

NATO ENLARGEMENT

Chair: Allen Weinstein

Presenter: Andrzej Olechowski

Commentators: Sheldon Ekland-Olson,
Bertrand de Crombrughe

Weinstein

We have with us a second such interlocutor who has played a very distinguished role in this process of communication back and forth between Europe and the United States over the last decade, both as Minister of Foreign Affairs and as Minister of Finance, and in a variety of other roles within the government of Poland as well. I suggest that after introducing Andrzej Olechowski and listening to his important remarks on NATO, that we hear our two commentators and then open the floor for discussion.

Olechowski

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me start by thanking you and the other organizers for inviting me to this impressive conference. And let me say at the start that for the last year and a half I was quite focused on polishing domestic issues and policies, losing a bit of touch with international issues. I am therefore very grateful to receive invitations to conferences like this so I can catch-up.

I believe, ladies and gentleman, that it is truly depressing that we should be entering the new century in as tragic a way as we did the previous one. Awaiting news about the war, teaching children how to survive a violent threat. Why is it so? What did we do wrong? The American tragedy of September 11th, the Kosovo atrocities, and other alarming instances of history repeating itself bring to us, I trust, three lessons. First, that security in the 21st century is an indivisible concept. We cannot separate its internal and external components. Second, that the existing international institutions, including NATO, are inadequate for modern global threats. The third lesson is that the

Alliance with the United States is of key importance for the safety of Europe.

The main conclusion I draw from these lessons is that NATO is unfinished business, both as to its scope and its membership. First, there is an acute need for a single Atlantic security policy. Single in both senses, covering all the internal and external aspects of security and adhered to by all the countries of the Atlantic region. There is a real need for a common security space with institutions capable of undertaking and coordinating effective action against contemporary threats. There is hardly any other era more in need of efficient supra-national institutions to deal with security. There is hardly any other era where the added value of such institutions for our citizens is so apparent. Yet on the horrific September 11th, there was no President or Prime Minister of a single NATO country who would wait for the Alliance, or European Union, to speak.

They all rushed to TV to offer their countrymen assurance and comfort, but there was very little they could do, singly, alone, to prevent the disaster, or to deliver on their promise. Their citizens knew it. They were thinking: even America, a mighty super power protected by two oceans, fell victim to terrorism — how can my own nation possibly make me safe? They were frightened and so were their Presidents and Prime Ministers. Indeed, it would be plain stupid to expect that our nation states can effectively deal with threats of a global nature. It would be plain stupid to hope that our nation states could make us safe. International cooperation, working together against common threats, is an imperative, not an option. Should we decide to not fully engage in a visionary common effort, but instead to revamp national roles, the citizens of all our countries will be the losers.

So, what can we do? A broad and ambitious vision of a common Atlantic security era needs to be formulated by our leaders. A vision grand enough to capture the imagination of citizens on both sides of the Atlantic, and practical enough to provide a premise for the systematic broadening of NATO's scope and responsibility. A number of inspiring suggestions regarding the need to create an integrated Atlantic community that have been made in the past by Kissinger, Christopher, and Rifkind, among others, could be now of use. The practical work of the former EU Commissioner, Leon Brittan, would be of help. Models for practical solutions could be provided by the European Union. The extraordinary meeting of the European Council which took place in Brussels on the evening of September 21st provided a revealing insight into the impressive potential for EU common action to confront terrorism.

The annex to the report from that meeting consists of a roadmap of the measures and initiatives to be implemented under the action plan agreed to by the Council and includes as many as 63 areas in which governments found it practical and possible to commit themselves to collective action by and through the European Union. No wonder that at the meeting with the EU delegation Secretary Powell emphasized the fact that although the NATO Council's decision to invoke Article 5 was of huge significance in a symbolic sense, the US administration was well-aware that it was only the EU that could deliver on many of the supportive measures the US needed from its allies. However, we should note the fact that Lord Robertson's suggestion that he would appreciate an invitation to the Council's working dinner was politely brushed aside. Could we do it? Could we really develop NATO into a community? The task appears enormous. Americans would have to accept an institution which infringes on the status they have held until now as the world's hyper-power. Until now they would automatically reject any idea of reduced national sovereignty for themselves, although they would applaud supra-national institutions for others.

A serious reflection on sharing sovereignty would need to be undertaken by the Americans. Europeans, on the other hand, would have to struggle with an idea unthinkable today for a number of us, and not only in France of course, of sharing European sovereignty with the Americans. Poles at least would be among the dedicated supporters of an enhanced NATO. The idea of a closer Atlantic community is dear to our hearts. Not because we like Americans, which we do of course, or as some people nonsensically claim because we are an American Trojan horse in Europe. We cherish that idea because it appears to us as the only geo-strategic concept that allows for a satisfying and comfortable place for Russia in Europe. Russia is simply too big for the European Union. The problem is that Russia's exclusion would throw the whole structure off balance, and yet without Russia unification of Europe will not be complete. The continent will remain divided. So, we need America. We need a community that includes Americans, and then could accommodate the Russians.

Secondly, we should continue to expand NATO to all those willing and able to share in the common security effort. A number of European nations aspire to join the Alliance. That is considered by some to be a problem and a burden. The process of extending Alliances is cumbersome and slow. In fact, we would be wise to actively encourage those European nations that are not yet in NATO to apply for the membership in the Alliance. First of all, we should

encourage all members of the EU to become members of NATO. Legitimate pride in national identities, devotion to the past and attachment to well-exercised ways and means should not prevent Finns, Austrians, and others from doing the obvious—getting together with our American friends in the face of common threats, and sharing in the common effort to vanquish them. As to the post-Communist nations, their desire to join the Euro-Atlantic institutions is the driving force behind their efforts to modernize.

Some of them, particularly the Baltic states, have looked to NATO membership as protection against renewed Russian imperialism. US protection is the best and perhaps the only way to make sure that what you build you keep, as President Bush put it in his speech in Warsaw. These are good reasons, commendable motives that bring peace to Europe, promote and preserve our values, and therefore we should encourage them and respond to them. As Zbigniew Brzezinski notes, European security was and is the single most important basis for European reconciliation.

Without NATO, Europe would not have felt secure enough to reconcile with Germany, and Britain would have been more actively opposed to Germany's reunification. Without NATO it is most unlikely that the EU would have ever come into being. So, as in the case of the three recent entrants, NATO should continue to lead the effort to define Europe. Nobody else can do it. That is why we need a robust expansion. That is why we hope that the number of new post-Communist countries, including in particular Slovakia and the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia would be invited to enlist at the summit next November in Prague.

So much about the will, the worthy drive to join the Alliance and its consequences. But what about the ability and capacity to enhance the Alliance's potential? The experience with the three new members is not very encouraging. While at least in Poland there are some unique capabilities such as GROM, Hungary and the Czech Republic have been disappointments. Indeed, money and politics have hampered the efforts of all three entrants to meet the modernization and restructuring demands agreed with NATO more than five years ago. While there are certainly some more innovative and friendly ways of improving new members' military capacity, including a new hard look into the area of military procurement, there are no smart quick fixes, and therefore there are no reasons to expect that the additional members will perform any better. After all, they have less resources than the first three entrants, and the world economy is in a recession.

This brings us back to the old debate on the nature of NATO. Do we want it to be primarily an integrated political and military Alliance, or the original security system? As is well put by Brzezinski—in the former case additional members should be judged primarily by the degree to which they may enhance the Alliance's political and military potential. In the latter case, they should be judged by the extent to which they increase the scope of political stability. The former argues for greater security and selectivity in admission, the second for less discrimination. I am sure we all agree that we do not want a watered down NATO that gradually loses its security cohesion and its capacity for united and effective action. If so, and if we keep NATO restricted to its present scope, there should be no further expansion at least for quite some time. I see no escape from this conclusion. Nor from the devastating damage such a decision would bring to European reconciliation and reunification. Unless, of course, we consider developing NATO into a comprehensive common security force. In this framework the addition of new members would be much more welcomed. Indeed, they would bring several worthy assets enhancing NATO's comprehensiveness, coherence, and efficiency.

The first Secretary General of NATO, Lord Ismay described the original goals of the Alliance in a celebrated formula, as follows: 'To keep the Americans in, the Soviets out, the Germans down.' Quite a complex task, and yet brilliantly performed. We have now an opportunity to simplify the goal of the Alliance, to reduce it to a simple task — to keep us all safe. But the way to accomplish this transformation is indeed quite complex. What the hell — we can still be brilliant!

Weinstein

Thank you. Well, I think we've listened to two brilliant presentations of the issues and the options involved for this afternoon's discussion. Without further ado, the first of our commentators is Dr. Sheldon Ekland-Olson, the Executive Vice President and Provost at the University of Texas at Austin. Dr. Ekland-Olson, the floor is yours.

Ekland-Olson

Mr. Chairman, I think we ought to at least consider me giving my time back to the panel. There are some clearly serious issues here that people have not had enough time to discuss. But if you would like the commentary, I will try to make it brief. I've been sitting here, thinking about what's been said, and quite clearly it seems that a central issue is this notion of *us* and *them*, *we* and *they*, and this is

the driving issue. Embedded in this idea of what constitutes *us* and *them* is trust and distrust, commitment or just lip service to values that we hold, legitimacy and illegitimacy. The question is, how do we cope with what might be called the paradox of community, the idea that the things that link us together are the very things that sometimes keep us apart. This has to do with interests, it has to do with language, and it has to do with values and multiple identities. It is in this paradox of community that the battle between the tendency to degrade and the willingness to disadvantage versus the idea that we should support, enhance, and defend will be decided.

In recent years the structure of organizations has been driven as much by events and unfolding pressing demands as by pre-determined preferences. The question is, what do we do about this? How do we position ourselves to anticipate the unpredictable? We need to ask how structures such as NATO can organize as tools for maximum adaptability. How do institutions such as NATO adapt to shifting realities? Self preservation may mean total transformation, and in this idea I take Miguel's point this morning that it is not so much enlargement as it is the idea of the potential for transformation of organizations that we need to take seriously. Do we include Russia? Do we include Mexico? Canada? What is the link between NATO and the European Union, and so forth.

New transatlantic Alliances mesh well with trans-pacific ones, but not always. How are priorities set? How do we maintain commitment and legitimacy as those priorities are being set? How do we negotiate the shifting boundaries between *us* and *them*? Does the structure, size, and diversity of NATO facilitate or hinder essential coalition building? And finally, what is the stable coalescing common ground? I think that is not well-defined, although we are in the process of seeking it out. From this common ground comes the motivation to organize. From effective organization flows legitimacy. From legitimacy comes commitment to collective goals. And with that, I'll end.

Weinstein

Thank you Dr. Eklund-Olson. Our next commentator is the Honourable Bertrand de Crombrugghe, Advisor to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, and former President of the EU working group on transatlantic affairs. The floor is yours, sir.

Crombrugghe

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would like to make two introductory remarks. One is that I'm speaking here in

my personal capacity, which is quite normal for a member of a Cabinet to say. The second is less formal and it is to acknowledge that I had the pleasure and honour to serve in the Belgian permit representation under the leadership of Ambassador de Schoutheete, to whom we listened this morning. I do not invoke this as an excuse for what I am going to say because I think this is a very nice opportunity to show gratitude to him. Much of what I know about Europe I basically learned it with him, and from him.

We have the subjects today of NATO reform and enlargement, and European integration and enlargement. These are, and I think everybody so far has said, essentially political subjects which have one thing in common, which is to adjust institutions or existing political systems to realities. The reality of the growing irrelevance of borders (and I think I do not need to go further into the debate about globalisation, which everyone understands) is also a real reflection of the desire to be part of this evolving world. There is a political dynamic on the part of all countries, certainly in Europe, to be part of the global system. The exercise of adjusting NATO and the EU is therefore basically one of linking the past and the future.

Looking back to the discussion we had this morning, I would like to say that despite the ups and downs, we should be aware of the capacity of institutions to adjust. I mean, the EU has gone through a number of crises and we tend to forget that. For example, the Empty Chair policy in 1965 was a terrible event for the then very young European Community. The endless discussion concerning agriculture prices and the "I want my money back" policy of Margaret Thatcher made us think that the community was finished with. But each time we had to note that the EU bounced back and proved that it is not something that is only a visionary project, but that it actually corresponds to a perceived need. When we look at the fundamentals in the single market, the common currency, and progress on defence, these are logical steps in a historical perspective. Of course it requires efforts to make them work, but they do credibly work, and retreat today appears unthinkable.

I would like to make a few comments born out of my experience in the present Presidency of the transatlantic dialogue, which I know best, and I would like to submit to you that I think that experience shows there was a similar type of dynamic between the EU and the US. We started under our Presidency with a new transatlantic agenda that was rather low key. Remember, there was the summit fatigue and the US explained that they didn't want to have a second summit with the EU in the latter part of 2001. Then we had a number of divergences on trade and we still have

a number of them. We are on different paths regarding non-proliferation, and the most natural approach of the EU did not resound within the United States. We had a clash over the Kyoto protocol and environmental issues. We have our regular differences over the death penalty.

So, we started out on a rather confrontational path, and then came the events of September 2001. And what was the reaction? Well, we noticed that all the disagreements moved into the background and that the fundamental solidarity between the EU and the US came back to the surface. We supported the United States in its actions on the ground in Afghanistan. We supported it within NATO, and we supported it within the UN. We actually got back to our fundamental common values. At the same time there was also the worry that Europe was losing influence. Of course, the US may be more dominating in the case of separate and fragmented European states than when faced with an integrated European body. We should also remember that from the EU side, and I think Ambassador de Schoutheete explained this very well, there was a tendency and willingness to maintain a high profile. He rightly mentioned that there was a regatta of European heads of states and governments lining up in Washington in the second half of September.

