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The footnotes (193) are not included.

Political animation. – Communists. – The Roman Catholic Church. – Big landowners. – ‘White Guard’ activities. – Planning for a *brazos caídos* strike. – Socialist organizations. – Other parties and organizations. – Trade Unions. – Associations of office employees, engineers, bank employees, and medical doctors. – Women. – Students. – Supreme Court judges. – Military officials. – Capital newspapers. – Reaction to the fall of Matte and Grove. – Socialism of a kind. – Censorship. – Landowners’ and industrialists’ tactics. – The Conservatives’ conferences. – Fascists. – Parliamentarism under consideration. – *Acción Revolucionaria Socialista*. – Socialist organizations facing elections. – Agricultural workers and aboriginal people. – The “responsible” politicians.

### **Political animation**

The considerable differences within the group that ruled the Socialist Republic were evident, especially in the initial period, only to the most politically aware circles of the Chilean society. To most of the people, the composition of the junta and the cabinet meant little or nothing at all. As a result, while the political position of people who were interested in the power struggle at the top or who at least were aware of, it depended on their attitude to the individual groups represented on the central state bodies, the rest of the population, diversified as it certainly was, reacted first of all to symbols and slogans: the Socialist Republic, state socialism, war against the crisis, social justice, etc.

At first, people reacted to the establishment of the Socialist Republic as such and the first proclamations of the socialist government, then to individual decisions and developments, and finally to the effects of the policies of the socialist government, and that was all superimposed on a generalized attitude to the state, the system, etc. The outcome was either support for or rejection of state socialism, although there could also be intermediate variants, the support could be conditional and accompanied by demands related to the programme of the socialist authorities and expectations of more clearly defined changes.

In this chapter, I will be looking at the attitude toward the government of the Socialist Republic in the broad sense, i.e., both attitudes expressed verbally and those assuming the form of broad action or deliberate inaction, but at any rate I will seek to define the political posture. This limitation is dictated by the character of the available sources; besides, these being scarce, I have to focus on attitudes that can be detected first of all by reading the press appearing in the capital, some North American and European papers and diplomatic and consular reports from Santiago.

I have resisted the temptation to use one of the methods of analysing mass source materials developed by political sciences, sociology, and social psychology. In that case, round phrases would conceal speculation rather than analysis. My source materials are too skimpy for that. I have therefore chosen a simpler method that is more appropriate to the nature of the available material. From among the criteria of organizing source information, I chose two that should make it possible for me to identify the postures in question. One is the criterion of the contents expressed by a given attitude. First of all, however, I would like to use the criterion of the form defining an attitude because it is usually the way in which a given attitude is manifested that draws the attention of the agent producing a source of information and helps the historian to identify the reality he is studying.

From the point of view of the form defining a political attitude toward a government according to the criteria of articulation, it is possible

to identify the following: a) the attitude of an individual, b) the attitude of a group of organizers or participants in a mass demonstration, c) the attitudes expressed by the media, d) the attitude of the group of organizers or participants in actions amounting to an attempt to take over power or consolidate the existing authorities. I will concentrate on group attitudes and only devote some space to individual postures in the final part of the chapter.

The biggest mass demonstrations occurred in the first period of the existence of the Socialist Republic. They were organized by political parties or trade unions. The only spontaneous reactions could be "hunger marches" by the unemployed or the response to the collapse of the Matte-Grove group, although in that instance the party factor played a certain role, too. Nevertheless, it can safely be assumed that the deteriorating living conditions contributed to spontaneous protests and the beginnings of a socialist welfare policy initiated by the new government could generate a sense of identification with the Socialist Republic. If indeed there were some symptoms of a grassroots pro-government mobilization, they must have been largely owed to Grove. The man became a populist idol, whose charisma attracted the masses to state socialism to the extent that the masses associated him with a better life. Pro-socialist moods began to spread and were manifested first of all in demonstrations of support for the Socialist Republic.

Probably the easiest task is that of defining attitudes manifested in connection with the actions or deliberate inaction of political parties, social movements, and organized pressure groups. Naturally, in source materials it is easier to detect traces of action than of refraining from action and the most conspicuous form of action is that which is either resolutely for or resolutely against the Socialist Republic, an action which in fact manifests itself for the most part precisely in such a way, without defining the manner of understanding socialism precisely enough.

## **Communists**

One orientation opposed to the socialist government to assume a clear form was the challenge from the ranks of the Chilean Left, and the Communists turned out to be the main current of the left-wing opposition.

The proclamation of the Socialist Republic found the Communist Party of Chile in a state of crisis because despite its relegalization in July 1931, it did not manage to return to the shape it was in before the split which occurred in 1926 and the ban on the activities of their party which took the Communists by surprise in 1927. A publication issued by the Party's Marx-Lenin publishing house in 1932 said the party did not manage to become open enough to admit proletarians in its ranks out of the fear that they might not be sufficiently prepared to act in a Communist party. The Party then had no backing among the copper miners and only scant support among *saltpetre* and coal miners, and the same was true of peasants and farm hands. Santiago and Valparaíso were two towns in which the Communists enjoyed a reasonable following. Factionalism was the most visible sign of the crisis in that party. That was nothing unusual in itself, but in the case of Chile there emerged two rival leadership centres focused around two leaders. Two separate groups claimed the name of a communist party, which led to a formal split in 1933. In the beginning of June 1932, both factions used the same name of the party and the same designation as the Chilean Section of Communist International. One faction was led by Elias Lafertte and Carlos Contreras Labarca was its secretary general, the other by Manuel Hidalgo, with Jorge Lavín as secretary general.

The Communist Party of Chile was not represented at the first conference of Latin American communist parties in Buenos Aires in 1929, and the official explanation was that this was because of an internal crisis in the party. Both factions competed in Comintern. For both, the Soviet Union with its Bolshevik Party were still what they were to Communists all over the world: an example of success, the first powerful base of the forthcoming global revolution. However, while the Lafertists were fully loyal to Moscow, the Hídalgists wanted to participate in shaping the international movement and rejected the "unjustified hegemony" of the Bolsheviks in Comintern. A big role in this split was played by the

policy of the Comintern's *Buro Sudamericano* based in Buenos Aires, opposed by the Hidalgists, who vainly expected effective assistance and were reluctant to give up their autonomy. It was only natural in these circumstances that in the end Moscow awarded the title of Communists to the Lafertists. Meanwhile, the Hidalgists went on cautioning against the bureaucratic threat to the Communist movement, voiced criticism of the Stalinist conception of socialfascism and eventually proclaimed the Communist Left option, joining the Trotskyite International in 1933.

The two factions were locked in a brutal fight, but the proclamation of the Socialist Republic created a situation in which the leaders of both currents were to meet. This was owed to the Lafertists, who, using their control over the FOCH, initiated the establishment of revolutionary councils of workers, peasants, soldiers, and seamen.

In Santiago, such a council was set up on June 6 at a university building seized by FOCH activists and students from the Communist *Grupo Avance*. Before long, similar councils appeared in other centres. A Comintern source lists at least ten of them, with reports on two more treated as unconfirmed. All of them collapsed after the ouster of the Matte-Grove-Lagarrigue group. None of them survived for more than eleven days.

Initially, the Revolutionary Council in the capital was said to include some 300 people representing no less than 129 organizations, mostly local unions. Among them were the leaders of the FOCH, controlled by the Lafertists, and of the General Confederation of Labour (CGT), controlled by anarchists. Apart from the Communist factions, some socialist parties and the anarchist movement were also represented. Therefore were students, delegates of the unemployed, peasants, farm labourers and small holders, and even *Aborígenes*. The anarchists walked out already at the first meeting because they were against the participation of 'politicians,' meaning representatives of political parties, and demanded that the council be limited to "producers."

The Hidalgists and delegates of socialist parties quit the Council at the second meeting to protest against the Lafertists' predominance on

the Council's presidium. That, however, was the official pretext. Prior to that, a dispute erupted over the programme of the Council. Contreras Labarca presented a very lengthy text containing countless political and economic demands and slogans, which presumably elaborated on the programme published in the "Crónica" paper on June 6. By contrast, the Hidalgists proposed a very concise programme. Both factions advanced their demands as the manifesto of the Communist Party of Chile.

I have not managed to locate the text presented by Contreras to the Council. Judging by Levin's account, it consisted of as many as 42 points. A Komintern publication later quoted 22 demands and slogans but made it clear that this was not the full version of the programme:

"Merciless struggle against the feudal, clerical, and imperialist reaction.

Down with Montero and Ibañez! Struggle with Grove's demagogical bourgeois government.

Long live independent struggle of the proletariat!

Long live councils of workers', peasants', soldiers', and seamen's delegates!

Confiscation without damages of all land held by big landowners and the Church and its distribution free of charge among peasants and farm labourers.

Returning to the Indians of all the land taken away from them and awarding them the right to establish their own and independent Araucanian Republic.

Confiscation without damages of all imperialist banks and enterprises.

Confiscation of all Church property without damage.

The annulment of all foreign debts and loans taken from imperialists.

The immediate disarming of White Guard formations and of the gendarmerie corps and of all anti-proletarian organizations.

The arming of the proletariat.

The recognition of the USSR.

Insistence that the government implement the part of its programme which concerns the proletariat.

The freedom of expression and discussion in army barracks and on warships.

The establishment of soldiers' and seamen's committees to oversee supplies, to fight against bad treatment and the system of punishment and for higher pay and better food.

The right for soldiers and seamen to join political parties.

Minimum wage at 10 peso.

The same pay for the same work also for women and juveniles. Paid three months live before and after childbirth.

The introduction of a seven-hour working day without a cut in pay.

A daily benefit of 5 pesos for all unemployed.

Immediate seizure of all vacant premises, free supply of water, electricity, and transportation for the unemployed.

Self-management of the jobless in hospices and shelters."

By contrast, the Hidalgoists' programme ran in full as follows:

"In the face of a political situation of decisive historic significance, Partido Comunista Sección Chilena de la Internacional Comunista has recognized that its position should not be expressed by slogans but by action, direct and energetic action at that. We must act. We must move into action, and since we have to act, we must strive for the following goals right from the start:

The Revolutionary Junta should arm the workers, recognizing their committees and issuing arms to them with a view to setting up the Revolutionary Guard.

The Revolutionary Junta should immediately proceed to an effective disarming of the units of the White Guard, the civil guard, the reserve guard, and firemen.

It is necessary to set up committees of workers and peasants, workers of factories, mines, saltpetre plants, transport enterprises, etc. and recognize the exercising of control over the production and distribution of goods by workers as their goal.

Supervision over the armed forces should be transferred to social classes that will exercise it through soldiers' and seamen's assemblies.

Supervision over urban and rural communes should be transferred to the working people; the communes will take over residential buildings and the unemployed will control food supply and provisions for themselves.

The means of production should be nationalized by way of expropriation without damages and the transfer of land to those who tend it.

The banking system must be broken up and the State Bank must be set up.

Down with opportunists among the civilians and the military.

Long live Partido Comunista Unificado!"

The plans of the leaders of both factions were not limited to the programme slogans quoted above. Their long-term targets were as similar as they were specified only in the most general terms: a revolutionary overthrow of capitalism and the introduction of socialism. However, in the new situation it became necessary to define the tactics in a clear-cut way. The idea was to exploit the new situation for the pursuit of the strategic goal and the answer to the question about the way of doing it depended on the assessment of this new situation. The appraisal of the nature of the government of the Socialist Republic was of crucial significance here.

The Hídalgists maintained that the Socialist Republic was a form of socialism embracing small industry in towns, retailers, private crafts, and people with high occupational skills, receiving poor or average pay and, being a petty bourgeois form of socialism, it would be unable to satisfy the socialist aspirations of the broad masses of exploited working people. However, while the Hídalgists believed that it was necessary to shatter capitalism by way of revolution and did not identify themselves with the Socialist Republic, they nevertheless adopted the view that all-out opposition to it would be as wrong as support for the governing bodies of the Republic. The Hídalgists emphasized the need of the struggle of the masses and among the masses, against capitalism and for socialism, but they did not turn a blind eye to the fact that the Socialist Republic had awakened great hopes precisely among those masses. Therefore, they insisted that it was necessary to mobilize the masses and exert pressure on the authorities of the Socialist Republic, demanding the implementation of its programme to demonstrate to those masses that 1° Socialist Republic is not capable of satisfying their aspirations or even the programme it proclaimed itself, and the 2° coalition of the oligarchy and the bourgeoisie was fighting against the Socialist Republic not because of a fundamental divergence of interests but because its proclamation created the possibility of the emergence of a situation that would be favourable to the Communists.



The Hídalgists were convinced that a radicalization of the masses would occur during the mobilization process pursued by them, and then the Communist Party would obtain an opportunity of leading the people toward a democratic-bourgeois revolution followed by the introduction of the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat and the beginning of the building of a classless society. In other words, the Hídalgists did not want to utter all-out verbal condemnation of the Socialist Republic in order not to lose touch with a large part of the society which supported the Republic, namely the proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie; what they tried to do was to demonstrate that the formula of the Socialist Republic had to be transformed into that of the revolution that they advocated.

The Lafertists, on the other hand, not only argued that the Socialist Republic would not meet the aspirations of the masses—on which point they were in accord with the Hídalgists --but immediately set its propaganda to a total condemnation of the new authorities as the archenemy of the masses and on top of that they openly advanced the demand for an official institutionalization of the presence of the Communists in the armed forces.

Another fundamental difference consisted in the fact that while the Hídalgists formulated their policy of entering the revolutionary process without stating the takeover of state power as their current objective, the Lafertists did just that and adopted the position that the revolutionary councils they started setting up were transforming into organs of political power. Contreras spoke in clear terms about the council as a premise of diarchy in Chile and, years later, Lafertte would write about the council's seat in the university building as a "Smolny in miniature."

The leaders of the Socialist Republic could not fail to notice the council, entrenched in the university, especially so as the university printing shop and radio station were working at peak capacity. It is not hard to guess either that the various factions of the heterogeneous base of the ruling junta must have been aware of the Communists' activities.

