Conferences

Conferences

The EU-US Cooperation, 2003
After the Attack: 'Several Europes' and Transatlantic Relations, 2002
Prospects for EU-US Relationship, 2001

The Polish Institute of International Affairs

The EU-US Cooperation

Transatlantic Dialogue Third Conference
Warsaw 2003

Edited by
Lawrence S. Graham and Ryszard Stemplowski

WARSZAWA 2003

The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Office for Public Information
1a Warecka St.
00-950 Warsaw
Phone +4822 556 8000
Fax +4822 556 8099
e-mail: publikacje@pism.pl
www.pism.pl

ISBN 83-918046-5-8

Typeset editor:
Dorota Dołęgowska

Photos by:
Ewa Maziarz

From the Editors

This volume contains the contributions of the participants of the Transatlantic Dialogue Third Conference, "EU-US Cooperation", Warsaw 2003, arranged by the authors' names in alphabetical order. The authors were asked to keep their contributions short. The published versions reflect both the contents of the initial papers which had been sent in before the conference and the conference debate, as the versions here presented have been edited by the authors after the conference.

The conference series was initiated in 2000 by the Polish Institute of International Affairs. The underlying idea for the Transatlantic Dialogue conference series is to bring a group of European and American analysts, diplomats, politicians, and scholars together periodically to discuss the EU-US relationship and stimulate mutual understanding to enhance transatlantic cooperation between Europe and America.

The first conference was held in Warsaw, December, 2000.[1]The second conference was held in Brussels, January 2002.[2] The fourth will be held at the University of Texas at Austin, Spring 2004.

---

[1] R. Stemplowski (ed.), Prospects for EU-US Relationship, The Polish Institute of International Affairs, Warszawa 2001, 123 p.

[2] R. Stemplowski, L.A. Whitehead (eds.), After the Attack: 'Several Europes' and Transatlantic Relations. Abridged Transcripts, The Polish Institute of International Affairs, Warszawa 2002, 217 p.

Table of Contents


POLSKI INSTYTUT
SPRAW
MIĘDZYNARODOWYCH
TRANSATLANTIC DIALOGUE
EU-US COOPERATION

Longer Term Perspectives for EU-US Relations: One European View

Alyson J.K. Bailes

The great 19th century British Foreign Secretary, Lord Salisbury, used to tell his diplomats when they got over-excited to "use a larger map". It is good to be told to use a longer time-scale once in a while, because in the hectic atmosphere of security analysis since 11/9/2001 there has been an understandable tendency to over-dramatise both the ups and the downs of the transatlantic relationship. It is undeniable that we have seen an unusual cluster of unusually explicit, bitter and divisive disagreements during this period. It is also very likely that something like this was bound to happen, even without the political accident of the Bush Government, at the intersection of 3 historical trends: the US's arrival at the peak of its unipolar power; the greatest outrages ever perpetrated by trans-national terrorism, painfully reminding this greatest power that the only way from the top of the hill is down; and

Europe's arrival at an irreversible stage of both widening and deepening in its unique integration process, exactly fifty years on from Monnet and Schuman.

Amidst this turbulence, however, neither the US/Europe rifts nor the US/Europe reconciliations have been as sharp and clear as commentators make them out to be. What kind of Atlantic crisis is this, in the middle of which NATO has agreed on its biggest ever enlargement and most sweeping extension of its military role, everyone has agreed to let it take over in Afghanistan and possibly have a peace-keeping role in

Iraq; the US and Europe as part of an international 'quartet' have launched the boldest ever plan for peace between Israel and Palestine; and US and European trade commissioners are both calling for a common front to rescue the Doha round? Isn't it also a kind of back-handed compliment to the strength of the Euro-Atlantic process that Russia during this crisis has positioned itself somewhere within the spectrum of West–West debate and tried to play both ends against the middle, instead of striking out a truly independent course? Conversely, it seems clear to me that even those Europeans who have stuck closest to the USA's side have done so as much because of their concern about the consequences of letting the Americans go free of all restraint as because of their true empathy with, or confidence in, the American course. When Europe, or certain groups of Europeans, have come back to make compromises with Washington their behaviour has shown increasingly striking parallels with that of Russia or even China, in recognising the overwhelming reality of US power and accepting that they are likely to hurt themselves more than anyone else by trying to trip up such a giant. The US-Europe relationship may already have changed its nature too far to let either side recall with anything more than sad nostalgia Machiavelli's dictum that "It is better to rule by love than by fear".

My own views about the longer-term prospects are pro-European, pro-integration and probably over-optimistic. The fairest thing I can do is perhaps to ask four questions which I am fairly sure are the right questions (at least from a European viewpoint), then offer answers which are admittedly personal and probably less reliable.

Is it healthier for US/Europe relations in the long term to have a united or divided Europe?

This one should be easy. The short-term temptations for the US to divide and rule are enormous, and the Bush Administration may have less compunction about doing so because it is perhaps further away from understanding the true nature and merits of supranational, law-based, interpenetrative integration on the European model than any of its predecessors. The Europeans have made themselves an easy target for divisive tactics for reasons still not fully understood, but which I suspect have something to do with the suppressed strains placed on France and Germany by enlargement and the post-honeymoon phase of EMU; with a string of relatively weak EU Presidencies, and with the total absence of any pre-formed EU policy or mechanism to deal with the particular issues at stake. Nonetheless, it should be clear that a Europe which is divided against itself and where the strongest countries try to undermine each others' success can neither effectively support the US nor effectively balance it. Nor can such a Europe make a success of the reunion of its Western and Eastern parts, the pacification and absorption of the Balkans, and the gradual spreading of integrationist culture to Russia—all of which are just as important for the US's future security vision as for our own future identity.

What would need to change for Europe to have an effective, united policy on the kind of issues thrown up by the Iraq crisis?

Paradoxically, perhaps, the first step is to regain some free will and distance from the way that the US itself is posing and defining such issues. The difference of security cultures, external relations systems, comparative advantages and weaknesses between the two sides of the Atlantic is now a given. Europe cannot match the US's approach in terms of power but it cannot genuinely want what the US wants or feel what the US feels (at least under this type of Administration) either. So if the Europeans take the US position as the starting-point of their own policy they will either end up emulating it unsuccessfully or opposing it unproductively, in either case producing little added value for the US or indeed

for anyone else. The right starting-point would be to ask what the given issue means for Europe itself—for its collective experiences, interests, values and ambitions—and what opportunities and advantages Europe itself may have for dealing with the challenges involved. This of course requires several difficult things, starting with resisting the temptation to fall into self-castigation ("Euro-pessimism"), which is just another way of running away from responsibility. It requires Europe to accept that it does have a world role and mission, and one in which forceful influence and even force will sometimes have to take a place—a thesis still difficult for some "old Europeans" to accept but which is interestingly enough shared by France as well as Britain, Spain, Central Europe and in their more idealistic way the Nordics. It requires Europe to wake up to the fact that in every region of the world there are groups of states trying to organize their local cooperation and security-building by copying some or all parts of the EU model, who do not want to or could not suddenly switch to mimicking the US and who want nothing better than for us to show them some sympathy and leadership. It requires the hardest thing of all which is for each of the 3 biggest Europeans to give up their most damaging eccentricities—for Britain to become less imperial, France less Gaullist and Germany less escapist—and for the smaller countries to accept that strong joint leadership by the 'bigs' is a strength for Europe as a whole. Nothing in the American armoury can offer help or a model for any of this but I do not see how anything America might do could stop us from pursuing this agenda either, if we wanted to.

Should Europe unite around the strategy of the jackal, the fox or the tiger **vis-ŕ-vis** the US?

These animal images are admittedly crude short-hand for different ways in which Europeans are—as a matter of observation—reacting to the facts of US power and policy, and hence options to be considered in future by Europe as a whole:

– The jackal sticks close to the lion, shares the meat from its kill and can sometimes influence who is killed and how. It faces minimal risk of being hurt by the lion, but the lion may choose at any time to ignore and even dispense with

its services. The other downside for the jackal is that it is not much loved or respected, by the lion or anyone else.

– The fox keeps out of the lion's way but keeps an independent mind and pursues its own agenda. It may mock and criticize the lion as it chooses, but is not powerful enough either to challenge its dominance in practice, nor to attract and protect a following of its own. Only wit, not strength, can preserve it from other large inhabitants of the forest (wolf, bear) as well.
– The tiger has a profoundly different nature from the lion, an independent mind and agenda, but also very effective teeth and claws of its own. It may choose to achieve its goals by cunning but is also a potentially lethal hunter, whether with the lion or on its own account.

I would expect Europe's collective strategy, for some time yet, to need to incorporate elements of all three behaviours. Against common enemies, which we cannot hunt on our own, jackal behaviour may actually be appropriate, but Europe can never again in history be united in accepting it as a complete and satisfactory strategy. There are many things we do today as foxes without either engaging or defying the US, such as the great bulk of the EU's internal business and its relations with neighbours and its global development and environmental policies. But the EU's larger and more outward-looking members are not going to be satisfied with such modest, non-provocative efforts as the sole basis for a strategy, and the decision to acquire a military arm for the EU already goes one step beyond fox-dom. The tiger model may seem hopelessly ambitious today but the EU is arguably already very close to playing that role on the world economic and monetary stage, and has also proved capable of standing up to offer an alternative role of leadership to the US on a limited number of security-related issues e.g. in the arms control and international legal field (Ottawa Convention, ICC etc.). My long-term money would be on the tiger: but Europe does need considerable time and space to grow into this role; and runs the risk of finding no niche left for it in the jungle if the US can either persuade or provoke other growing powers (notably China) to adopt the lion's tactics as well.

Which is more likely in the medium to long term, **that Europe will de-Europeanise (re-nationalize or whatever), or that the US will 'de-Rumsfeldize'?**

My money is on the latter. European integration is at the same time formal, legalized, and organic—hence in practical terms very difficult to reverse—and seems far from having reached the limit of the countries it can attract and absorb. When US/European relations are good it is easy for Europe to stay united, but when they get really bad it is only a matter of time before Washington offends all Europeans enough to drive them back into a common front. The US's line can meanwhile be modified by many things, both "bad"—disastrous experiences, excess costs and losses, economic crisis, desertion and betrayal by partners, scandals—and "good", i.e. recognition of the practical benefits of regulation and multilateralism, "socializing" effects of increasing globalization and interdependence, shift in threat perception hierarchies to problems which clearly can't be tackled unilaterally, etc. One of the most curiously self-defeating tendencies in European thinking over the last 18 months has been to depict the US as monolithic and irrevocably committed to a given post-9/11 agenda, in a way that cannot be sustained by the findings of opinion polls and the nature of debates within the US itself. We pride ourselves on being subtle enough to recognise internal differences and the potential for positive transformations in states like Syria and Iran. Isn't it time we apply some of that famous European subtlety to our analysis of our greatest ally?

EU-US Cooperation—The Polish Case

Krzysztof Bobiński

Around two years ago I was asked by Anatol Lieven at Carnegie to contribute a piece to a volume called *The EU, NATO and the Price of Membership*. The book was published only recently reminding this author at least of the danger of presenting firm conclusions in print in fast changing situations. Namely, I concluded that the enlargement both of NATO and the EU would of necessity transform both these organizations in such ways as to make them unrecognizable to those which the Poles and others had thought they were joining i.e., as they were in the past. The danger was, I suggested, that the new members would instead of becoming full-fledged participants, remain de facto outsiders working alone "for their own political and economic development". How this will play out in the case of the EU remains to be seen, membership is assured but the financial benefits will certainly fall short of the support previous "new members"

like Spain or Portugal received. In NATO, however Poland appears to have gained much status thanks to its support for US policy in Iraq. Indeed as it rides into the Middle East on the Washington administration's coat tails it has found itself rather at the centre of things.

Is this good or bad for the Poles and how does it impinge on the future of the US-EU relationship? Many Poles argue that their country's sudden elevation to "occupier" status in Iraq as well its happy relationship with the Bush White House is a good thing. It raises Poland's profile in the world, wins the country respect in the eyes of its EU partners, strengthens Poland's security and brings the hope of economic gain both in the form of US inward investment to Poland and in Iraq itself. This same body of thought rejects the damage that Poland may have done to its relations with EU member states such as Germany and France arguing (and this is the thinking inside the present Polish government administration) that EU membership is important for the country's development but that the real and immediate economic impulse for Poland can only come from the US. This view also argues that Poland was let down by its European allies in 1939 and likes to remember that it was the US in the 1980s which did the most to wrestle the USSR to its knees. However, the holders of this view tend to forget that it was the US that agreed to the post war division of Europe in 1945 leaving Poland on the side of the contained rather than the containers.

In Polish debates about the current reordering of US policy, the prime issue at the back of most minds is what will the country's military and security position be when Russia is once again in a position to reassert its power and to attempt to reclaim the territories which since the 18 century it has seen as its own. And here Poles, in the main, reply that Europe with its fledgling common foreign and security policy, provides few military guarantees for the future while the US is a much better bet. This thinking is understandable but only partly recognizes that the US no longer sees Russia as a challenge and has its eyes fixed firmly on other parts of the world as sources of current and future threats, to name the Middle East for one. To quote George Allen, the chairman of the European affairs subcommittee of the Senate foreign relations committee writing in the Financial Times recently:

"The nations formerly dominated by the Soviet Union are now free and independent but the passing of the Soviet threat was not an end to all threats". The author goes on to argue for the location of US bases in southern and eastern Europe to "provide versatility in responding to threats from the Middle East and Central Asia".

In a nutshell the present Polish government and many commentators have come to the conclusion that with the US losing interest in Russia as a "threat" the best guarantee for the safety of Poland's eastern frontiers is to follow the US into countries such as Iraq and if need be further afield. They also feel that it is worth taking the risk of alienating partners in the EU because these will never be able to match the security guarantees that the US is capable of providing to Poland in the future.

This is good news for the current US administration, which appears to have little interest in fostering a united and enlarged European Union but in a radical shift in thinking has embarked on a policy of disaggregation that comes down to weakening the ties, which are to bind the enlarged European Union together. This is bad news for the EU whose member states have grown together also thanks to the external Soviet threat and external encouragement from the US. Now the Soviet Union has disappeared while the US is no longer keen on European unity. It means that on the eve of the most complex and largest EU enlargement to date the Union will have to work all that harder to maintain its cohesion.

Meanwhile the US administration appears to be actively seeking to undermine the unity of the "old" Europe i.e., everything which wasn't directly Soviet occupied and bring over to its side the "new" Europe—everything which was occupied[1]. It seems that "new" for the White House means in the case of Poland (and this may hold true of the other "new" Europe countries) a rather plucky country, keener to maintain democracy and the free market than the western Europeans and run by true patriots who are ready to follow

[1] At our conference Prof. Alberta M. Sbragia pointed out that the "new Europe" tag also includes present members states such as Spain. Nevertheless the "new" taunt is meant to primarily denote new members states such as Poland or Hungary and suggest that the EU will be changing with enlargement in ways that countries like France might find difficult to countenance.

the White House wherever it deems the war on terrorism is to be fought.

I would suggest though that if we are to accept the new/old division it should be defined differently. The "new" European states are still recovering from years of Soviet domination, their representative and administrative institutions are weak, their societies are seen as corrupt and the largest are run (as a result of democratic elections) by governing parties which have their roots in the communist past. In a word they might be sovereign, have their own armies and security forces but their sovereignty, as defined by the popular confidence in their own institutions, is weak. This makes them malleable. Poland, which is now preparing to bring democracy to a part of Iraq is a case in point. Currently popular confidence in the present parliament is at an all time low of 12 per cent, corruption scandals festoon the government and the foreign policy community (think tanks, commentators etc.) is weak. Indeed one might suspect that Polish styles of corruption that have also infused the military and the security services will find a healthy breeding ground in Iraq.

In contrast it is "old" Europe that has strong institutions, both democratic and administrative and thus a strong sense of sovereignty (alongside military capability) and which is much less willing to act on instructions from the US. Indeed it is the "old" Europe in the EU which through enlargement has embarked on a policy of strengthening the institutions of the "new" Europe. Indeed many Poles who voted in the EU accession referendum on the 7th and the 8th of June did so in the hope that EU membership would help reform the state apparatus.

However Poland is not at the moment giving much thought to the issue of the EU-US transatlantic relationship. It has its own relationship with the Bush White House and deems it a priority for the US to stay in Europe be it within an EU framework or outside of one.

That in the medium term may be a mistake. It is one thing to choose the status of a client state but Warsaw can never be sure that the policy of one administration will be that of the next. In choosing to link its fortunes to the Bush administration Poland is signaling that it is ready to subordinate its commitment to the international rule of law to the wishes of the

US administration[2]. It would be good to remember however that weak states, as Poland undoubtedly is, have more to lose when international law is disregarded and the right is might principle begins to dominate in relations between states.

Secondly there is a faint air of absurdity about a state whose own institutions are weak being given responsibility for a zone of Iraq ostensibly because it put 40 fighting troops into the war and is prepared to commit a further 1,700 (paid for by the US) for the duration. Instead Poland should devote more attention to strengthening its own institutions through EU membership and fighting corruption at home before embarking on neo colonial adventures.

Poland should also remember that disaggregation and the consequent weakening of the links that bind the EU countries could destabilize the continent and raise the long term prospect of a return to a war prone Europe rather than the bureaucratic Europe of today. Disaggregation would also make it more difficult to stabilise not only the "new" European states, which in the near future face the challenge of the rise of populist movements, but also the Balkans, which are also looking to the EU to blunt their latent and still dangerous rivalries.

Even a few months ago the prospect of EU membership and Polish membership of NATO created a formula which meant that for the first time in 300 years the generation born in the 1970s did not need to engage in conspiracies, fight and die for the country, endure prison and exile in the fight for a normal state of their own. For the first time in 300 years the generation that is now in the first years of its career can simply work and play as it builds its country's fortunes. From the Vistula, despite the terrorist threat abroad in the world, the planet appears to be a safer place than it was 20 years ago. The country is at peace with all its neighbours and faces no territorial claims from them. Poland's first priority should be to strengthen its economy and institutions as well as safeguard democracy at home within the framework of the EU, its common foreign and security policy and NATO. Working within the EU, Poland should also do its best to

[2] We learned during the course of our conference that Poland has been resisting US pressure to agree to give US citizens immunity from the International Criminal Court. This shows a laudable instinct for self preservation and means that the Polish approach is less uncritical than I had thought.

maintain good relations with the US based on respect for international law. Taken together this is a difficult and onerous task. However Poland should not be taking short cuts through Iraq. That road risks taking the country into a dangerous cul de sac.

"The Iraqi Catalyst" of the EU-US Cooperation. Towards Militant Democracy?

Sławomir Dębski

Transatlantic relations have always been a very broad and troublesome issue, but today, in specific circumstances when the relations between the US and the enlarging EU are most often described by the word "divisions" and only sporadically by the word "cooperation", the problem in question seems to be even more complex. Additionally, current discussions about the state of transatlantic ties, on both sides of the Atlantic, are too often driven by strong emotions rather than sober analyses of the situation. Unfortunately, similar phenomena have occurred in Europe itself. The forthcoming enlargement of the EU has often been perceived as the enlargement of the area of common values, but after the Iraqi affair, which has provoked the strongest tensions since the end of the Cold War not only in the transatlantic family but between European countries as well, this conviction is being

widely questioned. Some observers of world affairs have emphasised the historical background of the pro-American line of the foreign policy of Poland and other ex-communist states entering the EU, which have caused differences between some of the "old" and "new" members of the EU in their attitude towards the US. However, this view may be read as a continuation of a traditional approach, influenced by the Cold War way of thinking, in which Central and Eastern European countries were perceived merely as passive actors of the super powers world game, but it also leads to a great simplification by omitting analysis of transformations which nowadays are in progress in Europe.

The current state of transatlantic relations, at least in its political dimension, is, above all, the outcome of two main factors: a strategic reorientation of US foreign policy that has occurred after September 11, which was widely discussed during a number of conferences on the subject,[1] and the process of shaping a new European identity that still remains a foggy issue on which more light should be shed.

Some politicians in the EU were very surprised by the fact that in the enlarged European Union, the newcomers will not only share the same rights and privileges with "old members" but they will also use the rights given. Ex-communist countries are entering the EU but subsequently they are not willing to accept any sort of a new patron-client relationship between "old" and "new" members of the EU. That is why the newcomers are deliberately acting in a way "not to miss any opportunity" to speak in their own voice, especially if the question concerns issues related to relations with the US. At the same time the two leading powers of the EU, France and Germany, preferred to use the Iraqi affair as a tool of emancipation from US patronage. Moreover, Paris and Berlin, following the revival of the French-German alliance, intended to speak confidently on Iraq and transatlantic relations in the name of Europe, leaving aside the fact that "Europe" is just on the eve of historical transformation. However, the process of the political and military emancipation of Europe from overwhelming domination by the US in these areas is

[1] See for instance: R. Stemplowski, L.A. Whitehead (eds.), After the Attack: 'Several Europes' and Transatlantic Relations. Abridged Transcripts, The Polish Institute of International Affairs, Warszawa 2002.

somehow inevitable, but the experience of the dispute that occurred in Europe over the Iraqi issue shows that the Franco-German attempt to use the opportunity and to take up the process was untimely. Both powers, outmanoeuvring above all Britain, Spain and the newcomers, tried to win the battle for the European soul even before EU enlargement, but they lost, at least for the time being. The US also contributed to the failure by conducting a policy of isolation of their political opponents in Europe (and in NATO) and by rewarding countries supporting Washington's approach to the problems of world security. But it's necessary to emphasise the fact that the way in which the US treated Paris and Berlin was more the result of ad hoc tactics than a deliberately planned strategy. France and Germany lost due to their own foreign policy decisions.

