the benefit of the defined concept. I refer the notion of the stability of a constitutional system to human activity and legal institutions. The basic criterion for the stability of a constitutional system is not the change as such or the lack of changes, not even a defined single change; this is the combination of (a) two defined equivalent states of balance, (b) two defined changes, and (c) time, that is the combination of (1) the state of original balance, (2) the disruptions that originated in this state of balance, and (3) the return to the state of balance equivalent to the original state, with (4) the return taking place in a finite time. The "return" used in the definition does not mean only the process of returning, but the process ending up in the return. The constitutional system is strongly stable, if after the cessation of the disruption that originated in an existing state of balance, it returns to a condition that corresponds to the original state of balance. The lower levels of stability are a function of the partial process of returning. The empirical discovery of the equivalents of the state of balance assumes the existence of adequate knowledge, which may require historical research of the original condition.

The problem lies in how we define the disruption. It may be defined narrowly, as a change that renders the working out or carrying out the *raison d'état* or national interest impossible. Or it may be defined broadly, as the rule of authoritarian government. In a strongly instable system, to differentiate between balance and disruption may be impossible even in a longer period.

Let us, however, first consider the problem of the duration of the disruption. If the period when the disruptive circumstances last is very long, the question arises whether something that in its initial phase might be considered a disruption has not later transformed into a stable change in the system? Should the duration of the period of the disruption be immaterial for the application of the definition of stability quoted here, the returning of the electoral democracy in Chile in 1999 removes the disruption initiated with Pinochet's coup in 1973. Would, however, also a potential change of the system in Castro's Cuba end the period of the thus defined disruptions, if it were to return the democratic government from before the Batista dictatorship, introduced after a short lived period of democracy? In this case, it would rather be the democracy that would be a certain disruption in the authoritarian rule. The political culture of Cuba has been shaped under the influence of authoritarian or autocratic government throughout nearly its entire history. This is what happened before the revolution, this is how revolution functioned. "Revolutionary justice is based not on legal precepts, but on moral conviction" – Castro (quoted after Pérez 1995: 316). Yet culture is also shaped by the social welfare policies

initiated in 1959. "Since then the Cuban Revolution under Fidel Castro has scored some notable achievements, especially in the areas of health care, education and race relations" (Smith 2005: 24). Could achievements of this kind remain without influence on beliefs – even under authoritarian rule – and not contribute to the understanding of – for example – egalitarianism or speaking more broadly – of justice – if their impact went even beyond the borders of Cuba, and even Latin America? This, however, must be a selective influence, if one does not hear much about the eagerness to follow the Cuban family code with its prerequisite for the men to participate in the housework with the woman in full-time employment. Possibly because it does not work in Cuba either.

The fact of the repeated character of the disruptions, even should they be present for decades, is not a complication that would be insurmountable in the application of the definition quoted above – Argentina experienced in the twentieth century the following: electoral democracy in 1916–1930, a military coup in 1930, returning of the electoral democracy with limitations in 1932, a military coup in 1943, returning of the electoral democracy in 1958 – yet with the limitation of the operation of the Perón party, a military coup in 1966, returning the electoral democracy in 1973, a military coup in 1976, and returning of the electoral democracy in 1983 – yet during the financial crisis (caused by the servicing of the foreign debt) Argentina had five presidents in two weeks (without any coup d'état) in 2001.

The number of military coups in Latin America in the twentieth century, ranged from 15 in Bolivia to 1 in Uruguay, with the average of 8 per state. The high instability in nearly all the countries of the region influences the political culture, but definitely also partially results from it – both in the realm of the private and of the public. Naturally, one must account for the external conditioning of the period discussed (the Great Depression, the cold war). If the technological and economic development continues parallel to that, and the state is active as the owner of businesses and allows foreign investments, the more do the borders between the mentioned above realms of private and public blur, and so do those between the democratic and the partially democratic, while the political culture acquires a greater significance. Similar discussions may be conducted about the connection between political culture with distributional justice and stability (Uruguay and Costa Rica have the lowest Gini coefficient).

With the narrow definition of the disruption, one might point at stable systems only in the case of Costa Rica, Mexico, and Uruguay, and at the systems stable at the medium-range – in the case of the states that experienced no

more than half of the average number of *coups d'état*. With the application of the broad definition, no state is stable. Due to the high instability of the system measured in this way, and automatically resultant instability of the relationship between the state and political culture, the question arises whether it is not the concept of crisis management that should be used in the analysis of the relationship between the state and political culture? Yet does such a concept of crisis not come from the same political culture as the concepts of balance and disruption?