Politicians representing the socialist orientation could not fail to notice that although the Communists demanded the arming of the proletariat, one Communist faction did not directly challenge them while the other proclaimed an uncompromising stand but at the same time advanced a long list of partial economic and social demands that were by and large convergent with the programmes of various socialist organizations. The Alessandrists could perceive the council as an attractive force weakening their socialist and military partners in government and rivals at the same time. The military of various political persuasions could not but be irritated by the Communist intrusions in the armed forces, especially the demands for the issuing of arms and the activity of the Lafertist-controlled university radio stations for which the army was one of the targets, and some demands convergent with those advanced -by the insurrection in Chile's navy in 1931; they also could not fail to note the formula of the council, which included soldiers and seamen. "The Santiago garrison began to betray anxiety," wrote General Sáez in his reminiscence. There could be no doubt that the ruling group was not indifferent to the existence of the Communist opposition. Admittedly, "La Nación" ran a denial issued by the Lafertists to counter charges they adopted a wait-and-see policy toward the government, but right next to that item the paper printed a box with the significant call: "Manual and white collar workers: don't let yourselves be fooled—this government is mainly attacked by the oligarchic and capitalist reaction." When "La Nación" which was a government organ, reported the formation of the revolutionary council in the university building, it was careful to omit "soldiers and seamen" from its name.

Finally, the leaders of the Santiago revolutionary council met with the leaders of the Socialist Republic. At that time, the council included the Lafertists, representatives of the FOCH controlled by them, representatives of the Federation of University Students, the Teachers' Federation, the Federation of Clerical Workers, the Working Class Federation of Railwaymen, and the Peasant League. A rally organized by the council was held outside La Moneda on June 14, after which a delegation led by Lafertte and Contreras went to meet Grove. As a result of these

contacts, the council moved its seat from the university, dropped "soldiers and seamen" from its name, and focused its criticism on Dávila, who was now to replace Grove as the personification of "the bourgeoisie's misleading manoeuvres"; from that time on, the council operated out of premises put at its disposal by the government of the Socialist Republic. Even if those changes, significant as they were signaling the possibility of the Lafertists being incorporated into the system of the Socialist Republic, little came out of them as there was no time for this tendency to develop: the Matte-Grove-Lagarrigue group collapsed whereas Dávila's views precluded such an incorporation altogether.

Meanwhile, after quitting the council, the Hídalgists focused their attention on activities within the Revolutionary Socialist Workers Alliance, which also incorporated anarchists, socialists, and trade unionists remaining under the influence of the aforementioned orientations. The Hídalgists later boasted with much exaggeration that the leadership of the Alliance was under their direct control. Their faction did not achieve much more than the Lafertists because they found themselves in a similar situation as their rivals when the Matte-Grove - Lagarrigue group was ousted.

The main features of the Communists' attitude to the Socialist Republic between June 6 and June 16 could be listed as follows:

1. To some extent, they used the opportunities of acting in the open, e.g., by informing non-Communist press,

2. They criticized state socialism without using the adjective "state." The programme of the Republic was described as an outcome of the class origin of its leaders. The Hídalgists' criticism boiled down to the charge that petty bourgeois socialism would not satisfy the aspirations of the working masses, especially the proletariat, whereas the Lafertists described the socialist rule as hostile and swindle,

3. The Hídalgists advanced a long-range programme of struggle for the deepening of the reforms of the Socialist Republic, first toward a bourgeois-democratic and then a socialist revolution. That programme called for a balanced criticism of socialist rule, without personalizing it

and antagonizing the leaders of the Republic too much envisaged exploiting the favourable conditions for agitation and focused on work with the working masses. The Lafertists, on the other hand, put forward a programme of replacing the government of the Socialist Republic at once by the revolutionary rule of councils of delegates of workers, peasants, soldiers, and seamen; such a programme required direct sharp criticism addressed to individual leaders of the Republic but at the same time it placed a great deal of emphasis on the construction of a system of councils as an element of diarchy in the state, by analogy to the period of Kerensky's rule in Russia, combined with simultaneous struggle for the implementation of numerous partial economic and welfare demands. That programme pointed to the means of achieving the establishment of a state ruled by the councils, but in the Lafertists' activities it is hard to find elements effectively leading toward that target; their statements about the political role of the councils are neither quite clear nor free of contradictions. Both factions demanded the arming of the proletariat and far-reaching expropriations.

4. The scope of the Communist mobilization of the masses was limited and the presence of the Communists in major demonstrations was unspectacular compared to the socialists.

5. There appeared some early signs of the Communists' accommodation to the Socialist Republic, but that period only lasted for a short time because of the coup d'etat. The modus vivendi did not evolve into a mature shape. In particular, the Communists failed to capitalize on the criticism of big capital, the clerical and conservative forces and imperialism in general to seek a platform of agreement with part of the forces which made up the Socialist Republic.

6. On the whole, in the first period of the existence of the Socialist Republic, the attitude of the Communists was characterized by contradictions, the failure to understand the processes taking place, and a negative approach to the Socialist Republic and especially the socialist parties, all of which were treated as one, and the officer corps. The

Communists regarded themselves as the sole depositaries of the ideals of the socialist revolution.

### **The Roman Catholic Church**

The leaders of the Socialist Republic were right when they insisted that the main enemy was on the right. True, the importance of an opposition organization or social group was not always paralleled by the ostentatiousness of its declarations. For example, to determine the attitude of the Roman Catholic Church and, indirectly, about its influence upon the faithful, one has to rely on second-hand accounts and deductions in the first place.

It is banal to suggest that the Catholic clergy of those days had to be opposed to socialism but the search for the reasons for such an attitude and a study of its manifestations along with the exceptions to the rule sheds a different light on the conditions in which negative attitudes toward the Socialist Republic could evolve.

It would be a mistake to see only the fear of Chile's socialists or Communists in the attitude of the clergy, which was mostly made up of friars who came there from other countries. That fear was born before the Socialist Republic and was largely connected with the situation in Spain and the influence of the anti-clerical Spanish republicanism on the Chilean people and later, on the government of the Socialist Republic.

Already in 1931 came the first signs of polarization in the basically uniformly pro-Spanish attitude of the Chilean society, a polarization that was to become exceptionally acute as a result of the Spanish Civil War. José Horacio Campillo, who succeeded Errázuriz as the Archbishop of Santiago, would then say a mass for "the victims of the republic" in Spain and greet Franco's rebellion as a "movement of national salvation" from Communism. However, already at the end 1931-to quote the Spanish ambassador in Santiago - that Archbishop, using a "group of devout women" and his considerable personal fortune, engaged in "propaganda," organizing "Weeks of Jesus Christ the King" throughout the country and mobilizing "part of the bourgeoisie and the cream of the

society" of Chile. The Catholic paper "*La Acción Española*", whose motto was "Religion-Country-Order-Family-Property", campaigned against the young Spanish Republic. Therefore, Ambassador Baéza was not surprised that a part of the Chilean people received the decisions of the Spanish parliament dealing with Church matters with open hostility.

On the other hand, the Left, including many immigrants from Spain who settled in Chile, viewed Spain's official anti-clericalism with sympathy. On Good Friday before the Easter of 1932, a rally of the newly founded Anti-Clerical League drew 8,000 people to a sports stadium and in *Teatro Setiembre*, filled to capacity, the FOCH secretary general, himself Communist, delivered a lecture on his trip to the Soviet Union. The Communist leader Elias Laferte was telling the Chileans who bore the brunt of the crisis that "in every Soviet factory and every collectivized centre of farmwork, the spiritual and material needs of all the employees are satisfied in full"; he never mentioned religion or churches, instead treating the assembly, which absorbed every word he said, to a detailed description of Moscow museums, filled at all times with workers visiting them, or a vivid picture of the opera house, previously a preserve of the gentry and now, under socialism, full of workers. In turn, the League's chairman, Deputy Arturo Lois, urged: "We have a lot to learn from what is going on in Spain because its Constitution is the purest source of genuine socialism and secularity." The Spanish ambassador was of the opinion that "the lack of moderation on the part of the clerical elements triggered a struggle over the religious question, which until then was surrounded with peace and calm."

Chile's Roman Catholic Church had a strong material infrastructure, although, unlike in Mexico or Peru, it was not such a big landowner and did not have such large collections of works of art and other valuables. In 1932, Thomas B. Bowman, the U.S. Consul in Santiago, estimated the area of the Church's farm holdings at between 200,000 and 350,000 acres. These estates were predominantly tied to seminaries and schools. However, the immovables which were exempted from taxation on the ground that they "yielded no income" alone were worth some 250 million pesos in 1931, which was a lot of the money and only a little less

than the value of all of Chile's hospitals, schools, and shelters, a part of which also happened to be owned by the Church; it was much more than the value of municipal property in Chile, over twice as much as the value of the indigenous land property and only 3.6 times less than the value of all state land holdings. What was more important, however, the Church's property that was taxable because it yielded an income that was worth some 3 billion peso according to unofficial estimates. As the overall value of taxable property in Chile was estimated at between 15 and 20 billion peso, the Church was in possession of 15-20% of it, mostly in towns. And while the annual tax on that kind of church property amounted to 1 million peso, the Church's annual income was estimated at between 120 and 180 million. On top of that came a state subsidy amounting to 2.5 million peso a year. By comparison, the overall Treasury revenue ranged from 1,234 million in the record year of 1929 to 515 million in the crisis year of 1932.

As for the legal status of the Church, while it was seriously curtailed by the 1925 Constitution, the Church enjoyed freedom of action, which, combined with the separation of the Church from the state that was not yet fully accepted by many Catholics, made it possible for it to pursue its own policies. After the June 1931 death of the Archbishop of Santiago, Crescente Errázuriz, whose authority had a moderating effect on the politically conservative bishops and who, like the Vatican, understood the need for the Church to adapt to the changed conditions, the bishops, led by his successor, the aforementioned Archbishop Campillo, searched for ways of regaining at least in part the lost position and put special emphasis on welfare activity and education, using "El Diario Ilustrado" and "La Acción Española" as their propaganda tools. The Church found a political ally in conservatives. In 1933, this led to the bishops' decision to back the election effort of the Conservative Party, a decision which was not published and eventually dropped under the moderating influence of the Vatican.

The proclamation of the Socialist Republic threatened those aspirations of the clergy in view of the emerging prospect of further curbing of the public role of the Church combined with big uncertainty

about the future of Church property. Official programmes and unofficial but often even more radical demands advanced by some parties and associations did not augur well for the Church. There was a danger that things would take an even worse turn for the Church than in the Republican Spain.

However, the Church of Chile was not at all monolithic and the differences in attitudes were influenced both by the situation at home and by the evolution of the social doctrine of the papacy. The government's slogans of social justice, a peculiar kind of corporatism, and the emphasis on the ethos of hired labour led to the association of the new order with the new encyclical. There could be no question of any breakthrough in the attitude toward socialism, but some changes did occur. This could be illustrated by a report in "La Nación", an official paper, saying that "Pope Pius XI's latest encyclical is convergent with the Chilean socialist evolution (sic)". Osorno Provincial governor reported to Interior Minister Merino about his exchange with the bishop of the Valdivia diocese, in which they agreed that Pius XI's encyclical "contained ideas similar to those proclaimed by the Socialist Republic of Chile." A parish priest saying exequies over the coffin of Bishop Klinke added passages from "Quadragesimo anno" which, according to a senior official, "were related to the socialist evolution (sic) in Chile;" in his sermon, he called for "concord and peace." The priest also voiced the view that "it was the obligation of the affluent to impart an altruistic social function to wealth." The priest drew his inspiration from the Pope, but that passage from the sermon would also please the author of Dávila Plan. The governor was of the opinion that "the sermon left a favourable impression on the high society."

Around the same time, the French chargé d'affaires Drouin informed his Paris headquarters that the religious orders were showing greater nervousity "than all the rest" in the face of expropriation. The French members of the congregations of Redemptorists, Assumptionists, School Brethren and Lazarists remaining under the patronage of the Order of St. Vincent de Paul feared that they would be the first victims and demanded protection from the French Consul Romeo. The superior



of the Lazarists had no doubt where the horrible danger of expropriation came from: he thanked the Consul for protection from "les menaces Communistes."

It should be noted, however, that the understandable negative attitude and often plain hostility of the clergy was not articulated in the new conditions; at least, this view is borne out by the scarcity of source materials. No hostility is evident in the official position of the Church and there are no signs of possible counteraction to Church moves. The Church did not become an autonomous centre of political opposition and it was not directly attacked for being one. Its criticism on the part of the architects of the new order could mainly be found in the slogan about the oligarchy and capitalism being the archenemies of the Socialist Republic. There was no major political conflict between the Church and the Socialist Republic. Maybe there was simply not enough time for such a conflict to erupt. At any rate, the low-key nature of that conflict was advantageous for the new order.

### **Big landowners**

Jean Carrière observed that in the mid-1930s, *Sociedad Nacional de Agricultura* became a highly active pressure group with a large membership and capable of expressing the views of agricultural producers from all parts of the country. The Society perceived its role as that of a group ready for battle, operating in a highly competitive political environment, a group pressing for the introduction of a policy aimed at providing conditions in which efficient agrarian capitalism could arrest the process of economic and political decline of Chile's class of landowners. It was not accidental that such a formula of the Society appeared in the mid-1930s: it was devised over a longer period of time. Even immediately before the proclamation of the Socialist Republic, the SNA was an active representation of Chile's land magnates, especially preoccupied with the problems of prices, agrarian reforms, and farm labour in a country in which a little more than five hundred families owned over half of all farmland.

The proclamation of the Socialist Republic did not meet with any official reaction of the SNA other than silence. This could not be explained by the absence of agrarian reforms in the programme of the Socialist government because the promise of a colonization campaign at the expense of inefficient big farms, the threat of a tax on considerable fortunes and, ultimately, the whole philosophy of state socialism were clear enough warning signs. Not even the existence of censorship can be blamed. Anticipating the subsequent argument, I can point out that even the establishment of the Commissariat for Prices did not evoke any public move by the SNA. Note that this was the first time the Society behaved that way. The same thing happened several weeks before the proclamation of the Socialist Republic, when Congress passed the Montero bill on price controls. This kind of principle both hurt food producers and aroused their doubts about the effectiveness of the planned moves, but then the controls were devised as a way of appeasing a growing social protest and the SNA supported Montero in general. Besides, there is no reason to suspect that the SNA might be able to block the passage of that bill. In this situation, the landowners representation chose silence. Thomas C. Wright hypothesized that the giving up of resistance to the price control bill showed that the SNA put the interests of the upper class before the narrower interests of landowners. If that indeed was the case, this might also account for the reaction to the Socialist Republic. However, additional lights were shed on the matter by a statement by a SNA board member on August 16, to the effect that "in the present circumstances it would be inconvenient to expose the Society to the dangers connected with its doctrine." Wright argues that, "taking into account the hostility of some of the government forces toward landowners, the SNA preferred to refrain from public action or statements to avoid possible retaliation" on the part of the Socialist Republic. This does not necessarily imply that the SNA or the landowners took no action at all, including backstage moves. I will return to the subject further in this chapter; one thing that can be safely said about the attitude of the SNA in the early period of the Socialist Republic is that it adopted a wait-and-see position, whether because of the lack of faith in the durability of

the new order or because it did not want to make enemies with the new rulers. It is hard to doubt that that attitude was one of negation of the new order, however.