The conclusion may be drawn that, indeed, the Iraq affair has become a catalyst for changes in international relations. Not only did it cause tensions between the US, on the one side, and France and Germany, on the other, but it also accelerated the process of shaping and defining the relations between the enlarging European Union and the US, taking increasingly more responsibility for world security. The situation which appeared due to the Iraqi affair should be seen by all involved parties as an opportunity not only for reviving the transatlantic partnership but, what may be more important, accommodating it to new circumstances and challenges. A new kind of partnership between the US and the EU is needed.

The experience of the EU to date indicates that the policies of the Communities were most often the result of a compromise and thus it should be expected that also a common European foreign policy will be formed in a similar way. Its occurrence must, however, be preceded by a phase of developing a consensus among the EU member states concerning their relations with the US, Europe's strategic ally —its still most important trading partner and military protector. The truth is that Europeans have been feeling quite comfortable living under the military umbrella of the US and that they are not ready to spend money to increase the military capabilities of European armies. Nevertheless, it goes without question that Europe will not become the new

city on the hill or the last oasis of peace in the world and sooner or later, and unfortunately I have the feeling that it will be sooner rather than later, Europe will be suddenly deprived of this kind of illusion. Warnings about potential imminent terror attacks have already been echoed in Europe. Every month new individuals are arrested by European security institutions and are accused of planning terrorist attacks. Statements of concern and even direct warnings have come, one after another, from officials in Britain, France and Germany and from Interpol. Hopefully, the issue of Iraq and its consequences may make Europe better prepared for the challenge.

Iraqi affair has helped the European states to define their standpoint on the importance of the relations with the US for Europe. Without answering the question whether European policy should be based on transatlantic cooperation or rivalry between Europe and the US, as well as without defining European aspirations in world politics and allocating the appropriate financial resources, the foreign policy of the EU will remain no more than a mere postulate. If such a policy is to appear it has to be equipped with adequate instruments. This is a sine qua non condition not only of its effectiveness but also of its very creation. Europe should possess a significant military capability to be "the able partner" of the US. Obviously, it does not necessarily mean that Europe will automatically follow Washington's decisions and will share American views on the state of world affairs. On the contrary, a common European foreign policy should not be defined only in response to the world policy of the US but should also find its global dimension. It means that Europe will have to take on more responsibility for world affairs, while accommodating the role of the US as the world police force. Having 60 000 soldiers, properly trained and equipped, able to effectively act in any place of the world, Europe will strengthen its position in relations with the US. So, Europeans will have to accept the fact that European forces, sooner or later, will have to be involved in areas even far away from Europe, where no direct EU interest exists. In other words, Europe without military power and a common foreign policy will not be able to protect itself and to conduct, if necessary, pre-empting operations, but also will not be a

strong and valuable partner of the US and effectively promote democratic values.

One may observe that the current position of the United States in world affairs gives them an opportunity to influence the process of forming a common European foreign policy, either supporting or hindering it. But even if the US deliberately wants to create obstacles to the development of this policy it may have the opposite effect. The question appears to be how long can this process be pursued of shaping for Europe its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in opposition to the US.

Nevertheless, Europe, having a coherent and stable view on global issues, may become a valuable partner for the United States and cooperation between the EU and the US may benefit both sides, especially when a compromise is to be reached. Europe and the US together would be able to bring all tyrannies, dictators and terrorists to justice, but Europeans and Americans should also be able to bring democracy to the countries harbouring terrorists and/or ruled by dictators. "Democracy is the worst form of Government except all those others that have been tried from time to time." If we agree with this famous statement of Winston Churchill as well as with some of the observations of Francis Fukuyama, which are related somehow to Churchill's above-mentioned remark, we should also accept responsibility for the state and the shape of democracy not only in Europe and in North America but also throughout the world. So, if we, being Europeans or Americans, assume that the copyright for democracy belong to us, we should be ready to protect this right together and feel responsible for the quality of the product we are going to deliver, without difference to what it means directly or indirectly, or by force or peaceful measures. Owning "the copyright" for democracy we are allowed not only to promote but also to export this as the only form of government we accept. This is the vision for the prospects for EU –US cooperation.

The issue of Iraq has also made us face the fact that after the enlargement of the EU France and Germany, which used to be the leaders of European integration, will no longer be able to dominate the CFSP formation process and will have to take into account the opinions of other member states,

especially the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, but also those of the new EU members, including Poland. Poland has no practice of reaching compromises in the EU but it has an experience, unique in Europe, of 200 years of the common foreign policy of two states: Poland and Lithuania, implemented by the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (1569–1791).

Poland cooperated with Lithuania and Ruthenia in building the first, in European history, multi-national, multi-religious and multi-cultural state. But undoubtedly, it was Poland, who was the leading, the most consistent and persistent turnkey constructor of this common house. Poland—the country being better developed, with greater population density, a higher level of history, a somewhat higher level of culture and civilization—was obliged to involve all of its potential in the struggles with Moscow, the Tatars and the Ottoman Empire, which were so essential for the foreign and security policy of Lithuania. Meanwhile, the Western orientation of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth foreign policy, traditionally important for Polish interests and aspirations in European affairs, was shifted to second or sometimes even third place in the strategy of this common state.

This experience shows that a common foreign policy of two and more states is feasible, providing that the stronger party is ready to take into account the interests and aspirations of the weaker one to a greater extent than its own interests and aspirations. Lessons of history show that this is a condition of fruitful cooperation, of benefit for both sides. The experience of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth may be useful in shaping the EU foreign policy, where France and Germany, due to the long lasting tradition of mutual cooperation, and due to the fact, which is probably more important, that they are willing to act together, are undoubtedly the stronger party. The same experience may also be applied to transatlantic relations. It shows that the US, having an advantage over the EU, should, in the name of strengthening transatlantic ties, consider to a greater extent the European standpoint on the issues of world security and on EU-US relations in world affairs. In accepting the above recommendations, Washington should reorient its European strategy, which until now have been merely concentrated on perpetuation of the American

role in Europe. The new security challenges require the US to give strong support to the development of a common foreign policy for the EU, for the improvement of its military capabilities as well as for the promotion of a role for the EU in world affairs.

So, the acceleration observed in the process of shaping a common foreign and security policy for the EU should be regarded as a very positive phenomenon. The gap between western and central European views on foreign policy matters is being exaggerated and more often misinterpreted. For economic and political reasons, the European Union is going to be the most important partner for the new member states from Central Europe. No one from this part of Europe wants to choose between the EU and the US and that's why the policy of the newcomers will be directed towards strengthening transatlantic ties. In the future, the European Union will have to have a coherent foreign policy, resulting from a compromise on the interests and aspirations of all member states. Europe must be able and ready to act globally for the purpose of exporting and defending the democratic form of government. This aim will create a common ground for a solid and consistent EU-US cooperation in world affairs.



Transatlantic Relations and the Bush Presidency

Lawrence S. Graham

Historically American presidents have had the power to set the national agenda, often in unsettling ways at home and abroad, to an extent exceeding the powers of prime ministers in parliamentary systems. The presidency of George Walker Bush certainly falls within these parameters. Elected by the smallest margin in US history and confirmed as president only after an appeal to the Supreme Court, Bush's response to the events of 9/11/01 has changed the dynamics of domestic and foreign policy making in the United States in an amazingly short time.

Using the mantra of terrorism and defensive nationalism, he has sustained a decisive majority in public polls, used the powers of the presidency to galvanize the different factions of the Republican Party into a disciplined majority political organization, and moved the dynamics of US politics

markedly to the right, despite a divided electorate and the continuation of a political climate characterized by extreme partisanship. Transferred into the international arena, he has utilized the powers of the presidency to change the course of international politics. Abandoning the multilateral use of power, characteristic as much of his father's administration as of the Clinton presidency, he has applied American military and economic power to setting a new course in world affairs.

The first signs of a new, assertive role for the US presidency, to an extent not seen for decades, are to be seen early in his administration in how he and his close allies in the White House changed the dynamics of transatlantic relations by imposing their own personal agenda as the basis for discourse. This direct use of American power emerged full blown in the events leading up to the Iraqi war and in the military campaign that ended in the ouster of Saddam Hussein and the creation of a power vacuum, the outcome of which has been an attempt to establish an Anglo-American interim authority in Iraq. More recently the Bush Administration's Israeli-Palestine initiative has made it clear that, like it or not, this administration has embarked on changing the status quo in the Middle East.

This direct use of US power internationally has evoked strong reaction. The extreme version of this new interpretation of the use of US power to shape world affairs is that an inside coup is in the making in the alliance among George Bush, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld/ Undersecretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, and Vice President Dick Cheney, in which the President's adviser Condoleezza Rice frequently provides the glue through which the neoconservatives and the "hawks" in U.S. politics now dominate the Administration's discourse. As one ranking Brazilian government representative summed it up informally, we Brazilians frequently refer to this new use of American power as the US's Ato Adicional (referring to the Institutional Acts in 1964/65 in which the Brazilian President and his military and civilian advisers decisively altered the basis of power in the Brazilian regime at a critical moment in their nation's history). There are many different versions of this view in circulation internationally. But, suffice it to say that for all

the hyperbole surrounding this strong reaction against the way in which US power has been used internationally, what warrants clarification is that— while the Bush presidency has become one increasingly dominated by perspectives identified with the new alliance of neoconservatives and fundamentalists (as analyzed by Michael Lind, Made In Texas: George W. Bush and the Southern Takeover of American Politics [NY: Basic Books, 2003)—it remains a democratic government, operating under rules long established in its federalist, presidential form of governance.

What is true is that under Bush the United States has returned to the practice of what has been called the Imperial Presidency, in which the Administration has seized the initiative and set the agenda for international affairs, largely independent of Congress. More accurately, the unilateralism of the Bush Administration that has so frequently been condemned is not all that different from the practice of politics domestically. In this new environment of hegemonic rule from the President's Office, supported by a legislative majority, one is welcomed to join in support of the White House, but on its terms. The criticism directed by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, on both sides of the aisle, is not all that different from the complaints of the failure to consult before acting within NATO circles or in Brussels in relations with the European Commission. What has emerged clearly in the exchange between Foreign Relations Committee members and the White House since the Iraqi war is that, while there was what has proven to be a flawed internal Administration plan for reconstruction in Iraqi, it was neither vetted in Congress at large nor really ever discussed with the Foreign Relations Committee—except to make it clear that support of the Administration's decisions and actions within Iraq was certainly welcomed, but not open to serious dialogue in attempting to build a broader national consensus on how to deal with post-conflict Iraq or to respond to the Committee's concerns. Still, even though past practice in White House-Congressional relations has always been centered around the process of advise and consent in the conduct of foreign policy, there is no clear-cut principle that prohibits the current Bush-Rumsfeld/ Wolfowitz-Cheney alliance, with their advisors and consultants, from determining the course of action.

Equally important, this "winner-take all" dimension of US presidential politics projects an image abroad of a broader consensus behind the President than is really the case. One should not forget that the divided electorate reflected in Bush's narrow electoral victory in November 2000 remains present, albeit divided and without strong opposition leadership. Again, this pattern of politics is not without precedent in the struggle to influence public opinion in the United States and to sustain party cohesion, although in this instance the marked policy preferences of the economic conservatives, social conservatives, and Evangelicals so militantly supporting the White House's current policies, both domestically and internationally, have given the Administration a distinctive character. This illusion of hegemony and the push to consolidate Republican Party rule over the nation should, however, not mask the possibility of yet another alignment of political forces within the US.

The budget just passed by Congress with tax cuts in the range of $350 billion dollars is based on a calculated risk that freeing up new money for investment by those with the greatest means in US society will serve to revive the economy at large, as the US heads into an election year in 2004. Equally problematical is the assumption that the interim US-Great Britain authority in Iraq will be able to consolidate a new regime favorable to the priorities and preferences of the Bush and Blair Governments. While the Bush Administration looks very secure at the moment with its bravado of military action as the basis for establishing a new US hegemony in the Middle East, failure either in domestic economic policy to revive a stagnant economy and/or in the international arena to reshape Middle Eastern politics and development according to the Bush Administration's policy preferences could well change quickly and decisively US politics and policies.

Once again historic perspective should help to keep in mind that the illusions of majority rule in the face of a divided electorate can suddenly lead to major policy reversals and very different outcomes in domestic politics and policies abroad. This is especially the case with the growing monetary costs of maintaining US troops in Iraq, now running at an estimated $3.9 billion a month (New York Times, 7/9/03, p. 1)

and with a public that is beginning to question the human cost of sustaining US troops there as the loss of lives and the maiming of its military personnel increase. Who would have guessed in 1926 with Calvin Coolidge secure in the White House and a booming economy that three years later a major economic collapse would ensue in the crisis of 1929, or that there would be a very different national scene in 1934 with Franklin Delano Roosevelt in the White House and the Democrats replacing the prior Republican majority in such a way that for the next 50 years the Democrats would dominate national politics and set forth a reformist economic and social agenda?

Certainly the conditions present in 2003 are very different from what ensued in US politics between the First and the Second World Wars. What is on the horizon is continued international terrorism, major conflict and upheaval in the Middle East, and economic uncertainty. More importantly, a debate has already ensued in academic and policy circles as to how to interpret the new world order in the making. At the forefront of this debate is the issue of transatlantic relations, whether or not there is a fundamental realignment underway in the West whereby increased divergence between the US and the European community and conflict over economic, social, and foreign policy will grow rather than diminish. Of the new books under discussion, the most cogent statement of the view that there is a fundamental realignment underway in the increased divergence in policy perspectives on the part of the United States and the European Union is the extended essay recently published by Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003).

The Kagan thesis is that the divergences between the United States and the European Union stem from very different courses pursued in domestic and foreign policy. The logical consequence of this argument is that increased conflict and divergence in economic, social, and foreign policy in Europe and the United States is inevitable and that opposition to Bush's international agenda is much stronger and deeper than conflict over and opposition to a specific set of policies in the international arena.

The emergence of the European Union as an independent regional economy with its own currency, in an area of the world in which there is a single market in the making with the potential of matching that of the United States, certainly speaks to a new dynamic in world affairs. Added to this is major difference in how the two regional economies are being administered and developed. The free-market preferences present in the United States and the prevailing laissez-faire economic policies with minimal government intervention to correct social inequities or to provide a safety net for those most disadvantaged by the shifts in the market stand in marked contrast to the European Union's preference for strong regulatory policies designed to offset major economic and social dislocations in their new, emerging single market. This also includes social policy preferences for a welfare state in which basic human rights and needs are guaranteed by government. These different perspectives do embrace a very different set of policy options and preferences. As the drive in developing larger integrated regional economies continues afoot, there are also enormous differences in the common market preferences present in the European Union and the free trade policy preferences dominant in North America as economic convergence among the United States, Canada, and Mexico accelerates. In this setting the Central American and Caribbean countries are finding the pressures to integrate themselves into a larger North American market difficult to avoid, as regional economic convergence grows without weakening the determination to maintain national sovereignty. The enormous asymmetries present in the new North American market in the making, as analyzed and reported on by Anthony DePalma in Here: A Biography of the New American Continent (NY: Public Affairs, 2001), speak to a very different regional economy from the new Euro Zone emergent in Europe.

But, rather than assume unavoidable conflict and divergence among national leaders, there is yet another possibility. The polarization and conflict brought to the surface by the Bush Administration in its conflict with the Governments of France and Germany stem from two very different sets of preferences in economic, social, foreign, and security and defense policy. What is missing from this discourse, however, and what is very much needed are

analysis of and attention to the issues in trade, in governance, in academic affairs, on each side of the Atlantic. The Bush Administration has very clearly set itself upon a new course of action designed to project what is different about its vision of the transatlantic world. Its worldview is centered on the maximization of opposed viewpoints and the projection of a distinct image of the United States. Yet this view speaks to but one reality in the United States and it rejects and denies the existence of another America that is multilateral in its view of the outside world and enormously tolerant and understanding of the diversity in its own society and the world outside. So, it warrants recognizing that theirs is not the only course of action. Equally possible is the promotion of programs, policies, and endeavors designed to enhance the understanding of the sources of the differences and shared values that are to be derived from the recognition of the value of the individual, the importance of democratic governance, and the vitality of market economies as drivers in a new world order that can draw on and reaffirm the great strength which lies in the diversity produced by the Western experience, of which the Americas is very much a part. What we need most of all at this juncture are new initiatives involving this other America for which transatlantic ties and shared relations with Europe are seen as essential to sustaining a Western world that remains a major force in this new world that is in the making for the 21st century.

Iraq: A Catalyst for a New Alliance?

Jean Y. Haine

The American encounter with the world has changed the world. What remains to be seen is whether it has changed America. This classic interrogation that underlies the study of US foreign policy since its origin is especially relevant after September 11th, when for the first time since 1812, continental America was attacked. The answer of the Bush administration to this new "day of infamy" displayed permanent trends as well as new specific features of US foreign policy. Among the former, several old habits can easily be identified: a Manichean approach to the definition of the enemy, a global interpretation of the threat, an ideological perspective in framing the challenge, a missionary zeal in fulfilling its new found mission with the usual premium on power, technology and warfare as solutions to the new security dilemmas raised by international terrorism. Among the latter, several innovations stand out: a sovereign and

unilateral prerogative to proclaim the right and the wrong for the world, a clear emphasis on unilateralism to achieve US objectives, a shift from institutional management to ad hoc coalition building and a new prominence on the preventive use of force. This combination represents a more assertive version of American exceptionalism in world affairs, a kind of "Wilsonianism in boots", a Jacksonian interpretation of "democratic" imperialism.[1]

The "war on terror" was the Bush administration's answer to the trauma of September 11th. This formula, which has become the alpha and the omega of US foreign policy, has the political advantage of unwavering willingness that contrasted with Clinton's evasive approaches and reflected the legitimate feeling of outrage that suited US public opinion. It offered none the less the misleading simplicity of erasing complexities and dilemmas inherent to world affairs, it was based on the false assumption of moral clarity since Washington had to rely on dubious allies like Pakistan to reach the source of Ben Laden's terrorism, and it pursued an elusive goal far more ambitious than the fight against Al-Qaeda.[2] Global in its essence and radical in its application, this war against terrorism reveals an imperial flavour to the US role in the world as it envisioned in the National Security Strategy of September 2002. Moreover, because Iraq was presented as a logical step following the fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, the conflict compels us to think more blatantly about the nature, the limits and the durability of this new American empire and to question the strategy of the "democratic imperialist" advisers in the Bush administration. It is too soon to tell whether this new impetus would be just a short fever limited to Iraq only or a prelude to a

[1] The first expression belongs to Hassner Pierre, "The United States: the empire of forces or force of the empire?", Chaillot Papers, September 2002, No. 54, p. 43. The second is from Ivo Daalder from the Brookings Institutions. See S. Fidler, G. Baker, "America's democratic imperialists", Financial Times, 5 March 2003.

[2] On the concept of "war against terror", see M. Howard, "Mistake to Declare this a War?", RUSI Journal, December 2001, No 146, pp. 1–4 and E.A. Cohen, "A Strange War", The National Interest, Special Thanksgiving Issue, 2001, pp. 3-8. For an account of the "moral clarity" in the war against terror, see W. Bennet, Why We Fight: Moral Clarity and the War on Terrorism, Doubleday, 2002 and the sceptical comment by F. Zakaria, "This is Moral Clarity?", The Washington Post, 5 November 2002.

long-term crusade aimed at remaking the entire Middle East. But clearly, Bush administration's choices in waging this war have so far brought divisions inside the West.

Why did the crisis happen?

As every crisis in international relations, the Iraqi conflict displayed a mix of contingent factors and deep forces. The first series largely explain the seriousness of the crisis, the second set helps us to grasp the roots of this transatlantic dispute.

Contingent factors

For the pessimists, the last row about Iraq was unavoidable. But an elementary exercise in counterfactual analysis leads us in the opposite direction. Diplomatic errors, bad timing and domestic politics were present on both sides of the Atlantic. If Vice-President D. Cheney had launched its campaign against Iraq after the summer, Chancellor Schroeder would not have opened the Pandora box of anti-Americanism and pacifism in its election campaign. Hence, German isolation, that was so exceptional for a country which has based its foreign policy on multilateralism, could have been less severe. This stance in turn offered an anchor for President Chirac when France decided to change its originally open stance towards a definitive refusal to the use of force. This partnership of circumstances, especially its ostentatious display at the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the Elysée Treaty, provoked a reaction from other Europeans countries who refused to grant to this Franco-German duopoly the right to speak in their name. This European division was in fact predictable from the start. In July, EU foreign ministers decided to formally hand over the Iraqi affair to the UN, without addressing the strategic case at hand. By doing so, they in fact gave a free hand to the permanent European members of the UN Security Council, France and Great Britain, i.e. the two countries with the most opposite views vis-ŕ-vis the United States. Not very surprisingly, they decided to play the UN framework first, and European solidarity second. In these conditions, the divide and rule tactics adopted by D. Rumsfeld was even more damaging. Last, but not least, if the United States had chosen the UN path with a genuine willingness to seek a compromise without proclaiming in the same time its eagerness to go alone anyway,

then the UN would not have been caught in the impossible dilemma of irrelevance or treason. That Saddam Hussein has succeeded where forty years of Soviet communism had failed to achieve, i.e. the division of the West, is the real tragedy. This comedy of errors on every side largely explains the severity of the transatlantic dispute: at the peak, every international institution seemed in jeopardy. With less blindness, pride or intransigence—to these diplomatic vices one may associate national virtues of its choice—the worst disagreement since Suez could have been avoided.

