

### **CLOSING REMARKS**

by the co-organizers of the conference:  
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#### *Whitehead*

I'm happy to speak on behalf of my very good friends, including my friends from North America, in this shared venture. It is part of the nature of this dialogue that we are speaking candidly and we are trying to pick up currents and reactions. And I think that our very great shared concern and dismay about what happened on September 11<sup>th</sup> notwithstanding, my own comments and those of others around the table have shown that there are differences in nuance about how that is perceived. And perhaps it is necessary to talk these through a little bit. Not with the object of making anybody feel bad, but with the object of generating the wider understanding that will strengthen the transatlantic dialogue with which we are all concerned. This conference is the second of three.

The first was held in Warsaw last December, and the third will be held in the United States in about a year's time. And the underlying idea behind the three, I think, is that we want to look at transatlantic relations with a very broad geographical approach, from Poland, as it were, to Mexico. And also we want to cover the very wide range of complicated themes which are present in that relationship. And this of course is very ambitious and very difficult to handle, and I do feel myself that in the last day or two we have been remarkably successful in, as it were, surveying the general framework of the relationship, without going into the intricate details and technical aspects of every single question.

This particular second conference was chosen last July with the idea that the emphasis would be on one particular theme, namely the several Europes and the way that affected the transatlantic relationship. And that's why the first three sessions concerned EU enlargement, NATO enlargement, and Russia in Europe. And the question was

how each of these separate works in progress are redefining European identities. First of all, how they were progressing, and secondly, how they fit together, or clash with each other, and third, what the implications would be for the long term relationship across the Atlantic. And I think that all three sessions were very illuminating in that respect.

On EU enlargement it does seem to me that there are huge pending issues, and considerable uncertainties about how they are going to unfold. On NATO enlargement it may happen a bit quicker, and it may go rather smoother, but it too has very long range implications for the identity of Europe, for its security, and indeed for the geo-political framework within which the EU enlargement will unfold. And that led, of course, to a very interesting discussion this morning about what this means for Russia. So I feel that we have successfully fulfilled the original mandate of the conference with those three sessions.

But the mandate was set up before September 11<sup>th</sup>, so what we did after September 11<sup>th</sup> was to consider very urgently whether the design that we created was appropriate or whether the world had changed in such a profound way that a totally different structure for the conference would have been necessary. And the conclusion we four organizers came to at about the end of September was: 'well this is a major shock to the system, but if anything it makes the original design more important to persist with', and that's why the conference did take the form as it did.

Notwithstanding the traumas of September 11<sup>th</sup> which may, I think, have had a slightly different effect on US opinion and on European opinion, its really too early to see how that's going to play out.

Notwithstanding that, there are a whole series of other transactions, relationships, works and businesses in progress which aren't going to stop. They are going to continue to unfold even if most of the political energy is devoted to the security question. The questions of enlargement and so forth may be cast in a somewhat different framework, and different priorities may then come to exercise pressure on policy makers, but there is nevertheless a whole series of economic, political, institutional, and legal agendas that have to be completed and that can't be left alone. And public opinion has to be brought along to understand the processes involved in these complex and difficult issues.

So, that was the justification for going ahead as we did. On the particular emphasis that we've had, I think that naturally and appropriately we have concentrated more than before on security issues this time. But it's important to remember that security issues were already discussed in

the Warsaw conference a year ago in an outline, and at that point they were placed in a context with other questions, economic questions in particular. These concerned such issues as the emergence of the euro and questions of the reconciliation of the claims of the European competition authorities, claims which would have an influence that would affect merger and acquisition policies of United States corporations, and vice versa. All those questions that were discussed a year ago are still unfolding, and as a casual glance at today's newspapers will show, these forms of interdependence, in addition to the security side, are of very major importance for both parties.

So, in the longer run we need, in looking to the future of this dialogue, to have a sequence of studies that take the security dimension as seriously as it must be taken, but also pays attention to the other aspects. In fact it was Leon Fuerth himself who earlier this afternoon talked about the major economic rivalries and the possibility that those could be pursued to destructive limits between the two sides unless more efforts were made to address these questions. In addition to the economic rivalries and the security rivalries, there is clearly the rebalancing of the regional political interests on both sides of the Atlantic. The shift towards Central Europe and the change in the equilibrium of representation of Europe, the consequences of NAFTA and the free trade area of the Americas, and the general shift in the United States' centre of gravity towards the West also need to be taken into account.

And there are transnational social changes of very great importance. People have talked about globalisation in general. There are some cultural shifts, including for example the rapidly increasing ascendancy of the English language as the central instrument for European integration, as reflected in this conference where everybody has conducted themselves in English. And there are other important changes that also need to be considered, one of which would be international migration flows. And all this, both the security, the economic, and the more cultural things need to be examined within the framework of strengthening the international rule of law.