### **'White Guard' activities**

Just as fierce opposition to the Socialist Republic was born among the Communists, the White Guard movement was reviving at the other pole, far removed from anything like Left. Its existence was noted already in July 1931 by the French Consul when he wrote about "une garde civique nationale", composed of students and replacing the pro-Ibañez *carabinero* formation. In September of that year, Cpt. Wooten reported that Guardia Civil, composed of volunteers hailing mostly from Chile's conservative clans, supported Montero and was determined to prevent radicals or Communists such as Alessandri or Hidalgo from taking over power, and that "regardless of the price" this might entail. In 1933, a German envoy wrote about the Guardia Civil movement that "it was formed in the turbulent times of the preceding year to protect the bourgeoisie from violent action by the Communists." On June 6, 1932, the French paper "Oeuvre" wrote that "guardes blancs" (the quotation marks are the paper's) were composed of "English and American volunteers seeking to defend foreign interests in Santiago and Valparaíso." More detailed information could be found in the Chilean press. On June 5 and 6, "Crónica" and "La Nación" reported the fatal shooting of one Gustavo Busenius and two other people by irresponsible gun toting *Guardia Blanca* youths; many more people were wounded: "Crónica" of June 5 put their number at 65 and "El Mercurio" at 61. Two days later, "El Mercurio" wrote about the protests of "workers commissions" against the pressure exerted by *Guardia Blancas* on shopkeepers to close down their businesses. The guards continued to operate despite the government communique, released on June 5, about the dissolving of "all civilian institutions of a military nature, such as *guardias blancas, legiones civiles*, etc.," whose continued activity would be deemed to be a breach of law; at the same time, the government

reaffirmed the exclusive right of *carabineros* and the armed forces. It should be admitted, however, that it was not only the White Guard that ignored ban. The official "La Nación" paper announced on June 8 that a *Guardia Social* was being set up, admitting "all citizens regardless of conviction" with a view to defending the "established socialist order."

### **Planning for a *brazos caídos* strike**

Another form of opposition was an action organized in professional milieux. In the face of Montero's defeat and the proclamation of the Socialist Republic, the national boards of the three most important professional associations: *Colegio de Abogados*, *Sociedad Medica* and *Instituto de Ingenieros* called on their members to "strike by folding their arms" (*la huelga de brazos caídos*). Remembering the role of such action in bringing Ibañez down, the leaders of milieux once again wanted to play an important political role. This time the action was a fiasco as it encountered opposition inside the groups concerned, as shall be seen later.

### **Socialist organizations**

In some respects, the social movements and parties which supported the new order, sometimes were merely sympathetic to it, and sometimes were its co-architects prevailed over the part of the opposition to the Socialist Republic in the first period of its existence. This prevalence was manifested in a variety of ways, depending on their membership, diversity and ability to mobilize the masses.

The largest group included organizations emphasizing the notion of socialism in their names or programmes. There were several dozens of them throughout the period of the existence of the Socialist Republic, although little over twenty of them left any mark in printed material. Their activity was visible first of all in the capital, or only there. Some were quite ephemeral, or they were alliances formed by more stable organizations or federations whose life span was not much longer than that of the Socialist Republic itself, and often shorter.

Realignment among those forces was a constant feature. The groups formed and split breakaway factions of various organizations combined into new bodies, etc. All kinds of "coalitions," "councils," "centres," "federations," "confederations," "unions," "editorial boards," or "parties" kept coming to life, reorganizing or collapsing.

The membership of those organizations was composed chiefly of people from the middle class, including students. The worker representation was much more modest, but even so it was more pronounced than the presence of dissidents from the big bourgeoisie milieu. The class composition of those organizations was as much a source of their strength as of their weakness. The strength came from the relative homogeneity and was the result of the nature of processes taking place in Chile for a long period of time already; this was conducive to the formation of the political representation of the interests and needs of the intermediate classes and the broadening of the social base of the central state authorities. However, one cannot fail to notice that these organizations lacked allies in the largest social groups. This could not strengthen such organizations in the face of politically active circles of officers and the representation of the economically dominant bourgeois groups and groups connected with foreign capital.

Apart from the aforementioned *Nueva Acción Pública* party, which was a member of the junta, a big role was also played by the *Acción Revolucionaria Socialista* party. Both filled important ministerial posts. The list of parties which support the Socialist Republic should include first of all the following organizations:

*Alianza Socialista Revolucionaria de Trabajadores,*  
*Centro de Propaganda Radical-Socialista,*  
*Club Social Demócrata "Zenon Torrealba",*  
*Confederación Socialista de Chile,*  
*Consejo Socialista Revolucionario Militar Naval,*  
*Federación Socialista Revolucionaria,*  
*Guardia de Defensa del Régimen Socialista,*  
*Juventud Revolucionaria Socialista,*  
*Legión Revolucionaria del Centro Radical Socialista,*  
*Partido Liberal Democrático Socialista,*  
*Partido Social Republicano,*  
*Partido Socialista Independiente,*  
*Partido Socialista,*

*Partido Socialista de Chile,*  
*Partido Social Demócrata,*  
*Partido Socialista Constitucional,*  
*Partido Socialista Marxista, Partido Socialista Unificado, Unión*  
*Socialista Revolucionaria, Universitarios Socialistas*  
*Revolucionarios.*

Not far from them in supporting the Socialist Republic were such organizations as

--- the movement of working class and intelligentsia women,  
*Comite*

*Revolucionario de Mujeres Proletarias e Intelectuales,*

--- the left-wing women's group called *Las Mujeres Izquierdistas*  
*de Chile,*

--- artists from *Sindicato de Artistas Revolucionarios,*

--- *Comité Revolucionario de Ingenieros,*

--- the left-wing *Federación de las Izquierdas de Chile,*

--- part of the teachers' association *Federación de Maestros de*  
*Chile,*

--- a large faction of the Chilean branch of the anarchist Industrial  
Workers

of the World,

--- *Liga de Acción Anticlerical,*

--- and the more or less ephemeral *Partido Trabajador,*

--- *Sindicato en Resistencia,*

--- *Sociedad "La Aurora,"*

--- the national association of Spanish immigrants *Ateneo Pablo*  
*Iglesias,* etc.

Some elements of the programme of the Socialist Republic also met with the

support of such parties, institutions, and organizations as

--- the federation of clerical unions, *Agrupación Gremial de*  
*Empleados de*

*Chile,*

--- the railway men organized by *Federación Ferroviaria, Centro*  
*Democrata*

*"Libertad",*

--- *Centro Liberal Democrático "Orozimbo Barboza",*

--- *Círculo de Ex-Oficiales de Carabineros,*

--- *Frente Unico de Ex-Marineros, Soldados, Aviadores y*  
*Carabineros,*

organizing those expelled from the armed forces after the naval  
uprising of

1931,

--- the association of wholesale traders *La Union Social de Chile,*

--- as well as the movement of the Alessandrists:

*Partido Radical and Partido Democrático.*

In view of the absence of full knowledge of the majority of the  
socialist organizations listed in this chapter, it is hard to judge the

relationship between most of them and the political leadership of the Socialist Republic or the extent of their support for the Republic.

In just one instance, things look plain, or at least this is how they were seen by members of *Partido Socialista de Chile* when they declared on June 8:

"Considering that the Junta de Gobierno, led by retired General Arturo Puga has recognized the branches of the Socialist Party of Chile as its own and that it has already carried out some points of its programme relating to the great community of people lacking the elementary means of subsistence, we have resolved to express our full support for the policies of the said Junta de Gobierno. "

It appears that *Partido Socialista Unificado* was one of the first to voice its support for the new Republic. Its manifesto of June 4 said:

"We, the socialists, do not want a simple change of the cabinet, we want a change of the economic system (...) to the inclusion of scientific socialism adapted to our reality and the lofty international goals of the Indo-American Entente. We want the new government to be based on the proletariat as the only force not poisoned by the addiction of capitalist rule. (...) We shall fight for '*socialismo intergal* (...)."

The Party undertook the effort of uniting Chile's socialists with the help of *Federación Socialista Revolucionaria*. In its headquarters, it also set up a special register to be signed by *profesionales*, i.e., highly skilled specialists with university degrees wishing to oppose the "counterrevolutionary activity of bourgeois and oligarchic *profesionales*, on June 6 it claimed 500 *profesionales* on its list and two days later the number was 1,500. Finally, the party developed the mobilization of the youth and allowed its premises to be used by the Armed Forces Committee with its register of ex-officers. On June 5, the PSU Executive Committee passed a resolution defining the Party's position on the just proclaimed Socialist Republic and announcing the decision to: 1) Grant its support to the antibourgeois revolutionaries movement started by the armed forces; 2) Cooperate regarding the political and economic moves of the nascent

Provisional (sic) Government, provided the socialist line of the latter does not clash with the fundamental interests of the global revolution (sic); 3) Demand that the new government recognize the USSR at once and establish diplomatic relations with it; 4) Announce these decisions to its branches all over the country, the participants in the planned Socialist Congress and to revolutionary organizations of an akin character: *Partido Comunista* and *Orden Socialista*. At the same time, PSU Secretary General Armando Carvolán Quesada promised to undertake an analysis of the *Dávila Plan*.

In very many instances, it is hard to establish elementary facts. Here is an example of the difficulties a future chronicler of the history of socialism in Chile will have to cope with to analyse definitively the role of some organizations: on June' 13, "La Nación" reported the establishment of the Socialist Propaganda Centre by *Partido Socialista Marxista* in the Chilean capital but at the same time it wrote that its founder and architect was "Comrade Vallejos," former deputy to the Peruvian parliament on behalf of the Peruvian APRA Party, who had been deported from Peru. It should be remembered that for historically obvious reasons the mutual Peruvian-Chilean resentments were as strong as they were widespread. And yet Agustín Vallejos Zavala appears as a member of Chile's Marxist Socialist Party and at the opening of the aforementioned Centre delivered a lecture on the American People's Revolutionary Alliance (APRA). On the other hand, we are aware of the differences between the Apristas and the Communists and between the socialists and the communists. This is no obstacle to naming the Centre after Stalin, and all of it is taking place with the support of the Apristas from NAP and personally Matte, who was even said to offer to ship arms to Peru. Was this the result of yielding to APRA, the influence of which, incidentally, Matte himself was to assure the *Apristas*, or rather the outcome of the policy of the Socialist Republic?

To what extent was this a consequence of the APRA support for the Socialist Republic, to the outcome of their popularity and favourable reception on the part of some circles of the Chilean society, and to what extent was it simply an act of opposition to the Peruvian authorities on



behalf of politicians expelled from their homeland? At first glance, the Chileans only perceived an institution called *Centre de Propaganda Socialista "Stalin"*, urging them to cooperate with the Marxist Socialist Party, and the reader of "La Nación," a government paper after all, found a report among a multitude of accounts of the support of the most diverse socialist organizations for the socialist government. The paper wrote at length about the accession of the new agency of the Marxist Socialist Party to the Revolutionary Socialist Workers' Alliance ASRT, in which neither NAP nor ASR were represented and in which the anarchists and Hídalgists played an important role, and yet a quarter of a century later Chile's socialist historians would write about the organization — without quoting any sources - that it was a structure set up at the urging of Matte and Grove! However, "La Nación" has reported that the inauguration of the Centre was attended by over 500 people, mostly workers (!), who applauded the call of the centre's secretary for support for the idea of "integral socialism" and the "revolutionary junta"; "integral socialism" was also mentioned by an *Aprista* whereas the whole lengthy account does not once mention the notion of "state socialism." It really is hard to establish accurately the extent of the Stalin Centre's support for the Socialist Republic. One can, however, uphold the view about the supportive attitude of such organizations to the nascent new order. The leaders of the Marxist Socialist Party, especially university students and professors, headed by Carlos Malas and Eliodero Domínguez, voiced clear support for the Socialist Republic "wishing to ensure the triumph of the Socialist Revolution". At a rally held on June 3 outside La Moneda and organized by *Alianza Revolucionaria Socialista* in the presence of a crowd of 20,000 people, representatives of NAP, *Acción Revolucionaria Socialista*, *Confederación Nacional de Cooperativas* (D.Uribe) and the Marxist Socialist Party (E. Domínguez) adopted a list of demands addressed to the government, insisting at the same time on the establishment of a volunteer Revolutionary Guard under worker control, demanding a radicalization of the 4th of June Movement by the introduction of representatives of the popular forces, advancing pay and welfare demands "so that the workers would support the revolution and

the bourgeoisie feel its collapse"; this was to include a reduction of the prices of essentials and the curbing of profiteering.

If the Socialist Republic, with its state socialism, was supported by *Partido Marxista Socialista* despite the latter's emphasis on the notion of *socialismo integral*, some other party's emphasis on the notion of state socialism did not necessarily mean that it supported the new authorities without any reservations. This happened to be the case of *Partido Orden Socialista*, a pioneer of the conception of state socialism in Chile. I have not come across any evidence of its support for the Socialist Republic, on the contrary, there is proof of its critical attitude or even opposition to the Socialist Republic when governed by the Matte-Grove Lagarrigue group. The socialists from *La Orden Socialista* proclaimed to be something of the nature of guardians of the socialist revolution and of "*socialismo de estado en su forma integral*," guardians of the revolution who would not be involved in the revolutionary (?) government. At the same time, they drew attention to the questions of doctrine. However, they were not to be seen in the middle of the team taking over power and they did not join that team after the proclamation of the Socialist Republic either; nor is there any indication that they were invited to join the government. It simply appears that the attitude of the leaders of that party might be influenced by the pattern of personal loyalty in the broad Chilean socialist movement.

### **Other parties and organizations**

Whereas the appearance of the term "socialism" in the name of a party did not automatically signify its support for the new order, its absence in the name was not necessarily a sign of indifference, let alone hostility. The leadership of *Partido Demócrata* solemnly declared on June 5 that the social movement supported by the armed forces articulated the aspirations of the people (*pueblo*) which "wanted the capitalist system to be replaced by a socialist one that would constitute the essence of the democratic doctrine." The democrats viewed socialism as a way of averting "fratricidal struggle from the times of the French Revolution,"

and the Socialist Republic as a fruit of more than four decades of their activity and the new government as a coordinator of the activity of individuals in the service of all. The Party's chairman, who also acted as minister of justice in the socialist government, Pedro A. Fajardo Ulloa, as well as his deputy Guillermo Bañados called on the people to "unite under this new banner, which symbolizes the age-old struggle of the proletariat for its rights." Three days later, the Democrats' Santiago chapter announced its declaration. Over two hundred delegates voiced the view that (1) the programme of the new government aimed at liberating *el pueblo* and the working classes from the yoke of the oligarchy; (2) the revolutionary demands of the proletariat can only be implemented with the use of armed force and it is an illusion that these ideals can be reached by any other means; (3) the new order must be made to last. *Agrupación Demócrata de Santiago* voiced full support for the Socialist Republic, declaring the will of "determined and enthusiastic work" for its final consolidation. *Partido Demócrata* played a similar role in Chile as *Partido Socialista* in Argentina. Its attitude was of vital importance for the Socialist Republic.