For the optimists, NATO has been there before. After all, the Alliance was still alive and well after enduring so many crises, starting with the "bomb in the Waldorf" in September 1950, the battle of diplomatic notes in March 1952, the EDC crime of August 1954, the Suez crisis of 1956, the French withdrawal of the Integrated Military Command in 1966, the Kissinger's year of Europe, a détente, a new cold war, Euro-missiles and Stars war. An alliance that had the nerve to survive the end of the threat that was supposed to be its main rationale and its only binding cement, that absorbed the reunification of Germany without apparent costs and that began to successfully enlarge to its former enemies, is after all the child prodigy of military alliances. The long list of premature obituaries for NATO, "where friends can fight and even agree" as Lord Ismay once put it, is nearly endless but all these funerals were premature. This crisis however was especially damaging. For the first time, the rule of consensus had been broken, three countries have refused to assist Turkey and the NAC was unable to resolve the dispute without deferring it to the DPC where France does not have a seat. The solidarity among Atlantic members has clearly vanished. Moreover, its most powerful member tends to consider the Alliance as a relic, irrelevant to its most prominent security concerns. This position reflects the specific character of the Bush administration.

In order to assess the relative impact of this administration, it is worth remembering the particular context of US policy during the 1990s, because its character, which one may be tempted to call schizophrenic, gives us the indispensable background that explains the origins of the current strategy followed by President Bush. That decade when, according to some, Washington took holidays from history, shaped in important ways the beliefs of the neo-conservatives currently in

power in Washington. The United States after the end of the Soviet empire and after the 1991 Gulf War was obviously the only superpower in the world. Its influence was predominant in every field, from economics to mass culture. In international security, its power was, as former Secretary of State M. Albright put it, indispensable. Yet Washington displayed the greatest reluctance to use it, and when it decided to do so, it was under strict conditions set to minimize American casualties. After the Somalia fiasco and the Bosnian imbroglio, the Kosovo conflict and the Operation Allied Force was considered by some advisers of the then future President Bush as the perfect example of a flawed strategy that revealed unbridgeable transatlantic deficiencies. For them, the asymmetry between the capabilities of European countries and their political influence at the North Atlantic Council on day-to-day operations implied too heavy a burden on US autonomy of action. The buzzword "war by committee"—the very essence of NATO process since 1949—implied that allies were seen as slowing factors and obstacles to U.S. security.[3] The bulk of the decision-making process was in fact implemented outside the NATO structure. Consequently, US disinclination to use the NATO decision-making and command and control structures increasingly gave the impression that the United States was no longer really a part of NATO. Whilst for the United States success must always be unilateral, only failure, it seemed, could be multilateral.[4] Multilateralism became a last option resort, not a necessary framework. This specific lesson was congruent with the deep beliefs of Bush entourage.

The group around President Bush is heterogeneous, but they reached a common agreement in the new mission to eradicate terrorism. Broadly put, we could distinguish three

[3] The U.S. management of the Kosovo conflict undermined the position of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), who is increasingly torn between his role as America's senior officer in Europe (CINCEUR) and supreme commander of NATO forces in Europe. As W. Clark has showed, it was more division inside Washington than disagreements among the allies that caused the problems: "There was much made in the press that this [Kosovo] was 'war by committee'… But there was also a purely American committee at work in Washington". W. Clark, Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo and the Future of Combat, Oxford: PublicAffairs Ltd, 2001, pp. 454–464.

[4] J. Lindley-French, "Terms of engagement: The paradox of American power and the transatlantic dilemma post-11 September", Chaillot Papers, May 2002, No. 52, p. 59.

different groups inside the White House. Among the first faction, we find Dick Cheney, a discreet but influential voice, and Donald Rumsfeld, a not so quiet American as The Economist put it, who could be called "assertive nationalists". They made their career during the Cold War and, from this experience, held several deep beliefs about the myth of arms control, the failure of détente and the fallacy of needlessly entangling international institutions. The end of the Cold War was first and foremost the direct result of a policy of strength, not an exercise in soft persuasion. Hard power is the real leverage, the essential ingredient behind diplomacy. These assertive nationalists favour a sovereign and assertive way of pursuing U.S. national interest. The second group is more ideologically oriented and relatively new to the Washington landscape, as their neo-conservative label suggests. Senior officials such as Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith at the Pentagon favour an extension of the empire of liberty, they proclaim American power as a force for moral good in the world. Taking stock of unparalleled U.S. hegemony, they used September 11th as an alibi to promote a far wider ambition than the fight against terrorism. Their ultimate aim is to redraw the map of the entire Middle East. In that respect, Iraq is not simply an attempt to tidy up unfinished business, it is the first step leading to the democratisation of the region. Such ideas had been promoted well before September 2001, in think tanks like the American Enterprise Institute or the Project for the New American Century. Somewhere between the end of the Afghan campaign and President Bush's State of the Union Address in January 2002, came the convergence of views between these two groups that would produce the war against Iraq.[5] The third branch in the US administration is symbolized by Colin Powell, a self-described "Rockefeller Republican." Suspicious of idealist rhetoric and fearful of the consequences of any military campaign, the Secretary of State cultivates a classic method to enhance national interests based on international legitimacy and institutional alliance. He was instrumental in bringing the President to the UN framework in September 2002, but he was constantly

[5] Mr Wolfowitz has been closely linked with US policy in Iraq for almost 25 years, and was the first among senior officials, just five days after September 11, to suggest to Mr Bush that he should deal with the Iraq dictator. On this, see B. Woodward, Bush at War, New York, Simon & Schuster, 2002.

undercut by the determination of the Vice-President to fight the war, even without a Security Council resolution. Seen as a dove by the "democratic imperialists", C. Powell embodied the State Department's prudent realism and tactful diplomacy, but he is also totally loyal to the President. As diverse as they may seem, these groups share some common characteristics: all believe in US power, all are convinced of American superiority and all reject former President Clinton's foreign policies of liberal internationalism. For his part, the President arrived at the White House inexperienced in world affairs. His own philosophy amounted to a populist commitment to American liberties, a distrust of the Federal Government, and a deep patriotic feeling expressed in his attachment to the US Army. In foreign affairs, he displayed a Jacksonian conviction that merged vigilance and modesty abroad, superiority of US values and suspicion of international institutions.[6] September 11th gave him a mission embraced with the zeal of a born-again Christian. In this change, he seemed to have assumed his new role with a blind confidence about the chosen means and the final end.[7]

With an administration that cultivates such a poor consideration for international institutions, NATO was in trouble well before the Iraqi crisis. Alliances have no meaning unless their members feel bound by their obligations. They have no relevance if their members do not commit sufficient military capabilities to fulfil their objectives. On both accounts, NATO suffered a credibility gap for Washington and a capabilities gap from Europe.

Deep forces

Immediate circumstances always reveals deeper forces at hand. In this respect, the Iraqi crisis is the perfect example of a relatively minor issue that becomes a test case of far more important issues. Among the deep forces at play, several stand out. First, and most obviously, the end of the Cold war and the

6 "Of all of the major currents in American society, Jacksonians have the least regard for international law and international practice". W.R. Mead, Special Providence, American Foreign Policy and How it Changed the World, Alfred A. Knopf, 2001, p. 246.

7 On this overconfidence, see N. Lemann, "Without a Doubt", The New Yorker, 14 and 21 October 2002, and M. Boot, "George W. Bush: The 'W' Stands For Woodrow", The Wall Street Journal, 1 July 2002.

pacification of the Balkans implied either a new NATO or an obsolete one. As the Bosnian crises showed, the transformation of collective defense pact to a collective security organization was painful enough. All the realist scholars underlined the simple fact that an alliance collapsed after the completion of its objective. Without the Soviet threat, the days of NATO were numbered.[8] The German reunification issue, arguably its biggest challenge, did not bring however the end of NATO. The Bush father administration decided to deepen transatlantic ties and to transform the Alliance towards a more effective East-West forum. Moreover, the Balkans wars demonstrated that NATO was the only effective military organization in Europe. Nonetheless, the unification and the pacification of Europe did imply on one hand increasing peace dividends for European countries and on the other transatlantic cooperation more political in nature.

After September 11th, security needs on both sides of the Atlantic began to diverge dramatically. This separation was more a choice than a necessity. International terrorism and proliferation of WMD were issues that should unite rather than separate Europe and the United States. However, the Bush administration concluded that the war on terror was "his" war and allied cooperation, although useful, was not a condition for action. Some pundits even argued that Europe was no longer a crucial strategic partner in this new international context, and it was time to recognize that a strategic divide between Europe and the United States had become increasingly patent. The asymmetry in respective capabilities meant Europe's irrelevance. The fall of the Twin Towers was an historical moment, a period of "tectonic shifts" as C. Rice put it, similar to the rise of the Soviet challenge at the end of the 1940s. This time however, the new global

[8] As the godfather of contemporary realism in International Relations argued, "The Cold War's end represented a rousing victory. What does one then expect the war winning coalition to do? In one word: 'collapse'". K. Waltz, "The New World Order", Millenium, Summer 1993, Vol. 22, No. 2, p. 190. In the same vein, Harries, the former editor of the National Interest, argued: "The political 'West' is not a natural construct but a highly artificial one. It took the presence of a life-threatening, overtly hostile 'East' to bring it into existence and to maintain its unity. It is extremely doubtful whether it can now survive the disappearance of that enemy". O. Harries, "The Collapse of the West", Foreign Affairs, September–October 1993, Vol. 72, No. 4, p. 22.

challenge was addressed with a different assumption that made all the difference between a prudent realist policy *ŕ* la Kissinger and the pre-emptive doctrine *ŕ* la Wolfowitz. The working hypothesis seemed simple enough: US hegemony should be used to win, not to manage, the "war on terror" and the axis of evil that supported it. This unparalleled hegemonic position, once a source of questioning if not a motive for inaction and withdrawal, is now a welcome reality that offers opportunities to shape the international arena. At its core, the NSS document calls for the United States to use its "unparalleled military strength and great economic and political influence" to establish "a balance of power that favors human freedom".[9] A combination of unparallel supremacy that should stay unchallenged and a global perception of the new threats constitute the basis of the Bush doctrine. The NSS document identified threats in the combination of terrorism, tyranny and technology, i.e. weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The combination of these three "T's" makes the security environment more complex and dangerous.

Two elements in this Bush doctrine raise specific problems for NATO. The first is the concept of preventive war as embodied by the Iraqi conflict. Such a concept is not well suited for a defense alliance such as NATO. It implies that member states not only share common defense priorities, but also more offensive interests. Here, the threat perceptions become crucial for coordinate actions. But in the case of Iraq, the divergence was too obvious. Contrary to a basic realist analysis, the White House tended to attribute to Saddam Hussein malicious intentions first and hypothetical capabilities second. Reversing this order of priorities, Europeans focused on current capabilities and disregard past behaviour. Saddam may be a congenital liar, but he was not a danger. They were more or less ready to recognize the remote threat that a

[9] The phrase "balance of power that promotes freedom" is repeated five times in the document. Its paternity belongs to C. Rice. At the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in April 2002, she observed that "an earthquake of the magnitude of 9/11 can shift the tectonic plates of international politics… this is a period not just of grave danger, but of enormous opportunity…a period akin to 1945 to 1947, when American leadership expanded the number of free and democratic states—Japan and Germany among the great powers —to create a new balance of power that favoured freedom". Quoted by F. FitzGerald, "Bush & the World", The New York Review of Books, 26 September 2002.

nuclear Iraq is likely to pose for the region in the future, but they did not support regime change by force, something that seemed to them too provocative a gesture in a country that had nothing to do with September 11th. Clearly, from a European point of view, NATO missed the right war, Afghanistan, and is called in the wrong one, Iraq. Moreover, the preventive war option rejects the classic international law definition of pre-emption based on imminent danger of an attack. By proclaiming the right to "anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack"—a clear broadening of the jus ad bellum—Washington took a position that was extremely difficult for its European partners to endorse.

The second specific feature of the Bush's exceptionalism is the "coalition of the willing" mantra. The main vehicle for cooperation is likely to come through coalitions of the willing as opposed to institutional frameworks.[10] The European reaction was evidently negative but excessive too. After all, coalitions of the willing are precisely what EU members are trying to achieve among them by "enhanced cooperation" in defence matters. Moreover, in an Alliance of 26 members, it is understandable that Washington refused to be limited by the lowest common denominator. But his reluctance to become entangled by international frameworks has huge implications. In this respect, NATO becomes merely a toolbox for an American agenda to which allies have to submit or run the risk of being ignored. Consensus and reciprocity that formed the backbones of the Atlantic grand bargain for fifty years are dismissed for unilateral and sovereign actions. Coupled with the Manichean view of "being with us or against us", this disinclination confronts traditional allies with an impossible dilemma of choosing between blind submission and overt opposition. This peculiar configuration ran contrary to the NATO principles of consensus and consultation. In these circumstances, transatlantic usual mechanisms of solidarity were doomed to fail.

From a broad perspective, a classic divide lies at the core of the transatlantic community whose main characteristic today is the heterogeneity of its members. In the present

[10] D. Rumsfeld, "The Coalition and the Mission", The Washington Post, 21 October 2001.

circumstances, the US is clearly the revisionist power while Europe is a status quo group.[11] European countries are by and large status quo oriented. They gradually absorbed the main result of the end of the Cold war, the peaceful reunification of Europe, certainly not a small achievement. In the process, they have to invent a new political body legitimate enough to represent 500 million people but flexible enough to act effectively and efficiently. Their chief problem is currently one of organisation among them.[12] By contrast, the United States has become the revisionist power in the world, mainly because after September 11th it cannot bear the status quo any more. Its perception of security has dramatically changed, as did the nature of the threat of transnational terrorism and failed or rogue states. Its chief concern lies in insecurity inside other states. The first gap is as old as international politics, but raises nonetheless significant problems for an alliance, and NATO is no different in that respect. For the status quo powers, it raises the entrapment dilemma where they could be asked to participate in a war that they did not want. For the revisionist actor, it is the opposite, the chain-gang dilemma, where the allies are seen as slowing factors and obstacles to its autonomy. Here lies the deepest force splitting NATO cohesion.

How serious is the rift?

On the Richter scale of transatlantic disputes, the Iraqi crisis was indeed severe. The earthquake does not mean the end of NATO itself, but the end of NATO as we knew it. The consequences of decaying Atlantic alliance are nonetheless far reaching, and nobody is actually ready to contemplate them fully. In other words, the Alliance needs, once again, to reform itself.

The US needs more Europe than it thinks

[11] This classic distinction was first formulated in 1946 by H. Morgenthau, Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946. See also A. Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration, Essays in International Politics, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962.

[12] As R. Haas noted, "The countries of the European Union like to work out their differences within certain clear rules. But the rest of the world doesn't play by those rules. Europe often treats the rest of the world as if it were a candidate for EU enlargement". S. Fidler, "Washington 'dove' frustrated by Europe", Financial Times, 9 March 2003.

From a military point of view, the United States enjoyed an indisputable superiority. Washington now has a defense budget bigger than the next 10 countries put together. This does not mean however that Washington can do everything alone, especially the fight against terrorism that is transnational by nature. The cooperation of others for tracking, arresting and delivering terrorists remains crucial, as intelligence sharing and judicial collaboration. When force is considered, the assistance of many countries in terms of flying rights, base locations, or active participation on the grounds remains critical. The war on terror demands more than ever multilateral endeavour.

Even in pure military aspects, the U.S. still needs friends. As Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan has demonstrated, the use of force must imply a sustain effort in nation-building that so far has not materialized. Indeed, in planning next-year budget, the Bush administration has simply forgotten to provision any financial aid to Afghanistan. Wars and victories are of course always popular but they lead to long-term investment, occupation and duties beyond borders that the US public has generally been reluctant to endorse. It is doubtful that America will remain lastingly involved in the reconstruction of countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq; it is unlikely that public opinion will tolerate a long-term military presence that could entail regular casualties. As Europeans well know, waging wars is most often the easiest part of a nation-building effort. Peacekeeping and enforcing operations are equally important but far more complex to sustain if the aim is to transform a failed state into a decent democracy. In that respect, as French, German and Dutch soldiers demonstrate everyday in Kabul, Washington needs stable partners.

The militaristic approach favoured by Washington is short-sighted, and ultimately counter-productive. If local populations remain merely objects in Washington's strategy and not subjects of their own future, the war on terror as currently conducted will lead to more rather than less insecurity. Even the war in Iraq is a case in point. First, the British contribution was substantial, not marginal. Second, the disagreement of Turkey could have been a major inconvenient for US troops in case of a Kurdish uprising in

the North. The point is simple enough: Allies are left without any room for manoeuvre to be involved and listened in this peculiar decision-making process; usual channels of influence seem to have been closed and traditional diplomacy is increasingly difficult when the main avenue used to express opinion is television studios rather than embassies. Europeans have the impression that crucial decisions have been already made when they are consulted. They are left with a frustrating "take it or leave it" method that renders consultation purely formal. Current neo-conservatives seem indeed deaf and blind. There lies the real hubris of American power. The President's determination to follow his global agenda should have made him more attentive to alliance politics. Enjoying a comfortable degree of support at home does not remove the need to gain consent abroad. Precisely because the United States is so powerful and its agenda is truly global, world public opinion matters even more.

An alliance like NATO brings thus legitimacy to the revisionist power and profits for the status quo powers. There should be equilibrium that trust and diplomacy could achieve. Coalition of the willing may be a useful short-term device, but it is not a long-term strategy. Repeat the game of ad hoc coalitions, and Washington will ultimately be isolated. Far from being the welcome leader of a coalition of friends and allies, Washington has become the main target of dissent and opposition. More broadly, the tendency to disdain what Thomas Jefferson called a "decent respect to the opinions of mankind" has led to Washington's unprecedented isolation in the world. Its "indispensable" power, once a motive of admiration, has become a reason for suspicion. Any attempt to redesign international politics must count on the support of public opinion to have any chance of success. American power and influence rest upon an idea, a unique and irreplaceable myth: that the United States really does stand for a better world and is still the best hope of all who seek it. What gives America its formidable international influence is not its unequalled capacity for war but the trust of others in its good intentions. This asset remains America's best weapons. Multilateral frameworks provide legitimacy, which is more than ever an indispensable component of foreign

policies.[13] Since the war on terror will ultimately be won in hearts and minds, the American model, whose strength rests on values, economy, culture and democratic leadership, must remain the envy of the world, not a subject of worldwide resentment. In other words, the example set by the American democracy is a better weapon than America's war-prone crusade.

Moreover, the current supremacy of the United States is for a large past based on a multilateral exercise of power. A framework like NATO by encouraging diffuse reciprocity made this U.S. hegemony acceptable. An alliance is a source of restraint and a resource for help. The creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization embodied the post-war combination of altruistic principles and strategic requirements. Its principles remain essentially liberal: transparency and democracy, political and economic identity, a jointly managed system that emphasized the values of community. NATO was a multilateral institution where consultation and consensus were the norms. This Atlantic system, where US power was constrained and its hegemony acquiesced, offered long-term advantages. Among others, the network of military bases, the integrated command structures and forces able to act together quickly represent considerable achievements. They decisively enhance Washington ability to project its power. From a national interest perspective, these assets must be kept.

From the Iraqi case, Washington should thus learn some valuable lessons. First, hard power must be followed by real commitment to rebuild failed states. Winning a war is the prerequisite of building a peace, but if democracy is the main aim, as neoconservatives claim, then a sustain effort must follow. The current situation in Afghanistan is not encouraging in that respect. In Iraq, the US could not repeat the mistake. Second, hard power needs soft power. Diplomacy and coordinate actions are as important tools as military

[13] As Ikenberry remarked: "Rather than invent a new grand strategy, the United States should reinvigorate its older strategies, those based on the view that America's security partnerships are not simply instrumental tools but critical components of an American-led world political order that should be preserved. U.S. power is both leveraged and made more legitimate and user-friendly by these partnerships". J.G. Ikenberry, "America's Imperial Ambition", Foreign Affairs, September/October 2002, Vol. 81, No. 5, p. 60.

interventions. Europe has built over the years a soft power strategy of integration and engagement that have been by and large successful. Third, the image of America throughout the world has dramatically deteriorated. This perception gap between American intentions and foreign perceptions, if not addressed, could become the most crucial problem of America in the coming years. More and more, the U. will need friends and allies. It has often been argued that the American empire has been fundamentally different from those that preceded it. "By consent", "by cooptation", "by invitation", even "by accident", were the usual qualifications attached to the notion of American empire. They remain true in a fundamental way: the United States does not want to gain and directly rule foreign territories. Interventions are essentially offshore. The war in Iraq has changed that perception. A revalorised Atlantic alliance could help to correct this deteriorating image of America.

The EU still needs America

The Iraqi crisis was another premature hour for Europe common and foreign security policy. Despite the official aim to speak with one voice in international affairs, Europeans were from the start divided about the Iraqi issue. The first reason of this fiasco is political. All European actors, great and small, put political considerations well before a strategic assessment. The result was a cacophony of national interests but an obvious lack of Europe. The crisis demonstrated however that grand strategy for Europe based on a reaction to US foreign policy is doomed to fail. Balancing, bandwagoning, hiding all these options could only lead to internal divisions. The main lesson is thus strategic: the EU has to begin to genuinely think about its own interest. This does not mean the end of the transatlantic relationships, but only more balanced ones. A European security concept will be a first step in the right direction. The Petersberg tasks, drafted in 1992, could no longer serve as official missions for the European Security and Defense policy.