I have already made reference to the known fact that the research of Latin American states frequently reflects the opinion about superiority of highly industrialised societies of the centre of the global system over the peripheral societies. Some of the complications result from the fact that the analytical categories applied are value-laden. The classification of societies, political cultures, and states in the global system is predominantly based on comparing everything and everyone to the condition of the societies in the centre of the system. The touchstone here is the democratic state functioning in the centre of the global system, any other state is classified depending on the degree of similarity to such a central state. Developed thus is a hierarchy with the democratic state (at its top) and ones defined with notions pointing to the lack of certain qualities of the democratic state. The extreme illustration of that are the notions of "failed state" and "rogue state", and the claim of the lack of civil society, or at least about its underdevelopment, in states outside the centre of the global system. In literature concerning the Latin American state, special attention is drawn to the concepts of: modernisation, dependence, imperialism, authoritarianism, military dictatorship, democratisation (democratic transformation), low intensity democracy, *defekte Demokratie*, and state antinomies (*Estado anómico*).

It is impossible to point at a lastingly democratic state ruled by law (i.e. a liberal democracy) in Latin America, and for that reason a disruption – e.g. caused by a military coup – refers only to such an electoral democracy. For that reason, one may even ask whether the system of electoral democracy should not be treated as a disruption of the system of liberal democracy. Treating liberal democracy as the final criterion leads therefore actually to the openly Eurocentric, or rather corecentric measurement of political culture. At the same time, it remains a fact that the international debate on democratisation makes use primarily of the European model, and partially also of the federalist model of the USA.

Nevertheless, even a positive answer to the question about the legitimacy of applying a European measure (democracy) does not rule out examination of an

alternative solution. It could be the hypotheses that political cultures (including the institution of the state) in the societies of Latin America are not to be treated as reflections of European culture, yet the use of certain categories worked out in the culture could be allowed. Accordingly, one should assume that each Latin American state combines authoritarian institutions with democratic ones; and each state does it in a proportion it believes proper. This Creole republicanism would therefore be characterised by the advantage of one-man executive in the system of power that aligns – through the system of personal loyalties – the interests of groups with the greatest economic power with the interests of those best organised sectors of the state apparatus (at the same time having at their disposal the means of direct physical force). A citizen who is not a part of any of these groups aspires to build for himself beneficial relations with the people who are a part of such a group, accepting the authoritarianism of one-man power, the priority of personal relations, hierarchy, voluntary character, and arbitrariness at each level of political power and administration. Relations of this type are reflected commonly outside the system of relations with the people of power. Such a political culture encompasses everyone and everything. In result, the operation of the society is based on such principles, both within the realms of politics and outside it. Yet the social dynamism is also subject to the impulses of economic globalisation and cultural diffusion of systemic models. This is why the Creole republicanism evolves, although not in a linear manner, towards the systems prevalent in the states remaining in the centre of the global system.

Thus, finally, using the model of European democracy makes sense, yet not because it is "better" but because it is the system of the stronger which influences the weaker, and to a certain extent transforms the weak to its own image. It renders the systems similar – and – to a lesser extent, the scientists who research them.

Thus, political culture in Latin America, including the institution of the state, should not be considered in an Eurocentric or corecentric manner, as a system that is immature because it lacks something (democracy), etc, but as one well rooted in historical social processes, and developing at the same time. This development is to be examined not only or primarily as an imitation of European culture but rather as participation and cultural diffusion – through the globalisation mentioned earlier – covering political cultures in the scale of the global system. At the same time, one must notice the evolution of political culture in the countries of the centre. In these states, we encounter the long-term drop in the consequence of increasing dysfunction of the representative

institutions (the turnout at the polls fluctuates strongly, the capacity of effective parliamentary scrutiny of the government's activities is falling, the EU integration processes require quick action that is unattainable in large parliamentary bodies), increase of the role of private financing and economic organisation (also in producing and communication of information), weakening of the state exclusive functions (see private provision of military services) and reinforcements of the institutions of civic society (also in suprastate relations), instrumentalisation of religion and weakening of the educational function of the school, production of ever more efficient means of killing people, growth of uncontrolled degradation of the natural environment... It was in no other place, but in Europe that Nazism was born and the German State operated under martial law for 12 years, it was in European cities of Russia that the Soviet system was born, and in Central and Eastern Europe there were states with authoritarian governments between the two world wars, and the autocratic governments after the second world war: regimes of the state socialism. Modern colonialism was born in Europe. The indigenous inhabitants of America were subjugated by Europeans. When constitutional republics were established in Latin America, European monarchies were still to reign for another 100 years. Plenty of nondemocratic phenomena in various periods belong to the historical origins of the democratic state ruled by law, treated as the main – if not the only – model in the analysis of any political culture. Currently, political culture undergoes a sped-up globalisation, and even if we want democracy to become ever more encompassing, democratic culture is changing as well and ever more often it functions as the resultant – which does not mean average – of various states of political culture. Even Europe within the EU is not uniform as a democracy.