Despite our concerns I think the discussion is genuinely open—it is there. Concerning the US I would describe the existential question as, what do they prefer? Do they want marginal additions to US influence, or a real partner with which to practice burden sharing? I think that when you see the United States complaining often that they cannot carry the load of being the world's policemen, we can see that we are talking about something real.

In the EU you have a similar existential question being debated, which I would describe as follows: either you cooperate within a wider context, or you become futile. You can make a parallel in the area of trade which is often recognized as a typical area in which the EU has been successful. If we had this successful WTO ministerial meeting in Doha then you can make the connection that this is something that the EU negotiated through a single body, notably the Commission, and that it is one area where the EU played a leading role and helped the US along on a most lateral agenda.

So, what I would leave you with is the idea that there is an internal/external dynamic to thrive upon. In other words there is a positive relationship between European integration and transatlantic relations. I would even argue that this is the key, in that our cooperation with the United States can only develop if those in Europe get their act

together. We need to be able to provide meaningful partners, institutions, and the means with which to cooperate with the United States. Only in such a condition will we remain relevant and remain a partner with a meaningful role for ourselves and the world.

Coming back to the main subject of the day I would argue that there is a similar relationship between the enlargement of the EU and the EU future itself. If the EU had not had the enlargement project, then we may never have had the debate about reforming the EU, and would never have gotten further on the Amsterdam and Nice Treaty policies. There is a similar reasoning to be held with regards to NATO. I'm not an expert in NATO, but I think I would agree with what I heard here this morning and this afternoon that the enlargement of NATO is also an opportunity to redefine its role and to adapt it to the present reality. Thank you very much.

Weinstein

Thank you, especially for sharing with us some of the achievements and experiences of the Belgium Presidency, and your lessons drawn from that Presidency. We are now going to hear from a number of people who asked to speak, starting with Dr. Peter Trubowitz. Next on my list I have Lord John Alderdice, Ambassador Ryszard Stemplowski, Ambassador Alisher Shaykhov, Ambassador Jerzy Nowak, and Mr. Miguel Mesquita da Cunha. If others would like to speak please indicate as we go forward.

I'm going to take the Chairman's prerogative and say two things before I open the discussion, and I'm going to invite our two Ministers to inject themselves into the discussion at any point at which they would feel they would like to do so. Firstly, Senator Lugar's speech has been mentioned and I think it is worth reading two brief paragraphs from that speech. I should add that Senator Lugar is a long-term friend of our Center, The Center for Democracy, and has been a director of our centre for the last fourteen years. We are in agreement with much of what he says, which is the following:

"Those of us who have been the most stalwart proponents of enlargement in the past have an obligation to point out that as important as NATO enlargement remains, the major security challenge we face today is the intersection of terrorism with weapons of mass destruction. If we fail to defend our societies from a major terrorist attack involving weapons of mass destruction, we in the Alliance will have failed in the most fundamental sense of defending our nations and our way of life, and nobody will care what

NATO did or did not accomplish on enlargement at the Prague summit.

That's why the Alliance must fundamentally rethink its role in the world in the wake of September 11th. My view can be easily summarized. America is at war and feels more vulnerable than at any other time since the end of the Cold War, perhaps even since World War II. The threat we face is global and existential. We need allies and Alliances to confront it affectively. Those Alliances can no longer be circumscribed by artificial geographic boundaries. All of American's Alliances are going to be reviewed and recast in the light of this new challenge, including NATO. If NATO is not up to the challenge of becoming effective in the new war against terrorism, than our political leaders may be induced to search for something else that will answer this need."

I think I can state with some assurance that Senator Lugar is not only speaking for himself, but also for many of our leaders in this administration, the opposition, the democratic opposition, and in the Congress. But interestingly enough another well-known transatlantic figure spoke on the transatlantic link on virtually that same day. Apparently some of you know him here in Brussels. His name is George Robertson, and he has some type of job at NATO or whatever. But what Robertson said, and I quote from the speech given to the Sweden's Central Defence and Society Federation, might have been said by Richard Lugar as well, although but he was not as polite. He said:

"The truth is that Europe remains a military pigmy. Europe has some two million soldiers in uniform but finds it hard to deploy and maintain 50,000 peacekeeping troops in the Balkans. And we don't have the planes to take troops that are offered for Afghanistan to Afghanistan," (here he is referring to soldiers committed by European capitals to guarantee the security of the interim Afghan government, and international aid organizations). "If we are to ensure that the United States moves toward neither unilateralism nor isolationism, all European countries must show a new willingness to develop effective crisis management capability."

To finish, one historical point and then I'll open this to discussion. This current situation in the United States with the reassessment of American strategy and policy—the redefinition of policy — is not a new phenomenon for us in the modern world. We've engaged in it on at least three occasions that I can think of in the decades since the 1930s. All of these occasions were provoked by what might be considered defining moments. In the period from 1939 to 1941, we engaged in a huge national debate over assistance, if you remember, to the United Kingdom—to

England which was fighting alone against Nazism after the fall of France. That debate was settled by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, and then Hitler and Mussolini very stupidly declared war on us, saving us the legal problem of deciding why it was we were declaring war on them since they hadn't attacked us.

A redefinition took place then. Another redefinition took place in the period from 1945 until 1949, from which NATO itself emerged, and there is a whole series of moments that the Russians — the Soviets at the time — provided us with opportunities to rethink our policies and gave us good reason to prepare to remobilize a good portion of the 15 million demobilized Americans.

Then of course in the period from 1991 until 2000 we were all rethinking everything on an almost daily basis, and the rethink continues, at least in the United States. Do we enlarge NATO? If so, who is in? Who is out? What do we do with the Russians, et cetera? But all of these traditional lines blurred after September 11th of last year. And that redefinition is in process. I think it's fair to say that that redefinition will also be concluded. It may take more than days or months and it may even take years, but we are at the starting point of the process of that reassessment.

Fortunately it comes at a time when Europe itself, the European Union and NATO are in the process of basically reassessing their boundaries, intellectually and the like.

So, enlargement has taken on a dual mission, if you will, or dual notion, of both enlarging NATO and enlarging its mission in whatever way the United States, Canada (one always forgets Canada, but Canada is a member of NATO after all), and the European countries wish to do so. Having said that, Dr. Trubowitz, the floor is yours.

Trubowitz

Thank you, Allen, I appreciate the opportunity to give you my thoughts about NATO enlargement and would like to thank the organizers for inviting me to do so. Most of what I have to say concerns the US side of the equation, or more precisely how Americans are thinking about NATO these days. I have had Dick Lugar's recent speech in mind and was thinking about it when I sat down and composed my own thoughts. As I understand it, my role as first speaker is to provoke discussion, so in that spirit I am going to throw in a few observations. The first is simply to point out that for all the "to and fro" about NATO enlargement over here, one senses very little of it going on in the United States, and even in Washington for that matter.

Indeed, one of the most striking things about the issue in the United States is, I think, how little of an issue it really

is. There is very little being written about it, and even less is being said about it, Lugar's comments aside, or notwithstanding. It would be comforting to attribute this lack of attention to September 11th, i.e., to the idea that NATO enlargement was on the agenda and it got put on the back burner by virtue of what happened. It is a comforting theory, but I think it's wrong. The truth is that there was also relatively little debate in the United States over the admission of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary in 1999.

The great debate that was supposed to occur never really did. Certainly it paled in comparison, let's say, to the great debate of 1951. Instead there is a great silence and I think it continues today. I mean, one indication is the recent lopsided vote in the House over NATO expansion that occurred on November 7th. The vote was 372 to 46, and there was very little discussion. Another indication was the absence of dissenting voices over Bush's call to admit nations from the Baltic to the Black Sea last June. Few Americans took note and those that did, I suspect, were at least as impressed that he knew where the Baltic nations were as they were by the message itself.

The point here, I think, is that the issue of NATO expansion is not an issue, and the question is why, and what if anything it means in the wake of September 11th? Does the absence of debate constitute a consensus in the United States? I think that one could only draw that conclusion if one believed that collective indifference is the same thing as national consensus, and of course it's not. The reason that there is so little debate over NATO expansion is not because everyone agrees that it is in America's best interest - the real reason is that most Americans really don't care. That is not to say that Americans are isolationists.

Nor is it to say that Americans are fed up with Europe, as they are not. What it does reflect, I think, is indifference, or more to the point a sense that NATO just doesn't matter as much any more. Just because the Americans are not opposed to NATO expansion does not mean that they think enlargement is all that valuable in and of itself. I don't think they believe that. My impression is, and I think public opinion polls bear this out, that Americans have come to see NATO as a kind of family heirloom. It looks good, you'd like to keep it, but it doesn't have a lot of intrinsic value. And this is really not all that surprising and not something Europeans can really blame the Americans for. I mean, most Americans have always thought that NATO's purpose was to aggregate capabilities, or resources, and to check the Soviets. I teach a course on US foreign policy every semester at the University of Texas

with more than 300 students, and to the extent that they know anything about NATO at all when they arrive, what I've just said is it. The end of the Cold War has made NATO seem less viable to many, indeed to most, Americans. This, I think, is the real meaning of the message that Lugar gave last week about NATO's future.

American concern about European security has been waning for some time, while Washington's focus on other parts of the globe, most notably Asia, has intensified. September 11th is likely to accelerate this shift, and if anybody doubts it they must account for the fact that when George Bush gives his speech next Tuesday, he's going to announce a 14% increase in the US defence budget. Once you discount for the amount that will be given to all of those men and women in the services that cast their absentee ballots in Florida the right way, it's a huge increase. If it goes through it will be the largest increase of its kind since Ronald Reagan and most of it is being designated for the kinds of capabilities that are not really focused on, or directed towards, the European theatre.

Instead these funds are for the development of power projection capabilities — really the ability to reach out and touch someone outside the European theatre. What Lugar has done in my judgment is a very good thing. He's given Europe a heads up, and I agree. He has basically said, and this is a friend of NATO calling, that in the absence of a new mission NATO is likely to be perceived as increasingly irrelevant to America's security interest. I think that's right. I think it's also somewhat ironic. For NATO has always served a second purpose, and there was an allusion to it earlier. It is one that most Americans know very little about.

NATO hasn't always been about checking threats from the east, it has also been restraining and influencing friends in the west. Let us be candid, the point of the Alliance is not just to aggregate capabilities and check aggression. For the US at any rate, it has also been about maintaining leverage over our friends. This is frankly where the real case in Washington for NATO enlargement lies today, but alas it is a case that cannot be made publicly, certainly not by someone other than a professor from a university. This, I think, is a pity for it is a view that would appear to be just as much in America's long-term security interest as the war on terrorism. It is a feature of NATO that actually speaks to America's long-term security needs and interests, but it is not part of the discussion in Washington or beyond, out in the heartland like in Texas.

Weinstein

Thank you, Dr. Trubowitz, for what I think we would all agree Harry Truman used to call “plain talk”. Thank you very much. Lord Alderdice.

Alderdice

Thank you very much, Allen. We are talking about the development of the European Union, and its relations with the US, and of course the wider Europe. The European Union is in some sense, as I think most of us would agree, still developing and in this sense is a relatively new instrument. Despite this it's been in development for 50 years, which tells us that 50 years is not a very long time in international politics. If we go back another 50 years, in other words to the beginning of the 20th century, we would have seen a very different world indeed. The British Empire, the German Empire, the French Empire, the Austria/Hungarian Empire - it would have been astonishing at that time to have predicted that within a very few years all of those empires would have disappeared completely. That Germany and Britain would go to war twice in a generation would have been particularly difficult to understand.

Let's remember that the imperial families were almost all related to each other by marriage, and foreign policy in those days was decided not on the basis of democratic votes, but elite decisions. Now, the point to my comment is simply to say that in truth we have no idea what will happen in the next 10, or 20 years, never mind the next 50 years. So, when we say that enlargement is inevitable, what we mean is we hope it will happen, or we dread that it will not happen. We're certainly not saying we know it will happen because we don't. The second thing is that we don't know that things will happen simply because they make sense.

Neither the First World War nor the Second World War really made very much sense in the end to anybody. They were incredibly destructive and damaging, and we spent the rest of the century trying to get out of what we created then. Unfortunately, and I suppose here I speak as a psychiatrist, people don't necessarily do things because they are in their best interests. They often do things against their best interests just because they feel like doing them. Indeed, they often feel like doing them out of fear as much as out of power or avarice. I come to this because, whilst I don't for a minute suggest that organizations always continue for the purpose for which they were established, we need to remind ourselves of the purpose for which both the EU and NATO were established. Both of them were set up to deal with the wars of the 20th century. The EU essentially came into being

because for hundreds of years Europeans had been fighting with each other with increasingly disastrous consequences. The disastrous lessons of the First and Second World War were that we began to realize that our impotence could no longer defend us from our own aggression. We had become powerful enough to destroy ourselves. In the past the limits of our power protected us from our aggression, but we couldn't depend on that after the First, and more particularly the Second World War. We were too powerful for our own good. As a result the EU came into being to protect us, and European citizens didn't need to have it explained to them that they needed to do something to prevent a further war. Everybody knew that it was an imperative.

Furthermore NATO came into being at least partly to protect Europe from the outside threat, both in terms of what Europe wanted and what the United States wanted. So these institutions were there to deal with aggression. But the mechanism that was used in the EU was economic cooperation. As a result, it seems to me that one of the difficulties now is that very few European citizens think of the development of the European Union as essentially to protect us from further European conflicts. The Brits, Germans, Italians, and French now would regard it as inconceivable that their countries would go to war against each other.

Although nothing is inconceivable, people regard it as inconceivable and they see Europe almost wholly in economic terms. From this point of view they are supportive of it, and supportive of the transatlantic nature of it because they no longer believe that any government controls economics. They no longer believe that it is possible for governments to deliver on those issues. That is, except in so far as governments and transnational organizations can provide money and grants, and then of course they are very welcome.