This leads to the second major lesson for Europe: getting its capabilities right. The aim is not to compete with Washington in military technologies; the objective is to build operational forces that could be plugged-in in a transatlantic alliance. As

noted earlier, one of the reason why officials at the Pentagon were so reluctant to consult with NATO allies is that European countries have very few to offer in terms of capabilities. This shortage in military hardware was the most important basis of the Saint-Malo agreement that launched ESDP, the European Security and Defence Policy. Nearly five years after, a lot remains to be done. With the current level in military budgets, the main deficiencies will not be adequately addressed. If this trend continues, Europe will become more and more irrelevant to American decision-makers. The chief lesson for the EU after the Bosnian and the Kosovo conflict was that diplomacy must be backed by force. This remains valid. It leads to a renewed effort in terms of cooperation and integration. At the core of the issue lies a crucial question: are European countries friends forever? If yes, then European governments should adopt enhanced cooperation mechanisms, pooling and specialization of resources and forces. So far, the answer is equivocal at best. Some want to deepen their relations and to build a core group of European countries. The mini-Summit last April between Paris, Berlin, Brussels and Luxembourg was the translation of this willingness to go further. But such an initiative met general opposition because it makes no sense in military terms to leave the UK aside. European defense could only be built around the most important players, i.e. France, UK and Germany. Divisions between London and Paris are lethal for ESDP, and the decision-makers know this too well.

In that respect, one of the very few processes left untouched by the Iraqi crisis was the EU-NATO agreement on Berlin-Plus in December 2002, finalized in Spring 2003. This crucial document specifies the conditions of the EU-NATO cooperation in crisis management operations. It has allowed the first EU mission in Macedonia. Although modest, this operation leads nonetheless to a more responsible Europe in defence matters. It shows that NATO remains the most adequate framework to develop and enhance the operational capabilities for Europe. The current division of labour between a war starter America and a peacekeeper Europe may not be sustainable in the long term, but it reflects the distribution of competences across the Atlantic. As Operation enduring Freedom shows, but also the post-Iraq situation, Europeans and Americans have everything to gain by working together.

Lastly, the Atlantic Alliance should continue its reforms to fulfil the security needs of its members. The NRF and the reshuffling of command and headquarters are steps in the direction of faster and more flexible Atlantic forces. It shows that for Washington, NATO is back on its radar screen. There is an opportunity here that Europe should seize. In the global context of international terrorism, and proliferation of WMD, NATO should become an international agency where threat perception, intelligence and planning are discussed. By and large, it is already the case. Cooperation across the Atlantic in these matters is alive and well, including with Russia. On that ground, the Iraqi crisis will probably remain just an exceptional crisis rather than a disturbing pattern.

Conclusion

Past failures in Afghanistan and current difficulties in Iraq underscore the limits of US power in stabilizing post-war countries; they represent real domestic political risks for the Bush administration. A post-war Iraq turning into a Lebanese nightmare could give new impetus to an American conservatism *ŕ* la Pat Buchanan pleading for a more isolationist America. Moreover, the Iraqi preventive war has increased U.S. isolation in the world and deteriorated its image around the globe. Removing one hypothetical threat led to the creation of real new ones. This imperial logic raises the risks of an America overstretching itself. The US may enjoy the luxury but also the hubris of its dominant position in the world, nonetheless its grand strategy is doomed to fail without international legitimacy. On these grounds, the US needs Europe more than it thinks. For Europe, which suffers the price of its own impotence and division, the result is increased insecurity. Given the limited scope of the current ESDP framework, Europe has no choice but to begin to seriously think strategically for itself. Blindly bandwagoning America or futilely balancing it makes no sense. A more responsible Europe should remember the lessons of Locarno: excessive legalism in collective security and inadequate armaments are a lethal combination. Defining common interests, assessing collectively the nature of the threats and correcting defense budgets constitute the first necessary steps forward. This however will take time. For this reason,

Europe needs America more than it thinks. Recognition of mutual deficiencies calls for a rapid end to the NATO crisis. Cold assessment of common self-interests across the Atlantic demands a renewed but stronger transatlantic partnership. In the current context of international terrorism, turmoil in Middle East and instability in the Caucasus, the worst scenario would be an isolationist America and a weak Europe.

Building a Transatlantic Partnership
Short Term Challenges and Long Term Prospects

Bastien Nivet

Recent events have illustrated that the existence of a strong transatlantic strategic partnership between the United States and the European Union remains to a large extent an imperious necessity but a virtual reality.

The notion of partnership itself would deserve a more thorough analysis, but in the transatlantic realm, one might expect it to be understood as "a group of state or non-state actors forming together a structural, cohesive and efficient force of action in the international system, which is perceived as such among its members and by third parties".[1] The least

[1] This is a very personal definition of the author, which reflects a rather high level of expectation towards the 'transatlantic community'. It

one can say is that the EU and the US do not fully fulfill this definition currently, despite international challenges strongly pleading for such a partnership to emerge, for the long term interest of both parts. Why is this the case and what are the prerequisites for a real transatlantic partnership to emerge (or re-emerge)?

The prerequisites of a partnership

Building a transatlantic partnership that would become a structural feature in the international arena requires, among others, four prerequisites:

- The existence of a common perception and assessment of international risks, threats and challenges (i.e. a community of identity);
- The existence of a community of views on the means and strategies that should be developed so as to address these challenges (i.e a community of action);
- A relation of trust and respect among partners;
- A relative balance of power among partners.

These basic conditions on which a transatlantic partnership could be based—which are by no means exhaustive-, are hardly satisfied today between the EU and the US. This rather pessimistic assessment should not, however, lead to renouncing the building of a long term transatlantic partnership but rather promote a voluntarist approach and a frank debate on the challenges underlined above. Indeed, some deficiencies, weaknesses, or miscalculations on both sides, which make a partnership difficult for now, could be progressively remedied.

Assessing international risks and threats

The first of the conditions presented here is only partially fulfilled. The EU and the US share a large set of values and principles (democracy, human rights, etc.), and have identified some common threats and risks such as international terrorism,

implies that the reality that is to be put behind the notion of partnership within the transatlantic realm should be stronger than that of other 'partnerships' in international relations. Indeed, international relations scholars and political leaders alike seem to use the notion of 'partnership' for the description of very various kind of relations among actors: relations of dialogue and low-achieving cooperation (Euro-Mediterranean partnership), relations of thematic consultation and cooperation (NATO-Russia), etc.

the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD),[2] etc. However, the differences or divergences in their assessment of certain issues should not be underestimated. Environmental challenges, issues of global governance and international norms, North-South relations and the proliferation of small arms have emerged as European priorities but remain largely neglected by the US. The international postures developed by the US and the EU over the past three years, the priorities they have tried to put on the international agenda, demonstrate that basic common values do not necessary lead to common international and strategic assessment and priorities.

Moreover, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 2001 have led to a reassessment of international threats and risks in the US, which has not really taken place in Europe. This has probably widened the gap between a threat assessment, which was rather "positivist" in Europe, and "hard security based" in the US, and led to some misunderstandings or diplomatic divergences, which hamper the building of a transatlantic partnership. If one cannot expect to force 'sui generis' the emergence of a common lecture of international challenges between the US and the EU, some pragmatic steps could help in closing this gap.

First of all, the Europeans should not underestimate the psychological impact of 9/11 2001 on the US perception of the outside world, its public opinion and strategic community (diplomats, militaries, political leaders, media, etc.). This has been very unevenly recognised and understood in Europe, and very little di,scussed among European leaders. There is first of all a need to talk, among Europeans, about the US, its evolutions, priorities and the challenges it poses for Europe. For as Nicole Gnesotto recently put it: "(…) it would be quite surrealist for the Europeans, who are so ready to talk about anything and everything, to refrain from looking together at the essential question: the profound changes that have taken place in the most powerful country in the world".[3]

---

2 However, even those issues are not perceived identically on both sides of the Atlantic, not least as far their causes, origins and consequences are concerned.

3 N. Gnesotto, Rebuilding *Bulletin of the Institute for security studies of the European Union,* April 2003.

Secondly and most importantly, one can hardly expect the emergence of a common transatlantic threat assessment when Europeans, among themselves, keep eluding the political process that should sustain and serve as a guideline for their budding European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP): the reflection on a common threat and risks assessment at the EU (25) level.[4] This mainly requires new mechanisms for sharing information, intelligence and evaluation of international situations at EU level, but also a rather conceptual and comparative work aimed at setting the political and strategic priorities for the EU in the world. In other words, the EU needs to 're-politicise' the CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy) and the ESDP. It is not certain that this process will lead to common assessments and common visions—both at the EU and on a transatlantic level—but avoiding it can only ensure that the project of a transatlantic partnership will remain unfulfilled.

Developing common actions and strategies

The second prerequisite for the emergence of a transatlantic partnership (the existence of a community of views on the type of strategies and actions to address the risks and threats assessed as being common) seems even more distant. Recent developments have highlighted obvious differences in the strategic cultures of the US and that of most EU member states:[5] the conditions for the use of force, the notion of pre-emptive action, the role of international norms and institutions in tackling international risks and threats, are among some of the more evident fields of transatlantic differences. In that regard, the gap between the US and the EU has widened due to the impact of 9/11/01 and the advent of the Bush administration, while the

[4] The last time such an exercise was significantly made was in 1995, through the writing and adoption, by the 27 members, observers and partners of the WEU of the document entitled: "European security: a common vision of the 27 countries of WEU", Declaration of the Madrid Council of the WEU, November 1995.

[5] Evocating the strategic culture of 'the EU members states' and not of 'the EU' is a voluntary linguistic choice aimed at highlighting the absence of a common European strategic culture. This argument would require, in itself, much deeper debates and analysis, which can not be made within the realm of this contribution.

Europeans have failed in building their own alternative vision on how to deal with new security risks. Paradoxically, if many European leaders are rather uncomfortable with the new security strategy of the US and the strategic choices made in Washington, their response has been either based on purely rhetorical opposition or on silent and complacent endorsement. This leads to a rift in the transatlantic community and among European countries between those who endorse and follow the US in their actions and strategies, and those who oppose it without being able to offer any satisfying alternative. Should it persist, this tendency will lead to the dissolution of the transatlantic community as a force of resolve and action in the international system through the multiplication of ad hoc coalitions of the willing.[6]

To achieve this prerequisite, a first constructive step would consist in clarifying the EU's own strategic options and concept, through a conceptual work and the definition of a global strategy for the use of its various means of international action (economics, cooperation, CFSP, ESDP, etc.). Once again, it is uncertain whether this exercise will lead to the emergence of a common transatlantic strategy and to an enhanced European influence on the US's own strategic choices, but it remains essential for any serious transatlantic dialogue (hence any partnership) to emerge.

Recovering trust and respect among partners

Another and more abstract constitutive condition for a viable Partnership is the existence of a relation of trust, respect and openness among its parts. This issue is also, to some extent, one of the weak links of the transatlantic chain. The Europeans' support of the US on issues such as the "War on Terrorism", is frequently marked by thinly disguised fears that the US may embark on dangerous, adventurous or irresponsible military intervention. Even the closest US ally in Europe, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, gives an

[6] The risk of such a process to occur is even more immediate that it is clear objective of some members of the current Bush administration, such as Donald Rumsfeld when asserting that "the mission determines the coalition".

example of this by arguing that his close association with the US is a way to obtain inflexions of US strategies.

On their side, the US seems to marginalize the multinational and transatlantic frameworks out of fear of having their hands tied to the allies' demands. Their refusal to deal with major issues within NATO as such (for instance after the 9/11/01 attacks when the Article V was activated for the first time), was largely dictated by the suspicion towards some of its allies – France most notably – which were perceived as a potential hindrance or obstacle for the realisation of efficient military operations.[7] These example of the lack of trust between the US and its European allies are the two sides of the same coin and mutually reinforce each other: the more Washington expresses its will to act outside any binding framework, the more it raises suspicion and uncertainty among its allies; the fears and reserves expressed from then on by Europeans do, in turn, comfort the unilateralist camp in Washington…

It seems difficult to establish the relation of trust that is indispensable for any Partnership under these conditions. However, a more open and frank discussion on a transatlantic level, and the political revitalisation of multilateral framework such as NATO and the UN would help rebuild confidence among the US and the EU. However, this means that these organisations should not be considered as a simple military toolbox (in the case of NATO) or as an agent for the legitimating of pre-conceived decision (in the case of the UN), as is currently the case. Besides, the lack of trust and honesty between the US and the EU could be remedied by a reinforcement of the current institutional frameworks of transatlantic dialogue, in particular at the level of Ministries

[7] One needs to remember that one of the main lessons drawn from the Kosovo war in the US was the rigidity of the decision making process within NATO due to the rule of unanimity and the need for consensus. This decision-making process led to tough debates, not least between France and the US, on the choice of strikes for instance, which were perceived as an obstacle in the US and as a limitation of their margin of manoeuvre.

of Defence and parliamentarians, the latter being necessary as strong relays of public opinion.[8]

Reducing the 'power gap' between the US and the EU

The important power gap between the EU and the US is also a major structural obstacle for the emergence of a genuine transatlantic partnership. If this gap is to remain, the transatlantic relation will remain an alliance of weak actors around a dominant actor—which is already the case within NATO. It could eventually evolve, as seems to be the case, into a nebulous coalition on ad hoc and random circumstances (with the weaker bringing, when necessary to the stronger, specific expertise, political legitimacy or limited support), but could hardly be qualified as a strategic partnership between two equally responsible and "excess of power". It is however vital that the European acknowledge their own weaknesses.

It is unfortunately doubtful, however, that Europeans on the whole, have the capacity to take the psychological and political step that would lead them to consider themselves—within the EU—as a partner that could be able, eventually, to speak and work on an equal basis with Washington. Certainly, this process would mean a revolution in the political and strategic European thinking that is probably neither available nor foreseeable, and that will not emerge without new tensions and crisis within the EU and the transatlantic community.

Concluding remarks

While international challenges and uncertainties strongly call for a strong transatlantic partnership, the current state of the transatlantic relationship hardly reflects the existence of such a cohesive force of action in the international arena. Not least, changes in the US doctrine and priorities under the Bush administration are putting the Europeans under heavy pressure, since they are virtually invited to endorse

[8] A more advanced process of common threat assessment (both at EU-25 and on a transatlantic basis) would also help reducing the current mistrust among partners, by avoiding division such as the recent one on the presence or not of Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq and the immediateness of the danger they might have represented.

Washington's choices, failing which they face the risk of being considered as irrelevant partners or being marginalized ("Those who are not with us are against us", "The mission determines the Coalition", etc.). Under these conditions, the long term emergence of a genuine Transatlantic Partnership will only be possible if the EU emerges as a credible international actor, and proves capable of identifying the interests, priorities and strategic choices it aims at putting forward. For if it is uncertain whether or not a strong EU will make a genuine transatlantic partnership possible, the non-existence of the EU as a credible international actor will make any partnership with the US simply impossible.

Crisis, Schizophrenia and Cooperation in the Transatlantic Relationship

Alberta M. Sbragia

The widespread concern about the current state of the transatlantic relationship has been reflected in a virtual torrent of newspaper articles complemented by conferences and symposia. The recent "Declaration on Transatlantic Relations: How to Overcome the Divisions" signed by twenty leading foreign policy analysts in the US, France, and Germany is but one expression of the worry that the rift between the United States and countries such as France and Germany has caused. At the elite level in both Europe and the United, such expressions are part of the discourse.

At the level of popular culture in the United States, by contrast, no such expressions are heard. On a popular night-time television show on a major network, the host's anti-French remarks are greeted with roars of laughter. On

Fox News, the popular O'Reilly Factor promotes a boycott of French goods, while a broadcast journalist cheerfully concludes that any pain the sinking dollar may cause the French or German economy is not a concern in Washington. The protests of the French Ambassador that France is being vilified simply provides more grist for the mill. Given that many Americans receive their information about politics, international affairs included, from popular rather than "high" culture, such expressions have to be acknowledged as indicative of a popular mood.

It is very easy to view this rift as something unparalleled. It certainly has features which did not exist in the last century. However, it also has familiar features. It is in fact important to place this particular rupture in transatlantic relations in some kind of historical context. France and Britain, on the one hand, and the US, on the other, have had important disagreements ever since the end of WWII: the pitched battle with the UK over Imperial Preferences within the GATT in 1947, the break with both France and Britain during the Suez crisis in 1956, and the American abstention in 1958 on an UN Resolution calling for negotiations between the French government and the FLN in Algeria (an abstention which infuriated the French) all represented serious rifts in the relationship between the United States and key European allies.

More recently, it is worthwhile remembering the very serious rift that occurred in both the transatlantic relationship and within the EC during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war (especially during the resupplying of Israel) and its aftermath. Tensions were already high before the onset of the Yom Kippur War, and the war exacerbated those to a significant degree. Basing rights were refused by Germany and Italy, the UK refused its support for an US sponsored UN resolution, and France shipped tanks to Libya and Saudi Arabia. The oil embargo which followed the war led to a split within the EC itself, particularly over the issue of how to deal with the Arab oil boycott of the Netherlands (with the Netherlands threatening to reduce its natural gas exports to France, Belgium, and Germany if its EC partners did not help the Dutch deal with the embargo).

Very deep disagreements in the transatlantic relationship—and within the EU— are therefore not unknown. The fact that they occurred within the framework of the Cold War of course helped repair the relationship—but the fact that they occurred even during the height of the Cold War also indicates how likely it is that serious disagreements will always be a feature of the relationship. The absence of the framework provided by the Cold War does raise the question of whether any comparable incentives exist to repair the relationship now. Nonetheless, it is important to remember that a fair number of very serious disagreements have occurred within the Atlantic community in the post-war period and that the transatlantic relationship has been repaired each time. Interestingly, however, each time a new rift develops, analysts often view it as unusual rather than as an occurrence that appears regularly. Viewed historically, the transatlantic relationship is very troubled quite often.

What is new to some extent is the articulation and expression of public opinion in both the US and Europe. Mass protests in Europe against US policy are of course not new. One has to only think of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) in Britain or the massive protests in Germany against the 1979 NATO decision to deploy Pershing II and Cruise missiles on German soil. Such protests, however, were often interpreted within the left-right framework, which characterized politics in some key European countries in the period before the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. The divisions between left and right are understood differently today, given the advent of New Labour, the policy constraints introduced by the Stability and Growth Pact of the EU's Economic and Monetary Union, and the disappearance of the Communist Party as a significant electoral force in both France and Italy. A mass protest in Italy when the Italian Communist Party was still a significant force carried a different meaning from that which is transmitted by a mass protest in today's Italy with no significant Communist party. Anti-Americanism today in Europe is viewed as not anchored in such left-right divisions and therefore as more dangerous to the relationship because it is more unstructured and presumably less compartmentalized.

The widespread opposition to the US-led war in Iraq (especially without a UN mandate) among mass publics in

both Western Europe and the new accession countries was evident in public opinion surveys as well as the mobilization in the streets in countries such as the UK, Spain, Italy, and Germany. On the US side, however, what was striking was the unease that the American public felt about going to war without the legitimacy of UN authorization. In fact, the support for the UN at the popular level surprised many analysts. Given the hostility that many in Congress have shown toward the UN, and the clear downgrading of its importance by the Bush Administration, the support for the UN by the American public was striking. The UN mattered a great deal to the American electorate, even when the US position was not finding favor. It is likely that the UN will remain much more of a referent for the American public than one might have expected (especially given the past Congressional hostility to paying the dues owed by he United States to the UN)

At the mass level, in the United States the UN seems to operate within the kind of "permissive consensus" that characterized the EU until the battles over the Maastricht Treaty ruptured that consensus in Europe. In spite of the enjoyment of TV audiences at "French bashing", the attitude of the American public toward the most multilateral of all institutions—the UN—bodes well. That is not to imply that Americans have the same attitude toward the "pooling of sovereignty" which Europeans have—they do not and will not. Nonetheless, a traditional multilateral institution does garner significant support. The preference of the American electorate for UN legitimacy over "going it alone" is in line with the results of a landmark survey co-sponsored in 2002 by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and the German Marshall Fund of the United States. Comparing the attitudes toward US foreign policy of American respondents with those of the British, French, German, Dutch, Italian, and Polish surveyed, the study found striking similarities in attitudes between the American and European respondents..

The Schizophrenic Transatlantic Relationship

Given that public opinion in the US has not turned "unilateral" in any profound way, what might provide the kind of incentive to repair the relationship that the Cold War

provided in earlier ruptures? Here it is important to acknowledge that the current rift involves a good deal of schizophrenia. That is, the rupture that is garnering so much attention in the broadcast and print media, while highly visible and very high profile, is remarkably compartmentalized. The fact is that an extraordinary amount of cooperation is going on. The cooperation between American and European intelligence agencies is notable—in fact, it sometimes seems as if such cooperation is much more solid than the cooperation which exists amongst the American intelligence agencies themselves. But the cooperation also takes place in policy areas that, while they may be "low politics", are of vital importance to the economic health of both sides of the Atlantic.

In fact, one of the differences between the rupture based on the Yom Kippur War, for example, and the one now is that our economic relationship has changed so profoundly in the past thirty years. European foreign direct investment is now roughly symmetrical with US FDI in Europe and the "private transatlantic relationship" has developed alongside the more traditional diplomatic relationship. But other critical, albeit less noticed, interdependencies have emerged which now link these two centers of great economic power.

One of these areas is cyber security. Although it is a field that rarely warrants newspaper articles, it is nonetheless one that is critical to all sorts of economic activities. The damage that would be caused by a breakdown in the system of cyber security is enormous. Here, transatlantic cooperation is absolutely critical—and it exists. If one were to ask practitioners in this area how to "repair" the transatlantic relationship in this field, those questioned would not view the question as relevant. From their point of view, there has been no rupture and there is no danger of one.