Turning the attention to the differences between systems and similarities between them can turn out to be useful, while explaining the institutional (legal) and sociological characteristics of the state, should we use one of the comparative studies methodologies: (1) "the most similar systems design" and (2) "the most different systems design", which Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune defined in the following manner: "The most similar systems design is based on a belief that a number of theoretically significant differences will be found among similar systems and that these differences can be used as explanation. The alternative design, which seeks maximal heterogeneity in the sample of systems, is based on a belief that in spite of intersystem differentiation, the populations will differ with regard to only a limited number of variables or relationships" (Przeworski and Teune 1982: 39, quoted after Merkel, Puhle,

Croissant, Thiery 2006: 10). In this methodology, one may account for the perception of the state through political culture, unless one takes the position represented by the author of the most developed application of this methodology to analyse democracy in Latin America (Peru, Mexico, Argentina), Peter Thiery, who finds no significant importance in the category of political culture (Thiery 2006: 54).

## **Political culture and collective identity**

Like state in the political, political culture is rooted in the cultural, i.e. the capacity as well as propensity to build and express individual and collective identity and other forms of social consciousness. Collective identity comes first as the propensity of individuals and families to build a multi-family and multi-generational group (community). Based on the fundamental values shared by all the members of the group and functioning in direct contact. Nationality, in turn, is the propensity to build a community of a specific type, the nation: the largest community based on the belief in joint origin and of the decisive importance of this origin for the identity. Which is how it is allowed to be interpreted in European experience and, to a certain extent, in an analysis of the Latin American state. Of special importance in this community is the shared language, the shared tradition (including religion), and the shared economic space. The institution of the state turns up as the most important institutional correlate of these phenomena and processes. Many European states, with their history uninterrupted since the early Middle Ages, operated in harmony with the processes of cultural development of thus construed national identity; the European states without such a continuity – if the lack of their statehood occurred in the period of the quickest forming of the modern nations, that is from the eighteenth to the nineteenth century (the situation of e.g. Poland) – were reborn in the result of the existence of (a) some external premises and (b) of a modern nation formed for a number of generations without their own state. (In such a country, social consciousness form appear which allows the nation to be juxtaposed to the state as if an autonomous entity.)

Compared to Europe, a different variation is present in Latin America, where the precolonial rule was destroyed but some institutions persisted. In colonies, with the passage of time, collective consciousnesses of dual character began to take shape, connecting what came from Europe, with what was being built already in America. Later, the divorce from the metropolises led to the formu-

lation of collective identities that though autonomous, were yet with immediately notable cultural and economic mechanism that separated the descendants of the indigenous American people and slaves from Africa from the population of European origin. Although *mestizaje* was present, yet not everywhere with the same impact on statistics, though everywhere with similar impact on the social structure. Autonomous towards the metropolises, these collectives assumed key positions in the new states. These were these new states that became the basic institutional material for the construction of the new nationality. The descendants of people of the non-European origin had to wait long for formal civic rights in the acts of law, yet in practice this inequality has not yet been fully eradicated, and its source has been not only ethnical. Both a black and a white inhabitant of the Brazilian Bahia state, both typically poor, see that the black "African tourists" from the USA, frequently met there, live in the five-star Hilton hotel.

Yet both these observers are to consider themselves Brazilians, following the *ius soli* principle (the birthright citizenship: where citizenship depends on the place of birth). In Latin America, citizenship has been identified with nationality. This was made easier by the language, as *nacionalidad* was identified with *cuidadania*, which was reinforced by legal formulas, thus *la nación* is not only the nation but also the state as a specific type of organisation of the society (e.g. "La Constitución de la Nación Argentina" of 1949).

In the 1930s, the ideologists of *Deutschtum* went the opposite way, as they treated all the German speaking individuals, regardless of their origin and nationality, as a community that is extended world-wide and united in their Germanic loyalty also beyond the Latin American nations and borders (Stemplowski 1975: 80–112). Similar was the action of the contemporary Italian fascists, who reinforced the ties and connections of the immigrants and their descendants to the old homeland of the forefathers. A similar direction, although without any aggressive purposes and to much a smaller scale, was followed at that time by the Polish teachers sent there to support the Polish "national substance" to Argentinean Misiones and Brazilian Paraná. These activities with quite a moderate result reinforced, however, certain elements of political culture in the milieu of people aware of their national origin: elements of political culture of their countries of origin (Stemplowski 1991: 33–38).