For example, when the Irish people unfortunately voted as they did it wasn't just because the political elite in Ireland were very poor at making the case. It was because the Irish people didn't regard themselves as under any kind of aggressive threat from anyone — except perhaps those accession states that might take away the EU grants Ireland has been receiving. They voted against it because they were pro-European so long as there was money coming to Ireland because of its social/economic status. Once it was a question of giving money to others rather than getting it themselves, it was a different matter all together, and so they voted against it.

I think one of the problems is that European citizens don't see the benefits of enlargement after the end of the Cold

War. In Western Europe, at least, people do not see enlargement as having the protective qualities that people in Central and Eastern Europe still appreciate because their experiences are much more recent. The tragedy for politicians, all of us as politicians, is that people very quickly forget what you have done for them. They really only vote for you for what you will do for them, and once a threat is gone, as Mr. Churchill found out, people have no more need for you. As a result there is a real dilemma for both NATO and the European Union in terms of enlargement. These institutions will lose support unless we can persuade people that the purpose for which they came into being, or the purposes to which they can be transformed, are relevant and effective. Now, this seems to me to lead on to the effects of September 11th, because there too the kinds of threats perceived to exist have changed substantially.

The significance of September 11th was not that something new effectively had happened, but first of all that the United States was invaded on its own turf in a way that hadn't really happened ever before (Pearl Harbor was not part of the continental US). September 11th also put terrorism on the world map in the post-Cold War era in a way that it hadn't been before. Most people had tended to see terrorism as something that was a vicarious form of fighting by the Cold War partisans, and although there were remnants of that still around in Cuba, in Ireland, in various places, in the main it was over.

Suddenly they realized that terrorism hasn't gone away because the vicarious requirement of the cold warriors is gone. It has reappeared in a very powerful way because of other value differences. The problem concerning September 11th for EU enlargement and NATO, as presently constituted, is that these institutions offer absolutely no defence against such terrorism at all. Consequently when people are frightened by the new conflict and the new aggression, they don't automatically see either the EU or NATO, enlarged or otherwise, as offering any protection.

In my own experience for example, if the British Army (not an almighty force, but not negligible either) was unable over a period of 30 years to defeat a relatively small but well organized terrorism army in its own borders, and was finally forced to make a political settlement, how on earth can a traditional military approach by NATO or otherwise protect the population? Indeed the jury is still out as to whether the IRA or the Brits in the end won, and we may not know for the next 20 or 30 years. That is what ordinary people see and say to themselves. So, whilst I am someone that wants to see European Union enlargement, and thinks that NATO

enlargement is probably a good thing if we can work out what exactly we want to do with it, it does seem to me that there are rather fundamental questions about the kind of world that we're in, and the kind of structures we need.

Essentially I believe that people now don't see government or politicians as being able to deliver the economic goods that they have, and that's one of the reasons that they're not voting very much for politicians. The democratic deficit is not the big problem, it is not that people aren't voting because of the democratic deficit. Instead they are not voting in any of the countries, on either side of the Atlantic, because they don't actually believe that politicians can deliver what they want economically. Indeed after September 11th they are not even sure they can deliver on protecting their own people in their own borders.

Weinstein

Thank you Lord Alderdice. As you can all see there is a virtue to having a psychiatrist in our midst in discussions of this kind. I also appreciate as an American your not having mentioned yet another issue which you're imminently qualified professionally to deal with, but which threatens to undermine the confidence back and forth between Europeans and Americans, and that is the European reaction to the treatment of al-Qaeda and Taliban prisoners.

The backlash will start in the next few weeks when we will see articles in which there is an analysis of the way that European countries over the last 30 years have responded to terrorist groups within their own societies, and so forth. If there is any European in the room who doesn't think that most Americans are absolutely puzzled, confused, and angered by what seems to be the response of the European media and some governments then that is another warning. It is important to watch this as it takes off, because it could be an issue that affects NATO enlargement and a lot of other questions. Ryszard Stemplowski, the floor is yours, Mr. Ambassador.

Stemplowski

I realize that it is my turn to speak now, although I asked for the floor on point one. And so, Mr. Chairman permitting, I shall refer to several topics which have emerged in the meantime. Lord Alderdice spoke about the widespread feeling among the populations at large, with people asking themselves whether enlargement, indeed NATO and the EU themselves, are effective protective institutions and whether they have sufficient qualities. He's right to point out the significance of the fact that such questions are being asked

50 years after the Second World War, and under the present conditions. This is due to two factors. First, the generational change, and secondly, the political permissiveness of the Western Powers *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union. Were it not for the fact that Poland and other Central European nations were fighting for their independence, what sort of topics would we be discussing right now? People should get to know more of world history and draw conclusions from history, lest they deserve repetition of the disastrous experiences of war, genocide, and foreign domination.

Identity has been another topic of discussion. I would say that the only enduring identity is generated within the family. Whilst nations seem to be a passing historical formation, the family is not, although it is undergoing a profound transformation. Nations are built either as cultures, in areas where states were non-existent or weak, or as purely political communities, in areas where there was an uninterrupted state organization in existence. However, nowadays we are experiencing a new type of integration in Europe. Bonded by nations as we are, ethnicity being the strongest base for the national identity, the European Union is stimulating our national identities, generating transformations in all the countries involved, while we are building the emerging EU identity drawing upon our ethnic or cultural identities at the same time. And why not go further and ask about the convergence of the European Union and the United States and Canada? Could it develop without influencing and being influenced by the national, American, and European identities? And globalisation is a feed-back with yet another level of the emerging collective identity. All of these - the European, transatlantic, and global identities - are in the making and at the least we should be talking about them.

A few words about the NATO-European Union relationship. There is a widely held view that NATO owes its existence to the US-Soviet confrontation. And I dare say that were it not for the fact that NATO was set up, another organization would have been put in place to protect unifying Europe, the emerging European Union that is, and to secure the US contribution to peace among the European states. The Soviet-American confrontation was a corollary or correlative fact. It was an important stimulus and it may have played a decisive role in terms of formation, policy making, and so on and so forth, but nevertheless the underlying social processes were those of unifying Europe and dealing with the outcome of the Second World War.

The question has been posed here whether EU enlargement is a foregone conclusion. I am positive about it: it is a foregone conclusion, because the formative forces of

unification on all continents have been at work already for generations now, actually more or less since the end of the 19th century, and what matters is that more and more economic reasons exist to cooperate. Technological development is pushing us in the same direction, and the alternative — a freezing or limiting of EU development — would bring about disastrous results in the long run to all the European countries and to the United States as well.

Weinstein

Thank you, Ambassador Stemplowski. I think we are all hopeful that this new collective identity that you describe emerges, but I cannot restrain myself from reminding you of a line that has affected my life a good deal. It was a line written by the American historian, Arthur Schlesinger, in an essay on the causes of the American Civil War (which is another war that Americans thought could never happen). In this essay he writes that “history is not a redeemer promising to solve all problems in time,” and I’m afraid we’ve all learned that in the 20th century. May we not have to learn it again in the 21st.

Let me tell you where we stand in terms of our speakers’ list. We have seven people who have asked for the floor, and there will be plenty of time for them and for other speakers, if others care to speak. I have invited Minister Geoana and Minister Olechowski to comment whenever they wish to do so. Hearing no request for the moment, I will turn to our next speaker, and our next speaker is Ambassador Nowak.

Nowak

Thank you. I was about to resign from the list of speakers owing to the fact that to a certain extent Ambassador Stemplowski has replied for me, but I very briefly want to refer to the somewhat depressing remarks we have heard from Professor Trubowitz, which were particularly depressing for me because I’m supposed to be a representative to NATO very soon. In fact, the first question I had was whether this is the opinion of, so to speak, the public at large or the political elite? Is this the opinion of Washington itself?

Then I replied to myself that if it is the opinion of the people, then sooner or later it will come to Washington and to the political elite anyhow. In addition there remains the problem of whether we could really change NATO in such a way that it would become an effective stabilizing force in Europe. Joining these two issues together, the question that seems to be pertinent is whether in this case the United States would see the merits to such a process. We believe that something like this opinion exists at the

moment. From our perspective NATO is not losing relevance, because although it is a less protective institution now, it can still provide a stabilizing force. Indeed, if we think about enlargement we should see the important value of this.

I should like to make two brief points. The first concerns something that has not yet been mentioned here: that if NATO enlargement is part of a complementary process with the European Union then it will have stronger stabilizing resources. The second is a brief thought: that neither EU enlargement nor NATO enlargement should be objectives in of and of themselves. In the case of the European Union it is enlargement of the area of common values which is important, realizing also the ideals of an idealist Europe. In the case of NATO, the objective should be enlargement of the area that can be stabilized.

Finally I want to refer very briefly to what was said by Willy Stevens, who has presented a list of problems such as financing difficulties, migration, insecurity, the changing direction of funds, and so on. I have a very strange feeling that we have already faced these problems, in 1981 and the years that followed, when Spain, Portugal and Greece were entering. They entered with precisely the same questions being raised, and there was no problem. I think that something similar will occur now, because if Poland has to invest 40 billion euros, even though this is a lot of money for Poland the 40 billion euros in the area of protection serves not only us, it serves the whole of Europe. Thank you.

Weinstein

Thank you, Ambassador. I have six speakers who have asked for the floor. The first Mr. Miguel Mesquita da Cunha.

Mesquita da Cunha

If we are talking about NATO enlargement, we must talk about NATO relevance in the same breath. What roles do we ascribe to NATO at the moment? The initial role, or at least the one that strikes the legal mind, is security of the NATO area, in other words the territorial aspect of NATO. Politics, geo-politics, and indeed the Washington declaration have expanded this concern of security of the NATO area, so that it means our security as events outside the geographic area can trigger Article 5. This, of course, gives a totally new meaning to the acronym TMD, which used to be theatre missile defence, and which is now more accurately terrorism plus mass destruction. In turn this generates a totally new relevance to the whole aspect of procurement. This impinges not so much on the procurement of the traditional equipment needed for defence, but procurement

of the equipment needed for defence against the new threats, which increase the military imbalance between the two sides of NATO. In this context there is not only a financial need for sustainability and a technical need for interoperability, but a political imperative for openness and a sense of fairness in procurement.

The third role for NATO, I think, is that of sustaining the transatlantic commitment, to which Dr. Trubowitz referred. This raises the question not only of the border countries, but also of Cyprus. If Cyprus joins the EU it would have a legitimate cause to join NATO.

A second important point when we consider the enlargement of NATO is the role of the armed forces, and here I think that we are speaking about totally different realities and mind sets. For the US, and of course I may be oversimplifying, the armed forces are primarily an instrument for defence and therefore for security. That's the purpose they serve. In the case of Europe, the situation is much more diverse and variegated. In some cases, such as France and the UK, the armed forces are primarily a means to maintain a status as a major power, hence the importance assigned to the nuclear dimension of the armed forces in those countries. In other cases, such as Sweden, Norway, Finland and Greece, the armed forces were seen as a means of territorial defence and therefore have a comparatively high level of public support. The third category in Europe encompasses Ireland, Norway again, and probably the Netherlands, where the armed forces are seen as an instrument of diplomatic autonomy and diplomatic presence in the world. Ireland has the ability to assert itself via the United States in a different way than the UK, whilst the Netherlands and Norway seek to generate the ability to have an internationalist diplomacy via their support for peacekeeping roles. The last category of European states as regards the role of the armed forces includes countries like my own native country, or Spain, Belgium, or Italy. Here the armed forces are ascribed no defence value at all, but are seen simply as a means to buttress statehood and traditional values.

Now with such different expectations from our armed forces the enlargement of NATO, the relevance of NATO, and the integration of NATO is extremely complicated. One of the consequences is that in Europe we have extremely poor value for money with regards to defence. Defence is daylight robbery of the taxpayer and there is extremely little debate, not only about European defence, but about defence in general. So, once we have taken these two sets of elements into account, the process of enlargement must now be reflected upon and conducted in the aftermath of September

11th. Now, I hope I'm not going to shock my American friends, but I may dare say that September 11th didn't change the world - it changed the American perception of the world, which is very different. Most of mankind happened to know that the world was a dangerous place, that terrorism existed, that international threats existed, and that we could be destroyed almost instantly. Suddenly the realization came to the most important country in the world, but it didn't change the world as such.

So the lessons from September 11th need to be taken into account when we deal with NATO enlargement. On the one hand, the fact that our most powerful ally was so badly struck in its own territory reinforces the impression, or renews the impression, that there is a common threat which requires common defence. This was an impression which was being watered down following the demise of the Soviet block.

For the US, I hope, September 11th marks a realization of the fact that although security requires a very credible and effective defence, it must go beyond that. There needs to be a realization that prevention of some threats cannot be obtained by defence alone and that the treatment of these threats should not rely upon the armed forces only. Thus the scope of action involved in enlargement goes hand-in-hand with two issues which could be either gaps or convergences, depending on how we handle them. The first is what we do about our military capabilities. Will the gap continue to widen, or on the contrary, via an intelligent procurement, will we see an intelligent integration of defence against the new TMD? Should we have more integration amongst those different armed forces, despite their different national functions? Secondly, will diplomacy, preventive diplomacy, and economic diplomacy be seen as an element of security?

Weinstein

Thank you very much. We have reached the point in our discussion where it is time for a coffee break. So, Mr. Ambassador, would you open up the discussion when we return from the coffee break? Knowing full well that my friend Minister Geoana has to catch a plane shortly, I wonder if he would care to make any remarks before we all break for coffee? Also Minister Olechowski, obviously.

Geoana

No. I would just say one word — that the quality of this debate indicates that irrespective of how we look at the tragic events of September 11th we have entered one of the most dynamic, interesting, and complex times. The only

thing I'm praying for, looking at our American friends for, and looking into the historical experience that Allen has referred to, is that the innovation continues. We have had the radio, the Great Depression, the New Deal, Truman, the great generation, and now this new generation of American leaders, some of them coming from Europe, home states, from the university — maybe they will give us a new response.