The June tide of public awakening, for many bordering on euphoria, engendered social movements which were closer to the Socialist Republic in what constituted its diagnosis of the situation in the country than its programme of action yet they remained potential allies of the new order. *Partido Social Sindicalista* is a good case in point. It presented its programme on June 7. It began with the thesis stating that a hundred years after gaining political independence, Chile needed social and economic liberation as well. In Chile, too, there was a conflict between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, in which the party joined the side of the proletariat in opposing the rule of capital. It pointed out that next to the Communists and socialists there were large social movements opposed to the existing social and economic relations. The Party termed the 19th century as the age of individualism and the 20th as the age of socialism. It rejected dictatorship, democracy, fascism, and Bolshevism as inadequate for Chile. It identified with neither the bourgeois parties nor with parties that were only nominally progressive and apparently

reformist, nor, finally, with parties that dreamt of destroying everything without building anything; *Partido Social Sindicalista* advanced a programme of building a new state and a new society and therefore it called for: 1) the transformation of the democratic and liberal state into a corporatist and syndicalist one; the corporations, or autonomous regional communities or communities of a professional or cultural nature would make up *Estado Sindical*; 2) basing the organization of society on the family and the obligation to work benefitting a family community embracing many generations; 3) the rationalization of production and consumption by combining the principle of cooperation with the principle of community and family-based economy; the development of the latter was to create a situation in which pay for work would not be conceived quite the same way as in a capitalist economy; the purpose of economic activity would be to ensure food, clothing and accommodation to el pueblo. In implementing these goals, the party promised to be open to initiatives coming from all ideological camps.

The anti-liberal and pro-corporatist orientation of the syndicalist party brought it closer to the advocates of state socialism. Its syndicalism did not constitute an obstacle, at least the way it was construed in the party programme, because it appeared as a notion similar to corporatism and an authoritarian fusion of the family and the state. The programme quite clearly referred to the programme of the Socialist Republic with its slogans of food, clothing, and shelter for the people. To many Chileans, this was a sufficient criterion of socialism, and it could also be added that syndicalism was probably identified at the grassroots level with support for trade unions, i.e., for the so-called ordinary working people. Therefore, although the party did not declare a clear support for the Socialist Republic, the similarity of both diagnoses and programme was sufficiently pronounced for observers to look at the party as an ally of the new order.

On June 5, support for the Socialist Republic was voiced by socialist radicals, dissidents from the very influential *Partido Radical*. *Partido Radical Socialista* stayed outside the socialist government, which it emphasized in public, although it seems that it aspired for power along

with other progressive (*de avanzada*) parties and supported the implementation of the socialist doctrine, consistent with the "imperative of the scientific conception of historical development", leading to socialization (*fiscalización*). The party leadership focused on economic problems. Its leader, Senator Aurelio Nunez Morgado, sat on a party commission specially set up for this purpose. Even before that, the party and Nunez personally campaigned for the disbanding of the C05ACH company and the party's programme contained various plans concerning financial, agricultural, and other projects.

Two days later, unconditional support for the government was voiced by the leaders of *Partido Alessandrista de Chile*, whose position was close to that of the socialist radicals, which followed from "the supreme socialist principles of the party's programme."

On June 5, *Federación Regional Revolucionaria* was set up by *Partido Socialista Unificada* and *Nueva Accion Pública*. *Partido Orden Socialista* promised to join it soon and "Cróni-ca" reported about talks with the Communists. However, the Lafertists set up their own council while the Hídalgists preferred to join other forces in setting up *Alianza Socialista Revolucionaria de Trabajadores* (ASRT). However, the contacts between PSU, NAP, and POS were to become closer only later and it was hard to notice any conspicuous activity of the *Federación*. ASRT activity was more visible.

The programme of the new ASRT alliance, announced on June 9, voiced the desire to set up a "genuine Socialist Republic" in Chile. "*El regimen capitalista*" has collapsed, as has "*la democracia burguesa*," a "clearly revolutionary period" has begun and not far off was "*la democracia parlamentaria*" of the one and only social class--the "class of producers," which, by toppling "las clases opresoras" and by "socializing land and the means of production," was to lead to "peace and justice in relations between all Chileans." However, the alliance did not identify with the current Socialist Republic, proclaiming an attitude of careful observation and vigilance toward those who "took over political power, ostensibly to introduce socialist system (regimen)." The alliance

intended to follow the principles of "true revolutionaries, interested in the establishment of a genuine Socialist Republic."

The alliance was born right after the proclamation of the new order. After a week of negotiations, its leadership was formed. It included representatives of organizations operating nationwide, or, to be precise, ones whose activity was not limited to capital, and local organizations. There was the *Comité Unido Pro-Defensa de la Ley 33* defending the "welfare gains" introduced by the Law No.33, *Asociación General de Profesores de Chile*, *Federación de Agrupaciones Anarquistas*, *Confederación General de Trabajo*, *Federación Nacional de Trabajo*, *Comité Revolucionario* set up to promote new welfare legislation, *Partido Socialista Marxista*, the clerical *Unión de Empleados de Chile*, *Confederación Nacional de Cooperativas*, *Partido Comunista* (Hidalgists), *Junta Central de Poblaciones Obreras* representing working class housing estates, the league of tenant farmers, IWW unionists, unions' of unemployed office workers, etc. The leadership of the alliance was a scene of battles between the socialists and the Communists, the former led by Eliodor Domínguez, the latter by Jorge Neut Latour. Both the programme and the composition of the alliance suggest that it was a kind of an alternative to the council set up by Lafertist Communists. The alliance became a platform for various radical organizations, including trade unions, which saw the Socialist Republic as a chance for pressing their claims more effectively and for broadening their influence.

The committee defending the Ibanez law No. 33 soon took over four organizations: housing cooperatives represented by *Confederación Nacional de Cooperativas de Chile*, representatives of working class housing estates from *Junta Nacional de Poblaciones de Chile*, *Comité Central de Dueños de Mejoras* representing the owners of primitive shelters built without permission on another owner's land, the name reflecting the fact that those people improved that land, and *Compradores de Sitios a Plazo*, an organization of buyers of building plots by instalments. By turning to the government", which promised to solve so many socio-economic issues at a stroke, the boards of these organizations called for the solving of the most important problems,

pointing to the most pressing of them, i.e., the shortage of housing. They also drew attention to the fact that the legalist moves of the previous government, combined with its lack of understanding of the fate of the poorest, led to evictions and homelessness. The committee demanded the implementation of Law No. 33 and especially the establishment of a mixed ministry committee and the introduction of financial concessions in the form of consolidation and conversion of the debts of members of the said organization, the annulment of taxes and fines, etc. It called for it, without using great words about socialism and complete dedication to the Socialist Republic. In a memorandum the Committee sent to the government these words did not appear even once. The Committee pointed out that it was not allowed to act effectively in the past because it was ignored by groups representing interests "flourishing in the shade of capitalist governments wholly dedicated to things foreign (*extranjerismo*)", and now it was turning to the new government, in which it saw "an ally of the working classes." Political support on the part of those nonparty organizations for the Socialist Republic was a result of their membership of ASRT.

### **Trade Unions**

On June 8, twenty-five organizations, mostly trade unions, presented an 11-point memorandum to the government, which was submitted by Fernando Escobar, secretary general of *Federación Nacional del Trabajo*, and other delegates to Matte and Dávila. It contained the following demands:

- 1) The organization of industry and production requires the inclusion of direct worker representation in the administrative apparatus.

- 2) The implementation of the socialist programme proclaimed by the government requires the immediate "socializacion" of the manufacturing industries, power plants, the copper industry, the merchant marine, the coal and *saltpetre* industries, banks, savings institutions and insurance companies.

3) Land should be given away to *inquilinos* and the unused landed estates should be distributed among the jobless clerical and manual workers, with the socialization of farmwork.

4) It is most urgent to order the organization of the Labour Assembly (*Gremial*).

5) Property owned by religious organizations should be expropriated and large landed estates confiscated.

6) In view of the fact that many houses are unoccupied, the ownership of urban property should not be limited so that nobody be denied an apartment.

7) A commission of indigenous chiefs should be set up to address all problems of that population group.

8) The state should exercise exclusive rights regarding the sale of imported essentials and foreign trade.

9) To implement the solutions proposed above, it is necessary to set up special commissions incorporating workers' representatives appointed by the workers themselves.

10) Regarding the general welfare and employment policy, the introduction of the following solutions would be recommended: the reduction of the scope of work paid on a per day basis, the introduction of minimum pay, the introduction of minimum family income, production minimum in industry, a full ban on the employment of minors under 15, equivalent pay for men and women related to their individual and family needs, the establishment of workers councils in factories, workshops and in any production activity.

11) To consolidate the Socialist Republic, the present Junta de Gobierno should incorporate workers' representatives appointed by the leadership of the organizations which signed this memorandum and enjoying equal rights.

The first signature under the memorandum was that of *Federación Nacional de Trabajo*, which was followed by signatures of the chairmen or secretaries general of such organizations as unions of



factory workers from various areas of manufacturing, bakers, bakery clerks, weavers, shoemakers, dyers, theatre technicians, clerks of tram companies, members of housing cooperatives, employees of big trading firms, etc.; they were for the most part unions of workers of one enterprise, typically from Santiago or Valparaiso.

A subsequent declaration of June 16 reaffirmed the 11-point memorandum, putting special emphasis on the demand for the "socialization of industry on the basis of mass-membership industrial trade unions." This position was supported by an even larger group of organizations, with FNT in the lead.

Associations of office employees, engineers, bank employees, medical doctors.

The government programme was backed by the Chilean General Association of Clerical Workers (AGECH), whose creation in the beginning of June was accompanied by commentaries portraying it as a political party of office workers and which ultimately defined itself as a labour-political organization, organizing clerks employed both by the state and by private firms. It should be noted that the clerical status was also enjoyed by some *profesionales*, e.g., a part of engineers, while some clerical milieux, e.g., bankers, did not limit the articulation of their opinions to the AGECH medium.

There were some groups of *profesionales* in which dispute over the attitude to the Socialist Republic were quite heated. In the case of engineers, the impulse for action--next to the attractiveness of socialism, represented by the new state authorities--was the call for a strike by engineers organized by *Instituto de Ingenieros*, issued by the board of the organization. A large part of members of *Instituto* immediately on June 6, came out against this action, with some of them campaigning for the setting up of a separate organization, while others argued that the fast growth of the ranks of supporters of the socialist government among engineers would lead to the takeover of the Instituto board by them and the ouster of its adversaries. Even if some engineers might present the view that professional cooperation was possible in spite of political

differences, I have not come across such views in the source material. At any rate, the strike did not occur.

As for the metropolitan banking community, a movement of supporters of the Socialist Republic was formed on June 7, which was largely due to the aforementioned initiative of *Partido Socialista Unificado*, which mobilized the professionals' support for the Socialist Republic. Here again, an important role was played by the threat of strike by professionals hostile to the new order. A large group of banking clerks firmly opposed that threat. They decided that the government was "defending the rights of workers and clerks" and that the strike proposed by the "reactionary elements" was aimed against those rights. The bankers declared their support for the new government and its policy of "justice and progress." In reality, they formed a kind of faction in their union in their determination to counter the moves of bank directors and stockholders, who were forcing the banks' staff to sabotage the new policy.

June 7 saw the establishment of an organization of doctors supporting the Socialist Republic. This group included "representatives of all radical social (*de avanzada*) ideals." However, the declaration of support for the "socialist programme" contained one reservation, namely, that it concerned a "revolutionary civilian government" enjoying the support of the armed forces, but the involvement of the latter in the implementation of the government's plans did not go beyond military matters." The new organization and its declaration of conditional support were a reaction to an earlier decision of the board of *Asociación Médica de Chile*, which tried to mobilize doctors to defend the Montero government.

The lawyers' association (*Colegio de Abogados*) wanted to act in a similar way as *Asociación Médica*, calling on its new members to strike. On the other hand, there were also the attitudes exemplified by secondary school teachers from *Federación de Profesores Secundarios*, who simply presented a list of their professional demands to the new authorities

without bothering to present their views on socialism or the government doctrine as such.

### **Women**

The proclamation of the Socialist Republic also elicited a declaration from the left-wing women's group *Las Mujeres Izquierdistas de Chile*. In a letter to Grove, its activists declared support for the government, condemned the "indolence of the oligarchic class," welcomed the "toppling of the capitalist dictatorship" by Grove (sic!) and the advent of "the rule of social justice, brotherhood and honesty." They wrote that the "glorious action" by Grove would bring about both "national revival" and earn Chile the distinction of being "the first nation of the continent to face fully with love and understanding, the new social reality that the spiral path of human evolution opens up before us."

### **Students**

The student milieu, always so active politically, also marked its presence on this occasion. Already on the way of the takeover, the students formulated a draft resolution voicing far-reaching support for *Gobierno socialista* along with the promise to defend it from the forces of the "reactionaries". On June 5, the Federation of Chilean Students proclaimed strike and seized the campus of the University of Chile pending "the introduction of a full reform of universities." Naturally, individual students have always engaged in very broad political activity in numerous political parties. One of the leaders of the student movement in the preceding period, Oscar Schnake, became secretary of the new junta. After the proclamation of the strike, the leaders of *Federación de Estudiantes de Chile* handed the minister of Education a proposal for the autonomy of universities, prepared by a mixed commission composed of students, university teachers and graduates right after Ibañez's fall. The authorities of the Socialist Republic took a positive view of the idea of autonomy and even took a general decision in this respect. It should be remembered, however, that only a part of the students' activities focused

on student or university life in the strict sense of the word. Most of the political active students simply acted in political parties and while some openly cooperated with the socialist government, others strove to overthrow it, staged demonstrations in the Supreme Court, joined the White Guard, etc.

### **Supreme Court Judges**

It would be valuable to define the attitude among senior state officers. As regards the central administration, information is so scarce that one can rely mostly on intuition, deduction, or even speculation. Two groups of which something is known are Supreme Court judges and senior officers of the armed forces.