There is the issue of acceptance by all parties of dispute-settlement procedures which are supposed to bind us, and the support for international treaties and international organizations, even when that means a certain degree of restraint on the sovereignty of the member states and all parties. People have talked a bit about the changing role of the state. And one part of that is not the disappearance of the state, but the self-limitation of the state - let's call it the pooling of sovereignty rather than the

loss of sovereignty - in the on-going processes of construction of both regional and transatlantic restraining international organizations. These will work and they will be productive to the extent that they are founded on continuing dialogue so that all parties listen carefully to the different points of view and the different angles of vision that very diverse parties are bound to bring to those discussions. And a continuing dialogue founded in the end on some shared values which would have to involve solidarity. Solidarity in the face of common threats also has to involve democratic values, and has to involve a tolerance of pluralism of views.

And I think that this meeting and many of the activities that have been ongoing in Europe and in North America in the last few years show that great progress is being made in affirming those values and extending the domains to which those values apply. This can only be sustained if the values, in fact, are demonstrably addressing the key questions which ordinary people care about, which would tend to include their security and their identities.

In the end, let me put this as a challenge to the Europeans: what is it that we intend these processes of construction to offer to the outside world in the broader meaning of the word? It won't suffice just for 'several Europes' simply to patch up their differences in some kind of careless, hasty manner, and then merely react to shocks that are coming from outside, or merely to formulate minor qualifications to a leadership which is provided much more effectively from the other side of the Atlantic. It will be essential for the processes of construction, if they are to be durable in Europe, to be founded on a capacity for more effective and more cohesive policies than we have seen in many areas recently. And in particular we will need a Europe which is not so introspective, and a Europe which can generate a coherent discourse. It is not that the United States has produced a very coherent discourse in the wake of September 11<sup>th</sup>, but by comparison what we still have from the European side is a great deal of hesitance, a great deal of separate little voices each reflecting more a kind of wish to defend narrow interests or short-term concerns than to formulate a broader vision. So the process of European integration and construction has to be carried out in the light of these requirements to address the broader problems of the role of Europe in the world. It has to be formulated in a way which is compatible with and harmonized with the United States.

This means that it's not just a European dialogue, it has to be a transatlantic dialogue which needs to help us reconcile the two viewpoints on the opposite sides of the Atlantic,

which in the end have many common fundamental values behind them but which are at present not always being harmonized, leaving public opinions on the two sides tending to tug apart. And that that is what this conference has tried to do. This is what I hope future conferences will try and do, and I know that we are all sharing a common commitment to those objectives.

### *Weinstein*

We've had 12 countries represented by my count - I may have missed one - and we've had over 40 interventions from separate individuals here over the last two days, which is not a bad record for a small conference of this type. And virtually everybody here — virtually everybody I think - has spoken at least one time. So this was not a conference dominated by a single voice or a few voices, and that's something I appreciate. I particularly appreciate the fact that, to use Leon's phrase, 20 years hence there will be some people in this room still shaping policies, still educating students, and working the non-governmental think-tanks in good order. We've had a good generational mix. We've had some younger people in our midst, and I am very grateful for that. I am grateful also, now that he's moved back into the room for a second, for the fact that our Mexican friend joined us in this process.

And finally, if I may say so, my good friend Leon Fuerth, a person who for eight years sat with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defence, and the National Security Advisor every morning representing Vice President Gore, involved at the very apex of the shaping of US foreign policy, will I'm sure be heard from again. I thank Professor Fuerth for having flown over for this one day with us, because he had other teaching commitments in the States. Thank you very much, Leon.

I've said what I wanted to say in the conference pretty much, but I want to go through a catalogue for you of what you've heard. I mean, when you think about the number of organizations that either you Europeans or we collectively have put together since the Second World War, it's really quite stunning to think about. Beginning with the Coal and Steel Community, the Council of Europe, and roughly around the same time period NATO, and then moving forward through all the various incarnations of what is now the European Union, and coming to the CSCE, which became the OSCE, which established yet another structure. Can anyone tell me that this is not a continent or that together we cannot create whatever other institutional forms we need to carry us into this new century? I just don't believe that. And I expect that it will happen.

I will close with two stories, or rather one story and an episode. I don't know how many of you spend time in Strasbourg, or how many of you do at the Council of Europe, as we have. I've had the privilege of doing that since 1983, so it's been almost 20 years now. But there is a wonderful house in Strasbourg, a 19<sup>th</sup> century house which some of you have stayed in, which is the home of the US Consulate General in Strasbourg. Which at some point in the 1980s, through some misguided foolishness about saving money, then Secretary George Schultz tried to close down until my friends in Congress and I, together with a few others, managed to stop him from closing it down. But that house was the house in which Winston Churchill lived when he took part in the deliberations which founded the Council of Europe. It's not an American house. It's an Atlantic house, and it will remain there in that respect, and I urge you to look through it if you're ever there. Some of you may remember the famous story, a true story concerning Churchill when the United States entered the war after the bombing of Pearl Harbor. Winston Churchill flew at great risk to the United States to spend the next three weeks with Franklin Roosevelt, recognizing that this was a moment in which he, on behalf of our democratic friends in Europe fighting Nazi-ism, had to sit with the Americans and talk about joint strategies and what they would do and not do. And it was a very creative period. At one point during that period Roosevelt, in his wheelchair, barged into the bathroom—one of the bathrooms in the White House - and found Churchill without any clothes in the bath, taking his bath. And the President was very embarrassed and said, "Winston I'm so terribly sorry to have disturbed you." And he started to turn the wheelchair to leave the room and Churchill responded, "No, no. Franklin. No problem. I have no secrets from you."