To put it a bit differently, are we going to look only to the empirical, superficial expression of this new threat, or will we take a deep breath and look thoroughly at the whole status of global affairs, including financial institutions, globalisation, poverty, education and the other key issues. The silver lining to this tragedy is that this new administration has a fantastic mandate which only usually exists after a big disaster — otherwise you have surveys, opinion polls, and strategists telling you what you should do and what you should say because you're losing points. Bush still has this mandate, but he also has the bad luck of having a stagnating economy. Even so, I think that from the American perspective this is a chance that should not be missed, and I'm hoping and praying that the end result of this introspection that America is going through will lead to something that is more important than job security in the traditional sense.

If we lose the US on this, I am afraid there is no other force today, not in Europe, not in Russia, not in China, and not in the Pacific that will be able to come up with a new proposition. Only a hyper-power has the ability to generate at least a debate on the structure of the global society in the 21st century.

The second point that I would like to make is more practical. What I took from Senator Lugar's speech was basically one simple idea. I think that sooner rather than later the issue of transatlantic nuclear, biological, and chemical missile defence will confront the whole transatlantic community, including Russia, the Central Asian Republics, and the former Soviet Republics. This will have a huge impact on the very nature of NATO. So rather than simply looking at how we want the NATO of today to adapt, I think we need to appreciate that we are in a situation which will put fantastic pressure on NATO to adapt in certain ways. I can see this from the debate between the Russians and the Americans concerning the American bases in Central Asia. This does not necessarily mean that America will provide a permanent presence, but that this space will come to be perceived as making up the interests of America.

The second point I would like to make is also from a European perspective. The question is, how quickly will globalisation and our economic needs indicate the need for a transatlantic free trade area? I would leave you with these two thoughts as the wings of the big question. Firstly, is this President going to use his fantastic historical mandate to regenerate — together with his European allies, the G7, the G8 and everybody else — a debate about the fundamentals of the 21st century world? This must be not only security, but also about economics, finance, and other factors. Secondly, will we have a NATO that will be a reflection of a new security arrangement, starting from this crossroads between mass destruction and terrorism? On the other side of that coin, how fast will we realize that enlargement of the European Union, on its own, is not good enough for the economic interest of the Union. America's free trade area will be good enough for American global economic and trade interests.

So, I'm leaving you with these two things. Thanking you again, I sometimes feel I regret that I'm in politics. I would love to be back in my Washingtonian shoes, writing cables about how the administration is handling the whole thing.

Weinstein

Thank you, Minister. As we adjourn for coffee first of all let me thank you all, especially those who have had great patience waiting to speak. We are going to take comments first and then Minister Olechowski would like to say some things, after which we'll go back to our list. I wonder if I could ask you to be back in your seats so that we could resume business at 4:00 sharp. That would be great. Thank you very much.

Shaykhov

I want to make some points which are connected to several of the issues that have already been touched upon by other speakers. I also want to use the opportunity to concur on the issue of enlargement of the European Union and NATO. I want to do this from our point of view, let's say as outsiders, as observers of what is going on, to look at the benefits we are getting from this enlargement. The first thing I would say is that when we now look to assess the enlargement processes of the European Union and NATO we are thinking after the 11th of September, and this means that we are thinking of how capable the institutions will be in dealing with the new challenges that already face the United States.

Unfortunately answering this question will be difficult. For the European Union it is a big question. For NATO it is also

the key question, but it's not so big. Through NATO we still have some of the tools of the cooperation with which we tackled certain issues and we have experienced a very intensive consultation during the action in Afghanistan by the United States and the international coalition. I think this is one of the biggest problems of the enlargement, because enlargement usually means thinking about institutional enlargement. About increasing the membership and establishing new bodies and thinking who will take care of the costs and so on.

Despite this, I think it is even more important to think about the conceptual enlargement, and the conceptual point of enlargement. From this point of view I will say that for Europe after the 11th of September maybe nothing has changed, and I think this is the response of the European countries. We understand this point as in Europe, because we also have the understanding that the world already changed several years ago. It didn't change on the 11th of September, but when the former Soviet Union collapsed.

There were already two camps, and even though the Berlin Wall was taken down, the glass wall still existed between the two sides. This is not only Russia, but also the Soviet Union. Afterwards, we changed our policy conceptually, but we don't see the same thing happening with regard to the southern countries, especially in the European Union.

Indeed enlargement took place when Finland and Sweden became new members, but what we gained we lost. Now it is more difficult to cooperate with these countries, as they follow the general policy of the European Union. We are expecting that this is what the next wave of enlargement will bring. We expect that we will lose our very traditional and friendly relationship with countries like those East European countries with whom we have very strong cooperation in the political, economic, and cultural fields. This is because in the cultural fields we don't have all the instruments in the European Union to open a dialogue. So what tool can be offered from the European Union? We don't see any for the time being. Thank you very much.

Weinstein

Thank you Mr. Ambassador. Our next speaker, who also waited patiently, is Minister Olechowski. He will respond to many of the comments made thus far, and then we will return to the speaker's list with Mayor Daldrup.

Olechowski

It is perhaps not so much a response, but a reflection that indeed one cannot be anything other than impressed by the

argument that there is a lot of work facing us if we are to make our security arrangements adequate for what we have already experienced and what we expect to experience in the 21st century. I'm trying always to take the same point of view as Lord Alderdice — that is, the taxpayer's point of view. I can't help but notice that after 20 years of fighting terrorists we have lost two world trade center buildings, and half the Pentagon. So, obviously money has been wasted and we cannot simply continue in this mode. The big issue is: what do we do now?

What would be the most appropriate, I would suggest, is to escape forward. This means deepen the relationship which is strategically and fundamentally essential for both continents. Europe and America drifting apart is undesirable. We've learned from experience a number of times that if America goes away then it means trouble for both us and for America, and we shouldn't repeat that. So, we need to carry on with NATO and deepen NATO rather than replace it.

I am surprised that I don't hear suggestions about how we can go ahead with this project. Europe is probably more ready for it than ever in the past. Europe, I think, has gained enough self-confidence to deal with Americans, to talk about the community with Americans. It has its own single market, it has its own currency, it has the necessary confidence to take on new challenges.

Daldrup

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. An observation I would like to make after the addresses and speeches here today, especially that of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania, is that I get the impression that if I want to meet politicians who are defending the case of Europe and are enthusiastic about the European idea, I have to go east. The best speeches on Europe, the best visions I received are from eastern Prime Ministers, politicians, and ministers, not from ministers or heads of state from within the European Union.

I remember when the Treaty of Rome was signed in 1957 and my father was asked by Konrad Adenauer to move to Brussels to construct Europe, and moving over here very early in 1958. I still remember very well the fascination of the vision of constructing a Europe, especially including France and Germany at that time, where there would be no more war. This was a vision that we believed in, and it was the heads of state who inspired it, not the populations of the time. The root of the European Union has names, Adenauer, Schumann, Monnet, and then later also Kohl,

Mitterrand — this was really a time of European leadership. It was these individuals that pushed the European idea. There was not too much asking or consulting with the population or the media, even in the case of the euro, which was the last project of Kohl. And in spite of the media, against all pressure from all sides, now that the euro is in place we are happy. We are satisfied. I think the last big European insight concerning the Union or the administration itself was Delors' *Vision of Europe, 1992*. What I've seen missing in the last few years is the big European insight, or the tools of the three big Europeans. We don't really have European leadership now, and I miss that. I see European leadership in the eastern countries that want to join, but I don't see it in our 15 countries. On the contrary, what I observe is that we are going back to nations. Take a look at what Berlusconi is doing, or my German Chancellor is doing - he is not a very European minded man. He was against the euro. He is not a European, even in France. And this is not even to speak about the UK or the Scandinavian countries. Some countries are not even interested in joining the euro. I think the fact that these leading European personalities are not there anymore explains a lot about the situation we're in today. You could compare it to a ship on the ocean where the Captain died, and there are only technicians and engineers. The ship moves, but where?

Unfortunately there is no direction — the Captain is missing. If you look to the administration here and the Councils of Europe, and all the other institutions, this is the impression that I'm getting. And as regards the enlargement of NATO, where is the head of state, where is the European man or woman in Western Europe, telling us and telling you in the east what the vision really is? What is the objective, the goal? Where do we go? Even I have no idea where the European Union should go. I am engaged in politics in Germany and neither my party nor other parties have a clear picture on where to go. It is very materialistic. Today we are living in a community where we share welfare, a community where we share funds, and this fund rising from Brussels is becoming one of the main objectives. Now when we speak about Brussels, Brussels means funds. If there are the funds to make all the streets green, we will make all the streets green. It is unbelievable what the vision of Europe has become. The same is true concerning NATO. I think the attitude toward terrorism in Europe is quite different from that in the United States, but where is the head of state, the individual to speak about it? Who is talking about how to fight terrorism and what instruments we can use? I think the European attitude toward terrorism

is to avoid terrorism right from the beginning, to look for the reasons of terrorism and then to fight these reasons. In other words, to start much earlier. I also think that our last objective is to use military intervention to fight terrorism. Our politics is to avoid terrorism right from the beginning.

This is also the European idea. We want to live in peace. I, and many here in this room, are living for the first time in an era where we have gone 50 years without war in Europe. It is the first time in 1,000 years that Europe, let's say Central Europe and Germany, not to mention Poland, has had a period of more than 50 years of peace. This has never happened during the last 1,000 years, and this is in our mind. We want to continue to live in peace, and terrorism is what we fear. If there is terrorism, and we fight terrorism with military action, terrorism will come back stronger, and will spiral up, up, and up. This is the fear we have.

To some extent this is also our attitude towards NATO and using it to fight terrorism, but we don't have a personality speaking for Europe. We don't have anyone going to the White House to speak on same level, face to face. Perhaps now, after the 11th of September, action was the right answer. I also agree that Europe has not been very successful in what it wanted to do, and we can see this from Yugoslavia and other conflicts. Still, we are under construction and the work is not yet finished. We started in 1958 with the Treaty of the 8th of May, 1957, and it has been 50 years. Some might say that is a long time. I would say that it's not easy to bring 15 nations that fought one with the other for 1,000, 2,000 years to live together peacefully, and to grow together, and now to integrate with another 10 or 13 countries.

My personal fear is that this process we are in today is becoming more and more difficult because we deal more and more with technocrats, with politicians who are oriented more to the nation than to the common cause. We are really coming back to our nations, and this is not good. Indeed it is also not good for our partners who want to join. I think we must really look in this European Union to identify personalities that are pro-Europe, that have clear visions. Individuals that can bring us closer to political union, that bring us closer to a European constitution, which brings us closer to European defence politics, which brings us closer to European social politics. There is so much left to be done, but I don't see any vision. I don't see anyone in the Commission doing it, or any Head of State. So, we are swimming without knowing which direction we are going in, and in that moment of crisis we got caught by surprise. It has been said that it changed nothing, but I

think it changed a lot. It opened our eyes, and it showed us in Europe how weak, in fact, we are.

Finally I think it is important to realize that you cannot simply grow the personalities we need—you cannot just pick them up anywhere. I think it is very, very important that we look to change the structure here in Brussels to make it a real democratic structure and not a structure that nobody can understand. We should not have Prime Ministers telling people that they don't understand how Brussels works, because if it is unintelligible to them and to us, what should the population think about Europe?

At the moment the population of Europe does not really believe in Europe. It is fine to cross borders with our passport. It is fine to have the same currency. It's fine to have a passport with the same colour, but we don't have a real European passport. We don't have a European citizenship. We are far, far, far away from this. I hope that very soon we will again have visionaries — political people that believe in this, in what we do, and who want to continue to construct it. I hope that it will be done by the time our children grow up, so that they will live in a Europe that is much more advanced than it is at the moment.

Weinstein

Thank you Mayor Daldrup. The concept of politicians who are statesmen is normally a retrospective concept. President Harry Truman left the White House at the end of this period of great creativity, having assisted in the creation of NATO and having worked with Europe in so many ways, with only about 27% of the American people thinking he had done a good job. The others were less impressed and this, I suspect, was true also of Schuman and Monnet and the others. The same is true of Churchill, who was replaced right at the end of the war. The moment the British people realized they didn't need Churchill any longer they moved him out of power. I guess what I'm saying is that people can rise to the level of events.

I'm told by my Chinese friends that the Chinese character for crisis includes the characters for danger and opportunity. We know what the dangers are here, but there is also an enormous opportunity for all of our countries, together, to rise to this occasion. We have the opportunity to establish a vision appropriate not for the founding generation, which is several generations back, but for our generation. For better or worse we now have the responsibility at this stage of the game. I think your comments are well chosen, although I wouldn't be quite as pessimistic. Maybe I'm too optimistic, I don't know. Our next speaker is Ambassador Andresen-Guimarães.

Andresen-Guimarães

Thank you. The comments of Dr. Trubowitz were very challenging, particularly when he started by saying that American public opinion was not really engaged in the discussion about whether NATO was going to enlarge or not, and how it was going to do it. This is, of course, true. However, when you compare this with what happened in the 1950s, there is not a significant difference in enthusiasm for NATO. The fact is that this lack of interest is not unique to NATO, it effects everything else as well. In the United States it is not that people do not trust politicians, as Lord Alderdice mentioned earlier, but that they trust them too much. They think that the politicians are doing such a good job that they don't have to think about it themselves. The fact is that in the United States most public opinion is not focused on any foreign policy.

The public might focus on an issue of the day on the day that it becomes national or internal policy, like now with Afghanistan and terrorism, and NAFTA before, but not simply because it is foreign or internal policy. Consequently, I would not jump to very negative conclusions because of that lack of interest. I think NATO is still relevant. We cannot pass a worse message to those countries trying to join NATO than that it is not worth it. That is saying to them that they're on the wrong line, and that they should try somewhere else. I think that NATO is still relevant.