The revolutionary junta declared respect for the autonomy of the courts, but it suspended the constitution and dissolved the parliament. The government only intended to obey those laws that did not clash with the new order. The Supreme Court reacted to it on June 6 by suspending its activities and notifying the Court of Appeals about its resolution on June 7. The latter debated on the new situation for a long time before finally refraining from taking a position on the matter, carrying on its activities and ... facilitating the postponing of its sessions during the strike of legal representatives and "attorneys proclaimed by *Colegio de Abogados*. In this situation, the government declared that, while respecting the autonomy of the judiciary authority, it expected that it would carry out a purge (*depuración*) at all levels of the judiciary system by itself. In response to that, Javier Angel Figueroa, President of the Supreme Court, resigned. "The judiciary system," he wrote, "along with Congress and the President of the Republic are constitutional powers appointed by the constitution precisely to exercise the sovereignty that is the nation's right, but with the dissolution of the constitutional organs of executive and legislative power, the courts, linked to the former by a common origin and bonds of close solidarity, have been deprived of the juridical power necessary for the exercise of their duties." However, while the President of the Supreme Court resigned, his fellow judges remained in their posts.

They remained judges but they still did not carry out their legal duties. The Supreme Court held a plenary session to examine the situation. It debated under the pressure of political events taking place outside the court and of a commotion caused by students of the Catholic University trying to force the judges to give up their duties. Finally, the Supreme Court passed a resolution rejecting the decision of *Colegio de Abogados* and restored the normal state, arguing that "*justicia* and *política* rule each other out." In this way, the Chilean judges referred to the well-known ancient maxim that has it that jurisprudence leaves by the same door by which politics has entered. The attitude of the Supreme Court could be interpreted as a sign of support for the Socialist Republic, which in fact it was in the sense in which the continued operation of the Supreme Court in an earlier period of unconstitutional rule in 1924-5 facilitated the survival of the state. Ultimately, the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals only resumed regular work on June 13. It was to turn out later that the Supreme Court, or, more precisely, its new president, with the executive powers granted to him by the constitution (sic), which he could exercise in the absence of the president or vice president of the republic, or when those posts were not filled, would play a decisive role regarding stability in the period of transition to constitutional rule.

### **Military Officials**

At the moment of the proclamation of the Socialist Republic, there was no indication of the existence of a socialist movement within the armed forces, which of course does not rule out the possibility that individual officers could not support various radical social conceptions already in the early 1920s. However, that was the time when a reform movement was set up which led to important moves in the years 1924-25. In 1932, state socialism was something that came from outside, not from the army. Moreover, Communist ideals filtered in from outside, but there was no sign that there was even one supporter of Communism among senior officers.

It is almost certain that there was no socialist movement among the officers but there is evidence that for a part of the officers' corps socialism was an acceptable proposition.

Therefore, even if there was no social movement professing the socialist ideology in the army, there was a social state of readiness to accept some socialist alternative. Otherwise the revolutionary committee in El Bosque, involving some military, could not be set up, nor could the first junta or the socialist cabinet, Dávila could not stay in power for so long, it would not be possible to set up a cabinet with an army man as the minister of war and no communique using the term "socialist policy" would be issued by a military minister.

The clue to the understanding of the position of the officers' corps toward the Socialist Republic consists in the interpretation of the notion of socialism and of revolution. The first limitation stems from the fact that the matter concerned support for a government which terms itself as a socialist one while the term revolution denotes first of all a violent and unconstitutional ouster of the old government and the formation of a new one. Socialism was associated with the government rather than with a comprehensive system, and the revolution was viewed as a method of change of government rather than of the socio-economic system.

Secondly, the government was perceived from the point of view of its composition and programme. Thanks to the presence of Grove and Puga, the officers could view that programme differently than they would if these were the declarations of an unambiguously civilian government. Finally, the programme itself contained proposals that appealed to the middle class, to which the officers belonged. The vision of the new role of the state could appeal to the military especially strongly. State socialism could easily appear to be a policy (sic) that at least deserved to be given a try in depressing conditions of the crisis affecting all areas of life.

The third factor limiting the support of the military was the doctrine which assigned the armed forces the role of an obedient tool of the civilian government, indeed all civilian governments. N.b. the advocates of the Socialist Republic could not use the legalistic argument

to neutralize their enemies or win over the undecided as they had themselves staged a coup against the constitutional authorities, whereas the enemies of the Socialist Republic could invoke the same ideal of apoliticality to demand the withdrawal of the support officially declared by the armed forces for the usurpers introducing the new order. After so many years of the army's political involvement, an argument of this kind had to carry some weight.

A special criterion of the attitude toward the Socialist Republic was connected with its policy toward such movements as the White Guard or the revolutionary Communist committees, because each of these kinds of movements was the same for the military in that both infringed on the army and police's monopoly of armed force in the state.

One last limitation was the fear of Communism, combined with the lack of clarity about the difference between socialism and Communism. Socialism interpreted in a too radical way could be equated with Communism by those who would be ready to support a moderately socialist socio-economic policy, whereas the opponents of socialism simply identified it with Communism and combatted it as such.

The surprise factor must be taken into account. This Socialist Republic was something really new, unknown, and unexpected. It took time for the attitude toward the new situation to take shape. The officers' corps was in a way an illustration of the political heterogeneity of the intermediate classes. Surely, a lot would depend on the policy of the new authorities on whether they 1) succeed in neutralizing the crisis in an essential way, 2) keep the dissatisfied masses under control, 3) without changing the status quo too much. The fulfillment of these three conditions would help the government to obtain stronger support from the military, probably regardless of the label it would give itself, provided it would avoid excessively extravagant moves, of course. Col. Grove's tirades about socialism and his posing as a radical idol of the masses could not go down well with the officers' corps.

## Capital press

"La Crónica" was influenced by the radicals and Alessandri and as such it served as a tribune representative of a large section of the public opinion. Founded in November 1931, it played a special role also because its editorial office served as a meeting point for anti-Montero conspirators. In reality, "La Crónica" became a tribune for all factions of the Left in the broadest sense, except the Communists, which were very active formulating their programmes in the first days of the Socialist Republic. An editorial published on June 5 said:

"The programme and doctrine of the new leaders are in many respects convergent with what we often have said in our paper. This applies to the Manifesto of the Revolutionary Staff and the programme of the revolution containing demands and plans to be implemented at once, that without a trace of doubt are the fullest government plans we have ever had a chance to learn about in this country. (...) Both the new government and we are striving to establish the first Socialist Republic of Chile."

These words had a great impact. The paper, regarded by some as being "openly socialist," and read by vast sections of the Chilean society, printed a large number of copies. It should be added, "however, that the paper's policy line could appeal to a very wide spectrum of the public because of its attitude to the armed forces. June 6 editorial carried the headline "*Socialismo, no militarismo*".

"The armed forces were the only a means of taking over power. (...) The authorities of the Socialist Republic will provide conditions that will rule out the involvement of the army."

These words were addressed not only to conservatives and liberals. The paper also sought to dispel the doubts of socialists, who found it hard to associate militarism with socialism.

"We believe that in order to pass from the liberal individualistic system (...) to a socialist one (...) it was necessary to resort to the armed forces. Does anyone believe that a fundamental reconstruction of the economic structure of the



society would have been possible by way of persuasion alone? It would be unimaginably naive because 'history tells us that the privileged castes have never given up the benefits arising from the exercising of power.'

The tactic of the radicals and the Alessandrists was evident: they sought to justify any method of removing the conservative enemies from power and reject the idea of a dictatorship based on the army. Support for the Socialist Republic was a fact, but it was not unqualified. The editorial was accompanied with deliberations placing the Alessandrists' line in a broader context. An anonymous author compared Ibanez with Montero, to reach the conclusion that although the former declared the intention to strive for a reconstruction of the society and the latter promised the rule of law that was identical for all, both acted in the interest of very narrow groups, violating democratic principles (Ibanez) or using the pretences of democracy for advancing the oligarchic-clerical-conservative interests (Montero). "La Crónica" tried to believe that the Socialist Republic would not repeat the errors of the past or be reduced — as some Chileans feared - to the formula of the military government.

On the same day and in the same paper, Carlos Préndez Saldías put matters even more clearly. He saw in the Socialist Republic a continuation of Alessandri's policies from the early 1920s. This was said "between the lines" but clearly enough. However, he wrote quite clearly that the then President Alessandri "represented neither capitalism nor the aristocracy" when he was toppled by the military. Therefore, he wrote that there was a subsequent attempt to treat the ideological progress of society in 1920 as some transitional occurrence, the financial and moral independence of the country was sold away to foreigners and the obligations toward the masses of unemployed and starving people, people sleeping by the roadside with the Southern Cross as the only covering being ignored. The paper put the blame for it on the "reactionary forces" and the demoralized conservative wing of the radicals, i.e., the civilian government! "La Crónica" hit both at the conception of the military rule and at its rivals on the civilian side. The criticism of the previous civilian governments was carried out in such a

way that Alessandri emerged as the only alternative worth supporting. On the other hand, the emphasis on the role of the military in the establishment of the Socialist Republic served to blur the role of NAP as its socialist ally. The paper criticized the military while conveniently forgetting about the military reformers of 1924, but at the same time it wooed them as it presented Alessandri - who was rarely mentioned by name - as an almost a legitimate contender for power in the Socialist Republic and a possible partner of the military, too. This was the editorial line of this paper in the first days after the proclamation of the Socialist Republic. Characteristically, the Lagarrigue plan, a product of the NAP social thought, did not appear in "La Crónica," which had previously published the Dávila Plan, but in "La Opinión." The latter did not have as good quality newsprint as its rivals and did not engage in the kind of tactical manoeuvres that "La Crónica" practiced. Its main mentor was Juan Bautista Rosetti, a young lawyer and ex-chairman of *Federación de Estudiantes de Chile*, who was an avowed socialist; he was also a co-founder of *Partido Radical Socialista*. "La Opinion" began to appear in March 1932 and immediately became the most vocal organ of the anti-Montero opposition. The paper enthusiastically welcomed the Socialist Republic and gave it its unqualified backing.

In those first days, support for the Socialist Republic could be expressed, for example, by publishing government communiques or reports about the activities of socialists or pro-socialist parties, and trade unions. In this sense, a positive role from the point of view of the new authorities was played even by the liberal paper "El Mercurio," connected with the most influential interest groups in the country and owned by the Edwards family. However, one should not forget about the existence of censorship. It helped to shape the face of "El Mercurio" in this way and in the case of the extremely conservative and clerical "El Diario Ilustrado" the result was that if the reader did not go beyond the first, most important page, he might remain ignorant of the immensely important developments taking place in Chilean politics.

On the whole, the authorities of the Socialist Republic had reason to be pleased with the effects of the operation of censorship and the

newspapers' reaction, even if the individual inner circles of the ruling team could not influence the content of publications to the same degree.

At a certain moment, the government of the Socialist Republic obtained its own press organ, "La Nación", which had 16 big pages and appeared six days a week. The "La Nación" enterprise was bought out by the government during Ibañez's rule and in 1931 it shared his destiny. Under Montero's rule, there was no room for a government newspaper, but its "socialization," or takeover by the employees of the enterprise, demanded by the opposition, was not permitted either. The enterprise could not publish "La Nación" but could provide printing and editorial services to the group publishing "La Crónica." Thanks to that, it survived despite the fact that "La Crónica" was victimized by the police. After the proclamation of the new order, "La Crónica" merged with "La Nación" and from June 8 the latter appeared in the morning and "La Crónica" in the afternoon. Since then, "La Crónica" could no longer be so openly pro-Alessandrist and "La Nación" again became the government mouthpiece. Characteristically, the socialist government was none too eager to "socialize" "La Nación."

The first editorial in "La Nación" conveyed the credo of the reborn paper.

"This time, fresh blood is flowing in "La Nación's" old veins. The paper will not embody an obscure set of political recipes. It is entering the arena of a direct struggle to fight for something else, for grander, bolder and more human ideals. Its ideology will be a socialist one, its immediate goal will be the final establishment of the Socialist Republic and, beyond Chile's borders, the dissemination all over the continent of the philosophical principles on which this great and irreversible universal current rests. The paper will defend manual and clerical workers against plutocracy and oligarchy, liberated thought against religious fanaticism, and the ardent youth against the shrewd and egoistic older generations. "La Nación" will be a popular paper in the strictest sense of the word as it will reflect proletarian demands and

welcome all ideas and every initiative aimed at our common goal: that of replacing the current liberal individualistic system by another one, in which the new socialist justice will prevail."

These words came of course from the editor of the official paper, but they can also help to get an insight into the attitudes toward the new Republic. The plan was to gain public support with the help of theses, which, according to the editors, could evoke the strongest positive response:

- 1) the overthrow of the free-market economic system and the rule of the plutocracy, oligarchy and the clergy, associated with the old generation;
- 2) the introduction - by young people in particular - of socialist justice in the interest of people living off the work of their own hands;
- 3) the tying of Chile's future to the universal socialist movement.

In other words, the "La Nación" ideologues saw the social base of the new order in the young generation of people hailing from the middle and working classes, who viewed social justice and international socialist solidarity as the remedy for Chile. The generalized nature of that platform could only be about the shape of the new policy. When Minister Lagarrigue declared that the overcoming of the problems facing the saltpetre industry was a great and complex problem and the role of the COSACn was only one part of it, "La Opinión" criticized that statement sharply: "The kind of socialist government we have introduced here should not be preoccupied with the interests of international capitalism which has been exploiting us and ruined us." To which "La Crítica" replied:

"We are not in the same situation as Russia. The old Moscow empire had isolated itself from the world to carry out its historical transformations. It could do so unchallenged. Our situation is different, we cannot ignore other countries. As a small country with a small population, we are doomed, more than others, to this forced economic interdependence now shared by all nations."

A similar view was voiced by "El Imparcial" and the censors did not prevent "El Mercuric" from writing in an editorial headlined "Peace Is Needed For Work":

"Every day and every hour there is a public assembly in some parts of the town. There are lots of speeches, both good and bad ones, people applaud and stage enthusiastic ovations, ardent slogans are being voiced about the good of the people and the future of the country (...) However, is it worth going on provoking countless gatherings and filling them with the lyrical (sic) fervour of promises and wishes and unclear predictions? (...) Perhaps the time for reflexion has come and fantasy should give way to realism."