A similar response would be given in field after field. Even in the field of environmental protection, one in which the Bush Administration's rejection of the Kyoto Protocol led to very bitter feelings, there is cooperation. In early March 2003, the US and the Commission (i.e. EU Research Commissioner Philippe Busquin) agreed to raise the level of cooperation in joint research on hydrogen fuel cell technology. Neither the bitter dispute over Iraq nor the deep differences between the

US and EU on how to achieve the reduction of greenhouse gases stopped the agreement.

In fact, if one were to talk with officials throughout the American government, the main disruption in the transatlantic relationship would be perceived by officials in the Department of Defense and the Department of State. The Department of Agriculture has been upset about the Common Agricultural Policy since it was adopted in the 1960s, and the negotiations over the Doha Round do not seem noticeably worse than they were at this stage in the Uruguay Round. Both the US and the EU seem to want to keep taking their complaints about each other to the World Trade Organization. In general, then, those agencies not involved in national security or traditional diplomacy have not experienced the kind of disruption seen in the area of foreign policy.

Thus, discussions about the transatlantic relationship can often lead to a sense of schizophrenia in Washington. Many officials in a wide range of policy areas will volunteer that "we have had and are having only excellent relations with Europe" when asked, so that much "low politics" seems to be insulated from the bruising experienced in the "high politics" realm. The same holds for intra-EU relations. While chief executives and foreign ministers have been accusing each other of various sins, the less glamorous and less visible work of the EU has been getting done. And there is the conundrum. The lives of ordinary citizens on both sides of the Atlantic would be far more disrupted if cooperation were to break down in the area of cyber security than it has been by the disagreement over Iraq. Yet the highly visible disagreements in the field of foreign policy are often assumed to spill over into all other aspects of what is in fact a very deep and complicated relationship.

This schizophrenia is likely to continue, exacerbated by the fear of the Europeans that the US will try to "disaggregate" Europe. Of course, the US has disaggregated Europe before— the negotiations on "open sky" agreements are a textbook example of that tactic. But in general the US has in the past encouraged and supported European integration, even when the economic effects of a custom union would hurt US economic interests. However, in those areas in which Europe is not united, such as in the area of

foreign policy, bilateral relationships are likely to predominate for at least some time precisely because Iraq has made it much harder for third parties to think of the European Union as an actor in the area of foreign policy.

The future of the transatlantic relationship is likely to remain excellent in the "low politics" areas that receive almost no attention. If the Uruguay Round is any kind of referent, the negotiations in the Doha Round will be very difficult and very long. In that sense, they will be typical of the transatlantic relationship in the area of commercial diplomacy. In that world, the transatlantic relationship is always rocky to some extent, and when a WTO Round is under negotiation, it simply becomes even more difficult.

In the "high politics" arena, it is likely that the relationship will be repaired over time because the US will in fact become at least somewhat more multilateral in its dealings with Iraq as the real difficulties of "nation building" are confronted. It is notable that the US has chosen the European GSM standard for Iraq's mobile wireless network rather than the rival CDMA standard used by the US and Israel. For its part, the European Union will find it comparatively easy to develop a coherent policy toward such nation building, thereby making the transatlantic relationship less fragmented. In a similar vein, the decision by NATO to help Poland's mission in Iraq is one step in that direction.

The decision in mid-June 2003 by the EU's Foreign Ministers to accept the use of force as a last resort (and when approved by the United Nations) in order to stop the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons also indicates that the EU is now ready to engage in serious discussions about the real threat posed by weapons of mass destruction. During the Iraq crisis, the EU did not have a common WMD policy—now it does. The EU's emphasis on strengthening the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as one means of avoiding the resort to force should facilitate cooperation with the US that is also very much interested in strengthening the IAEA's role in the field of nuclear non-proliferation. Finally, if the EU, acting as the Union, does indeed eventually mobilize peacekeeping forces (especially likely in the case of conflicts in Africa) while NATO takes command of the peacekeeping forces in Afghanistan,

Europe will gain both experience and visibility in mobilizing armed force outside of the European theatre. That in turn can only strengthen Europe's role in the transatlantic relationship, making it both more relevant and better able to be heard.



EU-US Cooperation

Klaus-Heinrich Standke

I.

Three issues can be identified as being at the roots of a profound change in the perception of European-US relations. These are, in reversed chronological order, (1) The Iraq war, (2) The 9/11 Trauma, (3) The end of the cold war.

The Iraq war

It is being argued, that the war in Iraq (March 22nd –May 1st, 2003) has changed the established international order in ways that are only beginning to be understood. Furthermore, there is a widespread belief that the relations between Europe and the United States will never be the same again. No other issue has preoccupied in such a short time public opinion in the developed countries as the apparent rift in the traditionally close EU-US relations. Conferences on this issue are mushrooming, best-selling books have been written, the

"think tanks" in many countries, political scientists in universities around the world, the media have produced hundreds, if not thousands of analyses trying to investigate the causes of the almost suddenly surfacing "US Hegemony" or US proclaimed "New World Order." Is there now "too much America" and "too little Europe"? And if so, why?[1] Has the United States now entered the era of an "Imperial Republic" as predicted already thirty years ago by Raymond Aron?[2] Or, as some claim, will the United States be transformed into an "Imperial Presidency" imposing a sort of "Pax Americana" upon the rest of the world? One could indeed interpret some of the pronouncements of US President Bush to this effect. For example, one year after 9/11, in his introduction to the new National Security Strategy of the United States he has declared: "…The United States will use this moment of opportunity to extend the benefits of freedom across the globe. We will actively work to bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the world."[3] Time Magazine revealed this motivation in the following terms: "In truth, this war is just as much about an idea—that Iraq is but the first step in an American-led effort to make the world a safer place."[4] None of the European leaders would have made such a far-reaching statement. But, as Henry Kissinger has observed, already almost ten years ago: "America's values impose on it an obligation to crusade for them around the world."[5] One of the reasons for the recent rift between the US and some European countries stems, no doubt, from the fact that the vocabulary used by some of the leading American politicians sounds too patriotic for European ears, too missionary oriented and perhaps too much driven by

---

1 R. Kagan, "Power and Weakness," Policy Review, No. 113, June/July 2002. R. Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order, New York 2003.

2 R. Aron, République impériale – Les Etats-Unis dans le monde (1945–1972), Paris 1973. R. Aron, Mémoires – 50 ans de réflexion politique, Paris 1983, pp. 634–645. Cf. also P. Hassner, J. Vaisse (eds.), *Washington et le monde, dilemmes d'une superpuissance,* A Bibliography, Paris 2003.

3 G.W. Bush, Introduction to the National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Washington D.C., 17 September 2002, p. II.

4 M. Elliot, J. Carney, "First Stop: Iraq," Time Magazine, 31 March 2003.

5 H. Kissinger, Diplomacy, New York 1994, p. 18.

stern American Protestant Evangelism "On July 4th, 2003, we still placed our trust in Divine Providence" (George W. Bush).[6]

Analysts are asking themselves now the question, if the present transatlantic encounter has been suddenly brought into the open a catalytic process only set in motion by the Iraq crisis? Is the transatlantic clash of positions just the visible part of an alienation between Europe and the U.S. which has started much earlier? Robert Cooper, Director-General for External Relations and Political-Military Relations, Council of Ministers of the EU, is supporting this opinion: "I am today much more concerned about the transatlantic relations than about Europe. Since this relationship defines itself in essence via the security issues, a conflict as occurred during the Iraq crisis can create great damage. However, we must remember that the process of drifting apart has not just begun under the Bush Administration. It is, if you so wish, a secular trend."[7] A similar position is being taken by Robert Kagan: "Although transatlantic tensions are now widely assumed to have begun with the inauguration of George W. Bush in January 2001, they were already evident during the Clinton administration and may even be traced back to the administration of George Bush sr."[8]

It should be said from the outset, that the issue at stake is not "EU" versus "US" and even less so "Europe" versus "US." According to a listing published by the White House, six of the EU-15 member countries, i.e. Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, as well as the EU associated member Turkey, have publicly committed themselves to the US-led "Coalition of the willing". Of the ten Central and Eastern European candidate countries, all of them (with the exception of Slovenia) have been listed by the White House as coalition members. Additional European countries on this list are Iceland, and Ukraine.[9] The U.S. Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, has redefined history in his own way in clustering those 18 countries of

6 "President Bush Honors Military in Fourth of July," Speech, Dayton, Ohio, July 4, 2003, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/07/20030704-1.html

7 R. Cooper, "Auf Deutschland kommt eine enorme Aufgabe zu", Interview in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung', 27 May 2003.

8 R. Kagan, "Power...", op. cit., p. 5.

9 Operation Iraqi Freedom, http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/iraq/news/20030326-7.html

Europe which supported the U.S. position into "New Europe" and those 9 EU countries which opposed the U.S. stance, into "Old Europe".

The handling of the Iraq crisis has thus deeply divided the European countries, the EU-15 as much as the EU candidate countries and has not spared "special triangular relationships" such as the three countries of the "Weimar Triangle", i.e. France, Germany and Poland as well as

the three neighbouring countries of NAFTA (U.S., Canada and Mexico) and the much older t "Transatlantic Triangle", that is to say U.S., U.K. and Canada. In consequence, there is no evidence for the simplistic argument that the Europe as a whole or—for that matter—the EU in its entirety, EU-15 or the future EU-25—has alienated itself from the US. Some individual countries have done so, others have not.

The shock waves from the attack on 9/11 resulting in the described profound change of US attitudes on aggression continue to be felt today. Here lie also the roots for the basic change of attitude and disenchantment of the US towards some of its European partners. Donald Rumsfeld, in a presentation to a Congressional Committee outlined "that some countries were not helping the US—like Cuba, Libya, and Germany."[10] In a speech to US Congress on 20.9.2001 President Bush has declared that each country has to choose, either to be on the side of America or on the side of the terrorists.[11]

Before looking to the causes for the present rift in the transatlantic relations, it seems to be useful to recall earlier happier times in the American-European partnership since WWII. To quote only one of the US Presidents during that period: John F. Kennedy, on July 4, 1962 in Independence Hall, has said that "alone" the United States could not do any of the big things which should be done in the world, but that "joined with other free nations" it could.[12] On another occasion he said "we [Americans] do not regard a strong and united Europe as a rival but as a partner". He even proposed that a "Declaration of Interdependence" be made between

[10] Cit. in E. Pond, "The Greek Tragedy of NATO", Internationale Politik, Transatlantic Edition, 1/2003, p. 9.

[11] US Embassy Berlin, USINFO-B-DE, 21 September 2001.

[12] P. Uri, et al., Partnership for Progress: A Program for Transatlantic Action, New York 1963, p. X.

what he described "As the new union emerging in Europe and the old American Union".[13] Thirty years later, Brent Scowcroft, National Security Advisor to President George Bush coined the slogan "Together where we can, alone where we must" which seems to have been reversed, another ten years later, by the present US administration into "Alone where we can, together if we must." For Donald Rumsfeld, US Secretary of Defence, in the future "the mission will determine the coalition". If this concept were to be followed, it could indeed mean the end of the intergovernmental system as exemplified by the UN or by NATO and as known up until now. What is probably meant by this statement can be read in the "National Security Strategy of the United States of America", adopted in September 2002: "The alliance (NATO) must be able to act wherever our interests are threatened, creating coalitions under NATO's own mandate, as well as contributing to mission based-coalitions."[14]

The 9/11 2001 trauma

The second and most profound incident resulting in the profound change of both public opinion and of the US leadership towards the UN and multilateral cooperation with the allies in NATO and EU was the traumatic experience of "9/11". George W. Bush has paraphrased the sustained impact on US policy of this tragic event as follows:

> "For America, our resolve to fight terror was firmly set on a single day of violence and sorrow. The attacks of September 11th, 2001, changed my country. On that morning, the American people saw the hatred of our enemies and the future grief they intend for us. The American government accepted a mission to strike and defeat the terror network and to hold accountable all who harbor it and who support it."[15]

---

[13] Cit. in J. Solana, "Mars and Venus reconciled: A new era for transatlantic relations," Albert H. Gordon Lecture, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 7 April 2002, p. 1.

[14] National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Washington D.C., September 2002, p. 25.

[15] Remarks by the President to the People of Poland, Kraków, 31 May 2003, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030531-3.html

More recently, Condoleezza Rice has echoed these feelings as follows:

> "No less than Pearl Harbor, September 11 forever changed the lives of every American and the strategic perspective of the United States. September 11 produced an acute sense of our vulnerability to attacks that come with no warning. In the terrifying hours and days that followed the attacks, we resolved that only true defense against a threat of this kind is to root it out at its source and to address it at its fundamental and ideological core."[16]

Many Europeans have apparently even today not well understood to which extent 9/11 has marked a turning point in U.S. attitudes judging in its international relations friends and foes likewise. It would be a grave error to believe that the 9/11 trauma would be felt in essence by the US political and military leadership and not by the American constituencies at large and by the American people. For example, Herbert I. Fusfeld, former President of the Industrial Research Institute Inc. (IRI), to which some 250 of the leading US corporations belong, has expressed his feelings as follows:

> "Since 9/11, we have been at war. Someone has declared war on us, and it is not another nation, so the rules that have evolved about relations between nations do not apply. We feel threatened with violence in a way that most Europeans do not."[17]

In his remarks to a large military gathering at the 4th July celebration 2003 in Dayton, Ohio, the US President declared

> "Our nation is still at war… The United States will not stand by and wait for another attack, or trust in the restraint and good intentions of evil men.… We will act whenever it is necessary to protect the lives and the liberty of the American people."[18]

---

[16] Remarks by Condoleezza Rice, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 26 June 2003, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/06/20030626.html

[17] H.I. Fusfeld, Personal e-mail message to the author, 30 May 2003.

[18] See footnote 6.

Apparently not all in Europe possess the sensitivity to understand what it meant for the only superpower of the world, which was sure about its invulnerability, that an attack of this order of magnitude of 9/11 was possible.

The US, unlike Europe, has responded with a complete reorientation of its defence policy ("revolution in military affairs"):

- adoption of a comprehensive new "National Security Strategy",[19]
- built-up a new gigantic "Department of Homeland Security",
- creation of a new Regional Command for the Defence of the North American Continent (NORTHCOM),
- arrangements for the installation of a comprehensive Missile Defence System in Alaska and—most visible and regardless of public opinion in the world—a profound change of military strategy in making preventive wars an instrument of national self-defence: "assuring, dissuading, deterring, defeating".[20]
- Increase of the budget for military expenditures since 2001 from US $300 billion to US $400 billion (Budget Plan 2004). This amount is in the same order of magnitude of all Direct Foreign Investments (FDI) in the world. It is intended to further increase the US defence budget—unprecedented in the history of nations - by the year 2007 up to more than US $450 billion. This is equal to two and a half times of the military budget of the EU-15 countries.[21]

Jack Straw, the British Secretary of Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, has described this situation as follows:

> "Since 11 September, all EU Member States recognise that the world has entered a dangerous new era. And we would all agree that the threats to

[19] http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html. The complete text of the new National Security Strategy of the US, presented on 17 September 2002 by President George W. Bush can be found at: http://www.usembassy.de/policy/nss.pdf.

[20] K.-D. Schwarz, "Militärstrategie und Streitkräfte", in: SWP-Berlin, Zwei Jahre Präsident Bush, Berlin, März 2003, p. 12 http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html.

[21] The EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, has indicated that the enlarged EU of 25 members is spending a total of 160 billion □ on defence.

> our security – from terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and chaos and contagion from falling states – may in extremis require a military response."[22]

The debate in Europe, whether or not the war in Iraq was "illegal", since carried out without the formal backing of the UN Security Council, seems to be irrelevant for the US. The country regards islamic fundamentalism, terrorism, mass destruction weapons[23] as the greatest threat to its security. The UN Charter, devised almost 60 years ago, did not foresee such "modern" threats. A debate on how to adjust the legal basis of the UN to the demands of the 21st century has just begun.

Indeed, whether these threats seen by the US are real or not is beside the point. The sheer fact that the most powerful country in the world feels threatened must be taken seriously.

Taking sides, in one way or the other, will inevitably either forge new alliances with the US or will break others— regardless whether they have been in existence for many years or not.

An illustration of a typical American opinion when judging European attitudes of indifference on this vital issue for the US, was given by Jack Straw as follows:

> "An American liberal Democrat, Michael Walzer, typifies the US consensus. He recently wrote, 'when war is just and necessary, as in the Gulf in 1991 or in Kosovo in 1999, it is the United States that bears the brunt of the fighting. Our European allies oppose American unilaterism only this far: they want a role in deciding when war is just and necessary, but they are content, once the decision is made, to leave most of the fighting to American soldiers.' "[24]

---

[22] J. Straw, "Europe in the World", speech at the Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 19 May 2003, http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029391647&a=KArticle&aid=1052839631711

[23] U. Weisser, „Der Irak: Eine Aufgabe für die Nato", Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 15 April 2003.

[24] See footnote 22.

New situation after the end of the "Cold War"

The third development that has changed profoundly the US attitude towards the UN—and any other form of multilateral cooperation—was the breaking up of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Since the world system was in essence after WWII—expressed in simplistic terms—a bipolar system, divided into influence zones of the "West" and of the "East", a pattern into which even the so-called Third World had to choose sides, the breakdown of the "socialist camp" in 1989–1991 has brought about a fundamentally new situation. The issue is now not geared anymore towards bipolar relations, but the question is whether the only surviving superpower, the United States of America, is seeing its role essentially in a unipolar world—under US leadership, or to what extent would the US be ready to accept a grand multipolar design in which various centres of gravity in the world, various "poles" do cooperate. In other words, how does the US define its hegemonic leadership in the world?

Not only since 9/11 in 2001, has the U.S. position already differed from the European assessment. The role of what the US has labelled "rogue states" or "States Threatening International Peace and Security (STIPS)," grouping such different countries as Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, North Korea and Cuba, is one illustration. Furthermore, and as the debate on the war in Iraq has demonstrated, the US—together with countries such as the UK—has seen a greater threat of arms of mass destruction in the hands of the so-called "states of concern" than a number of its European allies. Even before the present Bush Administration took power, the former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright had identified the non-proliferation of mass destruction arms as the key issue of contemporary security interest and as the overall uniting threat of the Western alliance.[25]

II.

[25] W. Drozdiak, "Albright urges NATO to Fight Arms of Mass Destruction," International Herald Tribune, 17 December 1997.

Multilateral security concepts by the United Nations, by NATO and by the EU

The Security Advisor to the US President, Condoleezza Rice has given a very revealing picture on multipolarity or multilaterism on one side and unipolarity or unilaterism on the other. She has said:

> "…Some argue that Europe and America are more divided by differing worldviews than we are united by common values. More troubling, some have spoken admiringly—almost nostalgically—of 'multi-polarity' as a good thing, to be desired for its own sake.
>
> The reality is that 'multi-polarity' was never a unifying idea, or a vision. It was a necessary evil that sustained the absence of war but did not promote the triumph of peace. Multi-polarity is a theory of rivalry; of competing interest – and at its worst – of competing values."[26]

She concluded her line of thought in arguing that the vision in Europe since the defeat of communism was "to rid Europe of "poles" and to unite Europeans around shared goals and common values."[27] The message is clear: The close cooperation between the US and Europe will continue, based on re-affirmed common principles but not necessarily on shared leadership.

In clear contrast to this, the European Security concept, however, presented to the European Council in Thessaloniki on 20 June 2003, is highlighting the need to build an international order based on effective multilaterism.[28]

United Nations

What has been the role of the United Nations in the Iraq crisis? It would not serve any purpose reiterating here in detail the 17 resolutions of UN Security Council dealing with that subject.

---

[26] See footnote 16.

[27] See footnote 16.

[28] J. Solana, "A Secure Europe in a Better World", Thessaloniki, 20 June 2003, http://ue.eu.int/pressdata/EN/reports/76255.pdf

Condoleezza Rice, expressed herself in mid-April 2003 in rather strong terms: According to her, in the field of security, the UN has up until now produced nothing but a series of failures.[29] But not only Americans are sceptical. S. Neil Mac Farlane, Oxford University and Faculty member, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, in his analysis "Rebuilding Iraq: The UN is not up to the job," came to similar conclusions:

> "The UN is a loose confederation of agencies over which the secretary-general wields little real power.... There is a number of chronic problems with this system: weak lines of authority; squabbling between departments within the Secretariat; turf battles in the field between UN agencies; deep tensions between civilian and military components of post-conflict administration; and the variable quality and commitment of UN personnel... How likely is it—given the disputes in the Council before and during the war—that the Council will be able to act cohesively, quickly and decisively after the war? If this question cannot be clearly and positively be answered, it would be irresponsible to confer a leading role upon the United Nations."[30]

The UN Security Council in its resolution adopted on 22 May 2003 has answered this question clearly: The United Nations will not play a "leading role" in the reconstruction of Iraq but instead the Council has resolved that the United Nations should play a "vital role" in this process. Furthermore, the Council has specifically recognised "the authorities, responsibilities, and obligations under applicable international law of these states as occupying powers under unified command (the "Authority").[31]

On the surface, the role of the international system as such seems not to be seriously questioned by the US. To the contrary, President Bush, in his introduction to the new

---

[29] "L'ONU ne veut pas renoncer ŕ sa mission, męme si Washington considčre qu'elle 'n'a connu que des échecs' ", *Le Monde*, 16 April 2003.

[30] S.N. MacFarlane, "Rebuilding Iraq: The UN is not up to the job", International Herald Tribune, 14 April 2003.

[31] United Nations Security Council, S/Res/1483 (2003) adopted on 22 May 2003.