It is relevant even if it has had to reinvent itself in the last 10 years. For forty years NATO had many missions, and its charter spoke of many things, but we all knew that basically there was one mission. I envy my predecessors who until ten years ago would come every morning to the office, put their head outside the trenches, see that the Russians were not coming today and then go back and play some golf or do something useful. Now we do not have that one single defining issue. So we have to work for a living, and that is why we meet at night, on the weekends, and so on. So I wish we were a bit less relevant sometimes, but that's the way things are.

I thought about a year ago that we would be praising how relevant NATO was, what with the extraordinary victory it had in the Balkans. It took care of Kosovo after a victory there; Bosnia was more or less at peace; and we stopped a civil war in Macedonia, against the will of the Macedonians themselves. I mean, NATO is not done yet. But now the question of NATO's relevance is debated on an issue which NATO never planned for. Speaking to NATO ten years ago about Afghanistan would have been ridiculous because we had a very definite area to cover.

Even now, with the concept of the area changed, Afghanistan is still way beyond our interests and capabilities. NATO is not a good instrument to fight terrorism. It's a completely different institution. As has so rightly been argued, the military means at NATO's disposal are not a very good way to combat terrorism. They're a way to stop a menace or punish the country from which terrorists are coming. We always thought that if we destroy their base in Zambia, or Morocco, or Cambodia for that matter, that we will have stopped them. Events didn't always work out like that, and the most important weapons to fight this war against terrorism have to do with judicial cooperation, police cooperation, intelligence cooperation, and financial cooperation.

All these are things that, up until a few months ago, some countries were completely opposed to. We should remember that six months ago the United States was completely against any change in tax havens. So what I'm saying is that NATO is not the instrument to fight terrorism. This does not mean that it does not have a role to play. It's a good meeting place to pick up a coalition of the willing, for instance. There is a very important function which is very seldom mentioned, and that is that NATO offers the only place where all the countries in Europe (practically all the countries in Europe except one) have the opportunity for integrated military planning. I see our Swiss colleague just left. Switzerland is not even a member of the United Nations, and yet on a military level they plan with NATO. So if the United States, or Spain, or somebody has a problem and wants to form a coalition of the willing or wants to discuss these matters, NATO is a very good place to do so. The military side of NATO is a unique instrument of planning that public opinion doesn't know about, because for all sorts of reasons until ten years ago this was an issue that you weren't even supposed to talk about.

But now, let us talk. I think one of the most important points about the enlargement, not just the enlargement but the process and the EAPC itself, is that it has deliberately forced countries to change the way they deal with their own military. The control of the military by civilians is an essential part of democracy. It's not written in everywhere, but you can't have a democracy without it. Countries that not only want to belong to NATO, but even to be in the EAPC, are taking steps in this direction and comparing themselves with other countries that are going in the same direction. They have their own military coming in and seeing what the other military is doing. It's not a bad thing. Everybody else is doing it so it can't be that bad. What I'm saying is that we are reinventing ourselves and the new functions we are assuming, I think, are as relevant as the ones we had before.

The difference in procurement between the one side of the Atlantic and the other is very big, and it's all very important, and we're all pushing and trying to get our own governments to do something more about it. That's why you could quote George Robertson, you could quote him every single day. Every time he sees a politician he would say that—oh, you should push this, you should push that.

This is very important. But what our taxpayers require from our armed forces in the United States and in Europe and in the individual countries of Europe are different things. In the United States you have a world role and you want to keep that world role. The need for those forces is now. It is not about Europe, although it used to be. It's not likely that there will be a conflict in Europe where you would need that type of equipment any more. So, it's normal that most countries in Europe also think they don't need that kind of equipment, because we will not be sending people to the Philippines. We will have conflicts here, and that's why in the conflict in the Balkans about 90% of the forces are European. They are not Americans, they are Europeans, and they are quite prepared for that role. Some of the conflicts, and now I'm talking about Portugal, some of the conflicts that we have to fight—even the question of Afghanistan—some European countries could have done in a different way. Not with intelligent ammunition. Not bombing with claimed control in Florida and bombing in Afghanistan. Most countries couldn't do that. We'd probably have to do it by foot, which is a hard way but for most conflicts that most European countries face it's still possible to do, albeit with casualties. So what I'm saying is that while we should have more procurement, the gap between the two is not as big as the gap between intelligent ammunition and plain dumb guns would tend to show.

Weinstein

Thank you Mr. Ambassador. We have six people who have asked to speak and we have Ambassador Burns coming in here sometime between five and five-fifteen, so I would ask the speakers if they could keep your comments to about five minutes. That way everyone will have a chance to speak before he arrives. Our next scheduled speaker is Professor Wiatr.

Wiatr

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I believe that the 11th of September is a threshold in recent history in the following way: it is true that it is not the first act of mass terrorism, but it is a qualitatively different act, in two ways. First, obviously the magnitude of the act: never before had so

many people died in such a short time in such a concentrated series of attacks. But more importantly, this is a truly trans-national act in the sense that it resulted not from a local conflict, be it the Middle East, be it the Basque region, et cetera, but from a global confrontation with the whole of Western civilization, the citadel of which is the United States.

The response to the 11th of September has two aspects. One is successful, so far at least. This is the military response, and I do hope that it will prove to be militarily successful. This means that we will not face another attack of a similar scale for a couple of months, because if that happens even the military success would be put under very serious doubt. But there is another aspect of the response which is non-military. This means responding to the political problems which are hidden behind the attack. Some people say, or used to say, that this was a heinous and irrational act. Heinous it was, but irrational it was not. It was a cynically rational act aimed at persuading the United States by force to pull out of the Middle East, out of the region from which the terrorists come. The response, obviously, should be the opposite. Instead of pulling out, the United States and its allies should be even more deeply involved in those international problems which came to the fore in this terrorist act.

And here arises the question of NATO. I think NATO is in a paradoxical situation. NATO is a success story created out of the containment doctrine, and it contained the advances of the Soviet empire in Europe very successfully. However at the beginning of the 21st century it faces a problem. The problem is not predominately military — it is partly military, but it is mostly political. To what extent is NATO relevant when facing the political problems which have been demonstrated by the terrorist attacks? For instance, are the NATO members able to collectively work out a coherent policy which would result in the resolution of the Israeli-Arab conflict? So far, we don't see any such coherent policy. Is NATO able to present other policies for the problems which the terrorists use as a rationale, but which are also objectively the source of the tensions that bring the terrorist attacks?

Once again the situation from the NATO perspective does not look particularly bright. Enlargement in this context is both necessary and a problem. Necessary because in the war against terrorism there is a deep conflict which may grow even deeper. It is important not to leave behind those nations which want to be in, which are prepared to be in, which are democratic, which share our values, and which consider the United States and other NATO members as

their allies. So in this sense enlargement is necessary, but enlargement also means that there has to be a much broader effort to work out a coherent transatlantic policy, not only for the protection of those Atlantic regions, but on a global scale.

I think it is a great challenge for NATO. I fully agree with the Chairman that crisis is both a danger and an opportunity. That is what we call a challenge, and this crisis is a great challenge for NATO. Unfortunately it will take a long time to see how NATO will be able to deal with it, but it also took 50 years to find out that NATO really did a good job in serving the original purposes for which it was created in the late 1940s. Thank you.

Weinstein

Thank you, Professor. I was remiss in not acknowledging that Ambassador Andresen-Guimarães set forth the argument in an effort to transmute NATO's mission at this point into something new. I think this is important because we've heard the other side of the argument presented and so now the dialogue is in the record. The point made by Professor Wiatr is also very important - what about the other side of extended NATO missions?

The question that crops up then, of course, is whether NATO forces would be willing to send a peacekeeping force to, for example, the Israeli-Palestinian situation. Would NATO be prepared to basically become the guarantor of the peace process there? We have five people remaining on the list. Professor Brenner, Professor Whitehead, Professor Grabendorff, Ambassador Nowak, and Ambassador Liegis, and we're going to get through the whole list which means that our next speaker is Professor Brenner.

Brenner

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll be brief. Our discussions have roamed broadly and have considered the four intersecting topics with which we are concerned. These are the enlargement of NATO, the enlargement of the EC, constructing an annex at least for Russia, and a revamping of transatlantic security architecture. What has come into at least three of those projects is the centrality of the United States and the worry that the United States constitutes an X factor, whose future behaviour seems increasingly unpredictable, if not erratic. So, following the admonition that anthropology, like charity, should begin at home, allow me to make a few comments about the current state, and the likely future state, of the collective American political consciousness.

There are three elements which I think all bode well for the future in terms of an American commitment to a constructive role in each of these projects. First, and above all, the United States still sees itself as the Godfather of a Europe that is undivided, free, and at peace. There are two elements that are intertwined in producing this. There is a realistic element, which is the will, that I think that Peter touched upon very well earlier, to exercise leverage in Europe. This view sees Europe constituting the most concentrated source of political power and economic power in the world outside the United States, with Europe also as the impregnable aircraft carrier, as a base of operations in other regions.

Equally, if not more important, is an American sort of idealism. The belief is that European construction and emulation of the American historical experience has created something that might be historically unprecedented and which has the potential to be extended right across the continent. It is this dedication to the extension of the west continent community which inspires and motivates the United States to continue to lend a practical and political weight to the continuing projects of European construction.

I think the second optimistic note to be struck is a rather significant reversion of official administration thinking towards Russia. It is instructive to remind ourselves that it was only five or six months ago that a Washington official was relegating Russia to the strategic margins of its foreign policy thinking. That thinking is now reverted close to one hundred and eighty degrees. Indeed, the extraordinary sort of initiative which the Bush administration has taken to create a prominent place for Russia within NATO's political space is indicative of the tectonic shifts that have taken place in international geo-politics since September 11th.

Third, on a much more sort of mundane level, is the question of capabilities and what's needed to close the capabilities' gap between the United States and its European allies. There has been a drastic revision made in the defence trade security initiative, with a very drastic revision of American regulations regarding the transfer of technology, and the access of allies to the most sophisticated and advanced American technology with military applications. This defence trade security initiative, which was sort of launched at the end of the Clinton administration, is continuing. It has begun to make a noticeable contribution to accelerating the pace with which the allies acquire many of the elements of the arsenal which the United States currently enjoys.

Having noted some rather optimistic factors, let me note some which give us reason to pause. The first of which is

that the United States commitment to formal structured multilateralism has become segmented and selective. It has become segmented as a matter of experience and selective as a matter of principle. Through the war on terrorism, collaboration in the intelligence domain is becoming closer and better integrated. Collaboration in terms of actually conducting the war on anti-terrorism has followed a different model. One is reminded, in considering what were the practical implications of the invocation of Article 5, of the biblical phrase: "many are called and few are chosen."

In this case, many declare themselves willing, but few are chosen. In fact only two or three allies have been chosen to provide assistance to the United States. This high degree of selectivity, where you are just sort of choosing partners in an ad hoc coalition, really emerges out of the context the US is working in. We should remind ourselves that the lessons that American policymakers drew from the experience in Kosovo are very different, if not antithetical, from those drawn by most allied government leaders. The European lesson was that never again would they fight a war in which the extraordinary gap between the American and European contributions in effect created conditions whereby the United States called the shots. The American lesson was also a "never again", but the American lesson meant never again conducting war by committee. In a remark that was little noted at the time General Michael Shore, who directed the air campaign, said in 1999, "In the future what we should do is to take the Alliance to war, tell them we're going to win this thing for the allies, but the price to be paid is we call the tune." At that time one didn't think this was going to be the touchstone of American intervention policy. It has turned out to be, at least outside of Europe, with regard to the war on terrorism.

The second or third reason for concern is that, associated with this attitude, there are really rather significant differences in the philosophy of war that the United States holds, particularly American security planners and uniformed services. General Klaus Norman after Kosovo was quoted as saying, "We now know what the Americans are prepared to kill for. We don't know what they are prepared to die for." What he meant was the United States dedication to using precision-guided munitions and stand off weapons, setting a zero casualty standard as one basis for defining strategy, had the effect of minimizing casualties but increasing collateral damage.

On this there was no consensus, and the absence of such a consensus is a contributing factor to the American judgment that it should conduct future wars not by activating any NATO organ, but instead by keeping them

distant. If one combines these elements, some of which point favourably towards constructive collaboration and more fruitful cooperative efforts in the future and some of which provide more troubling concerns, it is hard to say whether the unilateral impulse of the United States will prevail or not come the next crisis.

One can only say that producing a positive outcome from the mix of these elements is going to have to come from a thorough-going consultation, a type of consultation which in the American instance will be as much before the act as after the act. As we noted earlier, this will be a consultation in which the United States is going to have to have a partner which is not only willing, but which is competent and has achieved a degree of unity which makes it, indeed, an interlocutor for the Americans.

Weinstein

Thank you, Dr. Brenner. We have four speakers waiting to comment. I'm going to call first on Professor Whitehead, then on Dr. Grabendorff, then on Dr. Najder, and then for Ambassador Liegis, who will be our last speaker before Ambassador Burns gets here. The floor is yours.

Whitehead

My comment starts from an embarrassingly obvious point, but maybe if one develops the point and illustrates it, it becomes a bit more interesting. The embarrassingly obvious point is that both the EU and NATO have overlapping composition of membership, but they have distinctive characteristics. It follows from this that there are problems of coordination between these two organizations, and these problems can be highlighted by considering, among other things, the differences in membership. Here I wanted to take the example of Cyprus, if you will forgive me, as an illustration. Putting this example in context, we had some very eloquent presentations, among others by Lord John Alderdice and Peter Trubowitz this afternoon, drawing attention to the various arguments, both long-term and reflecting September 11th, about why both the EU and NATO might no longer seem quite so relevant, so attractive to public opinion, in at least some key member states.

We heard why there might be a loss of momentum, with some speakers even suggesting there is the risk of a reversal in the relevance of these organizations. But even if that's accepted in the strongest terms, the organizations exist, and the organizations not only exist but they have to take decisions about their membership. These decisions about additional membership are imminent, in the case of NATO within a year, in the case of the EU within two or three years.