Similar direction was followed by some catholic priests, despite the generally integrative function of the Roman Catholic Church in Latin America (even the relatively recent "liberation theology" did not challenge the idea of the nation, although it accentuated social justice, and rejected nationalism in an



orthodox manner). The integrative function of the church favoured the political culture of accepting every state. Although bishops blessing military dictatorship as the bulwark against – quite imaginary – communism were not few, there were some others who stood openly on the side of the excluded, irrespective of the beliefs of those simple people. "When I give bread to the poor, they call me saint; and when I ask why the poor have no bread, they say I'm a Communist" (Archbishop Helder Câmara, from Olinda-Recife Archbishopric). Despite the fall of the USSR, in the case of a bishop, "communism" cannot be replaced with "Islamism", yet the use of the term "terrorism" is still not fully ruled out.

The themes of the crisis of identity developed in the twentieth century *belles lettres* and political journalism concern the middle-class and predominantly the immigrant states. It is there that "el hombre está solo y espera" (Leopoldo Lugones). In such circumstances, characteristic for the political culture is the uncertainty of its routine, and this is why the state-building messages that it sends out may be ambiguous.

The comment made above concerns also political parties. Parties of all colour develop their activity in Latin America, being more of election platforms than mass organizations. The radical left has criticised local communist parties at least since the 1960s, dissociated themselves from the practices of East European state socialism, and took to arms in the romantic efforts of young intelligentsia ineffectively seeking allies among the underprivileged classes. Official experts bickered in the USA whether that "communism" was the result of the poverty omnipresent in Latin America, or of Soviet agents. Just in case, the governments of the United States supported, or at least tolerated, Latin American dictatorships, possibly even inspiring some of the coups, as the lesser evil and realistic alternative to the ideals like "alliance for progress" or Allende's socialism. That built a political culture where a political party seeks an ally in the army and not in the civil society. Officers, in their turn, correctly perceiving the military as the best-organised institution in a weak state, were becoming used to the political culture of modelling missions of armed forces as a quasi-political party, if not a quasi-social class (Stemplowski 1998). Attempts were made to introduce into the society the belief that the border between what is safe and unsafe for the state runs through the consciousness of a citizen, for which reason the military must intervene within the realm of thought, and if the military ideology of national security is insufficient, more radical means must be applied. Inefficiency of the state in ensuring justice and security, with the simultaneous application of the direct measures, and at times even physical

extermination, on behalf of the state – by the military, president, local dignitaries, or even a latifundist invoking “the order” – must reinforce a political culture that believes that sometimes one must take justice into own hands. Illegitimate violence may be condemned, yet violence as such may be a value accepted by the society. This ambivalence is strongly visible in political culture and, as a feedback, debilitates the impact of the principles of the formally binding constitution.

The sense of national identity may impact the question that is currently most important in bilateral Inter-American relations, namely the regulation of migration. Who demands respect for the identity of the incoming immigrants, assumes stability of some scope of their political culture, and at the same time assumes that their political cultures will impact the system of their new country of residence. The “ethnic” media in the United States consist of hundreds of newspapers, and radio and TV stations. Majority of them are in Spanish. There are also such schools. On the other hand, religious institutions in the new places of residence are rather multiethnic. Migrants in Latin America are not organised. They may vote in Latin American elections to local authorities, yet for understandable reasons, integration develops initially mostly through the market. At the lowest levels of skill political culture plays no significant role. Especially in migrations between the countries of Latin America, there are few people with higher education, and still their ability to adapt to different conditions is higher than average.

In reference to Latin American states, a special role is played by migration of people with higher education between Latin America, and the United States and Europe; migrations caused by the repressions of military governments and changed circumstances after their fall. During forced exile in highly developed countries, numerous immigrants acquire new professional qualifications. Moreover, they learn to live in a different political culture, which they later transfer, to a certain extent, to their native countries. They return physically to the community that they never deserted, but onto which they have a direct impact after their return, as people with slightly different set of beliefs, and with somewhat changed political culture. The most important groups among those are economists and lawyers, men of letters and journalists. Many of them are partisans of neoliberalism. These are usually people with anti-military attitude, pro-democratic stance, and pro-statist orientation; they are the partisans of the broadest possible application of human rights. In most cases they hail from outside the traditional “old” elite; an elite that they displace from public life. They are the carriers of professionalised political culture correlated with the group interest of the potentially new machinery of efficient executive branch of

power as the outward manifestation of the national state. This is an idealism of a new kind. These people probably reinforce all major political forces.