National Security Strategy has reaffirmed the commitment of the US to the world system:

> We are …guided by the conviction that no nation can build a safer, better world alone.
>
> Alliances and multilateral institutions can multiply the strength of freedom loving nations. The United States is committed to lasting institutions like the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, The Organization of American States, and NATO as well as other long-standing alliances. Coalitions of the willing can augment these permanent institutions. In all cases international obligations are to be taken seriously. They are not to be undertaken symbolically to rally support for an ideal without furthering its attainment.[32]

The way that the Iraq crisis was handled—by the UN and by the US—is delivering perhaps a blueprint for the development of new power rules leading to a new concept of "World Order". Condoleezza Rice, in June 2003, is not ruling out from the US point of view the involvement of the multilateral system in tackling global security issues—provided profound adjustments in these agencies are taking place. Therefore, she is calling for a "new spirit" preparing NATO to take on critical missions out of area. She is calling for a new spirit "to embolden the great multilateral institutions – particularly the United Nations – to defeat the common enemies of civilization: terror, poverty and oppression."[33]

The US has always used the full spectrum of instruments at its disposal to make its voice heard in international organisations and to make it crystal-clear, by way of "stick and carrot" strategies, the possible consequences if resolutions or programmes voted by majorities against American interests would be implemented. And yet, unlike other countries, the US has rarely used the "empty chair" policy for the boycott of international activities. If the US position on

[32] G.W. Bush, "Introduction to the National Security Strategy of the United States of America", Washington D.C., 17 September 2002, p. III

[33] See footnote 16.

the creation of the International Criminal Court of Justice (ICC) is a blueprint for similar future actions in other fields remains to be seen.[34] The creation of the ICC, originally supported by the Clinton Administration, was later categorically rebuked by the Bush Administration. In his statement on the renewal of UN Resolution 1422 in the Security Council, US Ambassador James Cunningham went as far as saying

> "The ICC is not a UN institution and, some would even say, challenges and weakens the UN Charter system and the Council's place in it. … The United States, therefore, has a fundamental objection to the ICC. In our view, it is a fatally flawed institution…".[35]

NATO

NATO has permanently adjusted itself to the changing situation after the end of the Cold War and has made a multitude of efforts to create flexible cooperation schemes: In an unprecedented act of solidarity and as an immediate response to an American request, NATO for the first time ever, invoked Article 5 of its Treaty and declared the attacks occurred on 9/11 in New York and in Washington as an armed attack on all members of the alliance.

And yet, in 2002, the Deputy Secretary of Defence, Paul Wolfowitz, when referring to the alliance, proclaimed the "irrelevance of NATO". Since not all of 26 sovereign member states of an enlarged NATO[36] (or, for that matter, the 15 member of the UN Security Council) will necessarily always accept US set priorities as their own; the US will – as in the case of the Iraq war—lean increasingly towards ad-hoc "Alliances of the willing".

---

[34] Amerika droht Partnern mit Streichen der Militärhilfe. Streit über Internationalen Gerichtshof, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2 July 2003.

[35] U.S. Department of State, Statement by James Cunningham, Deputy U.S. Representative to the United Nations on the Renewal of Resolution 1422 in the Security Council, New York, 12 June 2003, http://www.un.int/usa/03_085.htm.

[36] The second Eastern enlargement of NATO will take effect as from May 2004 and will increase the membership to 26 countries.

The NATO Secretary-General, George Robertson, admits openly that indeed—regardless of 9/11 or the Iraq crisis—NATO in the previous format is defunct:

> "…The theme I have been asked to tackle is whether after Iraq, the security strategies of the US and Europe are still compatible. My answer is, yes they are.
>
> That does not mean that the old cold war partnership between Europe and North America is still alive and kicking. It is not. It is dead and has been for some time.
>
> However, it is being replaced by something very different yet, I believe equally robust. A partnership for the 21st century based on security strategies which are at least as compatible as those which saw us through the cold war."[37]

The necessity for Europe to mobilise greater military efforts on her own, either within NATO or within the EU, has not found the necessary support leading from intention to action. Most European defence budgets continue to stagnate or even to fall. To make things even more complicated, the former U.S. Secretary of Defence, William Cohen, has declared at the Security Conference 2002 in Munich that the US would not be in favour of an autonomous Defence Policy of the EU outside the NATO structure.[38] And yet, the intended European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within NATO has not made much progress either.

In spite of this dilemma, the European Council has reaffirmed on 20 March 2003 in a statement on Iraq "…We are determined to strengthen the capacity of the European Union in the context of the Common Foreign and Defence Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)". On the other hand, initiatives to accelerate the European Security and Defence Policy at a meeting on 29

---

[37] G. Robertson, "The West after Iraq: Are the Security Strategies of the US and Europe still compatible?", speech by the NATO Secretary-General in Berlin, 24 June 2003, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2003/s030624a.htm; see also: "Robertson für Nato-Einsatz im Irak", Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 25 June 2003.

[38] S. Bierling, "Die Europäische Union und die USA," in: W. Weidenfeld (ed.), Europa-Handbuch, Gütersloh 2002, p. 642.

April 2003 in Brussels by Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg have provoked mixed feelings by other EU-15 members and by future EU members. At the Wroclaw Summit of the Weimar Triangle on 9 May 2003, the Polish President Aleksander Kwaśniewski made it very clear, that he was unwilling to accept any defence structure which might ultimately weaken NATO or which might lead to some duplication of efforts with NATO.[39]

It appears at present that NATO continues, as in the times of the Cold War, to be only effective if the interests of the alliance are fully in line with the interests of the US.[40]

Security Cooperation with the European Union

Both the US and the EU have realised that after the end of the "cold war" that what is known as "enabling partnership" needed not necessarily a new foundation but rather a new orientation. To this effect, in regular intervals during the 1990's and with a new momentum after 9/11, a number of initiatives have been launched.

It can be predicted already now that in Fall 2003, when in Rome the Intergovernmental Conference of the EU will have to ratify the intended European constitution, a new coalition consisting of the two European incumbents of a permanent seat in the UN Security Council will insist that the national veto will remain at the heart of European foreign policy making. The switch hoped for by others favouring majority voting would thus be prevented.[41] On the same issue, the British Foreign Minister, Jack Straw, was outspoken even before the EU.

Convent had reached an agreement of the draft of the European Constitution: "We also have responsibilities as one of the Union's two Permanent Members of the UN Security Council and the United Nations is and will remain an association of sovereign nation states." In the same

[39] K.-H. Standke, „Zwischen Irak-Krise und ESVP: Was wird aus dem Weimarer Dreieck?", in: Dokumente – Zeitschrift für den deutsch--französischen Dialog, No. 3/2003, June 2003.

[40] H. Arnold, "Sicherheit für Europa durch Kooperation", Development and Peace Foundation, Bonn, Policy Paper, No. 18, June 2001, p. 8.

[41] G. Parker, "France and Britain win EU veto victory," in Financial Times, 26 May 2003.

statement the British Minister made it bluntly clear what he feels about the outcome of the Convent. He said on 19th May 2003: "[T]here's a really important point. The Convention is making final decisions on nothing. […] Instead it will depend solely on the governments of the 25 nation states, meeting together in an Inter Governmental Conference (IGC) and able to take decisions only by unanimity." Mr. Straw went on to say "The Iraq crisis has shown that the foreign policies of nation states are ultimately determined by national interests. That will always be the case in a Union whether of 15 or 25 sovereign countries…".[42]

Against this background, there seems to be little room for optimism within the foreseeable future for the adoption of mechanisms allowing for a European "Common Foreign and Security Policy," if such a policy were to be meant more than just the umbrella for the least common denominator.

III. Conclusions and final observations

When looking at the quality of the new transatlantic relations, less than two years after 9/11 and less than two months after the end of the war in Iraq, the following conclusions can be offered:

(1) The rules governing the international system seem to be "deregulated". The United States has emerged from the end of the "Cold War" as the only country "with the power, the will, and the intellectual and moral impetus to shape the entire international system in accordance with its own values."[43]

(2) The United States whilst using actively its membership in the more than 200 intergovernmental global and regional organisations, but experience shows, it will not yield to majority rules (including those of the UN Security Council) as long as they are not in line with US interests. Andrew B. Denison has appropriately labelled this peculiar mix of

[42] See footnote 22.

[43] H. Kissinger, op. cit., p. 17.

cooperation on a multilateral scale with unilateral interests "Multilaterism 'American style' ".[44]

(3) President George W. Bush has declared on numerous occasions that he will operate—in particular on issues concerning US security—with "coalitions of the willing" consisting of changing compositions according to the given situation.

(4) The Bush Administration will continue to define US Foreign Policy almost exclusively under the angle of national interests. This is a tendency which can be observed as swinging backwards and forwards for many years in the alternation of US governments coming from the Democratic or the Republican Party.[45]

(5) In the light of the tragic events of 9/11, the US was instrumental in having the notion of terrorism and of other new threats such as Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, "Failed States" and organised crime, in a new security environment prominently introduced into the agendas of the UN, NATO, the EU and other inter-governmental agencies as well as into bilateral agreements.

(6) There is a new awareness, that within a rule-based international order, laws must evolve in response to developments such as security threats through proliferation and terrorism as well as through environmental threats such as global warming. The UN Charter, seen under this angle, needs to be accordingly adjusted.

(7) The notion of "pre-emptive engagement" vis-*ŕ*-vis countries persistently violating international norms of domestic governance or of international behaviour used by the US when justifying the Iraqi war, has found its place in the new concept for a European Security Policy.[46]

(8) The New World Order, which begins to emerge, will have, increasingly an influence on the sensitive interaction between national security and the access to global resources. The Iraq oil supplies have perhaps not been at the centre of

---

[44] A.B. Denison, "Unilateral oder multilateral? Motive der amerikanischen Irakpolitik," in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, Beilage zur Wochenzeitschrift Das Parlament, B 24–25/2003, 10 June 2003, p. 17.

[45] C. Rice, "Promoting the National Interest," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 1, 2000, p. 46.

[46] See footnote 28.

the causes leading to the recent war, but as in the Gulf war of 1991, when the Kuwait oil supplies were threatened, the future assured free access to the Iraq oil reserves was without any doubt a major strategic consideration behind the motivation to enter into the conflict.

What is new after 9/11, is the configuration in which international cooperation at large operates. It appears that, perhaps with the exception of some of the more technical intergovernmental agencies, the entire international system could benefit from a screening process aiming to re-adjust to the prevailing new circumstances on the global scene. The same has to be said about intergovernmental organisations operating interregional, such as NATO or OECD. The only "supranational organisation", i.e. the EU has just undergone the difficult exercise to define its constitution permitting, among other objectives, a more effective functioning of the organisation. All of them, regardless of their mandate or their size, have not yet overcome the organisational difficulties caused in essence by the fast growth in membership after the dismantling of the former Soviet Union.

– The UN system was geared for more than four decades in an essentially bipolar "East-West" orientation. Even strong UN supporters are admitting that confronted with the new global threats, the international system did not evolve sufficiently in order to redefine its role as custodian of the "Gewaltmonopol" in the world. Closely connected with this issue is the question of "sovereignty" of nations. Should it be lowered and thus permitting other states feeling threatened to enter into pre-emptive wars?
– NATO has after the end of the cold war not yet found a new "*raison d'ętre*". The North-Atlantic Alliance needs a complete overhaul to adjust itself to the new situation. "Out of area" missions seem to become the new motivation and replacing the basic NATO concept of collective self-defence. (Laurence Whitehead: NATO will be "out of area" or "out of business"). NATO seems to be ready to take on such new roles and missions in new parts of the world and is—in the words of its Secretary-General, "bouncing back".

- OECD, after a series of enlargements in its membership, finds it increasingly difficult to operate efficiently. In addition to the present 30 member states, there are 10 possible candidate countries hoping for membership.
- The EU—torn between the adoption of a "Constitution" and the process of enlargement—will need time to find a new equilibrium. Critics are predicting that the politically desirable increase in the EU membership to 25 in 2004, 27 by 2007 and bypassing the number of 30 by probably 2010, will be on account of the efficiency of the Union. "*Europe ŕ la carte*" (as compared to the US led "coalition of the willing" with changing compositions) may be an inevitable consequence.
- Last, but not least, Europeans were unable to understand the depth of emotion generated by 9/11 ("9/11 is everywhere") which ultimately has led to a complete "turn-around" of US attitudes towards international cooperation in general including transatlantic relations. It is today immaterial if—as result of a slowly changing awareness in European countries or because of US pressure—Europe seems to be now fully in line with the basic US concerns on international terrorism, organised crime, WMD proliferation and other threats. A Euro-barometer opinion poll, undertaken in October/ November 2002 investigating what European citizens do fear, came to similar results as opinion polls on the importance of these issues seen by the US citizens.[47]

Looking at the present tensions between Europe and the US, it appears that some overreactions may have blurred the true picture. It is worth to recall the assessment of the European-American relationship made just ten years ago by the acknowledged dean and proponent of the US foreign policy, George F. Kennan, who in his "Personal and Political Philosophy" had this to say:

> "It is true that this country becomes, with every day that passes, less European in the composition of its population and in the relative importance of Europe among its various interests and concerns.

[47] Eurobarometre, Sondage No. 58.1, Octobre/Novembre 2002

> Nevertheless, its governmental tradition and its political culture generally have been largely derived from that side of the ocean, particularly, but not exclusively, from the British isles…For these reasons the European continent is, for us, more than just another continent among continents…".[48]

In spite of all the turmoil in the transatlantic relations, which we are witnessing today, this statement remains basically as valid as at the time it was written.

President George Bush jr., two years ago, reached a similar assessment when addressing a European audience: "We share more than an alliance, we share a civilisation. Its values are universal, and they pervade our history and partnership in a unique way."[49] He reaffirmed this notion in his remarks "to the people of Poland" at Wawel Royal Castle in Krakow on May 31, 2003 in even more dramatic terms:

> "Europe and America will always be joined by more than our interests. Ours is a union of ideals and convictions, we believe in human rights, and justice under law, and self-government, and economic freedom tempered by compassion…We do not own these beliefs, but we have carried them though the centuries. We will advance them further and we will defend them together."[50]

The new EU security concept reaffirms likewise the importance of EU-US-cooperation: "…the transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable. Acting together, the European Union and the United States can be a formidable force for good in the world. If we build up capabilities and increase coherence, we will be a more credible actor and a more influential partner."[51] The cautious language chosen, "can", "if" and "will", reveals that the present situation offers plentiful room for improvement. Ernst-Ulrich von Weizsäcker is calling in this context "for an outline of a proud European

---

[48] G.F. Kennan, Around the cragged Hill – A personal and political philosophy, New York–London 1993, p. 205.

[49] See footnote 16.

[50] See footnote 15.

[51] See footnote 28.

vision from which an extent of world-wide influence could follow, which the US simply cannot ignore…".[52]

Another important "bond" between the two continents should not be overlooked: Transatlantic economic relations have so far not been seriously affected by the recent tensions. The economies—Exchange of Goods and Services as well as Foreign Direct Investments—of the EU countries and of the US are interwoven to such an extent that political disarrays seem to have little effect. The EU and US are not only the largest players in global trade, they are each others largest trade and investment partners. Either the EU and the US is also the largest trade and investment partner for almost all other countries.

To conclude, the Iraqi crisis has had a rather healthy effect on the transatlantic relations. The air has been cleared. In an act of Realpolitik the United States has reaffirmed its determination to play the role of the uncontested hegemonic leader. The European countries have apparently neither the will nor the power to challenge this situation. The debates in the UN Security Council concerning the post-Iraq war situation (Res. 1483) or concerning the renewal of resolution 1422 (ICC) have demonstrated that the fierce opposition to the US has been replaced by a pragmatic acceptance of the "fait accompli" and by the tacit will to find common solutions for future cooperation: Having assembled 49 countries publicly committed to the "Operation Iraqi Freedom", the US/UK lead military occupation authority—to which Poland has been co-opted—has had no difficulty after the war in mobilising military support from more than ten countries in the Iraq reconstructing efforts. Others, like Japan, Pakistan and India are likely to join this new "coalition of the willing."

The Secretary-General of NATO, George Robertson, in a speech on June 24th in Berlin giving an impressive overview of the results achieved on the whole range of security related questions within NATO, EU and UN said, if he would have made such a statement only a year ago, he would have been laughed at and he would have received a storm of protests,

[52] E.-U. von Weizsäcker, The Old and New Europe: Alternatives for Future Transatlantic Relations?, Keynote Address to the Transatlantic Policy Consortium, Speyer, 16–18 June 2003, p. 6.

perhaps his sanity would have been questioned.[53] On both sides of the Atlantic, governments—including those that were opposed to the Iraq war—are seemingly inclined to make gestures of reconciliation. No doubt, in this test of strength, the winner is the United States. Even when the US is sending out strong signals for a renewal of the transatlantic partnership, "the rules of the game" will never become the same as before 9/11: "The future of transatlantic relations will ultimately be decided far more in Washington, by the sole superpower, than in Brussels."[54]

[53] See footnote 37.

[54] Guoted by E.-U. von Weizsäcker, op. cit., Financial Times, 30 May 2003.



Towards the EU-US Hegemonic Tandem?

Ryszard Stemplowski

Intervention in Iraq as a Catalyst

The international debate over the policy towards Iraq is primarily an expression of and a stimulus for processes of (a) creating a system of common foreign and defence policies within the EU, (b) building up the US Administration's strategy to counter transnational terrorism, (c) deepening an understanding of the political cultures in the EU and US, and looking for a common political denominator of the EU and USA.

The current situation within the EU is characterised by a very high degree of interstate cooperation and narrow cooperation in the domain of Community policy. Further integration of EU member states requires broadening the scope of Community policy. This applies primarily to the sphere of the EU which is the equivalent to the external function of a member state (including, in particular,

diplomacy and defence and security policies) and which, as yet, has not been developed within the EU. If the EU is to develop such functions as a community, a solution needs to be found to the problems resulting from the integrative parallelism, i.e. functioning of the integrating states within both NATO and the EU.

The creation of EU institutions responsible for foreign, defence and security policies is further stimulated by actions taken by the USA. Following the collapse of the USSR the USA has become the world's only superpower, but its hegemonic position is now questioned to an extent unknown in the bipolar world age, when its leadership was a prerequisite to the effectiveness of the policy of containment towards the USSR.

The tensions within the EU between Germany and France, on the one side, and the United Kingdom and many other EU states on the other, which has appeared most conspicuously in the issue of Iraqi intervention, do not in fact relate to the issue of Iraq but rather to the manner in which the EU member states are to establish their relations with the USA as a the hegemonic leader of the world system and the main force in NATO.

We should note however that there is no tension in disciplining or policing the world system, as can be seen in the Prague decision of the leaders of the NATO member states on the territorial enlargement of NATO influence and the potential theatres of action.

When President George W. Bush made specific demands on the Iraqi regime, he was actually not just after Iraq. What was at stake was the position of the USA in the world after September 11, and his own presidency, which was everything. When he says that the USA will not allow any state in the world to become more powerful than the USA, he does not reject the EU but invites the EU member states to join the US efforts, albeit as junior partners. On the other hand, when France and Germany refused to accept a resolution providing for a direct attack on Iraq, they were not rejecting the United States of America, but rather presenting their independent assessment of the threat and emphasizing the need for prior exhaustion of all other means to resolve the conflict. And along the way, which should be most strongly

emphasized, indicating their wish to participate in the world leadership-in-the-making.

France's imperialism did not end with decolonisation. Now France defines its position in relation to the hegemonic leader, which also requires it to emphasise its distance from the less developed EU candidate states, if only through, for instance, arrogant comments. France may aspire to present itself as the leader of such a Europe which understands the Arab world and constitutes for the Arabs an alternative to the USA. The current position of the French government is one of dissonance, but it matters a lot less than the decision of Charles de Gaulle's government on France's participation in NATO.

Germany is also defining its role by completing the construction of a new identity of the German state based on lessons drawn from history as much as on its economic strength. Critics of the German government's stance should ask themselves whether they would rather wish Germany to press for an international military intervention. Chancellor Schröder's response is rooted in the better part of the German Social Democrats' tradition, the new stance of "the greens", and the political philosophy of the Allies in 1945, expressing Germans' contemporary ambitions in an unexpected manner according to most foreign observers. By presenting itself as an opponent of military action, Germany, which is burdened with historical experiences, is building its new identity. If parliamentary elections in Germany were held now Mr Stoiber would probably win, but after the elections he would probably also assume a similar stance. Despite their disagreements Germany remains an ally of the USA. Germany has only recently assumed command of the peace-keeping forces in Afghanistan and Bundeswehr soldiers are on duty in Bosnia and Kosovo under the NATO flag. Germany will be an ally, but no longer a vassal.

In the absence of a common position of the Fifteen, the letter of the eight leaders and the later statement of the Vilnius Group in support of U.S. intervention signaled that the creation of a common foreign policy in the enlarged EU would not be driven solely by the established set-up, and it would be accommodation rather than competition with the USA that would grow stronger.

The debate in the Security Council also shows that the opinions of the government-signatories to the above letter can directly influence the decisions of the Security Council. This was most visible in the speech by the representative of Spain, the country which initiated the letter of "the Eight", but is burdened with the Basque problem, which is defined by Madrid, regrettably, in terms of terrorism.

Poland can play a constructive role in two ways. Firstly, as a future EU member Poland can actively make use of the Weimar Triangle by proposing joint efforts in enhanced cooperation (through institutions developed by the Nice Treaty) and initiating consultations more frequently to consider, i.a., implications for the EU-US relationship. Poland can also make use of its good relations with Britain and involve governments of other EU member states (and future member states), together with the British, in working out a formula for EU-USA relations (among other things through institutional limitations of the negative consequences of NATO/EU parallelism).

Secondly, our government can use its very good relations with America to explain in Washington that the US administration is not faced with a wave of anti-Americanism by ungrateful Europeans, but rather an increasingly strong aggregate economic strength of the EU states, and the philosophy of legitimacy, peace and stability which implies mutual accommodation rather than a permanent competition, let alone a conflict.