Now decisions about membership and changing the membership of organizations defines the boundaries of organizations, and it also alters the internal equilibrium within organizations. You might say that when you decide upon membership that decision does much to shape the ultimate identity that the organization is founded on.

So, the questions on membership are not trivial. In particular, these are two organizations in which we have no examples of any member being either expelled or withdrawing, so we have to assume that when membership is expanded it is in perpetuity in either case. Now, it is obvious but necessary to underscore the difference between the EU and NATO. The United States and Canada are not going to join the EU. I think that's a reasonably safe assumption. Equally well the United States and Canada are not going to leave NATO, so we have two inherently different organizations for that reason alone.

They not only differ in composition, but they also have different mandates and purposes and different procedures for altering their membership. Furthermore, what we've seen recently suggests that NATO is able to act in a much more expeditious and prompt manner to add new members if it chooses to, whereas in the EU the steps are protracted and uncertain, possibly subject to more veto and can be more accident-prone. Now, having said that the North American members of NATO are not going to withdraw, I think there is a problem on the European side, a problem perhaps not as grave, but a problem which shouldn't be overlooked. This is the problem of the neutrals. Austria, Ireland, Sweden, Finland—it will not be easy for these countries to join, and we cannot assume that they will give up their neutrality easily.

They will be in the EU, but it will not be so easy for them to enter NATO. This will arise, I think, as a problem for Cyprus also. It is worth remembering that if Cyprus does become the next member of the EU the largest political party in Cyprus is the Greek Communist Party. It's not evident that they are going to say that they wish to embrace NATO very quickly. Turning a little bit more to Cyprus then, and this may seem like a British obsession, but it's worth telling you that when I was at school many of my friends who did their military service ended up coming under attack from terrorism. The terrorist organization in question was called Aoka and it was headed by someone who we regarded as a vicious bin Laden-type called Colonel Grivas.

However, Colonel Grivas is not seen in quite the same light by all the members of the Greek community. To some he is a freedom fighter or a symbol of the aspirations of the historical grievances of the Cyprian people. Remember too

that although NATO is a defensive Alliance against Russia, there were two NATO members, Greece and Turkey, who nearly came to war over Cyprus in 1973. The reason why Cyprus is partitioned and has been subject to ethnic cleansing on both sides is because of disagreement between Greece and Turkey, two members of NATO. Remember also that Turkey is a very long-standing and core member of NATO. Indeed one might say that it is one of the most vital members of NATO, for historical and geo-strategic reasons, and that it faces its own definition of terrorism in the case of the PKK. It also has security concerns on its borders, which are of very great concern to NATO as a whole. This means that NATO borders on Iraq, borders on the Caucuses, and so on.

Now, Turkey, in addition to being responsible for the illegal military occupation of a part of Cyprus, is also a candidate member for the European Union. When Foreign Minister Geoana said that Russia was too big to join in the EU, one has to ask oneself, is Turkey not too big to join the EU?

So, the conclusion of this particular case, which is only one particular illustration of a general phenomenon, is that there are several Europes, and that the membership of the different units differs from one definition of Europe to another. Harmonizing those different European organizations is a tough job. It's not just a tough job for the organizational and political reasons that we often talk about, it also touches on extremely sensitive security questions and ultimately on questions of culture and identity as well. Thank you.

Weinstein

The floor is yours, Dr. Grabendorff.

Grabendorff

Thank you Mr. Chairman. Since NATO is the heart of the transatlantic relationship, the European Union is not the heart. It's a partner, but NATO is the heart. We need to work with our American friends to define a new mission for NATO, because as was the case with the European Union, the new rules should be set before the accession members come in.

I think also with regard to NATO the new mission should be discussed before NATO is widened. Even on the most important issue at the moment, combating terrorism, there are large differences in perceptions between the Europeans and the Americans. On the European side there is at least some feeling that some states undertake terrorist acts as defensive measures, which is not the case for the Americans.

This difference of opinion is also important for the status of terrorists, by which I mean the legal status after they have been taken into prison. All of those issues highlight that we are all in war against terrorism, but what we define by terrorism is not entirely understood. Even the United Nations agreements, which have been widely subscribed to, are not very precise in this respect. A new security structure can only evolve after these issues have been discussed. We cannot say let's widen NATO if we don't really know what the mission of the wider NATO will be.

We should also realize that the NATO issue is more important to some European countries than others. At the same time there is a danger rising from our globalised world. If NATO is the heart of our relationship with the Americans, which is a relationship of both cooperation and competition, especially in the economic area, then if it comes to a new mission we have to find out if it is to be a really very narrowly defined security mission, or if there will not be some economic elements in it. With regard to the economic part of our transatlantic relationship this is important, because we don't agree on quite a number of issues. I think that NATO is already very political and if it widened its mission deciding what to do would become a much more difficult issue within the European group. Since we are all interested in strengthening the transatlantic relationship, more clarity on this issue is very much needed.

Weinstein

Thank you Dr. Grabendorff. Dr. Najder.

Najder

Most of the things I wanted to say have been said in the previous discussion by my neighbour, the Ambassador of Portugal, so I limit myself to three very simplistic remarks. The first concerns what has been said with regard to American perceptions about weaknesses in NATO. This tallies very well with the simple fact (which was never mentioned in this debate probably because it is so obvious) that even though Article 5 was invoked for the first time after the 11th of September, NATO might as well have never existed because in the biggest international enterprise in which the United States is now engaged, the biggest since the war in the Middle East, NATO doesn't participate. Everything goes outside NATO structures. That's my first simplistic remark.

Second, Mr. Mesquita da Cunha has disappeared, but he was asking our American friends to understand that the 11th of September hadn't changed the world. I would rather say that it revealed the world as it is. It did change

American perceptions of the world. I think that our Polish compassion, for example, was not expressed in terms like 'something unheard of ever before has happened to you'; but in terms of sympathy: 'we know what it feels like, we have experienced similar things.'

My third remark reflects the common opinion now among European commentators - not politicians, but European politologists - that Americans seem to see the world too much in their own terms. In their struggle against international terrorism they apply means which fulfil domestic expectations, but do not necessarily address the causes or the roots of international terrorism. That's more or less the gist of the difference in perspective between Europeans and Americans. A massive use of heavy bombs dropped from strategic airplanes may be very good to fight the symptoms. It doesn't seem to be too well adapted to fight the causes. Thank you.

Weinstein

Thank you. Ambassador Liegis.

Liegis

Thank you very much. I'd also like to make just three points. The first concerns the question of capacity to deal with enlargement, in particular NATO enlargement; the second is on the relevance of NATO; and the third encompasses a few words about Russia. Mr. Crombrughe referred to the fact that organizations have to deal with the question of enlargement and their capacity to cope with that enlargement. A couple of points on this. First of all, I think there have been studies that have shown that when an organization like NATO has to make decisions by consensus, once the membership of the organization exceeds eight members it makes little difference whether the organization consists of 19 or 29 members. So I think the cut-off point on the consensus issue is generally regarded as being eight. The additional problems as a result of expansion are not so much finding the consensus amongst a larger group as purely administrative problems. It's true that NATO internally is looking very closely at how to deal with the prospects of more members becoming involved after Prague. But when we, the aspirant countries, look at the historical experiences that we have had, for example us in the Baltic states regaining our independence just over a decade ago, and compare these historical moments—the fall of the Berlin wall, the collapse of the Soviet Union—it suddenly seems a bit odd that the discussions now depend on whether there will be a table large enough to sit 28 members around in NATO

headquarters. I'm sure that at the Prague summit, which has been called a rendezvous with history, the decision will not be based on the size of the rooms or the size of the table. The other point on the consensus issue is that many of the applicants have shown during the last decade, through the reestablishment of their democracies, that they will actually be very reliable partners when it comes to the whole prospect of consensus formation. Indeed, the cooperation that we have had amongst our own countries, that is amongst what's called the "Vilnius Group" (which was established at a meeting of foreign ministers in the Lithuanian capital in May of 1999) shows the potential reliability these countries would offer as members. I think this is an important aspect to bear in mind.

On the question of the relevance of NATO, my good colleague, Fernando, the Ambassador of Portugal, doesn't need to convince the applicant countries about the relevance of NATO. I think the very fact that there are ten more countries that are knocking on the door is one demonstration of that relevance. It is a bit like the Groucho Marx quote: "is it the case that we want to join a club that may not want us as a member." Why is that? I think fundamentally it is because of the experience of the last decade, those historical moments—The Velvet Revolution, the Singing Revolution in the Baltic States, the reestablishment of democracy, and this identification with the values that NATO represents—I think this is very pertinent. The fact that we were denied the opportunity for half a century to share in those values means that we trust very much that now that we are free once again we will not be refused this opportunity for a second time through no fault of our own. This debate about the relevance of NATO did, of course, crop up immediately in the early 1990s after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union. But it's fair to say that even then, and even now, what is important is that third element of Lord Ismay's quotation: "keeping the Americans in".

For us Latvians it is clear that the question of keeping the Germans down is no longer of relevance, nor is it of relevance for us that NATO keep the Russians out. I'll mention a little more about Russia a bit later on. For us, the main relevance is this American presence in Europe. I think it's also true that during our contact with NATO since the establishment of the Partnership for Peace ten years ago the cooperation aspect has been very important. This cooperation and partnership with NATO has been shown to be extremely important on both a practical and also a political basis. The fact that our soldiers are serving together with K4 and S4 soldiers from allied countries has

helped us to progress in building up our armed forces. This is because we, unlike some of the other countries which are downsizing, have built up our armed forces from scratch. This whole experience of Partnership for Peace and the contact that we have had with our NATO partners has been extremely valuable to us.

We don't see the enlargement of NATO as aimed against anybody. The Russian aspect is no longer there. But NATO is nevertheless about joining values. It is interesting to note, vis-à-vis the relevance of NATO, the fact that Article 5 was invoked for the first time in NATO history on September 12th. This decision was taken in record time by the Alliance, and it is also true that NATO has been engaged in the war against terrorism. AWACS were sent to the United States, and there were ships that were sent to the South Mediterranean. So it's not strictly true that NATO has lost its relevance in the war against terrorism, after the invocation of Article 5. This is even true today when we meet in our cooperative forum, where we have colleagues from Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan sitting at the same table. And this, once again, emphasizes the fact that this cooperative element is a contribution to the fight against terrorism.

Perhaps it would be wrong for me to stress or to point out what Latvia's particular contribution to NATO could be, but it is true that we feel that we have participated very strongly in the sense of Baltic cooperation amongst the three Baltic countries during the last decade. We think that's an added value that we bring to the Alliance. One only has to look at the value of the Romanian presidency of the OSCE to see the type of contribution that the Romanians can bring. The Southeast European applicant countries, their proximity to the Balkans, and the way in which they immediately without hesitation allowed their airspace to be used in the Kosovo action all show that the applicants actually do contribute, and that these issues are of relevance today.

Finally on the question of Russia, certainly Latvia welcomes very much the fact that NATO and Russian cooperation seems to be improving, because that's of benefit to both NATO and Latvia. That's the way we feel. We hope very much that this approach by Russia, by President Putin, is indeed a strategic one and is not a mere tactic. I think that the jury may still be out on that, especially if we look at how on the one hand there was this step forward by United States, the Blair initiative and the proposals and the visit of the Secretary General, and then there seemed to be Russia. At that point there seemed to be a slight rolling back and, of course, during this last week we've also had the comments from the United States on Chechnya once again and the

meeting with the Chechnyan representative. It will be interesting to see whether the Russian leadership will continue to move forward on that issue.

In closing, I should say that I'm convinced that this question of enlargement is a separate issue from NATO-Russian relations. I'm glad that the Alliance has got over that particular hurdle. Today, which is the 81st anniversary of Latvia gaining de jure recognition for the first time, I'd just like to end with a quote from the Foreign Minister of the United Kingdom, who said at that time that, "it would be an absurdity and an anomaly to recognize Latvia and it would inevitably end up with a war against Russia." Thank you.

Weinstein

Thank you Ambassador Liegis. The very patient Ambassador Damusis, the floor is yours.

Damusis

Thank you. I will be very brief. The one thing I hadn't counted on was Professor Trubowitz's comments — I like plain talk. I would like to start out by acknowledging some of the comments made by Professor Stemplowski, and congratulate him on those comments. The question that he raised about identity and a sense of belonging is really a very strong motivating factor for my own country, Lithuania, and our European integration efforts. It's not just because we are trying to get something back that was taken away, but because of this desire to be part of a club, to have the transatlantic connection, and be inside the decision making processes and not outside of them.

We should not be too downbeat about the capabilities of the new members. We're the first ones to admit that there's much work to be done in that area and that's why we're taking the whole membership process very seriously. I also think the NATO allies are in agreement that the contribution of the three new members is a very substantial and practical one, and that the three new members give a completely different perspective to some of the discussions going on in terms of the political framework of NATO.

The question of relevance came up, which reminded me of discussions that we had with the Western partners years ago when there was more sensitivity about the Baltic applications for membership. We were often asked why we were so insistent about joining the Alliance. The answer given then remains the same today. And it's a very simple answer: that we want in for the same reason no member wants to be out. That may be sort of a simplistic argument,

but I think it's a very valid one and it shows that the Alliance is very relevant to this day. I would agree with our Belgian colleague that life is a process of adjusting to realities. Without enlargement the question remains: will the Alliance reform and adapt? Change obviously forces change and we saw that happen when we started our own movement for the reestablishment of independence. The initial reactions were very cautious and the advice was to go slow or don't do it at all. From a perspective of ten years after the fact, the conclusion would be a completely different one.