However, it must have been the censors who prevented the press from publishing such views as this one, voiced confidentially by "a senior figure, known for his hostile attitude to the toppled government [of Montero for the benefit of a French diplomat:

"We are at a stage of fantastic and illusory socialism. The moves the press is writing about show that veritable chaos reigns inside the government, as a result of which these moves are inconsistent and carry the stigma of complete improvisation and amateurism."

### **Reaction to the fall of Matte and Grove**

The removal of the Matte-Grove-Lagarrigue-González group by Dávila, supported by part of the officers, unleashed a violent protest of a part of the population of the biggest towns and brought about a change in the forms of action of diverse parties and organizations. The protest took the shape of violent demonstrations and strikes, mainly in Valparaíso and Santiago. There were casualties and arrests.

The reaction was much milder in the north but that was the area that was the worst hit by unemployment and thousands of workers had migrated to the south. Those stormy protests showed that the ideals of

the Socialist Republic, even if they were interpreted in various ways, struck root among the working masses. They showed how many people saw the removal of the radical leaders as a blow to the very essence of the Socialist Republic or at least its welfare and economic programmes; they demonstrated the Communists' and anarchists' ability to mobilize people, confirmed the existence of worker solidarity despite the differences between Communists, anarchists and socialists. They also showed what Matte and Grove could have expected had they organized their political base differently. However, while such demonstrations may have been a spontaneous articulation of identifying oneself with the Socialist Republic, this kind of behaviour was not transformed into action in defence of the government, if only because of the lack of adequate organization; such action was mentioned and promised but it was not prepared for. Nonetheless, these demonstrations achieved one important purpose, namely, they contributed to an even stronger identification of Grove with the Socialist Republic and emphasized the importance of June 16 as the dividing line between the "true" Socialist Republic and the period of Dávila's rule. This was largely the reason for Grove's and Matte's subsequent election success and the origin of the later myth of the "12-day" Socialist Republic.

If one remembers the reaction of the *profesionales* to Montero's fall and the proclamation of the Socialist Republic, the attempts to provoke strikes by lawyers, doctors, or engineers, it is easy to notice that there were no such endeavours after the fall of the Matte-Grove group. This absence is all the more important as *profesionales* constituted, after all, the leadership of numerous socialist organizations. They were the ones who drafted the numerous resolutions voicing support for the Socialist Republic, they set the tune of the socialist rhetoric of the first days of the new order, and were the authors of the programmes of socialist clubs, parties, committees, federations and alliances.

The simplest explanation of this absence seems to be the fact that most of these people did not interpret the reshuffle at the top as the fall of the Socialist Republic. After all, Dávila was an ideologue of state socialism, he continued to declare the will to implement it and the officers who supported him also officially voiced their support for socialism. The personnel changes might appear to be a sign and result of a struggle between various factions, a struggle which ended in the most radical current, i.e., the NAP people and their military allies, being pushed aside. Even if in perspective these changes may appear to be a part of the dispute over the shape of the Socialist Republic, that should be no obstacle to assuming that at that time at least part of the observers regarded these changes as a sign of a family feud. It should also be noted that Grove's charisma could not appeal so strongly to *profesionales* as it did to workers, craftsmen, or lower-rank clerks, if only because there was no shortage of people in the leadership of socialist organizations or ones that only supported the socialist government in terms of intellect and political talent were as good as Matte and certainly better than Grove.

Secondly, the junta's political points of reference in the civilian society were very numerous but, on their own, very weak parties and organizations; they were a point of reference but not much of a base because there was no institutional connection between the junta and the majority of those organizations, except for a relationship between individual members of the junta and the cabinet. A great majority of those parties and organizations were not immediately connected with any given configuration of the junta and the cabinet of ministers.

Thirdly, the new state leadership immediately imposed stricter controls on assembly, press, radio, etc. Opposition activity had a high barrier to overcome and that would require the kind of motivation that even most radical socialist leaders lacked.

Fourth, the removal of the group of radical leaders was carried out under the slogan of averting the danger of Communism. It seems that such an argument could very easily get home to parts of the socialists, parts were disoriented by such arguments, and few of the undecided would see

much purpose in defending people whose defenders would have to defend themselves against charges of collaboration with Communists!

I have to stop again at the notion of Communism, but that is not a departure from the subject of this chapter. If the deposed politicians were branded as Communists or Communist supporters, the understanding of Communism is directly tied to the social perception of the activity of those politicians and the attitude on part of the Socialist Republic's leaders, and, by that token, the attitude toward a certain formula of that Republic.

Neither Matte nor Grove regarded themselves as Communists, which indeed they were not if the notions of Communism were applied properly. However, that notion also served as a synonym of extreme social radicalism, a violent and thorough social change, an alternative to the reigning social order. This perception of Communism was quite commonplace and deeply rooted. Communism understood in this way was not only a cognitive category but also a negative label used to discredit people, institutions, their programmes or even opinions ascribed to someone. This perception of socialism must have been sufficiently widespread for Dávila and his allies to be able to use it--and it alone--to lend an air of legitimacy to their coup. This was the first time in history that an effective toppling of a government was justified by a struggle against its Communism in the name of socialism the new government stood for. Yet this was precisely an expression of the fact that the radical variant of the Socialist Republic failed to win the support of the forces which at that very moment could decide about the manning of the key posts in the state.

### **Socialism of a kind**

Dávila meanwhile officially proclaimed socialism all the time and censorship notwithstanding, the public discussion continued to revolve largely around various socialist formulas, revealing the attitudes of its participants. In the beginning of August, an article headlined "La liberación socialista" appeared, being one of the only very few attempts



at an overall analysis of socialism by a Chilean author under Dávila's rule. That author was Gerardo Ortúzar Riesco.

In his deliberations on the economic superiority of socialism over capitalism, the author predicted a fuller biological efficiency of the working man of the socialist period, the development of cooperatives on an international scale and the collectivization of farming. The attractive vision of the future was illustrated in a way that could earn Ortúzar credit for being a forerunner of the authors of "agitator's notebooks" Eastern Europe got to know in the 1950s:

"Los tractores yanquis only work 400 hours a year, whereas the more efficient 'los tractores soviéticos' are busy for 2,500 hours a year."

Who cares that the reader could do his sum and see that this translated into 312 eight-hour days during a year! Or take this example of the use of statistical comparison techniques: In the United States, Ortúzar points out, four-fifths of the people have no tractors of their own whereas "*los tractores rusos*", owned by the huge masses of peasants, tilled 12 million hectares of land in 1930! Another information intended as proof of the superiority of the Soviet collectivization, which, incidentally, was just going through the worst Stalinist period, was that "*los kolkhoses rusos*" [styled as community property] embraced thousands of hectares, "*los sovkoses*" [state property] had tens of thousands of hectares, whereas in the United States a typical farm owned by a "wealthy peasant" was a mere 100 to 200 hectares.

As for politics, Ortúzar offered two suggestions. First of all, trade unions of the producers were to be the main source of power. The hypocrisy of general elections was to be rejected. The unions would appoint their representatives who could be recalled and who would be bound by the mandate of a strictly defined trade union and through those representatives they would lead the society. "Only the blacksmith of ideas, art and matter can exercise social leadership." Secondly, the introduction of an "international cooperative movement" was to take care of "ec!Nieoczekiwany koniec formułyonomic imperialism." "The

collectivized branches of industry" would not compete with one another content with "satisfying social needs." As economic expansionism would disappear, war would disappear forever as well.

Ortúzar paid more attention to the culture understood in a very broad sense.

"Socialism promises the liberation of the individual, beginning from his kindergarten years."

The capitalist upbringing of the rich impoverished the child's intellect and character, producing a neurastenic egotist, whereas the deprivation of poor families bred ricketiness, tuberculosis, and, ultimately, the children's rebellion against the poor home, producing vagabonds and beggars. Socialism, Ortúzar insists, will bring with it a rational upbringing of children. This will involve the removal of the considerable obstacle to an integral development of personality that family upbringing represents at present. Children should live a collective life from the youngest age. Instead of the family regime, there will be Casas de Niños, or children's homes. Naturally, they would be Children's Homes with the proper architecture, suitably located, with furniture without sharp edges, rubber flooring, etc., and in addition to that they would have garden gyms, libraries, terraces for sunbathing, wide windows for easy ventilation, museums, record collections, etc. After that, the time will come for "Rational School:" in it, at last, children will study without fear or a sense of duty, just for pleasure. Not content with "Human Rights,"

"Socialism proclaims the much more sacred Children's Rights. It is generally known that in Soviet Russia parents exercise no rights over their children, only have obligations toward them."

The relentless advances of mechanization were to free men from the slavery of work, providing time for the needs of integral development: a physical, intellectual, and spiritual one. The deceitful religions will disappear. The intellectual and moral elites, pushed to the sidelines of capitalism by gold hoarders, will regain their due position. After one hundred years of the existence of the United States, the real fruit of the

capitalist regime was born there, the gangster, financial tycoon, Ortúzar wrote. Al Capone is at least sincere while others pretend that they made it rich by "honest work" (the quotation marks are Ortúzar's). The gangster's frankness, incidentally, earned him popularity because only this can explain why the Yankee people (el pueblo yanqui) admire the charitable (Ortúzar's quotation marks) variety of gangsters.

Gerardo Ortúzar quoted the prediction that "Communism will emancipate science." He introduced it by way of a lengthy quotation from a work by a certain Rappaport, whose identity I have not been able to establish. Rappaport was telling mankind that science will make man happy, reducing the dependence of the human being on nature and on his own needs.

The pamphlet concludes with extensive deliberations about *la liberacion sexual* Ortúzar writes:

"The perfecting of capitalism required the suppression of sex. Such a powerful lever of human impetus could not be left outside the zone rationed by the capitalist society. There is no exaggeration in saying that free sex would destroy capitalism even before the industrial revolution."

The author tried to convince the reader that sex was precisely the factor that is at the root of great exploits. Ortúzar was not, of course, the only author to look for sources of revolutionary thought outside the mind, but he differed greatly from those who discovered that source in an empty stomach.

"The spontaneity of sexual activity leads to organic fulfillment, which liberates man from the insatiable urge to accumulate wealth. By contrast, unfulfilled libido, reined in by law and morality and stimulated by pathological fantasy is what gives money its boundless potency."

The commercialization of fashion, cosmetics, film, and literature all appeal to sex, inducing the male to economic struggle and the conquering of the female in this way. To Ortúzar, even furniture conveyed sexual insinuations. The "capitalist macho" subordinated the

woman to himself. The economic emancipation of women is the first blow to capitalism. This is how Ortúzar explained the spread of contraceptives.

Namely, the male - owner realized that it was only nature that opposed his economic power and so he invented a means of avoiding fatherhood, "which leads to blacking out the panorama of his empty life in the service of his own *órganos reproductores*." Contraception is therefore an objective of capitalism. By contrast, under socialism things will get better because socialism will assign a proper rank to sex, similarly as to diet, it will eliminate the malady of capitalist sensuality and usher in prosperity. The state will ensure food to parents, upbringing to children, and contraceptives will go. This was to be supported by "the magnificent Soviet reproduction coefficient, the highest in Europe". The author concluded his work with the following sentence:

"There can be no doubt that the naturalness of love, that the true fruit of socialism, will free mankind from one of its worst ailments, that of the sexual drive."

It would be wrong to dismiss patronizingly the above burst of incoherent words as a coup of some erotically unfulfilled, undereducated, and confused but ambitious and radically inclined intellectual from some exotic periphery. Ortúzar was a barrister, had his own law firm in the capital specializing in civil law, and advertised in the paper which published his article, apparently confident that his writing will not scare away his custom, what is more, the article appeared in a paper bearing the ambitious title "Cuadernos de la Economía Mundial" and immediately preceded a reprint of nothing else than a material entitled "Plan Socialista Alfredo Lagarrigue." Urtúzar's article presumably reflected a way of thinking characteristic of a broader circle of Chile's radically disposed intellectuals, their negation of the old order, and the desperate search for a new one, an attitude not devoid of illusion, as was only natural. Nonetheless, it was an attitude of support for socialism. However, the meaning of the word was a bit hazy, and there was a lack of information about the true state of the Soviet experiment. Instead, there was a false picture of it, the falsehoods were partly a result of deliberate

disinformation; nevertheless, the very slogan of socialism carried the promise of an alternative to the rejected capitalism, and that would often do. Besides, as Dávila himself proclaimed socialism, this kind of convergence could not produce any results in the field of public opinion.

### **Censorship**

The censors undoubtedly suppressed any polemics with the socialists. At any rate, I have not come across any open debate in the press. On the other hand, I have not encountered any outright ban on such criticism either, and that despite the fact that after Dávila was overthrown, the preventive instructions for the censors were published and it is a legitimate guess that what was published was precisely representative part of them. The ban embraced the following subjects: the resolutions of labour unions against Dávila's government, statements by the Bolivian foreign minister on the treaty of 1904, internal loans, the bartering of nitrates and copper for wheat, flour and liquid fuels coming from the USA, deportations, arrests, strikes, verdicts of military tribunals, credits in gold, mortgage Debts, elections to the constitutional assembly, the negotiations concerning COSACH, the President's spending other than officially published. Apart from the general instructions, there were also daily bulletins of the censorship office. After Dávila's fall, "El Mercurio" disclosed that its articles barred by the censors from appearing included ones which passed a negative judgement on such aspects of the government's activities as press censorship, financial policy, the Commissariat for Provisions and Prices, the Ammortization Bank, law-making by means of decree-laws, dissatisfaction in the provinces over the disruptions in metropolitan politics. In other words, the criticism voiced by that paper did not consist in materials analysing more or less abstract socialist principles, whereas writings analysing the principles of the new order originated from socialist circles. At the same time, it should probably be accepted that the criticism articulated in "El Mercurio" conveyed the negative attitude of those social groups which were opposed to state socialism or even to any socialism even when a given article merely

criticized a very definite decree on mortgage and never once mentioned the term "socialism."

### **Landowners' and industrialists' tactics**

Even under Dávila's rule, some of the negatively disposed social groups preferred to refrain from spectacular political action. I have already mentioned the landowners, the SNA's fear of possible retaliation on the part of the government. Indeed, when Dávila appointed the Commissariat for Provisions and Prices, the landowners organization did not react by issuing any statement. Bauer actually insists that the SNA remained "inactive and silent." That last observation is really certain if one looks at the public statements issued by the SNA, but then wherever some paper spoke against the Commissariat, it conveyed the position of the SNA and when the censors banned such an article, this was also a signal that would reach the authorities. So even if SNA remained officially silent, which is verifiable on the basis of the source material, it is not at all evident that it remained inactive as well. It is hard to imagine the verification of that part of Bauer's hypothesis. Naturally, the negative attitude of the landowners toward the socialist government must have manifested itself in many diverse ways, not necessarily in ostentatious gestures, and it would be amazing if such an attitude in this particular milieu should turn out to be absolutely undecipherable for contemporary observers.