All countries, including France, Germany, China and Russia, need to consider their relations with the Muslim states. Security comes first. Some EU states are faced with fundamentalism among the increasing number of Muslims in their populations (currently 15 million). There is also the problem of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and in this regard one needs to prepare to confront many a government throughout Asia and the Middle East.

Human Rights are taking on characteristic of the world's first universal ideology. We are coming to accept that Human Rights are gradually changing the concept of sovereignty as sanctioned in international law. International law is not set in stone, it has kept evolving since its beginnings. Intervention in the event of their breach must not be confused with the

struggle against terrorism. If the Chinese government, which is faced with the Uighur ETIM (East Turkestan Islamic Movement), and the government of the Russian Federation, trying to solve the Chechnyan conflict, consider defence of their own human rights policies to constitute the most important element in their attitude to action against the Saddam Hussein regime, they will vote against any intervention like the one in Iraq, all the more so since they dislike the model of a unipolar world. China, however, is no longer intent on questioning the world order, but in trying to find its place in it. The division in the Security Council could be of secondary importance for China, unless it had to support the USA as the only permanent member thereof, which is probably unacceptable to the Chinese as yet.

War has always made a stronger impact on the social awareness of the Europeans than acts of terror. In addition war has always been associated with the state. Moreover, the fight against terrorists is not yet considered in Europe as a war against terrorism. Trans-national terrorism will change mass awareness, but this requires time. In every society there are critical degrees of (a) resistance to suffering, and (b) readiness for military struggle, and in western societies such degrees apparently vary. Mass demonstrations against war with Iraq were in part a consequence of the anti-globalist movements redirecting their attention. They did not translate into support for Saddam Hussein-like rulers, but they could represent the fear that such a war, especially if not sanctioned by the UN, could evoke a wave of terrorism and guerrilla worldwide. Above all, the demonstrators were probably convinced that peace was worth nearly any price. With the exception of most US citizens, people did not consider the Iraqi government as a real and direct threat on a large scale, while war was viewed as a general evil and the Bush Administration policy was widely criticised. The fact that U.S. Republicans are less liked in Europe (media, academe) than Democrats is also of relevance. Public opinion in Poland was initially divided or undecided, the Government's pro-US and anti-Saddam position ultimately winning the argument, the public debate being rather lukewarm. The Poles want both membership in the EU and close cooperation with the US, and it is rather the general consideration than the specifically Iraqi or "terrorist" aspect

of the debate that has prevailed with us. Only the first casualties among the Polish soldiers in Iraq will generate a serious debate.

The international debate over the policy towards Iraq did not clearly take into account the fact that this same region was burdened with the problem of relations between Israel and its Arab neighbours. If the intervention in Iraq leads to reconciliation of the rational interests of the main religious groups (Sunnites and Shiites) and ethnic groups (Arabs and Kurds), then the Iraqi catalyst will accelerate changes and improve Israel's situation by stimulating moderate forces and restraining radical ones in the region.

Things would look simpler on all fronts if the presentation of US policy itself was more convincing. Its weak points include the insufficient number of individual consultations between the USA and its NATO allies (and Mexico) prior to the adoption of Resolution 1441, lack of evidence to support the existence of a link between the organisation of trans-national terrorism and the Iraqi government (implications which involve the credibility of the accuser), the unclear vision of relations in Iraq and the entire region after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, and, last but not least, the incomplete analysis of security on a broader scale. However, it should be kept in mind that US policy also has its own dynamics, and the last word about civil-military relations, including those between the President and the military, has not been spoken yet.

In the coming years the US administration will have to spend billions of dollars on the Iraqi venture. That money will go to someone, i.e. to companies to participate in Iraq's reconstruction, unless Iraq meets the same fate as Afghanistan in this regard. For many months the values of stock shares of the largest suppliers of the Defence Department have been going up faster than the average share value of the five hundred largest companies in the USA.

A strong NATO presence in Iraq through the introduction of an international contingent would turn the intervention in Iraq into a police operation in accordance with the assumptions adopted at the NATO summit in Prague but, admittedly, NATO must be first tested in its new role in Afghanistan. In the meantime, the US and many NATO member states are to be militarily present in Iraq. They are

going to stay there for a long time. An intervention is over only when the intervening force has left. The less ambitious their aim, the shorter their presence.

A Joint EU-US Hegemony?

The indicators of the joint EU-US share in the world output (56%), trade (51%), official development assistance (73%), military expenditure (57%) and arms transfers (51%) are suggestive enough, but add the data on such fields like industrial patents, information technology, warfare technology, energy production and consumption, Nobel Prize winners in sciences and medicine, etc., and the picture will become more complete. All such data should be read as information on what results from the historic development of societal systems in the US and Europe. It includes also selection and refinement of the social values, institutions, etc., in short, the development of political culture and a market economy. And here we have both the similarities and differences between Europe and America, and more specifically, the EU countries and the USA. When one thinks of the EU-US cooperation, economy comes first. The EU did not start from cultural or political institutions, either.

First of all, the market economy implies competition. There is competition between the EU and US. Save for a major technological upheaval, European demographics look detrimental to EU economic development in the long run, unless EU immigration policies are changed radically, and such a change is a possibility. Even so, social integration, if it does materialize, will take time. Another detrimental factor is labour efficiency in the EU countries, lower that that in the US. Nevertheless, both hypothetical social integration and improvement of efficiency are not unsurmountable barriers of growth, and the EU economy—based on the common currency—may catch-up with the US economy, in the long run. Still, the competitive relationship may by turned into cooperative one, but not automatically so, as it would require a profound change of public policy philosophies on the two shores of the Atlantic. Anyway, the first step toward closer cooperation, a customs union, should not be beyond the leaders' imagination, provided that progress is made along

the parallel path towards better perception of the public mind on the two shores.

Alas the political cultures seem to be more different than the economies and economic interests are. No ink shed will suffice to picture the profundity of the difference in question, but not enough has been equally said about the exaggerations of the statements involved. Are these cultures really so disparate? In short, social communication is a problem to be tackled, if we do want to understand each other, the Europeans and the Americans alike. It is beyond me to envisage Tony Blair, George W. Bush, Jacques Chirac, Aleksander Kwaśniewski and Gerhard Schröder as members of a weekly seminar sweating to deconstruct notions of a theory of justice, categories of national interest or principles of international law. It is however for me easy to foresee an institutional link between the EU and the USA to systematically discuss, in private, the main issues of public policy, not just international affairs. What a pity that politicians from both sides of the Atlantic who do not spare words about the EU-US relationship do not nevertheless propose anything like this, as far as I know. Is it perhaps the experts' role to start the process and build a similar institution? Could our conference cycle send a germane signal? Could we involve the politicians? Cooperative efforts originating in Europe and/or America need not lead to forging a hegemonic tandem, not in the life of my generation, anyway, but why not ask the leaders to institutionalize their communication to talk systematically about common concerns?

The Transatlantic Relationship After Iraq

Laurence A. Whitehead

Background

Our first conference took place just after the disputed November 2000 US presidential election, and before it was known who would succeed Clinton in the White House. My emphasis on an underlying transatlantic value consensus despite surface frictions may have reflected a Clinton era atmosphere that was already passé, but it was tempered by caution over the speed of change and the power of unforeseeable events. Neither the outcome of the US election nor the EU's Nice summit were known to us then, and not even the most alarmist of economic forecasters would have anticipated the severity and extent of the financial market and real economy downturns that were looming.

Our second conference was designed to focus on the broader structural shifts that would define transatlantic relations

regardless of temporary political or cyclical phenomena: the enlargement of the East of both the EU and NATO, and more generally the pressures on the old developed democracies arising from democratization and the emergence of low cost new suppliers in a more globalized world. However, in the midst of our planning came September 11th. So the conference was renamed "after the attack" and the focus shifted away from common values of the need for new institutional methods to manage the diffusion of power. Instead we were faced with the reconcentration of political energies on fighting "global terrorism", and Washington's new found determination to tackle what it perceived as an "existential threat" requiring a US-led "coalition of the willing". The economic costs and consequences were subordinated to an over-riding political imperative. The delicate balancing of transatlantic interests through a network of international institutions was to be set aside in pursuit of this over-riding new priority. As seen from Washington unipolarity abrogated the need for a broad debate over common values. Those who were not entirely with the USA in its hour (or decade) of need were no longer to be humoured, but if necessary to be brushed aside.

This was difficult to harmonise with our prior focus on the rebalancing of an enlarged Europe, and it met with mixed reactions from most non-US participants. In any case our second conference was dominated by this strong new message emanating from a broad political and popular consensus in Washington. The Taliban may have been ousted from Afghanistan, but it became clear that the psychological effects of September 11th would continue to drown out non-security considerations for some considerable time to come. It would overshadow discussions about any hypothetical transatlantic value consensus; or the redesign of international institutions to accommodate a wider variety of contending national aspirations; or the adjustment of international financial markets to a more fiercely competitive (oversupplied?) and increasingly integrated global economy.

Subsequently the second half of 2002 produced a new US security doctrine (advocating "preventive war" against potential terrorist threats, if necessary in disregard of international restraints), and the first half of 2003 has witnessed the material enactment of this doctrine in Iraq, with widening

geopolitical consequences that remain to be calibrated. Section II of this paper will therefore sketches out some preliminary suggestions and headings for discussion concerning the geopolitical consequences of the Iraq War. But, just as the unexpected and indeed the unforeseeable overshadowed our previous expectations, so this time also we should keep open the possibility that today's agenda may also prove partial and distorted. In section III, therefore, returns to the themes that used to inform our thinking about transatlantic relations before the "war on terror", and the doctrine of pre-emption. What remains of the "common values", the "institutional innovations", and the economic imperatives that used to provide the main themes for this type of analysis? These concerns will surely remain decisive in the longer run.

Geopolitical Repercussions of the Iraq War

The USA has emerged easily victorious, apparently more united and self-confident, and almost certainly more committed to the doctrine of pre-emptive war than when it was first enunciated. The European Union has been severely divided (and demoralised). Its chances of counterbalancing the power of a unipolar USA, or even of steering Washington policies in directions less damaging to European interests, have been severely set back, notably by the division between Britain and France (the two most substantial military players), but also by the broader division between what Rumsfeld called "old" Europe and "new" Europe, and also (equally importantly) by a widening division between most European public opinion and their assorted leaders. As a political institution the United Nations has suffered a body blow (although other UN-based agencies such as the World Health Organisation and the World Food Programme also demonstrated their indispensability and effectiveness).

The Middle East has only just began to absorb the consequences of a major shock—the second round effects of the Iraq war are still profoundly uncertain, and depend in no small part on how Washington chooses to use its new found margin of manoeuvre (by no means yet a settled question, although the emerging consensus in the Security Council on the probable terms of a US/UK "occupation" of Iraq provide a framework within which the UN might gradually recover a

political role under US leadership). The rest of the world is also trying to gauge the new distribution of power. Africa and Latin America perceive themselves to be further marginalized and downgraded. There is a chance that India and Pakistan may respond by reducing the incentive for outsiders to meddle in their local quarrels. China and Japan may also react defensively (though they have North Korea to contend with as a provocateur with little to lose from destabilising). Viewed from Moscow the weakening of the UN, the division of Europe, and the destruction of Iraq's Russian-supplied military are all disadvantageous outcomes, but a full assessment of the damage will depend upon how hard it proves to establish a new equilibrium with Washington. (The redeployment of US troops from bases in Germany to new locations further east is unlikely to be welcome in Moscow).

This is a familiar and conventional list of the immediate geopolitical repercussions of the Iraq war. It underscores the extent to which the initiative has currently passed to the Bush administration, and the uncertainties about how Washington is likely to deploy its enhanced power. The Franco-British divide proceeds from a shared perception of that key imponderable. Paris hopes, perhaps unrealistically, to constrain Washington by raising the cost of undesired choices, whereas London aspires—not necessarily more realistically—to achieve a basically similar result by signing up for Washington's main agenda. British and French preferences may differ on points of detail, but so long as they continue to clash with one another, they are both unlikely to exercise much influence on the Bush administration even on the wider range of matters where they share a common view. So long as this Gulliver's energies are focussed on combating what he believes to be a generalised and existential threat the delicate threads of the "transatlantic relationship" will not serve to restrain him.

On this analysis then the most critical sources of direction concerning power politics in the post-Iraq era must lie within the US political system. There are three main possibilities here. The first possibility is that as the 2004 elections draw near candidates with a more traditional outlook on transatlantic relations and the role of international co-operation may begin to gain in popularity. It is always possible that domestic electoral

politics might produce such an outcome, but Bush administration successes in the 2002 mid-term elections caution against this expectation. With patriotism and a huge campaign fund advantage working in favour of the incumbent, President Bush Jr. seems highly focussed on securing the second term that eluded his father. In any case Democratic presidential contenders would be unwise to highlight what many view as the current administration's major area of success. National security is where Republican strategists expect to reap continuing rewards. That still leaves open another option—a candidate who won the presidency on other issues might subsequently choose to edge towards a more internationalist foreign policy. But if so this would have to be done with caution, given the likely strength of opposition.

The second possibility is that American patriotism and self-confidence might be assuaged by the low cost of military success in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the public appetite for further risky and potentially entangling operations elsewhere could fade, as memories of September 11th abate. The problem with this scenario is twofold. It would be equally plausible to anticipate that easy success against two symbols of evil would reduce inhibitions against further operations of the same kind (especially if they prove electorally advantageous). In any case, as the most recent suicide bombings indicate, the "war on terror" may not be over—while US assertiveness may cow most target states into reluctant compliance with the disciplines emanating from Washington, the effect on non-state actors and networks could be quite the reverse. Humiliated arab nationalists and islamists could well react to the further discredit of their governments by organising acts of asymmetric warfare that once again stoke up US resolve to assert American supremacy.[1]

The third possibility is more nuanced, but perhaps more promising. On this view the legacy of September 11th will not simply fade from memory or be erased by domestic political preoccupations. The Bush administration has presided over a step change in US views about security, and about the usefulness of attending to pressures and advice from the rest

[1] According to Clyde Prestowitz (a former member of the Reagan administration) such US resolve is now deeply embedded, and not merely reactive. See his *Rogue Nation: American Unilateralism and the Failure of Good Intentions*, Basic Books, 2003.

of the world. But, once the Bush/Cheney/Rumsfeld group have responded forcefully and successfully to the initial challenge, a broader US foreign policy community could thereafter undertake an extended process of deliberation and renegotiation of relationships. In this case Washington's aim would be to stabilise the new more unipolar power structure, and to rebuild alliances with all useful partners—including many whose immediate priorities were over-ridden or neglected in the heart of the initial emergency. At this point questions of values, institutional commitments, and economic interests would once again compete with brute security in the determination of US foreign policy. On this view the transatlantic relationship has fallen into abeyance, rather than been abandoned. Over the medium term the US foreign policy establishment as a whole would reconstruct some new alliance system, building on the useful legacies of the old transatlantic relationship. This new version may be more one-sided than before, and there could be strong differentiation between the winners and the losers among America's allies as the diplomatic cards are redistributed. But US ascendancy will need to be legitimised and stabilised, even in a more unipolar world. If the post-Iraq international order is to be moulded in accordance with the currently prevailing Washington perspective the only kind of transatlantic relationship with a viable future would be one that was perceived by US opinion as serving that goal.

If Europe wants something different it will have to hugely upgrade its capacity to promote its agenda and to build support constituencies across the Atlantic. At best that can only be achieved over the medium term, and on two conditions that are presently far from being assured: i) European divergencies will have to be subsumed by a much more convincing and effective shared agenda; and ii) Washington will have to be persuaded of the merits of this agenda, and of the advantages of re-engaging Europe on common values, shared institutions, and enhanced economic co-operation. Both these difficult—although not impossible—conditions must be met if the relationship is to move beyond the current focus on unipolar security.

Beyond Unipolar Security

Values

Are there still common "values" underlying a hypothetical future version of the transatlantic relationship? If so, what are they, and how much can they explain?

At a very general level most Europeans would accept that the peoples of the wider Europe and the larger North America all share a wide range of common values and convergent cultural reference points, (however much they might disagree with certain specific policy decisions of one particular US administration). Even their disagreements are divisions within the transatlantic community as a whole, as much as clashes between the two sides of the pond. Thus, the governments Canada and Mexico disagreed with the Bush administration, just as Blair and Aznar endorsed its war decision. Equally, the keynote speaker at the London peace rally was the Reverend Jesse Jackson, and ex-President Carter received last year's Nobel Peace Prize. And the Pope's anti-war stance resonated among the Catholics of North America as much as in Europe. On the other side, both in the US and in Europe the Murdoch press campaigned for the war as aggressively as the market would allow.

If we argue that the relationship remains founded on common values, these clearly permit major differences of interpretation over substantive issues. For example, Americans tend to believe Europeans are prone to anti-semitism; whereas Europeans often consider the US attitude to Israel to be one-sided, with insufficient concern about the mistreatment of the Palestinian people. But these substantive differences can be derived from a shared value assumption: the need to protect the rights of minorities and the vulnerable. Similarly, European governments deplore the US stance on the death penalty, and on the free market in firearms, whereas the US government thinks its European counterparts are far too lenient towards human rights violators in their former colonies. Again these can be sharp political differences, but again the underlying values are not so counterposed. After all, it was the US constitution that first outlawed "cruel and unusual punishment" (the same document that authorised the right to bear arms). And the European Convention on Human Rights sets a standard that can be appreciated by US civil rights lawyers and that even generates a powerful supra-national enforcement mechanism.

But what (if anything) do transatlantic common values either mandate or preclude? My sense is that they probably preclude sustained unilateralism. If common values are important, this should at least mean that US public opinion and the American foreign policy establishment will not for long persist in any course of policy that is consistently opposed by all America's major transatlantic allies. Common values would signify that beyond periodic political disagreements, basic US public opinion would not remain permanently immune to whatever objections or counter-arguments can win wide external support. But if there is a real constraint arising from such values it is quite "soft" and quite long-term. Perhaps consistent European disagreement (even from such favoured partners as the UK and Poland) would eventually erode US self-confidence and commitment over time. If American public opinion felt that Washington was failing to win the argument with its allies and partners that might eventually erode US unity and self-confidence. But this would only happen if the external criticisms were cogent and sustained. And it would take some time.

Institutions

If "transatlantic values" provide no more than a very general restraint on the potential excesses of unipolarity, what about the complex grid of international institutions, treaties, and rules that supposedly characterise an emerging liberal world order? Obviously the political and security commitments that underpinned transatlantic relations during the Cold War and the Clinton years have been thrown into disarray by the Bush administration. Agreements that might restrain the US from pursuing its national interest (the International Criminal Court, Kyoto arms control agreements, etc.) were already under attack before September 11th. Since then Washington's assault on potentially sovereignty-limiting institutions has become much bolder and more systematic.

But even in the security realm the war on terror requires some new forms of co-operation and information sharing and in the political field any *ad hoc* "coalition of the willing" is liable to incur higher start up and maintenance costs than most of America's older institutional commitments. That may

be why NATO is being redeployed "out of area" rather than retired from the scene (indeed seven new members secured their Senate ratification this month). It also helps explain why the US continues to pay its UN dues, and to table complex resolutions at the Security Council. After all, international institutions are generally quite adaptable, so they can be reshaped for alternative use rather than abandoned.

If I am right that post-Iraq the broad US foreign policy establishment will set about formulating more complex medium term strategies designed to stabilise a new power structure, and therefore to compensate for unwelcome divisions in the western alliance, then in most cases this will involve reinterpreting America's existing international commitments, rather than abrogating them.[2] If this is true even in political and security realms, it is all the more applicable when considering economic dimensions of international co-operation.

Economic Co-operation

In terms of transatlantic relations the most critical arena is likely to be trade and finance. Here Washington has a strong interest in shaping more effective institutions (provided they are designed with US sensitivities in mind). Indeed there are signs that the Bush administration plans to step up its agenda of trade liberalization under the aegis of the WTO (the "Doha Round") as a way of shifting the focus of international diplomacy away from areas of division and conflict towards what economic liberals presume to be a

[2] In its latest annual strategic survey the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies endorses the Blair government's argument that Europe cannot aspire to counteract US predominance in accordance with an old-fashioned "balance of power" logic, but must instead acquiesce to "managed polarity" and a potentially marginal influence on Washington. The question of how that strategic predominance is to be managed, and how much influence Washington will concede to its partners, remains open for negotiation, and I suspect the US position on this is still fluid.

terrain governed by the principle of mutual advantage.[3] However, in practice there could be some pretty tough bargaining ahead. But given the delicate state of the international economy, and Washington's heavy dependence on international market confidence to finance the twin deficits that loom for many years to come, this is not an arena where unipolarity can prevail. Once attention shifts from security to economic co-operation the transatlantic relationship must regain some degree of balance, and perhaps even some wary mutual respect. On political issues Europe may be split between "old" and "new" but when it comes to trade and finance the EU is more of a unitary actor, and the US is less of a hegemon.