In terms of Professor Trubowitz's comment about the lack of discussion in the United States on enlargement, perhaps since we follow this issue so closely we do not have such a gloomy assessment of that discussion. He mentioned the no member voted in the US Congress on the Freedom Consolidation Act. If it is of any assurance, Professor Trubowitz, the Senate discussion was blocked by one Senator, Senator Warner, on the grounds that he wanted to initiate serious discussion on the enlargement issue. That is something that we, as a candidate country, are not afraid of because we've pursued this whole discussion in our own country with great success.

Weinstein

I agree that there are now support groups in the US consisting of former representatives of these countries which are campaigning to get them into NATO. Hyphenated Americans from Lithuania, from Latvia, from Romania, and from wherever all support their former countries, so that you're not lacking in the least a vocal political support group, whatever the general state of public opinion on the subject may be. Now, it's been a long afternoon and I thank all of you. We're finally going to get to you Ambassador — you're part of the process.

An observer

Thank you. I would like to clarify just a few points very quickly. Dr. Brenner referred to the very widely-held thesis that a lot of uniformed service people in the US army declared that they would never again fight a war by committee. When they were talking about war decided somewhere else, they were thinking not only about the capitals in Europe, but also of another place near the Potomac River. They were thinking about the ones in the Pentagon running the operations here. The big argument, as you know, was between the Generals who were in the Pentagon and the ones who were in the field. In the newspapers you might have got the impression that France

decided where the bombing was going to be, or Greece, or whoever. This was never the case. Instead 99% of the debate was an internal argument between Europe and the Potomac and between the services - the Air Force against the Marines, the Navy, and so on.

My second point is that Article 5 was invoked for the first time. I think, and this is my personal opinion, that invocation of Article 5 on the 12th was mainly an enormous, deliberate, and very brave manifestation of political support and of solidarity. You're being attacked, we don't know yet by whom, and how, and so on, so we feel it like an attack on ourselves. It was in a way the same thing that many newspapers said — we are all Americans today.

The third point is that it was the United States that was attacked, and I'm sure that for political reasons it was unthinkable that the response, the military response, would be not be undertaken by the United States itself. I don't think that the White House would like to go to its people and say 'well, now we're doing it, but the Portuguese are doing this and other people are doing that'. The main force had to be American. You can use help afterwards, before, and during, but you have the capability of doing it yourself. You had to do it yourself for political reasons.

My fourth and final point is that with this composition, even after enlargement to 19 or 26, NATO will not become the world policemen in the sense that it will be a force to be used whenever the politicians need to hit someone. It's very unlikely that this will happen with whatever the composition, because when one government makes that decision there is always likely to be some disagreement. Thank you.

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Weinstein

Welcome Ambassador Burns. May I, by way of introducing you, remind people that you were our spokesman at the State Department for several years. Ambassador Burns was a very distinguished Naval Ambassador to Greece before coming to NATO, and fought the fight against terrorism with our Greek friends in a very complex and difficult situation, the details of which many of you know about. Nick, it occurs to me that if I used up the time explaining the issues that have been put out on the table over the last three hours, beginning with Mircea Geoana's presentation and going on, you'd have no time to talk.

Instead I will try to summarise the main themes. I think it is fair to state that we have covered many issues from the Lugar speech to suggestions on expanding the mission to the struggle against terrorism and Lord Robertson's recent speech on the issue of new membership, enlarging NATO, and many other issues. I would like to suggest that you might take 10 to 15 minutes to discuss the status of NATO and the Alliance as you see it at this stage in the game — problems, opportunities, and the rest. Then we will go into some questions, and hopefully you will have time for a brief drink before you have to head out.

Burns

Well, good afternoon to everybody. I'm very happy to be here, and I want to thank my friend Allen Weinstein for inviting me. We collaborated on a conference in Greece about a year and a half ago, and I thought to our mutual advantage. I have long admired Allen both for his scholarship, his scholarly works, and his intellectual courage in standing up time and again in the United States for what I think is right. I would also mention that he has been a distinguished public servant through his writings and through his participation and leadership in The Center for Democracy. I'm delighted to be here with Allen and with my colleagues from the North Atlantic Council and from partner countries.

Weinstein

Thank you.

Burns

I'm sure if you haven't all spoken already you'll have a lot to say about the future of NATO. I don't want to give long-winded remarks, especially with a group like this. I'd much rather have discussions with you and hear your views and respond to any questions you may have. In that

spirit I will just offer some brief remarks with the intention of having a discussion as a centrepiece of this half hour.

Obviously the United States, as a charter member of the Alliance, believes that the North Atlantic Alliance is vital to our security. It is both vital and relevant, and it's just as vital and relevant today as it was 20, or 30, or 40 years ago. We see NATO continuing as far into the future as we can see as the core security institution that links the United States, Canada, and Europe. We say that because we're convinced that NATO serves many purposes for all of its 19 members, and it will serve the same purposes for the new members who will be admitted at the Prague summit.

First and foremost, NATO is the expression of a transatlantic link that has kept the peace for 53 years, and it will be the link that is, I believe, the most important foundation for European security in the future. Second, NATO is the only institution (I say this without any degree of disrespect for the European Union and its defence project) that can provide the insurance policy and the future security protection that Europe and North America will need in the coming decade and beyond. Our Secretary of Defence, Former Ambassador to NATO Don Rumsfeld, likes to say that the problem with looking into the future and trying to foresee where our security threats are is that we can't see around corners as we look into the future. Our ability to predict where our security is going to be threatened has been very poor indeed over the last 20 to 30 years. Secretary Rumsfeld tells a story to illustrate that point. When Dick Cheney was testifying in 1989 during the confirmation hearings on his appointment as Secretary of Defence before the Senate Armed Services Committee, those hearings lasted four days in January of 1989. Not a single Senator nor Cheney himself uttered the word Iraq. Just a year ago last week Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld was testifying before the same Committee for his confirmation hearings. In the three or four days of testimony not a single Senator or Secretary Rumsfeld uttered the word Afghanistan. So, our ability to try to look into the future to see where we will deploy forces, where the threats will come from, is very limited.

If that is true, and if it is also true that our reading of history tells us that conflict is inevitable and that challenges to our security are certain, then as Europeans and North Americans we ought to have a security Alliance, a collective defence organization that can protect us against all foreseeable threats. I would submit to you again, without any degree of criticism of the European Union, that it is only NATO that can provide that. NATO still provides the nuclear protection, the nuclear umbrella for Europe as well

as North America. NATO still provides the only conventional capacity to deter an attack or to deal with an attack if one is made.

NATO is also the institution that has done the most to provide for protection of its own militaries and civilian populations against the new threats from terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. And I think there is another reason why NATO is vital and important to all of us, and why we should continue to see it as our bedrock Western security institution. Since the end of the Cold War it has become the nexus for security cooperation first for Central Europe, then with Russia, the Ukraine, and now Central Asia and the Caucasus states. That is very important because security in Europe is not going to be a function only of what NATO and its members do, or the European Union and its members do, but of all these and all those states to the East that are critical to security. NATO, through its emerging NATO-Russian relationship, can create a NATO-Russian council and develop its relationship with the Ukraine.

Earlier in the 1990s, through our Partnership For Peace program and our outreach programs to the Baltic countries, to Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, it was NATO that defined the pattern of security and military cooperation that allowed three of those countries to become members and that will allow as many as nine of those countries to become members perhaps at the Prague summit. So we Americans are bullish on NATO, and we think it has a great future, and we believe in it. Now, I know there is criticism in Europe and I will deal with this straightforwardly.

If the United States did not use NATO as a collective defence entity to fight the war in Afghanistan, does that mean that somehow we've lost interest in NATO or that we're downgrading NATO, or that we've become a two-tiered Alliance where the United States carries out security tasks and Europeans carry out peacekeeping tasks? I would just answer that very simply by saying that not a single member of the Alliance, any 19 of us, argued in September, or October, or November, that the Alliance should be the totality of our response to al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan.

With the benefit of hindsight one can see how important the coalition was, with 70 countries, 26 of which ended up having military liaison cells in Tampa, at SYNCOM, and seven of which fought with us in Afghanistan. That coalition — key coalition partners being Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Bahrain — was the key to the rapid and effective military action in Afghanistan itself. So, we made the correct decision there but it is certainly true that if security is

threatened in any part of Europe in the future, or perhaps any part of the world just beyond Europe, NATO remains a viable vehicle for a future collective defence operation to defend any one of our members.

Furthermore, I don't buy the argument that because NATO didn't fight in Afghanistan somehow it is irrelevant. It is a woefully simplistic analysis of one action over 53 years. For the reasons I cited before I think NATO remains vital to our security. Having said that let me just say that I also think that NATO as an institution has had to evolve at key junctures along its 53 year continuum. We certainly had to do that most recently ten years ago, at the end of the Cold War, and we need to do that now as well. Along with the more conventional threats to our security, we now see the spectre of global terrorism, the possibility of biological weapon attacks on our citizens and not just our militaries, chemical weapon attacks, and God forbid nuclear suitcase bomb attacks on Berlin, or on Lisbon, or on Paris, or New York, or Washington. We have got to be ready as an Alliance to face that threat.

This is a new threat, and so we've been working in the Alliance towards this and we have a summit in Prague in November of this year, and I believe the headline of that summit will be that NATO leaders decided to build new capabilities to deal with the new threat. These will include counter-terrorism capabilities, special forces' capabilities, and civil defence capabilities to protect our populations against the threats posed by these weapons of mass destruction. NATO will transform itself over the course of 2002 to be prepared to fight these new fights, as we must evolve with the changing times. In addition to that we've got to address the capabilities' gap between the United States and most of the rest of the Alliance.

This is not an easy question because it involves defence budgets and the politics within each of the member states, but it is critical. If you look at the Gulf War, Bosnia, Kosovo, and now Afghanistan, one of the most significant military features is the growing disparity in capabilities among members. Certainly it is true that as regards the use of precision-guided munitions, in Kosovo but even more so in Afghanistan, our ability to lift troops into the theatre, our ability to deploy secure communications, and our ability to fight effectively with flexible special forces, the United States has the capabilities that are needed to deter and to fight against these new threats.

Some of our allies have some of those capabilities, but not enough of our allies have them to a sufficient degree, and we need to work on this within the Alliance. Since 1949 we've always been unbalanced in the Alliance in terms of military

capability. This is nothing new to those of you who have been involved in the Alliance in the years and decades past, but it's important now for a couple of reasons. We ought to want to have a core group within the Alliance, at least seven or eight countries, that have these new qualitatively improved military capabilities that are essential to winning wars in the 21st century. We ought to have them for our collective strength.

We also ought to have them because all of us in the European Union and NATO understand that there may be times in the next 20 or 25 years when Europe and America may decide that the European Union ought to take the lead in a crisis opportunity. If this is the case then European countries need to have these capabilities independently of the United States. I say that with respect to the European defence project, which we want to see succeed. We want to see the reaction force become truly operational and deployed, because we think that if it does it strengthens NATO in the process. It will maximize our ability as Europeans and Americans to maintain security.

Let me finish and summarize, Allen, by ticking off a couple of issues that have already been covered and which are important to us. To start with, enlargement. At Prague we will decide which of the nine candidate countries will be admitted as members. I believe this will be a large round of enlargement. We will take in many new members and I believe that all the candidates have done a good job in putting themselves forward. Some have strengthened themselves considerably just in the last 12 months and President Bush has taken the position quite openly and publicly that this is an opportunity for us to expand the community of democracies in a military alliance. It is an opportunity to ensure the stability of the Baltic region, of Central Europe, and we hope of Southeast Europe in the process, and we look forward to this decision.

Now, the United States has not made a decision as to which countries we will support. NATO has not made a decision. I think that decision will be made late, perhaps in September or October of 2002 as we approach the Prague summit. But it will be a substantial enlargement. In 2002 we will also need to create the new NATO-Russian council which will sit at 20 and attempt to work in a quantitatively different and perhaps more effective way with the Russian Federation. As we do that, we want to find a way to work more effectively with the Ukraine.

As we look at Central Asia and the Caucuses, we would like to replicate with those countries what we did so successfully within NATO in the 1990s, and that is to reach out to them. To begin to train with them, to see if we can help modernize their military doctrine and military effectiveness, and to work with them as we did in a real-life

situation in Afghanistan for peace in their region as well as in Europe and North America.

Finally, and I'll end on this note, I think we're making some progress in the relationship between NATO and the European Union. For years we had these high theological debates about how we would work together, on what basis, and we tried to write documents to codify those arrangements. I think we found in Macedonia in July, August, September and since, that when we put aside high theology and just try to define practically what we can do together diplomatically and militarily, we can actually work together very well. Peace in Macedonia has been a function of the European Union, the OSCE, and NATO over the last six months. We can be proud of the fact that that country did not (at least yet) descend into the type of civil war that most of its neighbouring countries, unfortunately, fell victim to in the 1990s.

I and my government believe that if we can keep our focus with the European Union on practical achievements and try to steer clear of the political and theological debates that have been difficult for us, we can support each other. The United States supports the European Defence Project because we think it can be a good partner to NATO. Let me end on that note. I've spoken longer than I wanted to and I apologize for that, but I do look forward to your comments, advice, and questions.

Weinstein

Thank you very much, Nick. The Ambassador as we've seen has covered virtually all of the major issues that we've been discussing this afternoon, and some that we covered this morning. Ambassador Burian, I invite you to offer the first question and/or comment, and then the floor will be open.

Burian

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Nick, I feel encouraged by what you said because not all the comments which we heard during the discussion this afternoon were so encouraging in connection with the situation and approach of the United States to the relevance of the Alliance. I really appreciate your comments and very comprehensive presentation. Basically my comments are also about the relevance of the Alliance. If somebody questions the relevance of the Alliance, he or she should have some alternative proposal for what the ultimate replacement of the Alliance might be. If that answer goes back to the individual concept of different approaches in our part of the world, it should be kept in mind that this meant a lot of disasters in the beginning of the century.