The Association of Industrial Manufacturers adopted different tactics. Already in the beginning of July, its chairman wrote to the minister of development that the Chilean industrial entrepreneurs were worried by the situation of their industries, that their sense of insecurity increased after the announcement of the government's socialization plan. According to the author of the letter, this policy had a negative impact on the availability of foreign credit. The industrialists complained that many dishonest demands for the socialization of industry were publicized, that the plans had not been preceded by analyses, that the government and its supporters did not take into consideration the fact that private enterprises

produced in general more cheaply than nationalized industry. The association demanded a precise presentation of the government's policies, especially a clear explanation whether the government plan concerned only those branches of manufacturing that the government was planning to create or the existing industries as well.

The industrialists' letter did not trigger any visible negative repercussions. On the contrary, it contributed to a more precise defining of the government's lines. This mitigated the state-socialist grandiloquence of the advocates of social change and contributed to a more clear-cut interpretation of the socialization formula. The minister's reply was a testimony to the possibility of dialogue between the representation of industrialists and the government and this was the outcome of the initiative of industrial circles. The attitude of that milieu toward the conception of state socialism could not differ greatly from the position of the landowners, but their tactic toward the government was different.

In contrast to political parties, organizations such as SNA or the Association of Industrial Manufacturers represented the interests of more uniform groups and focused on economic problems. The attitude of such organizations toward the Socialist Republic was connected first of all with the economic policies of the Interim President, while other aspects of Dávila's programme were only approached indirectly. The two organizations were in no hurry to take any public stand, with the SNA declining to do so altogether and the manufacturers' association waiting for a month after the proclamation of the Socialist Republic, and even then it did so unostentatiously. It should be remembered, however, that the interests of those groups were also articulated by political parties: the Conservatives, one wing of the liberals, and a faction of the radicals. Those parties took a very active position. Indeed, all parties were very active, the one exception being the Communists, who were discriminated against, locked up, deported, and excommunicated.

## **The Conservatives' conferences**

In the beginning of June, the Conservatives elected anew Executive Committee. Hector Rodríguez de la Sotta became the leader of the Party, Horacio Walker and Alejandro Lira were elected vice chairmen, and the other members of the leadership were Pablo Larraín, Manuel Muñoz Comejo, Carlos Vergara Leyton, Lindar Pérez Gacitúa, Rafael Luís Gumucio and Pedro Lira Urquieta. This team decided almost unanimously to publicize its opposition to the introduction of the socialist order. The party urged an immediate return to constitutional rule.

However, the Conservatives' "anti-socialist" attitude must be analysed in a similar manner as the pro-socialist postures. In either case, we are dealing with highly complex structures and it would certainly not be enough just to record the general programmatic slogans. The Conservatives' strivings are illustrated by the programmes adopted by the provincial assemblies of its members. For example, the Conservatives of the Aconcagua province, led by young and liberally minded politicians, adopted the following platform:

"The Party is opposed to imperialism, protectionism, expansionist wars, etc. The state may not be the source and the author of all laws; lawmaking must not be detached from what is natural and ethical. Professional milieux should be represented on lawmaking bodies. The Conservative Party denies the state the right to socialize fully the sources and means of production. The Party is in favour of associations organizing both employers and workers. Capital should serve wellbeing of the society and the Conservative Party is opposed to the extreme elements of the capitalist system, work is both a right and a duty; both the employers and the state are obliged to provide jobs. The Party is in favour of the introduction of a minimum wage that would guarantee a decent standard of living. The law of ownership is based on natural law, but the party rejects the conception of an absolute law of ownership and unlimited wealth. Private property deserves full legal protection and no authority may limit that



property by legal means ownership rights should only be limited by public interest and the definition of the way of acquiring it. Efforts must be taken to ensure a broader and more equitable distribution of ownership. The family shapes the individual and the state should protect the family. The Church has the right to speak on social issues. The Conservative Party is in favour of adding new system of representation of group interests to the old party system."

Shortly afterwards, an assembly of Conservatives of the metropolitan area adopted the following programme:

"it is necessary to authorize the distribution of land among the largest possible number of people, coupled with suitable compensation for the present owners. The Party is in favour of breaking up great landed estates which are not put to proper use and supports the establishment of producers' and consumers' cooperatives. It is necessary to limit the acreage of land controlled by an owner in the case of lease and farm labourers should be remunerated on the principle of profit sharing. The organization of production should take into account the fact that both capital and labour are its component parts. The labour should participate in profits and job contracts should be based on union and legal regulations rather than being open to unlimited competition. The Party supports the introduction of a minimum wage at a level guaranteeing a decent standard of living. The bank lending rate should be lowered. The Party is in favour of setting up syndicates organizing both employers and employees in individual trades and branches of the economy.["

Although those conservative programmes were already devised with future elections in mind, they inevitably expressed the party's attitude to Dávila's rule and to the Socialist Republic in general, neither the rejection of socialism as the principle of the system nor the emphasis on the crucial role of private property should be regarded as surprising. However, it is hard to overlook the fact that the Conservatives also

included in their programmes some theses that could be found in the socialist programmes of that period. While the sources of inspiration may have sometimes been different, in 'some cases the paths by which these theses were approached were remarkably similar. This applied in particular to: 1) limits on private property through the recognition of the social role of private property, 2) the promotion of representation of the corporatist variety, 3) the improvement of the situation of hired labour (also in farming!), e.g., through the introduction of the minimum wage and tying it to the concept of a decent standard of living, 4) the starting of the breaking up of large and inefficient landed estates. The scope of those similarities defined the extent of the Conservatives' acceptance of state socialism and the limits of compromise with the Socialist Republic on the part of those social forces which regarded *Partido Conservador* as their political representative.

### **Fascists**

During Dávila's rule, a fascist movement appeared on the Chilean scene. First, there came the report about the *Legión Social Nacionalista*. It was led by retired officers. The Legión was headed by Col. Alfredo Ewing, former minister of the Navy and military attaché in Holland. He was assisted by Capt. Luis Caballero from the navy, Col. Arturo Norambuena from the *carabineros* corps, and General Díaz, former commander in chief of the army. The Legion was expanding its nationwide network and by the end of June it was already said to have one thousand member. The organization rejected the existence of political parties. Its leaders insisted that the Legión had no political aims but at the same time they defended the "conception of property as approached by state socialism," as well as opposing Communism and the political involvement of the armed forces.

At the end of July, a leaflet attributed by Culbertson to "the so-called fascist organization" appeared in Santiago. The group introduced itself as opposition to all political formations that had been fighting for power "over the last few months." The leaflet condemned Communism

and criticized the Dávila government for stimulating its development, condemned the involvement of the military in exercising political power, castigated corruption among clerks, and warned against disruption ensuing from the activities of the incompetent officials of the socialist administration. At the same time, the organization demanded the return to constitutional rule.

The Santiago paper "Hoy" believed that the Legión could be recognized as the beginning of fascism in Chile, despite the fact that already in 1923 "El Mercurio" wrote that only the Communists could speak ill of fascism, "Las Ultimas Noticias" added that "we lack a Mussolini here in Chile" and the idea of a Corporatist state already then enjoyed support of the Clergy, the conservatives and officers. Ibañez's eulogists referred to him in Parliament as the Chilean Mussolini and the Chilean consul in Boston wrote in an official bulletin that "Ibañez is the Mussolini of the New World." [Later, Batista was called "Mussolini of the tropics"]. Even if in reality Ibañez was closer to Spain's Primo de Rivera than to Italy's Mussolini, the fascist ideas were known in Chile and at least some of them had their advocates there and before "Hoy" wrote in July about the Legión (which, incidentally, was formed already in June), the National Socialist Movement (MNS) had operated since April of that year.

*Movimiento Nacional Socialista* was to reach its climax several years later. Meanwhile, in 1932 der Führer der MNS, Jorge González von Marees, announced his programme. He saw the reason for the Chilean crisis in the parliamentary democracy, the chaos advocated by Communists and the threat of a social revolution. The Movement rejected all of Chile's sociopolitical organizations. One of the MNS's goals was to the "social justice," combined with the condemnation of class struggle, reactionary capitalism and anarchist Communism. MNS condemned "parasitic capital" and defended "productive capital." A French diplomatic observer noted a rapid growth of the number of MNS supporters in September 1932, a phenomenon also acknowledged by avowed enemies of the national socialist movement. From the point of view of this analysis, it is important that the MSI was joined not only by

dissidents from the parties termed as the historical ones. The new movement also attracted many people who pinned their hopes on the programme of the Socialist Republic from the first days after its proclamation. The radical version of the Socialist Republic had its followers. Disappointed by the toppling of the Matte-Grove group, they found an opportunity to support those conceptions of the Socialist Republic that were dearest to them by joining MSN. Significantly, those unquestionably radical champions of "strict social justice" rejected both parliamentary democracy, which they associated with great parasitic capital, and Communism, associated with the anarchy of class struggle. When a strong socialist party emerges, many of these people will quit MSN to join it, and when MSN's adventurism leads to a crisis of the organization in 1938, it will be reborn under the name of *Vanguardia Popular Socialista*. There were times when Chile's socialists and fascists proclaimed similar programmes and both movements articulated opposition to the variety of capitalism operating in their country. To some extent, the acceptance of the MSN programme in 1932 signified a positive attitude toward the Socialist Republic.

It is important that the above assertion will not be misunderstood. Nothing could be as false as a simplistic equating of state socialism with fascism. It is necessary to remember about the specific concrete contents of the socialist and fascist programmes. We are comparing here the socialists with fascists to demonstrate the complex tangle in the Chileans' attitude during that period, the tangle of various threads of social protest, and the search for a new road.

### **Parliamentarism under consideration**

The discussion over the shaping the system of representation of various interests on the political scene may serve as another example of the twisted ways in which political postures evolved. We know that state socialism envisaged constitutional reforms and the criticism of the old party system went hand in hand with the demand for the introduction of corporative representation. According to a different variant, this was to be

syndicalist representation and there was also another variant which envisaged a mixed representation, involving the old party system and new organizations of the corporative or syndicalist variety. As could be seen, even the conservatives were in favour of a reform of the representative system, accepting the existence of some corporative forms. There was no universally accepted position on this issue, however. The Conservative-Catholic paper "Diario Ilustrado" believed that the introduction of labour representation to parliament would be unconstitutional and opted for the retaining of the 1925 Constitution in an unchanged shape. The labour unions affiliated to AGECH took a different position. The position taken by their leaders was that the elections to Congress should be based on the principle of "vocational" representation because only such a system should be in force in a socialist state, in which political parties should be outlawed. A similar view was voiced by the editors of "Crónica." By contrast, "El Mercurio" voiced the view that Dávila's programme of basing the elections to the Constitutional Assembly on the principle of labour representation would not succeed, that it would be better to stick to the party system while letting in representatives of labour unions. Characteristically, even when the Government later gave in to the old system and announced Congressional elections on the basis of the 1925 Constitution, the radical papers continued to air their hostility toward that old system. They wrote that unless there is union representation in Congress, the efforts to consolidate the Socialist Republic would go to waste.

In the discussions over representation and political system it was not always clear whether the dispute was over the presence of trade unions or corporations. One thing that was obvious was the boundary between the advocates of a return to the 1925 Constitution and the reformers. The latter wanted either a complete replacement of political parties or at least the complementing of the party system with corporatist or union representation. Finally, it turned out that although the reformers may have been more numerous and were certainly more vocal, the option favoured by the supporters of the 1925 Constitution prevailed.

## **Acción Revolucionaria Socialista**

A very large part of the debate occurred within the organizations which ostensibly supported the Socialist Republic in its first phase and after June 16 had to appraise the new situation and agree on a line of action under Dávila's rule. In that new period, it is not easy to find the fervour of the early days of the new order. It would not be aroused by even the most radical economic decisions of Dávila's government. There appeared, however, deepened versions of the programmes of some socialist organizations and parties. The most complete conception was presented by *Acción Revolucionaria Socialista*.

This very long document, running to over 25 pages, is a blend of an ideological manifesto, a government programme and the statutes of a party. ARS introduced itself as an expression in the opinion and sentiments of the popular masses in the period of the first June government, even though the term "Socialist Republic" was not used once.

"We want what the whole country wants. (...) We are struggling with the past and the principles of economic and political liberalism. (...) We want order, we want discipline, we want social justice."

ARS traced its roots to the political change that occurred in Chile in 1920. This was when the proletariat and the middle classes became aware of their power and developed the desire to involve the productive classes in the structure of the state, the document said. However, neither the demagoguery of the then president, nor the military coups of 1923-24, nor the subsequent dictatorship or even later civilian rule could prevent the worsening economic disruption. Unemployment affected the whole country. The old parliamentary and liberal formulas went bankrupt along with the fall of the oligarchies that had kept them alive. The deep popular discontent and agitation contributed to the emergence of the new social consciousness of the productive masses, which bore fruit in the Revolution of June 4.

The ARS document went on to say that in contrast to all previous movements and the movement which toppled it (an allusion to the June 16 coup), the June Revolution occurred under genuine revolutionary economic and political slogans as it aspired to build a state in whose structure the productive forces of the country would be involved. The manifesto said that the people embodying these ideals did not hail from political cliques, they were professors and teachers, hired labourers, people who were intellectually awakened and who studied the problems of their country, and who at the same time had no ties to capitalism, whether native or foreign. These people fought in the defence of the collective interests of the working class, which is why they were branded as Communists, advocates of anarchy, or decomposers (*disolventes*).

"The government which has usurped power since June 16 and aspiring to the title of a socialist government, no longer relied on (public) opinion but on force. Its repressiveness has aroused the discontent of all social classes and its arbitrary economic policies, inflationary (*emisionista*) and reactionary one, led to a terrible deterioration of the country's situation. The economic crisis has deepened dramatically. It was absurd to try to arrest it by means of decrees, which only made things worse by addressing its effects rather than causes. It is necessary to take into account the will of the people, to have a precise programme of action and to implement it prudently in order to solve this prolonged crisis by now 12 years old and reaching its climax, to carry out the revolution this country needs. Governments born exclusively of military circles and the old political cabal can in no way guarantee the implementation of such a revolutionary programme. (...)"