For all Europe's economic failings, it is the US that needs to attract $ 2.7 billion per working day in bond purchases in order to finance its current account deficit, and the euro has abruptly swung around from being too weak to becoming too strong. By dropping any real commitment to a strong dollar the Bush administration may be able to force an unwelcome appreciation of the euro (and further accumulation of dollars in Asian central banks) but too much economic unilateralism risks transmitting economic weakness round the world in a manner that will impact back on the US as well. On the regulatory front, the Commission has won WTO authorisation to impose $ 4 billion p.a. of retaliation on US trade if the Congress does not fulfil its pledge to repeal the Foreign Sales Corporate tax provision; and major US corporations such as GE and United Technologies are finding that Brussels has regulatory powers that really bite. In response to America's farm lobby Washington and its allies have launched a formal trade dispute against the EU on the issue of genetically modified crops, but even if the US wins on this issue (by no means a certainty) the real outcome will depend on European consumer preferences which have to be shaped by persuasion rather than imposition. So the US and the EU may be condemned to take each other seriously in the economic

[3] US Trade Representative Robert Zoellick continues to stress the "shared economic interests" that link Europe and the USA and Alan Larson (Deputy Secretary of State for Economic Affairs and Agriculture) stresses that "we have no interest in promoting tension in transatlantic relations on the trade front" (Quoted in *Le Monde, Economie*, 6 May 2003).

realm, even if Washington regards Brussels as a security pygmy and a political nuisance.

A New Transatlantic Agenda?

On this analysis there can be little prospect of any return to the transatlantic *status quo ante*. There is also no consensus available to underpin the transition to a new equilibrium. On the contrary, within Europe opinions about the justice and practicality of alternative patterns of transatlantic relations remain sharply divided. But there is also a perceptible gap between the outlook of even the most pro-US segments of European opinion (e.g. Blair and Aznar) and the dominant group within the Bush administration. These "atlanticist" Europeans would like a stronger State Department and more authority for Colin Powell. But, at least for now, within the Bush administration and perhaps also US public opinion more broadly, the crowd at Foggy Bottom are marginalized and downgraded. It is the Pentagon, the security services, and the conservative think tanks that have the initiative.

The contest to define structures and priorities governing a post-Iraq international order remains quite open and unresolved. There is not even an underlying agreement that some kind of transatlantic component must necessarily occupy a central position in the eventual pax americana. There is certainly no clarity about what long-term obligations Washington is expecting to assume, as a counterpart to its now more forceful presence on the international stage.

Nor is it at all apparent which of her past or potential allies will gain, or lose, or find themselves reassigned to a different role in the eventual international division of political labour. It is by no means evident, for example, that the administration's most unswerving allies will receive any concrete rewards to compensate for the costs and risks they have incurred on Washington's behalf. If power is both hard and soft, both material and symbolic, both a question of international resources and also of domestic agreement, then it is far too early to tell overall whether it is Blair who has gained, or Chirac who has lost. The cards of international diplomacy have been called in and redealt, but each player is still evaluating his new hand, and the new game has just begun.

The transatlantic relationship after Iraq may therefore be quite unstable and unfamiliar. But a continuing relationship there has to be. In fact some aspects of the relationship (on trade rules on competition policy, on intelligence pooling, and on public health co-ordination) are almost certain to become closer than ever—though not necessarily more just or well-balanced. In some key areas, at least in the near term, it can become more stormy and potentially destructive. A rebalancing that is not achieved through agreement will emerge as a product of threat and brinkmanship. As the agenda shifts, and new players come to the fore, the underlying structure of the relationship may become obscured. But the following are among the features most likely to shape the future agenda:

1. Neither the British nor the French electorates have much appetite for a step change in the amount of public resources they wish to devote to defence and security. Nor does the rest of Europe seem likely to step forward to fill this gap. Consequently the USA seems almost certain to continue outspending and out-organising the rest of the world on security by a very large margin for many years to come. In the realm of military capacity and willingness to strike wherever it chooses, Washington's unipolar supremacy is likely to remain unchallengeable for the foreseeable future. Even if Europe proves more united and effective than expected in forging a common defence posture, it will be cautious, limited, and reliant on US back-up. Since the world is likely to remain a potentially turbulent and threatening place Europe will continue to need a US umbrella. The US will require convincing that Europe has much of value to offer in return.
2. Political Europe is in flux, whereas the "fortress USA" is far more certain of its identity, its frontiers, its institutions, and its interests. The Nice treaty provided no coherent blueprint for enlargement of the EU, and it is open to question whether the Convention will make the situation any better. Perhaps the current US administration may be faulted for playing up the divisions within Europe, and for devaluing the integration project. Some in Washington who ought to know better are quoted as advocating the

"disaggregation" of Europe. But it is the Europeans themselves who are the main source of those divisions, and the main impediment to successful integration. There is no authoritative European counterpart to Washington, either in Brussels or in Frankfurt; in London or in Paris. Nor is one likely to emerge for years to come. Imbalances in the transatlantic relationship are as much due to European invertebracy as to American hegemonism. The seesaw between these two goes far to explain current and prospective instabilities in the political component of this relationship.

3. Geopolitical Europe can be perceived by the rest of the world as even more introverted than a nationalist USA. This may seem a strange assertion, given the proposed new Polish role in Iraq, the activities of French forces in the Ivory Coast, or the NATO presence in Afghanistan. EU enlargement creates new neighbourhoods, and might be expected to prompt Europe to look outward (or at least eastward). But even here a US-led NATO is more agile than the Brussels-based-EU. So long as Europe's integration project remains so unfocussed and internally contested the old continent has scant leeway for projecting either its values or its interests in most of the rest of the world. Its energies are overwhelmingly absorbed with attempts to tackle its internal contradictions. The fact that even now the Common Agricultural Policy still absorbs half of the EU's collective resources—or that such key participants as France and Germany may be unable to avoid breaching their fiscal deficit commitments and incurring huge EU fines for non-compliance—are eloquent in this regard. It may also be true that America's external involvements will prove fickle and subject to the vagaries of domestic politics, but the Europeans are in no position to criticise on that score. At least there exists a potential for the US foreign policy establishment to stabilise an international posture more or less geared to America's national interests. The Europeans are not nearly so well situated. America's international posture is more truly global than that of Europe, which at best is focussed on the more immediate neighbours. Until this imbalance is rectified the transatlantic geopolitical relationship will remain lopsided, and Europe's interests in the rest of the world

will be fragmented or will even founder by default, while America makes the running.

4. Economic Europe is much closer to parity with North America, and each side of the Atlantic displays its own distinctive profile of strengths and weaknesses. The Federal Reserve Board has higher prestige and more operational effectiveness than the European Central Bank. But both are vulnerable to financial market instabilities, and each needs the co-operation of the other. Fiscal discipline may be under strain in Europe, but US fiscal policy is also out of kilter. Perhaps the North American economies are more innovative and flexible than those of Europe, but both sides of the Atlantic house a broad array of world class enterprises. The most striking difference between the two may concern labour market flexibility and openness to immigration.[4] But just as NAFTA has shifted the balance of market power against labour in North America, so enlargement of the EU to the east may do the same for Europe. Here perhaps are the best foundations for a transatlantic partnership based on comparative advantage and mutual learning. But in a deflationary global environment competition between these blocs can be fierce and debilitating.
5. Cultural Europe is also in flux. The predominance of English, and the propagation of information technology, have eroded the old certainties and "cultural exceptions" more rapidly than any process of political or economic integration. Some resistance to "American hegemony" (notably in France) consists of elite reactions to this cultural shift. But the effects are quite as startling in North America as in Europe. In fact this is a global process of cultural transformation. It probably facilitates new forms of transatlantic communication and exchange, but these changes to the agenda may prove unsettling to all established interests.

[4] The US is spending 2.9% of its GDP on innovation and research, as compared to only 1.9% spent by the EU. Europe's target of raising this to 3% by 2010 look very optimistic, given the continent's budgetary constraints and the organisational failings. At the beginning of the 1990s 50% of Europeans who did their doctorates at US universities wanted to stay on there. Now the proportion is 75%.

Agenda for the conference

Steering Committee: Lawrence S. Graham, Ryszard Stemplowski, Laurence A. Whitehead

Moderator: Bohdan Lewandowski

Proceedings Editors: Lawrence S. Graham, Ryszard Stemplowski

Conference Secretary: Katarzyna Kołakowska

Friday, May 30

	Arrivals. Hyatt Regency Warsaw Hotel
19^{00}	Belvedere Restaurant. Dinner Guest of Honour: Professor Adam Daniel Rotfeld, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs

Saturday, May 31, 2003

8^{00}	Hyatt Regency Warsaw Hotel. Breakfast Guest of Honour: Mr Daniel Passent, Political Columnist of the weekly "Polityka", the Polish Ambassador to Chile (1997–2001)
9^{30}–12^{45}	Belvedere Palace Conference Room. 1st Session: "The Iraqi Catalyst"
11^{00}–11^{15}	Green Room. Coffee break
13^{00}	Belvedere Palace Pompeian Room. Lunch Guest of Honour: Professor Michał Kleiber, Minister of Science, Chairman of the State Committee for Scientific Research
15^{00}–19^{00}	2nd Session: "The Long Term Foresight: The EU-US Relationship"
17^{00}–17^{15}	Green Room. Coffee break Closing Remarks.
20^{00}	Belvedere Palace Pompeian Room. Dinner Guest of Honour: Dr. Jan Kułakowski, Chief Negotiator of Poland's Membership in the European Union (1998–2001)

Sunday, June 1, 2003

8^{00}	Hyatt Regency Warsaw Hotel. Working Breakfast. Sightseeing. Departures

Participants

Alyson J.K. Bailes

Alyson J.K. Bailes arrived in Helsinki on 10 November 2000 to take up the post of British Ambassador, following the departure of Gavin W. Hewitt. She is unmarried, 51 years old, and has been in the British Diplomatic Service for 31 years in all. She has been a regular visitor to Finland since 1987.

Miss Bailes' first overseas posting was from 1970–1974 in Hungary, where she succeeded in learning the language. She moved on to the UK Delegation to NATO in Brussels, then back to the UK for a sequence of jobs including the EU internal policy desk; a temporary attachment to an EU "Wise Men" study team on institutional reform; and an exchange posting to the British Ministry of Defence. She then spent three years at the Embassy in Bonn, dealing with defence and Berlin-related matters. In 1984 she returned to the FCO as Deputy Head of Policy Planning Department. She was selected in 1986 to be the Deputy Head of Mission at the British Embassy in Beijing and began work there in 1987 following Mandarin language training. She spent two and a half years in China, including the period of the Tian'anmen events, and then took a short academic sabbatical at the Royal Institute for International Affairs in London. From 1990–1994 she was Deputy Head of Mission at the British Embassy in Oslo, and from 1994–1996 Head of the FCO Security Policy Department. From 1996 to summer 2000 Miss Bailes held two outside jobs on special unpaid leave

from the Diplomatic Service: first as a Vice-President responsible for security policy programmes at the New York-based EastWest Institute, and latterly as Political Director of the Brussels-based European defence institution, Western European Union.

From 1 July 2002 she shall be leaving the British Diplomatic Service to become Director of (the independent security-policy research institute) SIPRI, or in full, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

Krzysztof Bobiński

BA (Oxon) in History, MA (School of Slavonic Studies, London University). Warsaw Correspondent of the Financial Times since 1976. Since 1998 he has been the publisher of Unia & Polska, a bimonthly review devoted to analysing the implications for Poland of forthcoming EU membership.

Sławomir Dębski

Born 1971. PhD (Hist.), Jagiellonian University. He is the Head of the Research Office at the Polish Institute of International Affairs. His recent publication is Sławomir Dębski, Beata Górka-Winter (eds.), Kryteria bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego państwa, Warszawa 2003 [in translation: *Criteria of International Security of the State*]. He is the Editor of *Европа*—the Russian language journal of the Polish Institute of International Affairs. He is also the member of the Editorial Board of *The Polish Foreign Affairs Digest*. Research interests: history of diplomacy, world politics, international security, German–Russian relations.

Lawrence S. Graham

Lawrence S. Graham is Associate Vice President for International Programs and Professor of Government at the University of Texas at Austin. A specialist in comparative politics and public policy, his work has focused primarily on Latin America and the Portuguese-speaking world, especially Brazil and Portugal. He received his Bachelor of Arts degree from Duke University (1958), his Masters of Arts in Hispanic

Studies from the University of Wisconsin (1961), and his Ph.D. in political science from the University of Florida (1965). For thirty-eight years he has pursued a career combining teaching and research with program management and consultancies in Latin America, southwestern and southeastern Europe, and southern Africa. Included in this experience is work with the National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration as director of a U.S. Agency for International Development project, overseeing development management programs in the developing world (1987–1989), and five years as Director of the Brazil Center at UT Austin (1995–2000). Since spring 2000 he has headed UT's Office of International Programs. Throughout these years he has been actively involved as chair and executive committee member of the Section on International and Comparative Administration in the American Society for Public Administration and is a past chair of the NATO Fellowship Committee for the U.S. He has published 10 books and over 90 refereed articles, chapters in edited books, and professional papers, throughout his career.

Jean-Yves Haine

Belgian. Doctorate in Political Science, Institut d'Etudes Politiques (IEP Paris), Master's Degree in International Relations from the University of Sorbonne (Paris) and a degree in Law, University of Louvain (Belgium). Formerly Visiting Fellow at the Government Department, Harvard University 1997–1999, lecturer at the IEP Paris 1993–1997, and journalist at Courrier International 1990–1993. Publications include articles on American foreign policy, transatlantic relations and European defence.

At the Institute (EUISS), Jean-Yves Haine deals with US foreign policy, transatlantic relations and the development of the CESDP. He compiled Chaillot Paper 57.

Katarzyna Kołakowska

MA (Warsaw University, Department of Sociology), Promotion Specialist of the Office for Public Information, The Polish Institute of International Affairs (since September

2002), Brand Manager Jr in public relations agencies (1999–2002).

Bohdan Lewandowski

Polish diplomat. Born in 1926. Education: MA at Academy of Political Science from the Warsaw University, studies at Consular & Diplomatic School, D (hon.) Kyung Hee University in Seoul. Career positions: Polish Consulate in Pittsburgh and Chicago, 1945–1946; Polish Embassy in Washington, 1946–1948; Representative from Poland to General Assemblies in United Nations, 1950–1971; Chief of North American Section in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1951–1956; Deputy Director of Anglo-American Department in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1956–1960; Representative of Security Council in United Nations, 1960; Permanent Representative of Poland in United Nations, 1960–1966; Chairman of the Second Committee to General Assembly of United Nations, 1962; Vice President of General Assembly of United Nations, 1964; Head of Planning Office in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1966–1967; Director General in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1971–1972; UN Under Secretary General, 1972–1982; Senior Adviser to Administration of Development Programme, since 1983; Member of Policy Board of Interaction Council in NYC and Milan, since 1984; Consultant of Aspen Institute of Humanistic Studies in NYC, since 1983; Member of Governing Council Ctr. International Studies at New York University, since 1983; Regents Professor at University of California in San Diego, 1984; Visiting Professor at Diplomatic Academy in Vienna, 1984, 1985, 1987.

Bastien Nivet

Bastien Nivet is research fellow in charge of EU and European security affairs at the Paris based Institute for International Relations and Strategic Studies (IRIS), since march 2000. Prior to this, he has been research assistant at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Western European Union (WEU). He holds an M.A. in International Studies from the University of Leeds (UK) and an M.A. in Strategic studies from the University of Paris.

Within IRIS, Bastien Nivet has created and chairs the Cercle de réflexion sur l'Europe et son environnement géopolitique (Group of reflection on Europe and its geopolitical environment), which aims at bringing together officials, diplomats, military, academics and media specialists to discuss and reflect on the EU, its strategic environment and the challenges for a more efficient EU action in the international system.

His main research areas concern the emergence of the European Union (EU) as an international actor, its CFSP and ESDP, the trends and process of European integration, transatlantic relations and foreign and defence policy challenges in Europe. Within his appointment at IRIS, Bastien Nivet has written several studies and policy notes on these subjects for the French MoD and the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as a number articles in reviews and collective books.

Bastien Nivet is also visiting lecturer in European Politics at the Institute for Political Studies (Sciences Po) of Lille and at the Ecole Supérieure des Sciences Commerciales d'Angers (ESSCA).

His latest publications include:

Le petit dico européen ['A short dictionary of Europe', with Pascal Boniface], Paris: Collection Major, Presses Universitaires de France (PUF), January 2002, 192 pages.

(Editor) "Repenser la défense européenne" ("Rethinking European Defence"), 48th issue of the Revue Internationale et stratégique, Winter 2002/2003.

(Co-editor, with Barthélémy Courmont) Transatlantic Relations, to be published in September 2003, by the Presses Universitaires de France.

Alberta M. Sbragia

PhD (University of Wisconsin–Madison). Director of the Center for West European Studies and the European Union Center, UCIS Research Professor of Political Science at the University of Pittsburgh. Her scholarship has focused on European integration, the EU in global environmental politics, comparative American-West European public policy and public finance, and American urban politics and urban

economic development. She has published extensively in those fields, serves on the editorial board of numerous journals in the United States, Canada, and Europe and has lectured widely throughout Europe as well as to US governmental agencies.

Her current work examines the emergence of regional "blocs" in North America, the Southern Cone, and Asia as a response to the role of the European Union in international commercial diplomacy and in the global economy. She received her Ph.D. from the University of Wisconsin–Madison in 1974, wrote her dissertation as a Fulbright Scholar on Italian politics, and taught "Business, Government, and the International Economy" at the Harvard Business School as a Visiting Associate Professor in 1983–1984. She then directed the Brookings Institutions project on European integration which led to the publication of Euro-Politics: Institutions and Policymaking in the "New" European Community (1992). Chair of the European Community Studies Association, (1993–1995), President, Conference Group on Italian Politics and Society, (1995–1997), co-chair of the 1999 American Political Science Association (APSA) conference, she has served on both the Selection and Evaluation Committees for Centers for German and European Studies for the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD). At Pittsburgh, she has taught courses on the European Union, West European politics, Italian politics, American and European political economy, and American and European public policy. She has also taught at the School for International Affairs at the University of Trento, Italy.

Klaus-Heinrich Standke

Klaus-Heinrich Standke (Dr. rer. pol., Technological University Berlin, Dr. h. c. Poznań University of Economics, Dr.h.c. International University Moscow) has left high-school with the age of 16 to become an apprentice in a steel mill. Until his baccalaureat he has worked in the export departments of Steel manufacturing companies in Wetzlar (Germany), London and Paris.

He has studied Economics and International Relations at the University of Frankfurt/Main, Technical University

Berlin and French Literature at the Université de Paris ŕ la Sorbonne.

K.-H. Standke has spent most of his professional life in international organisations: Between 1966 and 1990 he was subsequently Counsellor at the OECD in Paris; when Germany had joined the United Nations, he was appointed as the first Director of his country at the United Nations secretariat in New York; his last function was Assistant Director-General and Special Advisor to the Director-General of UNESCO in Paris.

After the collapse of the Berlin wall, he returned in 1990 to his native country, Germany, to become the first President of the Academy for East-West Economic Co-operation, Berlin.

His advisory activities include the Senate of Berlin, the Council of Europe, the EU, the OECD, OPEC et al. Most recently he has served as a high-level EU expert to the State Committee for Science of the Polish Government (KBN).

At present he is inter alia President of the Committee for the Promotion of the French-German-Polish Co-operation (Weimar Triangle).

He is Member of the President's Council, New York Academy of Sciences, New York; elected Member of the European Academy of Sciences and Arts, Vienna; Special Advisor for Eastern Europe to the Prince of Wales Business Leaders Forum, London and a Governor, Kulturstiftung Haus Europa, Berlin et al.

He was awarded with the Cross of Merit of the Order of Merit of the Federal Republic of Germany, (1st Class).

His research focusses on topics concerning issues of international co-operation (including EU enlargement and transatlantic co-operation, North-South questions), Science and Technology Policy, International competitiveness, International Organisations).

He is author and/or editor of 13 monographs and of more of 150 articles on his fields of interest.

He is/or was honorary member of the Faculties of the Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC), Jouay-en-Jossas/Paris; the Free University, Berlin; the University of Potsdam and of the Poznań University of Economics.

Furthermore, he has assumed numerous Lecturing Assignments at universities in Eastern and Western Europe, in North and Latin America as well as in Asia.

Ryszard Stemplowski

LLM, PhD, DHabil. (Hist.) is Director of The Polish Institute of International Affairs, and Professor of Warsaw School of Economics (SGH). Research fellow of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1973–1989; Chief of the Chancellery (Chief Clerk) of the Sejm (Chamber of Deputies), 1990–1993; Ambassador to London, 1994–1999. Bibliography: www.pism.pl

Laurence A. Whitehead

Laurence A. Whitehead has just become the first Director of Oxford University's new Centre for Mexican Studies. He is an Official Fellow in Politics at Nuffield College, Oxford University, and Senior Fellow of the College. His most recent publications are Laurence A. Whitehead (ed.), Democratization: Theory and Experience, OUP, 2002 and Laurence A. Whitehead (ed.) Emerging Market Democracies: East Asia/Latin America, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002.

In 1980–1981 he was Senior Research Officer at the Latin American Program of the Wilson Center, responsible for a large scale comparative project on "Transitions from Authoritarian Rule and Prospects for Democracy in Latin America and Southern Europe". The fruits of that research were published in four volumes in 1986 by the Johns Hopkins University Press (Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, Laurence A. Whitehead (eds.), Transitions from Authoritarian Rule).

In 1985–1986 he was Acting Program Director at the Center for US-Mexico Studies, University of California, San Diego. From 1989–2001 he was joint editor of The Journal of Latin American Studies, Cambridge University Press.

He is editor of an Oxford University Press book series, Studies in Democratization. The first book in the series (Laurence A. Whitehead (ed.), International Dimensions of

Democratization: Europe and the Americas) was published in 1996. A dozen books have been published in this series so far).

He also chairs the Area and Development Studies Committee in Oxford University's new Social Science Division. He previously served as Chairman of the Social Studies Faculty 1990–1992 and on the University's General Board 1997–2000.

Druk i oprawa:
Zespół Wydawniczy CBK PAN
ul. Bartycka 18a
00-716 Warszawa