Now, we have no secrets from one another. What gives us our strength is the absolute transparency of this relationship. We may have a secret here and there, but by and large we have no secrets. And we have lived this way with one another, transparently I would argue, since the 1940s. And we will continue to live this way, and we will continue to argue, and we will continue to quarrel like the occasionally dysfunctional family that we are, but mostly we will function. And I think we're going through one of those periods now where there is a sense not of disarray, but of discontinuity. This is a word that has been used here - that there is a sense that there is something that's new in the air in a variety of dimensions. From commitment to global economic and social assistance, to commitment to a global struggle against terrorism, to other things which for both Europeans and for Americans may have been a bit

“out of area” until recently. Because we’re in that struggle together and we have no secrets from one another, we will develop in the end effective mechanisms to deal with these problems.

### *Stemplowski*

If we are going to have any future as Europeans, it has to be a common future with the United States. Our monitoring effort is aimed at contributing to this end. The transatlantic dialogue of ours could help answer a lot of pertinent and outstanding questions, such as: Since international security requires the EU and USA to cooperate, what is going to be the most effective way of accomplishing it? Are our economic models converging? What system should emerge to help the EU and the USA and Canada to optimise cooperation and maximize their collective position in the world system? In what way could the EU and the US enhance world governance? Will NATO and the EU form the new institutional framework for world governance? Will an enlarged EU and perhaps an enlarged NAFTA jointly work towards setting up a customs union to start the process of an enhanced cooperation system? Will Australia and New Zealand become its members? Can the EU and the US jointly form the core of a transatlantic economic area consisting of the enlarged EU, NAFTA (enlarged?), Russia, the Ukraine, and the remaining non-EU countries of Europe? How can we progress towards balanced relations between such a cooperation system and Japan, China, Brazil, and India? And what about our common attitude toward transnational terrorism? Are we going to harmonize development and security on a global scale, and if not, are we bracing for the deeper and endless troubles?

If we are going to have any future, the Europeans and Americans alike, let us ask about the meaning of the postulated commonality, and what shape the common future might take on? My own view is that the United States will not be able to carry on the role of a lonely hegemony for long. Neither will the Americans be able to go on incurring the increasingly painful costs involved, nor will the Europeans be prepared to play Greeks to the Romans for ever. Hence, the crucial question is: how are we going to prepare our societies for the redefined alliance or a new Atlantic Community? Do we know enough of our political cultures, in Europe and America, to debate it? These are the kind of problems the organizers of these conferences should take into consideration.

The conference organizers promised themselves not to speak extensively during the conference, satisfying ourselves with shaping the form of the dialogue, and I think

we kept our promise, more or less. What we were not able to achieve before this conference was to enlist support of all potential sponsors. We didn't ask the NATO Secretariat General for anything, and that was a mistake. But we may improve our work in this domain. We did, however, ask the European Commission, more than once, and it did nothing to help us, and we did ask the presidency of the European Council and the Belgian Government and their Foreign Ministry for support, and they did nothing to help us. We have managed, nevertheless, to get funding for the conference from the contributions of the University of Texas at Austin, the Center for Democracy in Washington, and the Polish Institute of International Affairs in Warsaw. Speaking on behalf of Laurence Whitehead, Larry Graham and myself, I would like to thank the Center for Democracy for their management of the conference.

In preparation for the next conference, I may write to some of you to help me to understand a bit more about the intricacies of the transatlantic dialogue. I would also like to invite my colleagues, the co-organizers, to prepare a joint paper for the next conference on how we understand the transatlantic dialogue or our common destiny. Well, we may be debating on what our common destiny is, but we know at least that our common destination next January is Austin, Texas.

### *Graham*

Let me just second the words that each of my co-organizers have offered, but I think there is someone who deserves particular public recognition, and that's you Ryszard Stemplowski, because when you returned from your post in London, you called both Laurence and me about the idea you had concerning the great need for a dialogue to begin that would be more structured and more focused, involving Europeans and North Americans. And I think it's from that idea, which began as a simple discussion, that hopefully some constructive ideas and relationships have been developed. But I think the success of a conference of this sort is owed, above all else, to the participants. So, to all of you who took time out from your very busy and important responsibilities to come together over the last two days, our thanks go out to all of you. Especially in the case of the Center for Democracy and its staff for the thousand and one organizational details which are necessary as always. But I think what we all hope is that we can create a foundation for beginning a more structured and focused dialogue on reaffirming those things that draw us together. I think the postponement of the conference until now, because of September 11<sup>th</sup>, helped us reaffirm the common

values that shape all of our destinies. That while there are different perceptions, different life experiences, and different things that occur to all of us as we move through our respective lives, one of the themes—perhaps the most important theme I heard over the last two days - is how much we share in common and our vision for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. And the understanding that, to use the phrase just alluded to, whether it's from John Adams or from the Irish setting - we all have to hang together in the new world that is in the making. On behalf of all of us, thank you very, very much.