ARS termed itself as a revolutionary organization, but its "revolution does not signify an uprising, rebellion or confiscation; it does not signify disorder: it signifies Organization." And although that revolution required "destroying in order to build," it also required "making haste slowly rather than rash action." ARS proclaimed: "Our revolution

will not take place in a day, not even a year... *Revolución es Construcción.*"

*Acción Revolucionaria Socialista* declared: "We are not Communists, but at the same time we do not believe in the Communist menace." ARS did not fear "the doctrine that was unable to adapt to national realities." ARS also spoke out against militarism, i.e., a rule based on any kind of armed force. It argued at the same time that the government proclaimed on June 4 was not a militarist one, or else it would not have fallen the way it did. ARS also dissociated itself from fascism, branding it as a dictatorship of armed civilian forces, based on uncompromising and militant nationalism and defending the bourgeoisie against the productive classes. "Fascism is a variety of bourgeois socialist despotism."

ARS forcefully emphasized that it was not a political party, only a union of revolutionaries. It had no kind words for political parties. It divided them into traditional and left-wing ones and regarded the former as reactionary and the latter as opportunistic, although in that case it was prepared to recognize some units as "honest exceptions." This attitude to the institution of a political party was related to the conception of the state adopted by ARS.

"Americanismo y nacionalismo" were two important ingredients of the ARS programme. ARS declared:

"Latin America is a collection of societies (pueblos) similar in terms of origin (raza), history, language, and culture. Their remaining in an identical state of dependence (situación *de* dependencia) on foreign capital, the identical nature of the division of wealth, and their common interest will lead them to smaller or bigger unity and, sooner or later, to the materialization of Bolívar's dreams. However, our nationalism is not a diehard nationalism. While defending Chile's interests we are also defending other Indo-American countries and while organizing our national society (nacionalidad) on new foundations we are taking a major step toward Americanism. ARS maintains



cordial relations with similar currents of public opinion in fraternal countries and when it takes over power it will strive in every way possible to form economic, cultural, and other alliances with other nations of Hispano-America."

The programme also envisaged a privileged treatment of relations with Spain.

The ideas outlined above were meant to be contrasted with the programmes of other parties and movements and of the government. However, the subsequent and longer part of the document contained an outline of the policy of the future socialist government. In its main points, the economic policy programme constituted a kind of confirmation and development of what Plan Dávila and Plan Lagarrigue contained, occasionally in a modified form, starting with the plans to replace the liberal economy with a socialist one, and ending with a detailed proposals, such as the one concerning the establishment of the State Bank. The notion of socialist economy was a derivative of the definition of the capitalist economy, which ARS said, there was a free interplay of production, exchange, consumption and private profit.

"In a socialist economy, the state controls production, exchange, and consumption in a direct or indirect way; the state eliminates free competition and takes collective profit into account. Therefore, [the state] takes consumption as the starting point and adjust the production and exchange to it.(...) [However, as\_production and exchange] are to be subordinated to the interests of the Chilean consumers rather than international capitalism, we shall strive for a gradual nationalization and socialization of the whole wealth of Chile."

It appears that nationalization denoted the taking over of foreign property in Chile while socialization meant the takeover of private property of Chilean capitalists, by the state in each case.

In capitalism, labour is a commodity, while in the socialist economy it was to be a "compulsory social function," said the ARS programme. The point was not, however, an obligatory work but the

obligation for the state to guarantee "the indispensable minimum pay" to every citizen, and that implied a full employment.

The state was also obliged to guarantee the proper functioning of schools of all levels, libraries, education for adults, the development of literature and the arts, e.g., through state-owned publishing houses and a state theatre; the state was to ensure the proper "direction" of the press and the upbringing of youth and of productive classes was to be stimulated by the state in such a way as to impart dynamism and enthusiasm to that process and eliminate the effects of the general collapse of morals and culture; the state was to "boost socialist consciousness" and, in addition to that, organize sports and physical training and the defence of the [Chilean] identity (*la raza*) as well as attending to welfare and introducing health protection, ensuring an adequate level of hygiene, etc., etc.

In many respects, ARS went further than Dávila, Lagarrigue, or NAP. On the other hand, as regards the state control over the economy, it repeats their conceptions, systemizing them somewhat differently and refining them; therefore there is no need to relate that part of its programme.

The future political system was outlined in the ARS programme in rather general terms, but even so this is again a case of conformity with Dávila's and NAP's conceptions, not of differences. ARS wanted a functional system, without defining the notion, however. But, as it criticized the "false representative system" at the same time, there are grounds for interpreting that "functionalism" as a sign of sympathy for corporatism blended with syndicalism. Power was to be vested "in the hands of the productive classes" and the society was to be put in the mold of a syndicalist organization in which - unlike in the party system - people do not engage in politics in isolation from the national interest. The ARS statutes contained a characteristic provision, whereby the basic organizational unit, the "group," was to be composed of eleven people of the same trade or profession and the heads of the groups would make

up local syndicalist sections in such a way that each section would bring together heads representing the same trade or occupation.

ARS had its headquarters in Santiago but, unlike many other parties of this kind, it also had a vast network outside the capital, presumably in towns.

The social pattern of ARS membership was probably similar to that of other organizations of this kind, with people from the middle classes making up the core, with few workers and, only in exceptional cases, dissidents from more affluent social groups. The leader was Oscar Schnake and other members of the inner leadership were Eugenio González, Augusto Pinto, Julio Valiente, Gregorio Guerra and Mario Inostroza.

Although the ARS programme did not use such terms as the Socialist Republic or state socialism, its contents was consistent with the meaning of both terms; what differences there were, were of a marginal character. As a matter of fact, the presence of Schnake and González among the leaders spoke for itself, ARS was unquestionably a potential base of Dávila's government, as it approved of socialism and represented social forces supporting the construction of a socialist state. During the period of Dávila's rule, ARS played arguably the most active role of all the socialist organizations, presumably more important than the role of NAP once weakened by Matte's exile. Only *Orden Socialista* and *Partido Socialista Marxista* could match its significance. ARS developed especially lively relations with *Partido Socialista Unificado*, made up of former members of the disbanded *Partido Socialista Revolucionario* and *Partido Socialista*. Before long, the whole PSU would be incorporated into ARS.

### **Socialist organizations facing elections**

Whereas in the early period of the existence of the Socialist Republic, a large part of the activity of socialist parties consisted in manifesting enthusiastic support for it, with Dávila in power they focused their activity on consolidating their organization, defining their

programmes, forming alliances involving other socialist organizations or preparing election manifestos. However, while new declarations of support were lacking, there were no manifestations of protest either. Despite their dislike of Dávila or even hostility toward him, these organizations represented a socialist attitude. Admittedly, the Interim President did not cooperate with those parties and put more emphasis on contacts with trade unions, so much so that he actually appointed a special undersecretary of state to attend to those contacts.

It is easy to understand the socialists' initial elation in June once one realizes what the proclamation of the first socialist republic on that continent signified. Nevertheless, when the first emotions subsided, Matte-Grove group was ousted and the socialist economic policy did not produce the expected, i.e., fast and radical, changes, the socialists increasingly focused their attention on the effects of the economic crisis and the approaching elections. Even the official "La Nación" changed its tenor, running fewer declarations of support and plenty of dramatic accounts of the plight of the jobless, state-run soup kitchens, the plague of begging children, people unable to pay their water and electricity bills, localities without bread, hospitals without petrol for their ambulances, etc. Government employees seized every opportunity to draw the public's attention to the Government's moves aimed against the crisis, portraying assistance to those in need as a duty of the socialist state, possibly the most important duty, and the gratitude of welfare recipients could justly be interpreted as political acceptance. The eating of soup from the state kitchen was transformed into an act of popular approval for the government's socialist policies.

### **Agricultural workers and aboriginal people**

One can only speculate about the attitude taken by such groups as, for example, the Indians. They were mentioned in one official statement issued in the first days of the Socialist Republic and also the Communists (Lafertists) remembered about their interests. Their most vocal defender was the Convention of Primary School Inspectors, which prepared a

programme of educational work among the Indians in the first half of September. Admittedly, even those inspectors debated on the Indians' communication with the "civilized world," but it was nonetheless a positive endeavour on their part. I am unable to say anything about the *aborigenes'* reaction but if the news of that programme reached some of them--as it surely did--it could dispose them favourably to Dávila's government.

On the other hand, it can be taken for granted that the existence of the Socialist Republic stimulated the activity of workers of the state sector, farm labourers and *inquilinos* in state colonies. The farm workers could be inspired by the attitude of the 34,000 workers of the public works sector, who set up special commissions to represent the interests of that part of the workforce, but one fact that was characteristic of the influence of the corporatist idea was that those committees represented both supervisors and day workers and that they presented a list of economic demands to the minister of development Viktor Navarette. Incidentally, *inquilinos* and farm labourers also refers to workers of an even higher status, namely industrial workers in the private sector. While the latter earned 10 to 15 peso for a 6 to 3 hour day, rank-and-file farm workers demanded 2.5 peso a day for working from sunrise to sunset, thus joining the farm labourers of the central and southern, regions, among whom there were also Indians. In this way, the pioneering work of the Communists among the *inquilinos* and farm hands was bearing fruit; another factor contributing to the mobilization of that milieu was the activity of *Partido Socialista Unificado*, whose leader, Corvalán Quesada, organized *Grupos Agrícolas Socialistas* and explained the sense of the "socialization of means of production."

The *aborigenes* constituted an ethnic minority and were discriminated against socially; all *inquilinos* and farm hands were in a similar situation. From one point of view, Chile's women were also a minority: they were discriminated against in a variety of ways. The Alessandrists were the first to mobilizes women for politics, seeking their support in the elections, but it was only the socialists who launched a mass campaign of this kind. To be precise, it was the female socialists who made the

move when, at the end of June, they transformed Partido Feminine Nacional Independiente into an organization called *Congreso de Mujeres Socialistas*. The resolution on the foundation of the Congress said that a general assembly of PFMI members "recognizes as its own all the aspirations that are manifest in the activity of the present government."

### **The “responsible” politicians**

The identification of individual attitudes is not an indication such that the author is excessively ambitious. The examination of source materials has only reinforced my prior conviction that an answer to the question about such attitudes, in the sense of their typology, frequency of occurrence, correlation to social structure, etc., will only come as a result of a much bigger advancement of studies of the Chilean society, the existence of the well-known Chilean dictionary of personalities notwithstanding. However, it would not be justified to leave out these problems altogether. Besides, is not it so that when writing about group attitudes we always mention important features of some individual attitudes? But even with the limited sources and without drawing conclusions from group behaviour, it is possible to say a little more about individual attitudes that give rise to questions about group attitudes. In that case, the point is not to reach the individual through his group out to identify a group attitude thanks to identifying an individual attitude first or at least to defining some constituent elements of an individual attitude in persons regarded as representative ones.

One politician I find interesting from this point of view is Luis Izquierdo, elected to parliament several times as a representative of the conservatives, a holder of ministerial posts in numerous conservative cabinets of the previous two decades (including the post of finance minister in Montero's government). How did Izquierdo react to the proclamation of the Socialist Republic? There is a mention of his reaction in Ambassador Culbertson's personal diary: "

“II. Señora de Izquierdo called me about noon on June the fourth and asked me whether her husband could call on me that

afternoon. He came about three o'clock. He had a package in his hand and, handing it to me, asked me if I would be willing to put it in a safe place. He said, with a tremble in his voice: "In this package is practically all that my wife has and we do not like to leave it in the house in times when someone may come in and demand our property at the point of a pistol." I, of course, accepted the package and placed it in the Embassy safe."

The move may have been devised first of all as a signal to the U.S. ambassador about the reaction of members of the elite, or maybe the idea was to exert pressure on Culbertson and prod him into action against the Socialist Republic, But it would not be altogether surprising either if the Izquierdos were merely looking for a safe hiding place for their jewellery, terrified by what they associated with the notion of socialism. Although not everybody had access to this exceptionally strong safe, this kind of reaction to socialism certainly was not unique. Not without reason, the Junta's first decree ordered the closing of the banks to prevent a rush withdrawal of deposits. The Izquierdo case reveals the moods which the founders of the Socialist Republic feared. It was people like Izquierdo that Thompson had in mind when he informed the Foreign Office that the announcement of the composition of the authorities of the Socialist Republic made a bad impression on "responsible circles."

Those "responsible circles" also included Enrique Zañartu Prieto, who already in 1924 was Alessandri's minister of industry and finance, then became a senator on behalf of the Liberal Democratic Party and finally a finance minister during Dávila's interim presidency. Recruiting him for his cabinet was part of Dávila's ploy aimed at winning over the opposition. But what could have driven this kind of politician and formerly one of the wealthiest men in Chile to accept the job of minister of finance in the government of the Socialist Republic? The British diplomat found a simple explanation for this phenomenon. He wrote that Zañartu's holdings were said to be mortgaged to the tune of 11 million peso, which would explain his enthusiasm for inflation. As finance minister, he tried to liquidate the institution of mortgaged agrarian credit by converting debts into less burdensome obligations. He failed and had to step down, but it

shows what for an outstanding politician of such a creed and a landowner at the same time was the proverbial Paris that was worth a socialist mass.

And again, as in Izquierdo's case, the case of the landowner Zañartu is not an isolated one, although it did not always have to mean that there were direct economic interests involved--often it was a matter of fulfilling one's ambitions and contributing to the maintenance of a certain political influence. This is how, for example, the case of Arturo Puga can be explained. What could have persuaded this retired general and ex-diplomat, who enjoyed big popularity among the officers, to join the junta? He was no socialist and no revolutionary. General Sàez wrote in his memoirs that Puga's presence in the junta came as a shock to those who knew the man well or so they had thought. Unquestionably, Puga longed for active duty and felt he had too much strength left in him to be left on the sidelines, but he not only did not prepare any plot but even did not accept invitations from the circles of the Movement of June 4 people. It was Alessandri's envoys that persuaded him to accept membership of the junta and Puga - according to Grove - undertook to represent that orientation in the ruling body. In other words, in the case of Puga we would be dealing with the attitude of a very high ranking officer who is lured by the role of a moderator in a heterogenous ruling group and who sees the last chance in his life of playing a public role. He assumes the task of a tactical ally of the socialists to further the long-range interests of the Alessandrist political movement that was dear to him.

However, what is Puga's decision compared to the attitude taken by Ibañez? When a chance of regaining power appears in the beginning of July, or at least when some of his old supporters insist that he return, Ibañez lands in Santiago to announce: "I am not pursuing any honours, I have no ambition to govern, I just wish to serve Chile and I offer our country the only thing I have: the love of the motherland, order and social justice (...), we should cooperate in the name of the socialist ideal of repairing the injustice." But maybe he was not really as much of an opportunist as it seemed? After all, Ibañez could not fail to notice that in Dávila's state socialism there was much more state than there was socialism.