There was also a discussion here on the speech of Senator Lugar. One of his ideas was that if NATO wants to remain relevant it should go out of area. My first question, Nick, is whether that is thinking which is supported by the administration, and what the response was to the speech of Senator Lugar. If there is this kind of thinking, does it also imply the necessity of revision or adjustment of the strategic concept?

Burns

Peter, thank you for your question. On the word “relevance”, Secretary Powell tells a nice story. He’s frustrated by this sense that perhaps NATO is irrelevant. He says, ‘how can NATO be irrelevant?’ For the last ten years a lot of his European friends have been saying NATO is outmoded - that it helped to win the Cold War but it doesn’t serve a useful purpose any more. ‘You ought to close your doors’, they tell him. He replies that it’s hard to close your door if so many countries are knocking on it to get in.

We believe that because of the uncertainties of history, because of the changing geo-political situation and the changing technologies that allow terrorist groups, not just nation states, to deploy significant attack potential against any of us, we’ve got to have a collective defence organization to protect us. NATO is that collective defence organization. It is a proven organization with common political will and very substantial capabilities. So we utterly reject the notion that NATO is declining in importance or is somehow irrelevant. I invited Senator Lugar to come to Brussels last week because we held a conference on the future of NATO for the permanent representatives. It was a very small conference for the 19 ambassadors and about 20 other people, and he came and he had two messages or three messages. He’s a firm believer in NATO and he came and said that. He believes that NATO has a very bright future and he said, as a Republican senior member of the Senate, there is very strong support on Capitol Hill for NATO.

However he also said that NATO has to address the capabilities’ issue that I referred to very generally and briefly—and that our European allies need to invest more in certain technologies to be efficient and capable of meeting these new threats. That was his major message. He feared that if that did not happen the Alliance would become further unbalanced. It is not that the United States would leave—we’re not going to leave—but that more responsibility for security would fall on the shoulders of the United States. Obviously, as an American representing taxpayers from Indiana, he doesn’t want to see that happen. As

someone who cares about Euro-Atlantic relations he doesn't want to see this gap widened—he wants to see it narrowed. Secondly, he said that he is particularly concerned about the threat of weapons of mass destruction to our common security. That's been a long-time concern of his. He is the father of a piece of legislation called the Nunn-Lugar bill which has allowed us to spend \$6 billion in the last eleven years to help the denuclearisation of Kazakhstan, Belarus, and the Ukraine, and to help in trying to destroy both nuclear weapons and fissile material. He said that he thought that we had to focus on the question of "loose nukes", as we refer to it in the United States, and of a threat from weapons of mass destruction, and that NATO ought to look at this as a function.

Let me now address the end of your question, which had to do with strategic concept and out of area issues. We, the United States, firmly support that NATO has already gone out of area in fighting in Kosovo and remaining there. We certainly believe that while we don't think of NATO as a global Alliance to fight in Southeast Asia or Africa, still NATO ought to have the self confidence and the political will to go out of area when it must, and when conditions dictate it to secure the peace and freedom of its 19 members. We will continue to assert that within the Alliance. I don't expect that we're going to want to reopen the strategic concept in any fundamental way at Prague. We know now that counter-terrorism has to be a priority of this Alliance and I don't know a single member of the Alliance who would disagree with that.

Weinstein

When taking your next question, you may want to see the message from your government that has just come in. Okay.

An observer

I have a comment. I still think that in the context of the transatlantic relationship more emphasis could be laid on the EU. Mr. Ambassador Burns, you yourself have referred to the role of the EU in Macedonia. This is especially the case if you look at the wider concept of security, not only in terms of military cooperation, military security, and terrorism, but in terms of building common values, common interests and addressing common needs. I think if there was more emphasis on these factors there would be more activities falling into the picture of the EU, so I want to emphasize that the EU has a key role in the transatlantic relationship, and maybe a role that is strengthening. Perhaps you would like to comment on that.

Burns

Well, I'm a career diplomat, so I've served since the Reagan administration for a succession of Republican and Democratic administrations, and what was frustrating about American policy to me in the 1990s was this debate about whether or not we should support the European Defence Project. I was pleased to see that when President Bush came in, at his very first meeting with Tony Blair at Camp David last February and then his subsequent meeting with Chancellor Schroeder in Washington in March, we released joint statements with both Britain and Germany. Both those joint statements said, in effect, that the United States supports the European Defence Project. This is good for Europe, it's good for the United States, and there ought to be a way for NATO and the EU to work together. I was glad to see that ten year debate ended by those two joint statements, because I agree with you. The European Union has become the vital force in this continent. Politically and economically, and it also has a security role to play. We Americans should welcome it. Indeed those of us in the North Atlantic Council should make every opportunity to strengthen our ability to work together, and Macedonia was a very auspicious example of what we can do together when we want to work together. Having said all that, and whilst I don't want to be critical, I think it is important to realize that the European Defence Project, at least to our minds, is a work in progress. A lot more work needs to be done to make the force truly operational. It is not yet operational. We would like, and would very much support, a rapid expansion of the ability of that force to be truly operational, because we believe that it would strengthen our common security. However, until European governments make these admittedly very difficult decisions about defence budgets—about investments in lift, in special forces, in secure communication, and of course the A-400-M project that is just now being launched in precision-guided munitions—until that happens I really think that the only true focal point in a crisis will still be NATO. We would very much like to see the day when we have several options for all of us.

Weinstein

Seeing no great waving of hands, may I take the Chairman's prerogative and raise a question? Do you find differences between yourself or between the US position on the meaning and definition of terrorism, and the position of other governments within NATO, and the Perm reps in particular? Obviously in the discussions we've had this afternoon there have been several points along these lines.

While no one has said that one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter, there has been the suggestion that one reason that NATO can't move expeditiously toward developing counter-terrorist capabilities beyond what it now has is basically because there is a fundamentally different perspective held by part of Europe, at least amongst some European friends, and the United States. This is a discussion you and I first began in Athens, of course.

Burns

Well, I would be interested to see what Europeans say about this because you live here. I would say as an American that Europeans have had far more experience with terrorism, with indigenous terrorism, than we've had. I think of Spain, Italy, Germany, France, Britain, and Greece, where there have always been significant indigenous terrorist groups over the last 30 years. I'm not one of those Americans who thinks that terrorism was just created. Obviously you've been dealing with it for a generation or more and you've learned the appropriate lessons about how to fight it successfully.

In NATO I don't discern any European/American division over the nature of terrorism, or the priority of fighting it. But NATO has to be focused on what it does through counter-terrorism. There are military capabilities that we can have to counter global terrorism, and I've cited a few of them. But I think it's more for the European Union and the United States bilaterally to talk about other dimensions of fighting terrorism - intelligence cooperation, law enforcement cooperation, and economic cooperation to dry up the ability of terrorist groups to launder money. I don't think we should confuse the two. NATO has to focus on what it can do best militarily, and the EU should also focus on what it does best.

Our agenda, the American agenda, is with both organizations, not just with NATO. It's with the EU as well. I think the only area that I can see where we've had some differences is on the question of Iran, where we have been less inclined than European Union states have to, in effect, normalize our relations with Iran. In Iran we see a major supporter of Hamas and Jabalya, and those two terrorist groups have inflicted great damage on Israel, and on the Arab-Israeli peace process. So we've had a more philosophical disagreement on Iran. And there is the issue of the three Turkish terrorist groups, each dedicated to the overthrow of the Turkish state. We have put them all on our prescribed list of terrorists. There are at least three European countries that allow these three groups to have offices in European capitals. That's a significant

disagreement and that's a current disagreement that we are talking about. So, those are some disagreements, but on the broad nature of the threat and what we're going to do about it I see more agreement than disagreement.

Weinstein

Thank you, Nick. Miguel Mesquita has asked for a brief word and/or question.

Mesquita da Cunha

Mr. Chairman, I know you don't expect me to be brief, but I hope to surprise you.

Weinstein

Thank you.

Mesquita da Cunha

Mr. Ambassador, we Europeans are extremely gratified by American support to ESDP. We realize it's a work in progress. We realize that even when the Helsinki objectives are met, even that will be very insufficient. But even if we went significantly beyond the Helsinki objectives, I would still argue that we very much need NATO and NATO is and should remain the number one bedrock, as you said, of European defence. So, on that I think we entirely agree. On the other hand, we all know that we need to bolster our defences. Now, that means, of course, increasing the budgets and for that there has been friendly American prodding for a long, long time. But it also means streamlining the use of what funds are available, both nationally and collectively. On that crucial aspect, which implies a number of political and procurement decisions, what responses or what awareness have you found on the part of European politicians?

Burns

Well, I agree with you very much on the first point. On the second point, let me just say one of the lessons of Kosovo that we've tried to learn as a NATO Alliance was that unfortunately very few allies could fly at night and could have secure communications among forces. The Serbs were listening in to some of our communications. Indeed few countries have the type of new modern weapons that were essential to victory there and subsequently in Afghanistan. As a result we developed this Defence Capabilities Initiative. It had over 100 priorities, with 58 sub-categories, and I think it was just too broad, and too ambitious, and politically and economically unrealistic. Because of this we

have not succeeded in that Defence Capabilities Initiative. We are now thinking about trying to compress that initiative and to suggest to each other within the NATO Alliance that perhaps we can agree that there are five or six priorities that over the next few years we all need to invest in to be truly capable.

This might be more politically realistic, and it might be politically more manageable for European governments working with their parliaments. We understand the budgetary caps the EU has imposed on national governments, and we understand the very difficult political and economic decisions that governments need to make. We want to be more practical and also to achieve greater capabilities all around. This is our main focus and we very much hope that we might be able to work with our European allies on that basis.

Weinstein

Minister.

Olechowski

Mr. Chairman, let me just state briefly the conclusion I am going to take home from this interesting although sometimes worrying debate. My conclusion is that there is a good deal of work that we have to do in each and every country that we spoke about. That is, of course, if we want to avoid in the future another setback like 9/11. Certainly modernization of the military, less orchestration, more rapid deployment capabilities, more money, a more integrated approach to security, much wider links and complex international cooperation and so on. Secondly, and here I differ with Ambassador Burns (with whom I otherwise agree 100%), I think we would be wise, practical, and visionary, if we make NATO the heart of this effort instead of focusing it only on external defence. Once again, thank you very much for inviting me to this conference.

Burns

We believe there are five efforts that the Americans and Europeans should make to counter terrorism. One is military action and military capabilities. The second is intelligence cooperation, which is critical to find these terrorist cells within all of our societies. A third is law enforcement cooperation, to put people behind bars if they deserve it and if they are judged by the courts to be guilty. A fourth is economic strangulation of the ability of terrorist groups to use our financial systems to launder their money. A fifth is diplomatic isolation.

I think NATO should have the lead on the military end, and will have the lead as we develop new capabilities. On the other hand the European Union and the United States and Canada have to really work on the diplomatic end. I think we've got to play to our comparative advantages and I think the European Union has a major role in this fight with intelligence, law enforcement, and the economic elements. Thank you.

Mesquita da Cunha

Thank you for catering to my needs. Mr. Ambassador, those five priorities are wonderful. I don't exactly see where the need to tackle the costs of terrorism fits in. Those five priorities are extraordinary and well thought out to counter terrorism, but I think it is extremely important to tackle the root causes of terrorism in the first place, and that you haven't mentioned.

Burns

I don't want to keep everybody waiting, but this is an interesting point. We have a Mediterranean dialogue - NATO and the Mediterranean states. And when the Mediterranean states, six Arab countries, and Israel came, the Arab governments wanted to talk about root causes. They said the root cause of September 11th was the absence of peace in Israel and in the Palestinian territories. Now, we want to see peace in those territories, but Osama bin Laden's major motivation has never been the cause of the Palestinians. It's always been the cause of his brand of Islam versus the Saudi leadership and the United States. So I think if we had peace in Israel and the Palestine territories tomorrow, with a peace agreement all sewn up along the lines of August of 2000 at Camp David, we would still see al-Qaeda terrorism striking at Europe and the United States.

I actually think one of ways to tackle the root causes is for Arab societies to try to figure out why this phenomenon has been produced in Egypt, in Saudi Arabia, and in the Gulf states, and to see what can be done in those countries to deal with it from the ground up, from the roots up. However we must be clear about the nature of the al-Qaeda terrorism. It's pernicious and it's about their own fanatical brand of Islam, so I'm not sure we can do a lot in the West to stop these people from emerging, although we do have to counter them when they do emerge.

Weinstein

I first want to conclude this panel by thanking the Ambassador for being with us. I also want to thank all of you, since we have, as we will know when the transcript

emerges, solved all the problems of NATO here this afternoon and that deserves a compliment. Let me say a word before we close and go to enjoy some drinks. I hope the Ambassador can stay with us for a few minutes and talk informally.

To start with a word about Ambassador Nicholas Burns, we've known one another casually in Washington. I got to know him a little bit better in Athens and I hope to get to know him even better here. This is a man who lived with the threat of terrorism as a very personal thing, with his family, his wife and his children there. Quietly, with no fuss about it, he went about projecting not so much American perspectives, but what you might call Western perspectives in a sense—NATO perspectives—in a way that I came to admire enormously. When the terrorists blew up the Truman statue on November 17th the Ambassador took up a private collection among private American citizens to build a beautiful statue to General George Marshall, which now resides in the American Embassy Complex, where I was privileged to be at the dedication ceremony. We've held conferences, we've done a bunch of other things, but in quiet initiatives the Ambassador has a capacity which I'm afraid some of his colleagues and some of my colleagues in the think tank world and the academic world don't share. He knew and knows how to listen.

I think his colleagues among the permanent representatives understand that about him—that he is not here to tell you what Americans think but to share an Alliance perspective. In a situation in Greece where it was not simple to do that (even with a good friendly government) by and large Nick Burns managed it and I'm very proud to have him represent our country there. I just wanted you to know that. I urge you to be here at 9:00 tomorrow morning when we will resume again, and I urge you to come have a drink with us and toast the day away.