Seeking for further factors binding the institution of the state to collective, national consciousness, we should ask about the importance of presidential and parliamentary elections. Political culture is manifested in all its components, beginning with the elections statute and ending with elections behaviours. Pointing at specific connections requires further research.

The specific characteristics of each national identity, the distinctiveness of each nation and each political culture are related also to the differences in the institution of a national state in Latin America. In Latin America, combined effects of the cultural and the political developed forms similar to the European nation-state, and the differences are connected mostly to the scope and level of social integration. High cultural heterogeneity is at the same time diversification in the field of political culture, and discussions of it facilitate examining the state from various perspectives.

Should we follow Whitehead and other authors believing that the states of the Southern Cone were the ones best organised at the end of the twentieth century, and the states of central America (apart from Costa Rica) – worst, then Mexico and Brazil may qualified to the medium level of state organisation. Following Whitehead, Mexico and Brazil, at the beginning of the financial crisis (the previous one, that is, in 1982), “possessed perhaps the most sophisticated and effective, certainly the most ambitious and self-confident, state autocracies of the region. By contrast, at either of the two extremes, we witness far less in the way of positive change, and also much less growth in self-confidence. Since 1982 the impression of relentless advance has been reversed, through the region, by the debt crisis and the consequent near bankruptcy of most states...” (Whitehead 1998: 385). One is allowed to believe that “ambition”, “self-confidence”, and “relentlessness” are connected to political culture. This is how culture keeps influencing the organisation of the state and is undergoing a change as induced by that organisation.

## **Closing remarks**

The deliberations above underpin my presumption that the cultural and the political of Latin American societies have led to the development of political culture, wherein the ancient Creole republicanism connects with autocracy and

democracy in different proportions for different states (and even for the ethnically differentiated groups and regions in individual countries), the states as organisations with significant *pueblos originarios* being still divided along the cultural line. In fact, in Latin America, the state as an organisation is not (yet?) a fully integrated national state, and the cultural and the political have (as yet?) hardly anywhere brought about the establishment of a society organised as a political nation that is functioning with the use of institutions of the state that is actually and generally accepted in the political culture of a given society, and different states feature different levels of such an integration. In the currently operating states, there are visible – although not everywhere the same – cultural variations, also in the sense of political culture. In the light of the existing literature of the subject, including also my own research, the very notion of political culture remains ambiguous for being too general.

The question why the systemic principles of Latin American states for nearly 200 years did not manage to take a permanent, deep and widespread root beyond the text of the constitution, cannot be fully answered by portraying the limitations of Eurocentrism in system models. One should rather point to the importance of the norms reinforced in the period preceding the earliest stages of building independent statehood. It may be worthwhile to consider the hypothesis that where the cultural will not lead to the establishment of a group with collective identity, with characteristic feature being the capability to manage other groups (from outside the realm covered by its collective identity), the political of such a group does not result in the establishment of a state capable of surviving in the original institutional shape. All in all, making use of literature devoted to political culture is walking on quicksand, even if one is aided by a relatively operational definition. The state view from the angle of political culture, discloses many of its aspects, yet its image does not in this way become much clearer, gaining rather depth and shades. The connection between the state and the political culture naturally exists, yet the results of seeking a specific cause-and-effect connection allow speaking of no more than probability. The more so, as the dearth of Latin Americanist studies of state and political culture combines here with shortage of such research in Latin America. Finally, the parallelism between thinking about the cultural and the political is manifested – on the one hand – in their inconsistently controlled Eurocentrism, which in turn is accompanied on the other hand by the eagerness to accentuate the non-European uniqueness and supposition that if the European observer does not understand something in Latin America, it is because this “something” carries within itself *ex definitione* a deepness of meanings. Despite all

these, discussion of these ties helps us in thinking about the state – both as an institution and as the specific type of organisation of the society, functioning thanks to the systemic connection of norms (building material for institutions) with the population living in a natural environment within a specific territory and developing in the cultural and the political, that is about the nation state. Stabilisation of democracy in Latin American states and the increased prosperity of the population will favour the depreciation of the political significance of satisfying basic needs, appreciating the importance of institution- and culture-related problems of the state (Ingelhart 1989; Pye 1993). Yet before one will be able to say something more revealing about such a State from the point of view of political culture, accounting both for continuity and social change, before one will actually be able to clarify the issues and questions of the state through discussion of political culture, there is a huge work to be performed in research.

Translated by Piotr Krasnowolski